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Abstract 
 
Ethiopia’s centralized programmes of economic growth and social development are 
bringing the nation towards achievement of its goal of becoming “a middle-income country by 
the year 2025” (MoE, 2015: 11).  Significant advances in social programmes have resulted in 
longer life spans, increased incomes, and a much better educated population.  Yet, unexpected 
outcomes are inadvertently threatening the state.  The emergence of a thriving middle class, 
especially among those employed in service industries in the metropolis of Addis Ababa, has 
resulted in a demand for better and more comfortable housing.  However, residential and other 
construction has only been possible through the expropriation of land along the periphery of the 
city and this is displacing hundreds of thousands of smallholders.  At the same time, the federal 
government has considerably increased educational opportunities.  Although this has been 
widely beneficial, it has also resulted in secondary school leavers and university graduates who 
substantially outnumber current employment opportunities.  While issues of developmentally 
induced ousting and youth unemployment pertain to other areas of Ethiopia, they are occurring 
particularly rapidly along the periphery of Addis Ababa.  Ousted smallholders must quickly adopt 
new non-farm livelihoods while a better-educated youth cohort must find suitable and proper 
employment.  A sense of groupism has moderated the reactions of smallholders to their ousting 
even as the frustration of unemployment among youth groups is manifesting in anti-government 
disturbances.  These issues existentially threaten Ethiopia’s political and social order.   
This thesis explores the reactions of smallholders and students to Ethiopia’s successful 
social and economic development through a conceptual examination of the role of in situ and ex 
situ displacement narratives.  It finds that different groups have exhibited significantly divergent 
reactions to their circumstances.  It concludes that while Ethiopia’s form of centralized 
development has undeniably benefitted the nation, those benefits are, themselves, inadvertently 
resulting in secondary issues which impinge upon stability and individual prosperity.    
  
4 
 
 
Dedication 
 
 
In remembrance of ‘Professor’ Norm Kearney, a pilot who flew in the Berlin Airlift  
and who sparked a life-long interest in foreign affairs,  
and dedicated to my wife, Mona, without whose help and assistance this would not have been 
possible.   
 
  
5 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract           3 
List of Figures, Maps and Photographs       15 
List of Referenced Ethiopian Proclamations       16 
 
Chapter 1 
An Examination of Displacement in Ethiopia 
1.0 Introduction to the Thesis       18 
1.1  Ethiopia’s Successful State-led Development      19 
1.2  Background of the Problem        21 
 -- Certainty of Displacement in sub-Saharan Africa and Ethiopia     22 
 -- Ethiopia in Transition        24 
 -- The Significance of Youth Unemployment and Under-employment   24 
1.3  The Research Question       26 
 -- Establishing Place Attachment       27 
1.4 The Research Approach and Objectives      28 
1.5 Why Study Change in Ethiopia?       30 
 -- Outcomes of Ethiopia’s Growth and Development    31 
 -- Geographic Scope      32 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis       32 
 
Chapter 2 
A Review of Literature Concerning the Effects of Development  
on Poverty, Place Identity, and Displacement 
 
2.0 Introduction          34 
2.1 What is Development?         35 
2.1.1 The Bretton Woods Conference and the Modern Development Era   36 
6 
 
 -- The Bretton Woods Framework       37 
2.1.2 State-led Development         39 
 -- State Power and Development        39 
2.1.3 Centralized Development in Ethiopia       39 
 -- Early Economic Growth in Zenawi’s Ethiopia      40 
 -- Zenawi and Job Creation        42.2
 What is Poverty?          42 
 -- Chronic and Transient Poverty        44 
2.2.1 Deepening Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa       45 
2.2.2 Poverty in Rural Ethiopia         48 
2.2.3 Job Creation and Under-employment in Ethiopia’s Formal and Informal Economy 46 
 -- Formal and Informal Sectors       47 
 -- The Formal Economy and the Beginnings of Under-employment   48 
2.3 Locus of Control, Self-efficacy, and Risk Aversion     48 
-- Self-efficacy          49 
-- Risk-aversion         50 
2.3.1 Business Risk Aversion and Cultural Obligations     51 
2.3.2 Horizontal Inequality         51 
 -- Income Inequality and Poverty       52 
-- Income and Horizontal Inequality       53 
2.4 Relative Disparity, Youth and the Beginning of Violence    54 
 -- Peer Group Sustainment        54 
2.5 Displacement Through Development       55 
2.5.1 Common and Intersecting Categories of Displacement    56 
2.5.2 In situ and Ex situ Displacement       57 
2.5.3 Success Amongst Oustees        58 
2.6 Groupism and Social Systems       59 
 -- Assimilation, Belonging and Liminality      60 
 -- Social Systems and the Family       62 
7 
 
2.7 Economic and Conflict Displacement in Ethiopia     63 
 -- Conflict Displacement        63 
 -- Effects of Displacement on Children      64 
2.7.1. Displacement Through Infrastructure Construction and Land Investment  
in Ethiopia          65 
 -- The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam       66 
 -- Foreign Land Investment        67 
 -- Large Scale Leasing as Federal Policy      69 
2.7.2 Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan 69 
 -- Changing Developmental Imperatives      69 
 -- The FinFinne Special Zone        70 
 -- Proxy Reactions to Resettlement and Relocation Programmes   71 
2.8 Social and Educational Displacement      72 
 -- Different Forms of Displacement Outcomes     72 
2.9 Ethiopia’s Education Policy        74 
 -- Enrolment and Goals        75 
2.9.1. Social Displacement Resulting from Education     76 
 -- High and Low Context Participation      78 
2.9.2 Enculturation          80 
2.9.3 Place Attachment and Farming       81 
2.9.4 The Process of Place Acculturation       82 
2.9.5 Enculturation and Path Dependence       83 
 -- The Social Loss of Place Identity and Culture     84 
2.9.6 Loss of Place and Cultural Bereavement      85 
2.9.7 The Effects of Loss of Place Attachment in Rural Ethiopia    87 
 -- The Value of Friendship Networks       92 
2.10 Summary          88 
 
 
8 
 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
3.0  Introduction          90 
3.1 Research Approach and Rationale       91 
3.1.1 Social Constructionist, Constructivist, and Grounded Theories   92 
 -- Social Constructionist and Constructivist Theory     92 
 -- Grounded Theory         94 
3.1.2 Power Typologies         95 
 -- Knowledge and Experientially Based Power     96 
3.1.3 Positionality and Ethics        97 
-- Research Ethics         98 
-- Interview Format          99 
3.2 Research Methodology        100 
3.2.1  Competing Research Approaches       100 
-- Quantitative Method        101 
-- Qualitative Method         102 
-- Mixed Methods          103 
3.2.2 Document Review         104 
-- Content Analysis         105 
-- Triangulation of Responses       105 
3.2.3 Interview Access and Sample Size       105 
 -- Access          106 
 -- Sample Size         107 
 -- Focus Group Discussion        109 
3.3 Study Area Characteristics        111 
-- Environmental Characteristics       111 
3.3.1 Field Work          112 
3.3.2 Research Locations         113 
 -- Lalibela          113 
9 
 
 -- Sheshamane         115 
 -- Addis Ababa and the Surrounding Area      116 
-- Illustrative Value of the Three Study Areas     119 
3.4 Conclusion          119 
 
Chapter 4 
Stage Setting 
4.0 Introduction           121 
4.1  Historical Synopsis of Ethiopia       1122 
4.1.1 Emperor Menelik II          123 
4.1.2 Emperor Haile Selassie I        123 
-- Property Rights in the Selassie-era Ethiopia     124 
4.1.3 World War II and the Cold-War Influences      125 
-- Super Power Contestations       125 
4.2 The Dergue Government        126 
4.2.1 Dergue Land Distribution and Resettlement      127 
-- Provincial Origins of the Dergue :Leadership     128 
-- Forced Resettlement and Food Shortages     128 
4.2.2 Educational Reforms         129 
4.3 The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front    130 
4.3.1 Constitutional Articles and Current Property Takings    131 
4.3.2 The Structure of Ethiopia’s Federal and Subordinate Governments   132 
 -- Federal Ethiopia         133 
4.3.3 Regions          133 
 -- Regional Government Structure        136 
4.3.4 The Wereda          136 
10 
 
-- Land Valuation at the Wereda       137 
-- Land Registration Certificates       137 
4.3.5  Kebeles          140 
4.3.6 Local Observations of Expropriation Outcomes     141 
4.4  Development Induced Displacement and Mega Projects    142 
 -- Urbanization         142 
4.4.1 Mega Projects          143 
 -- Ethiopian Mega Projects        145 
 -- Minimalist and Maximalist Takings       146 
4.5 State-led Programmes of the Developmental State     146 
4.5.1 Ethiopia’s Development Plans       148 
 -- Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan    149 
 -- SDPRP Development Strategies       149 
 -- Plan for Accelerated Development to End Poverty    151 
 -- PASDEP Reliance on Agricultural Employment     151 
 -- Growth and Transformation Plan       152 
 -- Industrial Development Strategic Plan      154 
 -- Second Growth and Transformation Plan      154 
4.6  Post-conflict Economies        155 
 -- Post-conflict and Peace Stability       156  
 -- Ethiopia’s State-led Development and the Middle-class    157 
4.7  Chapter Summary         158 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Chapter 5 
Ethiopia’s Development and In Situ and Ex Situ Displacement   
 
5.0 Introduction          161 
 
5.1 Ethiopia’s Development Approach       162 
 
5.1.1 Prime Minister Zenawi’s Development Vision     163 
-- Basic Manufacturing Skills        164 
5.1.2 National Development Priorities and Transformation Plans     165 
5.1.3 The Growth and Transformation Plans      166 
 -- First Post-Zenawi Plan        167 
 -- Infrastructure and Exports        168 
5.1.4 Development and Land Expropriation at the Micro-level    168 
 -- Extent of Expropriations        169 
5.1.5 Smallholder Response to Imposed Changes     170 
5.2 Pro-poor Policies in Ethiopia        172 
5.2.1 Adaptation and Social Obligations       173 
 -- Social Sharing Obligations        174 
 -- Difficulty in Hiring Displaced Smallholders      175 
5.2.2 Gender Bias in Agricultural and Development Programmes    176 
-- Bias in Business Development       178 
-- Family-based Farm Loans        180 
5.2.3 Youth Small Enterprise Development      181 
5.3 Ethiopia’s Government Structure       183 
-- Semi-authoritarian States        184 
5.3.1 Electoral Authoritarianism        186 
 -- Electoral Peril and EPRDF Responses      186 
12 
 
-- Developmental Authoritarianism       187 
5.3.2 Using Soft Power as a Means of Repression     189 
5.3.3 Soft Power and Service Deserts       190 
 -- Smallholder Recognition of Government Hegemony    191 
 -- Official’s Recognition of the Withdrawal of Services    192 
5.4 Vote Buying Through the Absence of Choice     193 
5.4.1 Youth Related Political Instability and Radicalism     195 
-- Government Response to Student Demonstrations    196 
5.4.2 Delaying the Youth Employment Problem      197 
5.5 Movement Restrictions and the Surveillance Society    199 
5.5.1 Movement Restrictions and Illegal Residents     200 
 -- Self-relocation to Urban Areas       201 
5.5.2 Securitization of Dissent and the Surveillance Society     201 
 -- Political Dissension and the Securitization of Speech    202  
5.5.3 Displacement and Liminality        203 
5.5.4 Shoe Shine Surveillance        204 
--Surveillance and Societal Repression       205 
5.6  Summary and Emerging Findings       206 
 
Chapter 6 
Ethiopia’s Education and Training Systems 
 
6.0  Introduction          209 
6.1 Background of Ethiopia’s Education System      210 
6.1.1  The EPRDF’s New Educational Direction      210 
6.1.2 What Comprise Ethiopia’s Education System      2151 
6.1.3  Ethiopia’s Educational Objectives        213 
13 
 
6.1.4 Rural Literacy           214 
 -- EPRDF Restructuring of the Educational System     215 
6.2 Ethiopia’s Formal and Non-formal Learning Systems    216 
6.3 Elementary and Secondary Education      218 
6.3.1 Elementary Schools         218 
6.3.2 Secondary Schools         219 
6.3.3 Upper-Secondary Education        220 
6.3.4 Elementary and Secondary Education Exclusions      220 
6.4 Tertiary Education and Vocational Programmes     221 
6.4.1 The Paradox of Tertiary Education       222 
6.4.2 Educational Standards        224 
6.4.3  University Education and Under-employment     226 
 -- The Focus of Ministry of Education-operated Universities    227 
6.4.4 Technical Vocational Education and Training     228 
 -- Early Vocational Training Pilot Programme     228 
6.4.5  Adult Learners and Threats to Ethiopia’s Political Hegemony   229 
-- Ethiopia’s Vocational Training Audience      230 
6.5 The Challenges of Community Training Centres and TVETs   231 
 -- Gendered Aspects of Vocational Education and Training    233 
6.6 TVETs and Stake Holders        234 
6.7  Older Vocational Students        235 
6.7.1 Older Smallholders and Vocational Training      236 
6.7.2  Success Among Vocational Students      238 
6.8  Emigration          239 
-- Emigration Destinations        241 
6.9  Conclusion and Emerging Findings       241 
 
 
 
14 
 
Chapter 7 
Thesis Conclusion  
7.0 Introduction          244  
7.1  Main Findings          245 
-- A Constructivist Approach        247 
7.1.1 Pro-poor Policies         247 
7.1.2 Educational Policies and Outcomes       248 
 - The Effects of Too-rapid Growth in Tertiary Education    249 
7.1.3 Delayed Industry & Manufacturing       250 
 
 -- Economic Impact Upon Nearby Communities     250 
7.1.4 Employment          251 
7.1.5 Liminality          252 
7.1.6 Groupism          253 
7.2 The Implication of Pro-poor Policies       254 
 -- Physical Displacement        254 
 -- Educated Youth Un/Under-employment      255 
 -- Extended Liminality         256 
 -- Changing the Emphasis from Subsistence Agriculture to Manufacturing Employment  256 
7.3 Recommendations for Further Study       257 
 
Bibliography           260 
  
15 
 
List of Figures 
Fig. 1.1 World Population Growth Projection      23 
Fig. 2.1 Ethiopia’s Urban Population-to-Employment Comparisons   47 
Fig. 2.2 Place Attachment Model       81 
Fig. 3.1 Interviews Conducted        108 
Fig. 4.1 Local Political and Social Organization     133 
Fig. 4.2 Second Stage Land Use certificate      139 
Fig. 4.3 Ethiopian GDP Growth, 1983 – 2016      147 
Fig. 4.4 Ethiopia’s Youth Bulge       157 
Fig. 5.1 Local Political and Social Organization     185 
Fig. 5.2 Horn of Africa University Enrolment      298 
Fig. 5.3 Educational Attainment Among Age Cohorts    299  
Fig. 6.1 Educational Hierarchy in Ethiopia      212 
Fig. 6.2 TVET Curriculum        231 
Fig. 6.3 TVET Fee Schedule        232 
Fig. 6.4 Trend in Total Emigration       240  
Fig. 7.1 Objectives, Expected Finding, Observation     246 
List of Maps 
Map 3.1 Ethiopia’s Location        111 
Map 3.2 Study Areas, Addis Ababa, Lalibela, Sheshamane    113 
Map 3.3 Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development 
Master Plan and Study Areas       118 
Map 4.1 Provinces and Regions       134 
Map 5.1 Protests Following Infrastructure Corridors     196 
List of Photographs 
Photo 2.1 Electric Transmission Line Construction, Suluta Area     66 
Photo 3.1 Interview, Conducted West of Lalibela     114 
Photo  5.1 Ploughing Expropriated Land       174 
Text Box 
Box 4.1 The Flowering of State-led Agricultural Development   152 
  
16 
 
List of Referenced Ethiopian Federal Proclamations 
Federal Negarit Gazette 
 
Proclamation 31/1975  Public Ownership of Rural Lands. 
Proclamation 7/1992 A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of 
National/Regional Self-governments. 
Proclamation 83/1994  Monetary and Banking Proclamation   
Proclamation 89/1997 Rural Land Administration 
Proclamation 361/2003 Addis Ababa City Charter Revised Proclamation 
Proclamation 442/2005 To Establish the Central Statistics Agency  
Proclamation 455/2005 To Provide for the Expropriation of Land Holdings for Public 
Purposes and Payment of Compensation 
Proclamation 456/2005 Rural Land Administration and Use  
Proclamation 533/2007 The Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority Hereby Established as an 
Autonomous Federal Agency Having its Own Legal Personality. 
 
Proclamation 591/2008 A Proclamation to Amend the National Bank of Ethiopia 
Establishment Proclamation   
Proclamation 621/2009 To Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and 
Societies  
Proclamation 721/2011 Lease Holding for Urban Lands 
Proclamation 281-2013 National Planning Council and National Planning Commission 
Establishment Council of Ministers 
City of Addis Ababa Proclamation 17/2004:   To Provide for the Preparation, Issuance and  
Implementation of the Addis Ababa City Master Plan 
  
17 
 
  
18 
 
Chapter 1 
An Examination of Displacement in Ethiopia 
1.0 Introduction to the Thesis 
 
This research interrogates the unforeseen consequences of successful growth and 
development programmes in Ethiopia, in particular focussing attention upon two groups, 
development-displaced smallholders and educated but socially displaced youth.  While Ethiopia’s 
development has resulted in a more stable and prosperous economy, its beneficial outcomes have 
been unevenly experienced, especially by these two groups as the process and outcomes of 
development have different meanings for individuals and groups.    
Following a period of highly erratic economic growth, in 2002 the federal government of 
Ethiopia initiated a suite of state-led development plans.  The outcomes have had substantial 
positive effects such as calming the erratic economy and reducing mortality rates for infants and 
children under five years old.  Key among Ethiopia’s programmes has been the almost universal 
availability of education at the basic levels (MoE, 2015; Seid, et al., 2015; CSA, 2016).  The success 
of these plans has dramatically increased economic and social development, creating a prosperous 
middle class who are now seeking new and more comfortable housing outside of the urban core 
(Mohammed, et al., 2017)  Ethiopia’s economic development has led to a more prosperous society 
overall.  However, it is also resulting in the wholesale ousting of rural residents in some areas and 
social dissension among students in others (Desalegn, 2016) these affected groups have had 
significantly divergent reactions to their physical and social displacement.   
Beginning with its 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan, the national 
government has primarily emphasized labour-intensive agriculture and a highly specialized service 
sector rather than the creation of lower-level manufacturing opportunities that newly displaced 
smallholders might aspire to (Clapham, 2017; Shiferaw, 2017).  Though the economy remains 
vibrant, in the absence of appropriate employment youth at both the secondary school and university 
levels are finding too-few work opportunities.  Their frustrations are resulting in destabilizing civil 
disobedience (Desalegn, 2016; ADBG, 2017).    
This thesis examines the critical transitional period for these groups, during which their 
displacement is both physical and social; a time during which neither smallholders nor students have 
fully transitioned to new lives.  While specifically revealed in Ethiopia, the larger issues precipitating 
these changes are likely to apply throughout Africa as the development and population of the 
continent substantially increases during the 21st century (UNESCO, 2015).    
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1.1 Ethiopia’s Successful State-led Development 
Countries from the global North were initially attracted to sub-Saharan Africa for 
purposes of colonization and resource extraction, but their interest later expanded to include the 
strategic value of the Horn of Africa during World War II and its political value throughout the 
Cold War (DoD, 1990).  Once the Cold War ended, Northern states, particularly the former 
Soviet Union and the United States, lost much of their interest in the area.  Since then, 
Ethiopia’s development has become a primarily indigenous and therefore a more sustainable 
process (Chanyalew, 2015).   
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 
19911 following a 17-year civil war with the Marxist-slanted Dergue government.  The EPRDF 
initially governed through a decade of highly erratic economic growth which was interrupted by 
droughts and cross-border wars.  To better control that growth, in 2002 the national government 
initiated an iterative programme of centrally directed state-led development.  The introduction of 
these programmes by former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi quickly stabilized the erratic 
economy and by 2005 Ethiopia’s GDP growth rate had risen to 12.6% annually (ADBG, 2017; 
NBE, 2017).  Ethiopia’s economy has continued to be a success story and the nation has been 
generally peaceful.  It is now considered to be “one of the most stable states in Eastern Africa” 
(IMF, 2016; Shiferaw, 2017).   
Garland, et al., (2018: 38), however, caution researchers not to conflate GDP growth 
with social success, stressing that “economic growth is a component of progress, not 
synonymous with it.”  Such measures of growth may not fully discriminate between beneficial 
and harmful effects.  As example, expanding industrial output is an indicator of economic 
improvement, yet a corresponding increase of serious health issues resulting from industrial 
pollution may undermine or limit further growth.  Thus, this research examines the unintended 
outcomes of successful development programmes, specifically the confounding and seemingly 
disparate issues of displacement of smallholders in peri-urban areas and the under-employment 
of Ethiopia’s educated youth, despite the carefully planned and delivered social programmes.  
Both groups are displaced, physically and socially, as neither can return to their physical place 
                                                             
1 The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was known during the war period, 1975 until 
1991, as the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front.  It was led by Meles Zenawi, who was then a member of the 
Marxist–Leninist League of Tigray.  Zenawi served as President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia from 1991 
until 1995, and subsequently as Prime Minister until his sudden death on 20 August 2012.  For brevity sake, the few 
references to the TPLF will read EPRDF. 
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of origin nor easily move forward, as the social/political structure they had relied upon no longer 
exists for them.  
Caldentey (2008: 28) contends the “developmental state refers to a state which 
[positively] intervenes and guides the direction and pace of economic development.”  State-led 
development programmes pursue growth strategies that are unique to the particular nation, and 
at their basic level, they demonstrate “the state can play a central role in economic growth” 
(Radice, 2008: 1153).  Thus, Fantini (2013: 2) asserts Ethiopia’s exceptional growth and 
development have occurred through a focus upon “public capital investments” particularly those 
in employment producing infrastructure projects such as new housing and roadways, dams and 
power plants, “as well as a high degree of investment in poverty reduction programmes and 
basic service delivery” such as community health care.  Development however, results in more 
than better housing or power plants.  According to Kelsall (2011: 4) it represents “the 
transformation of the economy and personal well-being expressed through a positive change in 
growth, per capita income, life-expectancy, access to education, healthcare, and clean water.”  
Yet, as Bellu (2011: 2) warned, benefits accruing to “one part of the system may be detrimental 
to the development of other parts, giving rise to conflicting objectives.”   
Ethiopia’s state-led2 development policies have, however, generally by-passed the 
industrialization phase of economic growth.  The initial state-led plans prioritized the polar 
opposites of labour-intensive agricultural development and a high-technology service sector 
(SDPRP, 2002; PASDEP, 20063) and its evolving educational policies have reflected those 
primacies.  Its current development plan, the Second Growth and Transformation Plan, strongly 
advocates the sequenced construction of new infrastructure and employment through industrial 
development (NPC, 2015; Wondifraw, et al., 2015).  Yet, even as manufacturing and industrial 
                                                             
2 The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States defined ‘the state’, as a person in international 
law, as possessing “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) capacity to enter 
into relations with other states” (Montevideo, 1933: 3). 
3 While PASDEP (2006: 14) (Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty) advocated industrial 
development as “the driving force for the overall development of the economy” it specifically promoted micro and 
small businesses as employment generators.  It gave emphasis to low-skill, and essentially subsistence enterprises, 
such as “animal breeding, poultry farming, silk production, honey production, small-scale sewing and metal works, 
construction work, waste collection and disposal activities, car parking services, maintenance services as well as 
establishment of miniature stores.”  Leidholm (2002) found those micro-businesses in lesser-developed countries are 
often short-lived cottage industries whose sales cater to easily met consumer needs.  Such ventures are often acts of 
last resort rather than a response to an emerging market opportunity.  Literature regarding Ethiopia notes the speed 
with that medium and small enterprises enter the market, briefly succeed, fail and then exit the market (Gebreeyesus, 
2007; Bekele & Worku, 2008; Adam, 2014).  Their rapid failure makes them a poor choice for newly educated youth 
who are seeking long-term economic stability in their own right as well as representing a risky investment for 
transitioning smallholders.   
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development have become a national priority, they remain generally confined to low technology 
outputs such as sugar and leather products and so government policies at all levels continue to 
rely upon agricultural labour for the bulk of employment (MoE, 2015; NPC, 2015).  This does not 
meet the employment needs of a better educated youth cohort and the lack of suitable 
opportunities for this group are resulting in civil disorder (BBC, 2015; ILO, 2017).  However, 
there are enough well-paying opportunities within the metropolis of Addis Ababa to create a 
substantial demand for new and better housing outside of the urban core and this is causing 
widespread displacement among smallholder farmers who reside there (Home, 2016b).  
1.2 Background of the Problem  
Increased income levels among a highly educated and occupationally focussed core of 
service industry professionals in the capital city are allowing urban workers to purchase land in 
the peripheral areas of the city for new and better housing.  New home construction will displace 
hundreds of thousands of smallholders (Home, 2016b) who generally have few non-farm labour 
skills with which to transition to peri-urban livelihoods (UNESCO, 1975; AU, 2007; Belete, 
2011).  As their farmland is expropriated for residential and commercial construction or 
infrastructure development, displaced rural residents disburse and move into neighbouring 
villages and towns, typically in larger numbers than those communities can absorb.  They 
consume services as well as drive down the incomes of other unskilled labourers and this is 
inherently antagonistic and destabilizing for established residents (Crisp, 2002).  
Displacement is also social.  Ethiopia’s substantial investment in its education system 
has created a better-educated youth cohort, particularly in the urban areas (UN, 1989; Nordas & 
Davenport, 2013; Azeng & Yogo, 2015; Desalegn, 2016; Fukunishi & Machikita, 2017).  
However, after its peak of 12.6 percent annual growth, the levelling GDP growth rate (NBE, 
20174; WB, 2017b) is resulting in fewer employment positions that require those higher levels of 
education.  Cerra & Saxena (2007: 10) found “the years immediately prior to recessions tend to 
experience significantly lower growth” and if sustained, unemployment and civil unrest can 
result.  Consequently, newly accomplished young men and women are now discovering they 
                                                             
4 The National Bank of Ethiopia was established by government Proclamation 83/1994 and later amended by 
Proclamation 591/2008 that, in Section 5-13, provides it with the mandate to “collect data from any person and 
prepare periodic economic studies…and other relevant statistical indicators for analysis and for the formulation and 
determination of monetary, saving and exchange policies as are useful to the Ethiopian economy.”  As such, its 
analyses and reports are considered by this researcher to represent the position of the Government of Ethiopia.  The 
Banks’ analysis of current growth rates is triangulated using the analyses of other international banks and agencies 
(Figure 4.3) that agree that Ethiopia’s GDP growth has slowed since 2005. 
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have fewer prospects following their formal education and thus are becoming unemployed or 
under-employed.  During this liminal period, students find they cannot return to the lives they led 
prior to their schooling because their educational experiences have fundamentally changed 
them (Turner, 1987; Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010; Murcia, 2018).  
In the Ethiopian context, as elsewhere, work provides more than financial means, it is 
“both a response to poverty and a vital source of respectability and self-worth” (Crivello & Van 
Der Gaag, 2016: 28).  Critically, without employment educated youth cannot begin independent 
lives as socially recognized adults (Honwana, 2013) and therefore they are likely to become 
marginalized and socially displaced (Brookfield, 2005; Bezu & Barrett., 2012).  Hence, while 
peri-urban smallholders are being physically displaced from their homes, their peers and 
livelihoods, Ethiopia’s better educated youth are becoming socially displaced from their past but 
cannot successfully transition to their future.  Moreover, unmet expectations among a better-
educated youth cohort are resulting in predictable patterns of civil unrest (Pape, 2005; Seid, et 
al., 2015; Brechenmacher, 2017) similar to those recently witnessed in other North African and 
Middle Eastern nations (Honwana, 2013; Mulderig, 2013; de Chatel, 2014).   
 
Certainty of Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa and Ethiopia 
 
Macro-level development-induced displacement among agriculturalists is well studied 
(Erman, 1998; Doutriaux, et al., 2008; Tadele, 2009; Chaudry, 2010; HRW. 2012; Veilleux, 
2013; Yirdaw, 2013; Gebregziabher, et al., 2014; Randell, 2016; Mohammed et al., 2017).  The 
2008 World Development Report (WB, 2008: 8) found that “inefficient, labour-intensive 
subsistence-level agricultural practices are not able to replicate the level of production, nor the 
economies of scale, necessary for developing nations to compete in a modernizing world.”  That 
report further predicted the continued use of subsistence agricultural methods such as the hoe 
and plough, which remain common among Ethiopian smallholders, will be inadequate to meet 
the food security demands of a rapidly increasing African population which is predicted to more 
than triple by the year 2100 and which is disproportionate to the population growth of every 
other continent (Figure 1.1).   
 
The World Bank’s conclusion was that consolidation of land into medium and large-scale 
commercial farms, led by an emergent entrepreneurial class, will become the future of sub-
Saharan Africa’s agricultural sector.  However, it also found that few ousted smallholders will be 
sufficiently skilled to survive the technological transformation required as nations rapidly 
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develop, nor will they have the social or educational background to adapt to the new demands 
brought about by changing market forces, including urbanization and industrialization.  
Ethiopia’s modernisation programmes and economic and social policies have precedent in the 
Marxist-oriented eastern European states of the former Soviet Union, a system from which the 
Dergue government drew its inspiration and support between 1974 and 1991 (Grigoriev, et al., 
2014).   
 
Figure 1.1 
 
This thesis contributes to current displacement literature by filling gaps in the array of 
outcomes of successful mezzo-level development.  Hence, this research contributes to a more 
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comprehensive understanding of the range and scale of the results of pro-poor development 
programmes and strategies.   
Ethiopia in Transition 
Ethiopia is in a transitional phase.  As a nation that has been dependent upon the 
production of primary agricultural commodities such as unfinished animal hides and raw coffee 
beans, it is now reorienting itself towards a market based, industrial and service economy (NPC, 
2015).  These urban-oriented policies have resulted in physical and social transformations 
which are compelling change in the very basics of the lives and livelihoods of the rural 
population.  As its upstream economic growth has increased the relative wealth and position of 
some groups, the downstream effects have been uneven, adversely impacting other groups or 
entire communities as development-induced displacement occurs.   
This disparity is often overlooked.  In their article on the process approach to 
development, Bond & Hulme (1999: 1340) discuss close “relationships between the 
beneficiaries and the project management.”  Their model does not include consideration for 
ameliorative actions to address the physical and social needs of communities or individuals who 
will be adversely affected by very large, or ‘mega-projects’.  Rather, they state, the focus is 
primarily upon the economic benefits of those projects and developers minimize the effects 
upon those who are displaced, especially minority populations, the poor and disadvantaged.   
Hence, as circumstances beyond their locus of control eliminate the livelihoods they 
have practiced for generations, displacement may induce already poor and disadvantaged 
smallholders to become withdrawn and to isolate themselves in a small group of their peers 
(Mogues, et al., 2009; Akram, 2013).  Youth, though, may respond more violently if their social 
progression is impeded (Pape, 2005; Azeng & Yogo, 2015).  This thesis contributes to a better 
understanding of those outcomes at the meso- and micro-levels. 
The Significance of Youth Unemployment and Under-employment  
Similar to the unemployment among displaced smallholders that is resulting from a lack 
of marketable non-farm skills, recent literature describes a parallel condition of under-
employment among educated youth.  This cohort is increasingly unable to find employment to 
adequately utilize their newly acquired skills and knowledge (Adamu & Addamu, 2012; 
Desalegn, 2016; IMF, 2016; Yirdaw, 2016).  Under-employment has been defined by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO, 1998: 4) as the “under-utilization of the productive 
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capacity of the employed population, including those arising from a deficient national or local 
economic system.”  Barnichon & Zylberberg (2015: 6) contextually define unemployment in 
terms of “an individual with some university (or more) who is employed in an occupation which 
requires at most a high-school [6th form] degree.”   
The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2013: 17) found that in Ethiopia 
“unemployment has been a problem particularly of those with a senior secondary education, 
among whom the unemployment rate has been higher than all other educational groups.”  A 
more recent report notes a combined 54% unemployment/under-employment rate among the 
cohort aged 15 - 24 (ILO: 2017).  At the same time, Ethiopia’s educational system enrols more 
students than the number of available and properly skilled educators can accommodate.  
Tessema (2009) notes this too-rapid expansion of university enrollment has led to the hiring of 
less-qualified instructors who, in turn, produce less well-prepared graduates.  In a trend analysis 
of quality assurance among higher education institutions, Tessema’s conclusion was 
substantiated by Adamu & Addamu (2012: 842) who found “Quality culture is not a well-
developed notion in Ethiopian higher education.”   
Seid, et al., (2015) conclude the too-rapid expansion of university programmes, and their 
increasingly poor quality, directly contributes to high unemployment and under-employment 
among the youth cohort.  They, too, note the economy is unable to absorb the influx of new 
graduates, or even better educated youth, and that “the imbalance between the increase in the 
supply of, and demand for, workers in Ethiopia has resulted in a high unemployment rate and 
long unemployment durations, particularly among the youth” (Seid, et al., 2015: 10).  The 
domino effect of under-employment was described by Barnichon & Zylberberg (2015: 3) who 
noted that as “high-skill workers move down the job ladder, they take the jobs of less-skilled 
individuals, who are in turn driven out of their market or further down their own occupational 
ladder.”  
As a result, under-employment among the better educated youth decreases the 
employment opportunities available to displaced and unskilled smallholders (Bryceson,1996; 
Hoffman & Stein, 2003; FAO, 2012).  This not only establishes new strata of rural and urban 
poverty, it also undermines social stability.  It is, however, precisely this younger age cohort who 
are most likely to engage in civil disobedience due to under-employment and lack of social 
momentum (Pape, 2005; Whitmore, 2010).  Therefore, the thesis has focussed on these two 
seemingly unconnected groups.  These issues are exacerbated by the general absence of the 
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social, entrepreneurial, and management skills necessary for a reliable industrial labour force 
(Bekele & Worku, 2008; Yirdaw, 2016).   
Uncertainty regarding their futures also connects and correlates the interests of 
displaced smallholders and graduating students.  Uncertainty was described by Williams and 
Balaz (2012: 168) as “the unpredictability of the future.”  For displaced smallholders who may 
already live at or near the poverty line this uncertainty (Akay, et al., 2009) has to do with the loss 
of their livelihoods following ousting from land whicht may have been held by their families for 
multiple generations.  For secondary school and university students it may be the consequence 
of under-employment as the Ethiopian economy slows and fewer employment opportunities for 
graduates are available (Desalegn, 2016; ADBG, 2017; NBE, 2017).   
 
Throughout the study, six recurring themes unmistakably presented themselves.  Those 
were: (i) the effect of Ethiopia’s pro-poor policies; (ii) the outcome of its education policies; (iii) 
the issues which have delayed the rise of Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector; (iv) employment and 
employment choices, including the active choice to remain unemployed; (v) the often 
unrecognized issue of liminality among physically and socially dislocated individuals; and (vi) 
the important, but what appears to be the under-studied, issue of groupism especially among 
older workers.  Individually, their impact appeared peripheral yet in combination, and as their 
frequency of mention during interviews is extrapolated to the wider population, their chemistry 
poses a substantial social impact.  As the study progressed, these themes set the direction of 
the research; including both the initial and follow-up questions posed to individual respondents 
and in the later analysis of the 104 responses obtained. 
1.3 The Research Question 
In the study area, as smallholders’ land is expropriated for new development they are 
paid a formulaic sum for their property but are not forcibly resettled or relocated, they are simply 
ousted ex situ with no further assistance.  In this environment ousting is also economic and 
social as their livelihoods are being rendered obsolete by urban growth (Hyndman, 2012).  Their 
dispersal and the atomization of their communities denies them the friendship bonds of security 
and trust necessary to recover.  Moreover, their displacement renders them socially and 
economically undetectable; they become politically unimportant and therefore their future 
becomes invisible as only the positive outcomes accruing to the beneficiaries of development 
are accentuated in planning documents (Bond & Hulme, 1999; Admassie & Abebaw, 2014; 
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Aleman & Kim, 2015).  Youth, including, better educated students are finding that while still 
robust, the economy is slowing (ADBG, 2017; NBE, 2017).  They are increasingly unable to 
obtain employment which is commensurate with their new knowledge, skills, and expectations.   
Establishing Place Attachment 
Regarding smallholder displacement, agricultural livelihoods develop strong place 
attachments that represent social touchstones for which people typically have no substitute.  
These connections are especially resilient among people who consider their personhood as 
being indivisibly linked to their occupational peer groups, while their individual place identities 
have been shaped by collective values, behaviours and experiences (Mehretu, 2012; Rijkers & 
Soderbom, 2013; Abay, et al., 2016; Leu & Muller, 2016).  “Identities are not construed by 
individuals alone but negotiated in social interaction processes between individuals”  (Reitz, et 
al., 2014: 281) and so their disruption through displacement can create voids which impair the 
already limited political voices of the poor and socially marginalized as they become physically 
and socially separated from familiar settings (Robinson, 2003; Brown, 2005; BMI, 2015).  
However, it is the better-educated and skilled youth cohort who are most likely to engage in civil 
disobedience and anti-government violence in response to a perceived lack of proper 
employment (Whitmore, 2010; Richardson, 2011).  Therefore, while pressure is exerted upon all 
levels of government to provide for the needs of unskilled, displaced smallholders policies must 
also mitigate the demands of youth. 
Ethiopian government planning documents promulgated at the federal level, and the 
wider academic literature pertinent to the subject, conclude that states cannot sustain economic 
growth without ensuring a combination of the complimentary issues of ‘peace’ and ‘stability’ 
(SDPRP, 2002; Newman & Richmond, 2006; Nir & Kafle, 2011).  Development theorists and 
practitioners, including Berdal & Malone (2000), Collier & Hoeffler (2004b), Pape (2005), and 
Stewart (2011) describe a range of factors responsible for increasing levels of instability and 
conflict which can slow an economy and reduce employment demand (ADBG, 2017).   
If the literature suggests that state-led development leads to different experiences and 
outcomes for different groups within society, then it is important for this research to focus on the 
question:   
 
“In what ways does development unintentionally contribute to new strata of 
poverty and internal instability?” 
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At its root, this question is motivated by the paradox of development processes wherein 
some members of society may substantially benefit and profit, while others lose their livelihoods 
and still others are unable to realize their reasonably anticipated social and economic 
advancement.  This undermines the potential of otherwise highly successful programmes 
(defined here as ‘resulting in the intended effects when carefully evaluated’) and initiatives 
where an increasing number of citizens are unable to fully participate in national success.  It is 
also important to understand the process by which this takes place for different groups. 
 
The question is inspired by the works of Michael Cernea, a social scientist who 
questioned the moral, social and economic sustainability of involuntary development-induced 
displacement and the resettlement of populations.  Cernea (2004) noted that once ousted from 
their property, the poor are almost never made economically or socially whole again.  He 
described a concept of impoverishment risk which derives from displacement, a condition which 
is compounded by the loss of life-long social and place identities and occupational 
interdependencies, especially among marginalized groups (see also Jansen, 2008; Docena, 
2015; Lowe, et al., 2015) whose political voices are further weakened as they are physically and 
socially dispersed (Cernea, 1995; Robinson, 2003).   
 
It is also informed by Victor Turner (1987), who described the transitional periods that 
people, particularly youth, must negotiate when leaving their past place experiences and group 
associations for new ones, a time during which they belong to neither group and that is 
inherently destabilizing.  Turner closely investigated the emotional ambiguity experienced during 
these liminal periods of uncertainty as individuals move from one social paradigm to another.  
Particularly where students have ‘played by the rules’ and have a reasonable expectation of 
economic and social advancement, the absence of opportunities and new social belongings can 
lead to destabilizing civil unrest (Gurr, 1970; Halevy, et al., 2010; Ostby & Urdal, 2010; Maasho, 
2016).  Three points regarding (i) the certainty of displacement; (ii) the transitional nature of 
Ethiopia’s economy; and, (iii) youth unemployment and under-employment provide further 
background for the research question.   
1.4 The Research Approach and Objectives 
State-led development is useful for synchronizing the energies of private industry and 
federal government policies in order to facilitate the growth of markets.  However, development 
is often structurally inequitable in the opportunities it presents (Huang, 1995; Ferraro, 2008) and 
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as its outcomes are unequally distributed or result in other unintended consequences (Del 
Castillo & Bunche, 2015; Galbraith, 2016).   
Thus, while Ethiopia’s state-led development has been substantially successful, there is 
a growing level of social and economic disparity between the traditional and the newly 
developing economy.  Moreover, the increasing gap between employment opportunities and the 
surplus of potential workers is not adequately addressed by the developmental government.  As 
a result of Ethiopia’s state-led programmes, we can observe (i) continued forced displacement; 
(ii) a need to re/establish income producing livelihoods, (iii) a likelihood of increased internal 
instability, and (iv) a tendency for the national government to rely on social and political 
repression to manage unrest.  Therefore, two objectives are presented: 
Objective 1:   
To examine the role of Ethiopian state-led development policy in delivering outcomes 
that support equitable and inclusive pro-poor growth. 
Objective 2:   
To identify the social, cultural and economic dynamics of these government-led 
development programmes on two social groups: young graduates and smallholder farmers, 
within and around the city of Addis Ababa.  
Using Ethiopia as a case study, and by combining these two objectives, this study 
addresses the effects of unforeseen outcomes of the successful development which is inducing 
the displacement of smallholders, and of an educated yet under-employed youth cohort who 
may experience social displacement through unemployment and their new liminal dislocation 
within society.  Both groups experience displacement and unemployment or under-employment 
in different ways, and the two objectives help to focus questions about Ethiopia’s pro-poor 
programmes and its educational policies; the need for new employment through increased 
manufacturing; liminality and groupism, and the surveillance society which the national 
government has created.  
A constructivist perspective will be adopted to allow the research to develop an 
explanation of the primary concerns of the respondents in the study area.  Grounded theory has 
been widely used in participatory education research and assessments and has been recently 
recommended “as a powerful tool to tackle new subject areas where existing theoretical tools 
have hit a road block in explaining the real world” (Tucker, 2016: 436).  The application of 
grounded theory here “makes sense out of researcher experiences and analytic sense out of 
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their meanings” (Charmaz, 2006: 11).  This is enabled through an extraction of the key 
relationships within social processes which derive from the empirical data when suitable 
literature and knowledge does not exist (Ng & Hase, 2008).   
 
1.5 Why Study Change in Ethiopia? 
Case studies are a well-established method to examine the interrelationship of 
environmental and micro-level social systems, allowing the researcher to ‘unpack’ meaning and 
increase understanding (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006; Piekkari & Welch, 2011).  The Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Ethiopia) was selected as the case study for this thesis 
because it presents three interesting characteristics not found elsewhere on the continent and 
therefore exogenous factors are limited.     
First, unlike other sub-Saharan African nations Ethiopia was never colonized.  A 
significant body of research concludes that European colonization of African nations had long- 
term adverse developmental effects as their wealth was extracted, while at the same time their 
indigenous political and social development was artificially repressed (Boahen, 1985; Bertocchi 
& Canova, 2002; Austin, 2010; Heldring & Robinson, 2012; Ziltener, et al., 2017).  Ethiopia lacks 
that colonial history and since 2009 substantial legal restrictions have been placed on foreign 
non-government organizations operating there, including those who are interested in 
democracy, agriculture and land reform, or human rights  (Barnes, 2006; Carter, 2009; 
Proclamation 621/2009).  Consequently, social development and economic growth have 
become more indigeneous and potentially more sustainable, making Ethiopia’s course of 
development its own (Chanyalew, 2015).   
Second, Ethiopia is a non-resource intensive and non-coastal state.  Its trade must cross 
borders that it does not control and it has few revenue-generating exports.  It is surrounded by 
neighbours with whom it has had both lengthy and intermittent conflicts, and it has experienced 
a recent and significant influx of refugees from neighbouring South Sudan.  Ethiopia’s 
population is predicted to double, reaching 187 million by the year 2050 (UNDP, 2012) and this 
is expected to cause substantial changes in age cohorts and settlement patterns.  This will drive 
further social transformation as urban areas almost triple in their population density, eventually 
housing approximately 41% of the nation’s population (UNHABITAT, 2007).  That new degree of 
urbanization will cause significant physical and social change among the 86% of the population 
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who are now rural and the 80% who currently draw their livelihood directly from agriculture 
(Getahun, 1978; CSA, 2012).   
Third, especially in urban areas, Ethiopia’s basic educational system has expanded 
significantly while university programmes are producing far more enrolments than any other 
nation in the Horn of Africa per capita (see Figure 5.3).  This has resulted in a population that is 
better educated than at any time in its history, but also one which is creating new social, political 
and economic demands on each level of government.  The federal government has initiated a 
series of state-led development programmes which have catalysed economic growth and social 
development and in turn, health care, agriculture, education, and infrastructure have all shown 
significant improvement.  Nevertheless, insufficient employment that could otherwise absorb 
both displaced smallholders and a better educated youth  cohort is being generated. 
Outcomes of Ethiopia’s Growth and Development 
Beginning with former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s ambitious 2002 state-led 
development policy, Ethiopia’s “economic growth is owed to the unprecedented level of public 
investments in infrastructural schemes and public enterprises, funded by borrowing and foreign 
aid” (Haylemarian, 2017) and this growth has been coupled with its similarly successful effort to 
improve health and education programmes.  Zenawi’s policies have now created an emergent 
middle-class, though currently one within a narrow services sector that relies upon digital 
technology and therefore it is a highly skilled and precisely educated work force (WB, 2016).  
However, those policies have not equally benefitted other segments of society through the 
creation of industrial employment despite the evolving strategies now generally, though not 
exclusively advocate it and so inequalities result (Galbraith, 2016, Oqubay, 2018).   
Ultimately, the outcomes of Ethiopia’s growth and development are resulting in the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of smallholder farmers, and others, and the 
disarticulation5 of a growing number of newly educated youth who are increasingly under-
employed.  Employment among students who have become better educated is depressed by a 
slowing economy because they have fewer opportunities than in the past, even as the national 
government is preparing new infrastructure to stimulate industry (ADBG, 2017; Clapham, 2017; 
NBE, 2017; Shiferaw, 2017).  Increased unemployment and under-employment has resulted in 
                                                             
5 Huang (1995: 167) described disarticulation in terms of “missing linkages among economic sectors”, including the 
forward and backward flow between industries that create demand for products and services and especially in the 
lack of demand for a skilled or higher educated work force. 
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a widening avenue of civil unrest among a restless youth cohort, which has, in turn, resulted in 
an increase in repressive measures (Desalegn, 2016; HRW, 2016).  As generally similar 
conditions of unemployment and under-unemployment are likely to occur throughout sub-
Saharan Africa, Ethiopia provides a unique opportunity to understand and address the 
potentially adverse outcomes of too-rapid development and imbalanced initiatives within this 
important region.   
Geographic Scope 
This thesis presents a focus upon the areas to the east and north, immediately 
contiguous to the capital city of Addis Ababa which are now included in part of the Oromia 
Special Zone Surrounding Finfinne (Tadesse & Imana, 2017) though this plan itself is formally 
referred to as the “Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan” 
(Proclamation Number 17/2004).  While the thesis presents examples from two other regions of 
the country to inform and provide nuance, these are not intended to represent a comprehensive 
analysis of economic conditions nor of displacement in all areas of Ethiopia.  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters.  Following Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provides a 
review of the global literature as well as literature which is specific to the Ethiopian experience 
regarding state-led development and poverty.  It explores groupism, formal and informal 
displacement, as well as risk aversion related to the aging process.  It highlights the literature 
pertaining to loss of place and group identity and their cumulative effects upon individual and 
community health, as well as the effects upon educational choices parents may select for their 
children.    
Chapter 3 describes the primary methodologies used, including social constructivism 
and grounded theory which allow hidden concepts to emerge.  These are particularly useful 
where there is little literature pertaining to the subject.  The chapter describes the selection of 
research sites, including Sheshamane where rapid economic transformation was taking place 
and Lalibela where environmental and agricultural conditions were resulting in both youth and 
adult smallholders leaving their farms to relocate to both vibrantly growing and economically 
depressing urban areas.  These communities approached population and economic change 
very differently and their experiences provide salient comparisons to the primary study area east 
and north of Addis Ababa.   
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Chapter 4 examines the history of Ethiopia, including the structure of its government and 
the legal basis for the expropriations that are being carried out as a result of successful 
development programmes.  It demonstrates that Ethiopia’s current policies are often the legacy 
of Cold War superpower interventions and of the culturally formed mengist belief in the 
omniscience of government leaders (Lefort, 2007; Vaughan, 2011).  However, this cultural tenet 
is now under attack by better-educated and under-employed youth whose civil disobedience is 
challenging Ethiopia’s developmental policies as well as the traditional authority of the state.   
Chapters 5 and 6 present the result of fieldwork and the data obtained. 
Chapter 5 analyses the successful process of development which was introduced by 
former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.  This allowed the federal government to better control an 
erratic economy by stimulating improvements where culture and tradition had impeded social 
development.  Early growth policies focussed upon employment in labour-intensive agriculture 
and the development of a service sector.  It was not until the introduction of the Second Growth 
and Transformation Plan (NPC, 2015) that these policies more clearly emphasized industrial 
and manufacturing capacity as an avenue to increase employment even as agricultural 
employment remains central to the national imperative.   
Chapter 6 describes Ethiopia’s educational system, including the now almost universal 
availability of basic education and the substantial increase in university attendance.  The rapid 
expansion of the university system has resulted in an imbalance of educated youth vis-à-vis the 
ability of industry and commerce to absorb them.  This is resulting in a wide spread issue of 
under-employment which, at its extreme, is causing the unemployment of unskilled displaced 
smallholders and a growing vulnerability to internal instability.  In addition to Turner (1987), Field 
& Morgan-Klein (2010) and Brookfield (2005: 51) describe issues of cultural and social 
separation which can result among individuals who reinvent themselves through education or 
skills training and who then “risk being excluded from the culture which has defined and 
sustained them up to that point in their life.” 
Chapter 7 revisits these issues in terms of the research objectives that were established 
for the thesis.  It provides a more detailed discussion of how the research objectives were met 
and what their implications may potentially lead to, both for Ethiopia and for sub-Saharan Africa; 
as well as reflecting on some remaining research challenges.   
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Chapter Two 
A Review of Literature Concerning the Effects of Development  
on Poverty, Place Identity, and Displacement 
2.0 Introduction  
Development, in its many forms, is often assumed to be positive.  A substantial body of 
literature describes it in positive terms of trade and economic growth which gives rise to 
increased income levels; of improvements in health care and educational programmes; of 
modernizing infrastructure improvements ranging from hydro-electric dams to rural feeder roads 
(Bradshaw, 2006; Bellu, 2011, Crush, 2012; Dorius, 2012, Haller, 2012; Fantini, 2013; Dom, 
2016; Stifel, et al., 2016; Zahonogo, 2016; Clapham, 2017; Shiferaw, 2017).  Theorists suggest 
development reduces the incidence of social violence (Collier & Rohner, 2008); that it increases 
education levels (Aghion, et al., 2009); and, that an educated and peaceful labour force is 
central to increasing national prosperity (Okafor, 2017).   
Although well planned and properly sequenced infrastructure and other physical 
development projects “work best in conjunction with sound economic policies, transparency, 
and good governance” (Sachs, 2014: 1), there often appears to be inadequate debate during 
the planning process regarding their foreseeable social outcomes (Bond & Hulme, 1999).  In the 
study area, land expropriation precipitated by physical development is causing a loss of place 
and identity, of social support and cultural grounding, particularly among poor and older 
populations (Norvy, 2013; Ghatak & Mookherjee, 2014; Fukunishi, & Machikita, 2017).  
Simultaneously, educational and vocational training programmes increase the capacity of 
human capital.  Yet the liminal effects of education and training can separate individuals and 
groups from their past (Turner, 1987; Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010) resulting in social 
disarticulation and instability (Brookfield, 2005; Tadele, 2009; Soliman, et al., 2016).   
This chapter provides a review of the development literature, summarizing core issues of 
development including poverty, the loss of individual place identity, and attachment which 
results from formal displacement practices as well as ambitious educational policies.    
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2.1 What is Development? 
Economic growth and social development are generally considered a ‘social good’ in 
that they elevate living standards.  Whitmore (2010: 169) contends that practitioners often 
assume “development itself is a benign process which simply needs to be steered in the right 
direction; that if one avoids certain key pitfalls and obstacles, good will result.”  However, the 
definition of ‘development’ is imprecise and varies from author to author and from place to 
place.  
Udogu (2005: 2) describes development as “a social condition in the nation state in 
which the authentic needs of its population are satisfied by the rational use of natural resources 
and systems.”  Growth and development are, according to Pereria (1984: 6), “a total social 
process in which the economic and political structures of a country undergo continual and 
profound transformation and a historical process which occurs through stages and eventually 
becomes self-sustaining.”  Kelsall (2011: 4) defined development as “the transformation of the 
economy and personal well-being expressed through a positive change in economic growth.”  
However, he carefully noted his definition was limited and did not address changes in political 
freedoms.  Fukuyama (2001: 8) further concludes that social development results in greater 
human capital and cooperation and so it advances economic innovation that it is necessary if, 
for nothing else, than “as a means of achieving selfish ends.”   
Dudley Seers (1969: 3) asserts development occurs “with the reduction and elimination 
of poverty, inequality and unemployment within a growing economy.”  Yet he noted not all 
outcomes of development are positive, that some have decidedly negative effects upon groups 
and individuals, a proposition that is explored here.  According to Feldman, et al., (2016: 6) 
development has “the objective of creating prosperity and increasing citizens’ quality of life.”  
Feldman, et al, continued, saying this can create social tensions as different life-styles and 
cultures suddenly come into contact.  Urama & Acheampong (2013) determined “societies 
which enjoy economic affluence aren’t truly prosperous if that affluence benefits only a 
privileged few, rather than being spread throughout society.”  Further, Cigdem, et al., (2009: 10) 
noted that profound social changes resulting from different forms of development might create 
conditions of forced mobility and rural-to-urban migration.   
Indeed, developmental advances often give rise to displacement and as Schmidt & 
Bekele (2016: 1) note “the literature argues that as an economy grows, the location and 
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structure of labour transitions from primarily rural, agricultural-focussed activities to more 
urbanized activities in the industrial and service sectors.” Hence, development may perform as a 
negative accelerant.  Under-educated and technically unskilled workers who may have been 
successful in other locations and occupations become marginalized as “development of one 
part of the system becomes detrimental to other parts, giving rise to conflicting objectives” 
(Huang, 1995; Schedler, 2006; Bellu, 2011: 2).   
While some of these changes occur through the process of forced displacement which is 
required for new infrastructure and other construction, others follow social displacement as 
individual circumstances and outlooks inevitably change through educational experiences (Van 
Gennep, 1909) and which Turner (1987) noted become individual social transitions.  As cities 
expand, the need for educated, technically capable workers for industrial and other activities 
normally increases while the overall demand for unskilled labour decreases.  As individuals are 
either pushed out of their previous lifestyles by displacement or choose new lifestyles through 
education, they can become socially placeless during the liminal period bridging their previous 
experiences and the uncertainty of their new lives (Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010).   
2.1.1 The Bretton Woods Conference and the Modern Development Era 
Within the literature (Boahen, 1985; Bertocchi & Canova, 2002; Austin, 2010; Ziltener, et 
al., 2017) there are significant assertions made that colonization of the African continent 
occurred in order to plunder its natural resources, with the colonization process having been 
formalized, at least among the delegate European nations, during the Berlin Conference of 
1884.  This had long term effects as African wealth was being extracted while at the same time 
indigenous social development was suppressed by the colonizing nations.  African social 
development was of little concern for the delegates and industrialization of the colonial holdings 
located in the global South, in their own right, was essentially an afterthought (Terborgh, 2003).  
These events continue, in theory, to result in the current underdevelopment of sub-Saharan 
nations.   
Modern efforts to facilitate improvements in economic and social conditions, as well as 
the agricultural and commercial sectors of lesser-developed countries, can be traced to the 
World War II Atlantic Charter agreed in 1941 by President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill (DoS, 1941).  While most of that Charter was specific to the war 
effort, its fifth point related to post-war economic reconstruction and development including the 
promise for:  
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“fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of 
securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security” 
(Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 236) 
Subsequently, the policies of isolationism and neutrality which had helped to lead the world into 
war were overturned by innovative post-war economic plans agreed at the 1944 Bretton Woods6 
conference (Kennedy, 2002).  These plans resulted in a continuing era of Northern political, 
economic, and humanitarian interventions.  
The Bretton Woods Framework 
Bretton Woods sought to establish a framework for post-war global financial 
management and monetary policy (Escobar, 1992).  At the time of that conference, “most of the 
developing countries were still colonies and only a relatively few, mainly independent nations of 
Latin America, were invited” to attend (Helleiner, 2015: 5).  Though Bretton Woods concluded 
that unrestricted international trade was essential for global economic growth, attendees initially 
favoured programmes which would benefit the already developed nations and their primary 
focus was rebuilding Europe following World War II.   
Nevertheless, Haque (1999) noted that, over time, theoretical and ideological shifts in 
development paradigms take place circularly.  They evolve from centralized state-led schemes 
to a greater reliance upon market forces and job creating commercial competition, back to state-
led development.  Moyo (2008: 10-26) confirmed this circular economic theory and found that it 
is differentiated according to seven broadly evolving political and ideological conditions which 
were first enunciated with (i) the 1944 declarations of Bretton Woods, (ii) and then as 
development and reconstruction began in earnest in 1947 with Marshall Plan aid designed by 
the major western powers to reconstruct a war-ravaged Europe and stabilize the American post-
war industrial base.   
Development took on a greater re-industrialization emphasis in the 1960s (iii) when, 
according to Skocpol, et al., (1987) Cold War tensions heightened.  This resulted in ideologically 
motivated perspectives of the developmental-state and a shift towards (iv) poverty alleviation in 
the 1970s that in the 1980s (v) transitioned to a period of Northern-imposed structural 
adjustments during the Reagan and Thatcher era.  Those adjustments required aid-recipients to 
                                                             
6 Bretton Woods was a gathering of financial and political delegates primarily from the industrialized Northern nations.  
With additional invitees, the conference eventually numbered 44 nations who worked to plan post-World War Two 
economic recovery through a series of measures pertaining to international exchange rates and open markets, global 
monetary systems and international development programmes. 
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adopt neo-liberal market reforms which minimized the active role central governments have 
played in African states.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s7 (vi) the 
overall focus of international aid programmes turned towards democratization and good 
governance rather than rapid cash infusions.  Moyo (2008: 26) describes the current path (vii) of 
western development theory which has taken place following the millennium as becoming a 
period of glamour aid whose way has been “paved by an army of moral campaigners, including 
pop stars and movie stars, and new philanthropists.”  This succeeded in “capitalizing on the 
success of raising cash for emergency aid, and extending it to a platform of raising development 
aid monies” (Ibid).  Beyond the evolutionary economic principles of Bretton Woods, Weinstein 
(2005) concluded that international development practice oscillates between a humanitarian 
perspective and a collective security perspective; that Northern policy makers view regionally 
destabilizing civil violence as a failure of local leadership; and that internal conflict and state 
instability are the result of inadequate governance.   
Chandler (2013) asserts traditional societies often face a no-win dilemma, acquiesing to 
external demands for the adoption of modernizing social and economic practices or to renounce 
those changes in order to “retain their cultures, institutions and individual convictions” 
(Whitmore, 2010: 173).  Some developing countries have chosen not to adopt the structural 
adjustments demanded by Northern economists following Bretton Woods, including calls for 
reductions in government subsidies to businesses and the contraction of the public sector (Ibid).  
They chose not to initiate too rapid modernization and cultural change which might inadvertantly 
extinguish useful government, social or religious institutions thereby displacing local traditions, 
including communal practices or group identities in order to suit the framework recommended 
by Northern donors and developrs.   
 
Ethiopia’s response was to choose what Gebreeyesus8 (2014: 3) described as a “defiant 
attitude” towards this neo-liberal advice and pursued its own “strong state role to guide the 
private sector in the development process.”  
                                                             
7 Superpower contestations, including aid and development programmes in the Horn of Africa are discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
8 Naming conventions in Ethiopia do not include family names.  Children are known by their given first name and then 
the name of their father.  Thus a child named ‘Zemenfes Gebregziabher’ carries his own name and that of his father..  
Following this convention, succeeding generations will not have the same easily traceable western-style surnames.  
In order to ensure transparency and to facilitate ready identification of the author(s) as they appear in print, the 
University of Reading recommends the same referencing convention for all authors as their names appear on the title 
page of journal articles, reports, or other reference sources.  Other naming conventions used in official documents 
are similarly vexing.  The Central Statistics Agency sometimes refers to itself as the Central Statistical Agency and 
the Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan may be referred to in government 
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2.1.2 State-led Development   
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2015: 71) lists five conceptual 
traits which developmental states engage in.  Those are (i) explicitly favouring certain sectors; 
(ii) commanding competent bureaucracies; (iii) placing robust and competent public institutions 
at the centre of development strategies; (iv) clearly articulating social and economic goals; and 
(v) deriving political legitimacy from their record of development.  Their choices set the direction 
of limited budgets regarding, for example, whether to expand educational access or procure 
more military armaments, all of which suggest that politics and the economy are inseparable.  
While there is no single definition of what a developmental state is, the definitions which were 
offered above are situationally dependent upon the location, circumstances, and their socio-
political realities (Radice, 2008; Caldentey, 2009).  Razvija (2007: 105) contends developmental 
states are “conceptually positioned between a free market capitalist economic system and a 
centrally planned economic system.”   
State Power and Development 
As Skocpol et al., (1987: 4) introduced, state-led development occurs as national 
governments situationally “adopt development as a purpose to which state power is put.”  Such 
initiatives are common practice.  Governments at all levels build infrastructure and provide 
services for the common good, thereby stimulating the economy.  Such state-led development 
may be particularly necessary following periods of economically and socially debilitating conflict9 
such as those experienced in Ethiopia (UNDP, 2008; Cevik & Rahmati, 2013).  These occurred 
after the overthrow of the Selassie monarchy in 1974 and was also followed in 1991 after the 
violent overthrow the Marxist-Dergue government, both of which resulted in periods of fierce 
reprisals and repression (Zenawi, 2012). 
2.1.3 Centralized Development in Ethiopia 
 
Prior to defeating the Dergue and taking control of the nation in May, 1991, the EPRDF 
had already begun its transformation to a functioning governmental structure.  Even as a 
guerrilla organization it had provided services and stability throughout the areas it was 
                                                             
documents as the “Addis Ababa Revised Master Plan.” The nomenclature chosen by the article’s author or agency 
for the title page is used here.  
9 A border war with Eritrea lasted from 1998 – 2000; war with Somalia occurred from 2006 – 2009, and border 
skirmishes with each of its neighbours continue to occur from time to time.  These conflicts divert limited public funds 
away from economic growth and social development to the military.  
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incrementally occupying.  It organized political committees and village councils and it 
established laws and courts to reduce banditry and other crime.  During that period it 
established its still-current practice of payments which are made for land expropriations as it 
ensured the provisions and transportation assets required by its advancing military forces were 
compensated rather than commandeered (Hailu, 2014).   
The administrative experience which the EPRDF had demonstrated during the war 
(Chinigo & Fantini, 2015) substantially increased popular pressure upon it to rapidly impose a 
governance structure over the entire country once the Dergue had been defeated.  Bach (2014: 
108/113) described this as the transitional period “from rebellion to government” and this 
included the need to rapidly address Ethiopia’s “economic potential in a country which had to be 
rebuilt.”  The literature notes the practical complexity of this task in post-conflict states is 
compounded by the competing need to deliver political and social changes which have been 
promised during conflict, yet simultaneously control a population that remains psychologically 
divided by civil war (Murthy & Lakahminarayana, 2006; NYU, 2016).  A primary concern of the 
new government in Ethiopia was to distance the nation from the strongly authoritarian economic 
and social policies of the Dergue regime while moving towards a more market oriented 
economy (Shumuye, 2015).   
Early Economic Growth in Zenawi’s Ethiopia 
While there are different interpretations, economic growth is often characterized in the 
literature as progressing through three stages (Acs, 2006: Bhattacharya & Das, 2008).  In this 
theory (i) economies begin with subsistence agriculture and smallholder agricultural production, 
leading to specialization and small sole-proprietor/family enterprises and light manufacturing.   
As industrialization takes place (ii) the economy transitions from agricultural production to small 
but then increasingly larger manufacturing interests, until it ultimately transitions (iii) to a service 
and information oriented economy.  Former Prime Minister Zenawi (2006: 36) took an Ethiopia-
centric approach, appearing to reject much of this economic theory by asserting it promoted 
“fragile, unstable democracy that is not only incapable of evolving into a stable and mature 
democracy but actually hinders the development of an alternative path of democracy.”  His 
Ethiopia-centric economic theory was contemporaneously analysed by Fritz & Menocal (2006: 
v) who recommended that “rather than focusing on what the ‘right’ role of the state is or should 
be as a normative issue”, government should concern itself “with why some states have been 
more capable and more supportive of development than others.”    
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Since 2002, state economic intervention in Ethiopia has taken this conceptual direction 
and enunciated it through four (to date) five-year development plans, including the Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Plan 2002-2005; and the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty 2006-2009.  The vision of the first Growth and 
Transformation Plan, 2010-2014 was to “build an economy that has a modern and productive 
agricultural sector with enhanced technology and an industrial sector which plays a leading role 
in the economy” (MoFED, 2010: 7).  In GTP I, infrastructure and social development received an 
increased degree of emphasis over what had been articulated in the two previous plans.  The 
Second Growth and Transformation Plan, for 2015-2019, continues to promote agricultural as 
the primary source of national employment.  It also introduces programmes which endorse 
greater individual savings and it provides a very substantial state investment in both the energy 
and overwhelmingly in the infrastructure sector, which is necessary to properly sequence later 
industrial development.  Clapham (2017: 5) links these investments in physical infrastructure 
and manufacturing to the emphasis of state-sponsored university programmes which are now 
comprised of “40% student enrollment in engineering programmes, 30% in other sciences and 
30% to arts and humanities” (see also MoI, 2013: 12).   
Nevertheless, Fantini (2013) predicted the federal government’s continued rate of public 
investment in job-producing infrastructure would be unsustainable in the long term.  The IMF 
(2014: 14) also foresaw a slowing of investment as sources of funding became scarce and, as 
one example, noted the federal government imposed a requirement “that civil servants sacrifice 
one-month’s pay to buy Renaissance Dam bonds” to fund national infrastructure projects.  
Clapham (2017: 6) concludes the continued high rate of investment in infrastructure is 
dependent upon “the government’s success in hoovering up any source of funds within the 
domestic economy to support its infrastructural drive”, including such centralized programmes 
as forcing banks to invest their deposits in government bonds.  While the literature confirms that 
GDP growth and social development continue along a beneficial arc, the rate of infrastructure 
construction has slowed, in part, due to funding constraints (IMF, 2016b; ADBG, 2017; NBE, 
2017, and WB, 2017b).  
Zenawi and Job Creation  
The literature and data concerning large scale job creation outside of the agricultural 
sector following the implementation of Zenawi’s state-led development is thin.  Schmidt & 
Bekele (2016: 3) note that Ethiopia’s 2013 National Labour Force Survey (CSA, 2014d) 
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collected and categorized workers differently than the previous survey and this gave a false 
impression of employment gains.  For example, rural workers who listed ‘firewood gathering and 
water collection’ as their occupation were counted as having been employed in 2013 but not 
2005.  Once Schmidt & Bekele controlled for them, the total “share of people working in 
agriculture decreased by only 3%” after the introduction of Zenawi’s centralized policies.  The 
Labour Force Survey also found formal work opportunities remained minimal in a nation with a 
2013 population of about 87 million.  Such categories as ‘stationary plant and machine 
operators’, including mining and mineral processing workers; metal processing and finishing 
plant operators; textile fur and leather products machine operators employed only 150,200 
labourers and the category of ‘business and administration professionals’ employed just 
126,100.  The number of higher-educated science and engineering professionals in formal 
employment numbered 64,700, while tela retailers (home brewed beer) employed 178,300 
workers (CSA 2014d: 187).   
2.2 What is Poverty?  
Poverty is widely addressed in development literature; it is a concept which is 
theoretically and practically related to problems and issues of underdevelopment and to the 
sometimes imbalanced attempts to modernize a nation.  Poverty is also a fluid concept, spoken 
of in terms of unequal availability of social resources and often considered to be the result of 
inequality of opportunity (Kuznets, 1955; Graff, 1998; Mancini; 2005).  Its definitions are relative 
and often based on social and economic expectations which are situationally constructed 
(Townsend, 1979; Bigsten & Shimeles, 2004; Cleaver, 2005).   
Bradshaw (2006: 4) described poverty generally, as a lack of necessities including “basic 
food, shelter, medical care, and safety.”  However, he is careful not to generalize what 
constitutes the state of poverty since necessities in one cultural circumstance may not be as 
important in other instances.  Walker (2015: 3) takes a wider approach to it, hypothesizing that 
“poverty is not just an absence of income, money or the money-like resources required to meet 
needs.  It is the multiple consequences of resource absence which are simultaneously 
experienced by people in poverty.”  In terms of economic growth programmes, Sen (1999: 3) 
concluded poverty reduction programmes must “contribute to expanding human freedom … that 
development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom [sic]: poverty.”   
Oscar Lewis (1966: 19) described popularized concepts of ‘the poor’ as existing along a 
subjective continuum from the “blessed, virtuous, upright and serene” to those who are 
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“shiftless, mean, sordid, violent and criminal.”  He noted that situations of poverty transcend 
national and regional boundaries; that it includes all races, and is both rural and urban in its 
setting.  Lewis went on, distinguishing between poverty and what he felt was a distinct ‘culture 
of poverty’ in that the poor remain poor due to a pattern of enculturated and value-laden 
decisions.  Being poor, he concluded, shapes friendship networks and determines spending 
patterns which contextually channel available problem resolutions to an ever smaller field of 
possibilities.   
Other theorists disagreed with Lewis’s overall approach to a defined culture of poverty.  
For example, Small, et al., (2010: 9) argued that regardless of social or economic circumstances 
there is not a pre-determined set of poverty-associated decisions.  Instead, they found that 
regardless of income “people differ substantially in the coping strategies they employ” rather 
than engaging in similar actions based on little more than economic status.  Walton (2011) took 
another view, contending the individual’s habitus, including personal economic circumstances, 
familiar place surroundings, social history and particularly the opinions of peer group members 
play a highly significant role in limiting the resolutions and opportunities available to the poor.  
Future behaviours are, he contends, substantially moulded by current associations, including 
the influence of place and culture. 
In marked contrast, Daubon (2005: 5) removed the economic and resource qualifiers 
and defined it in terms of exclusion from political participation, asserting:  
“Poverty is not the lack of things, 
it is the lack of power to change the circumstances that generate the lack of things.” 
Gergen (1999) took a political direction similar to Daubon, finding that cultural, youth, or 
other groups who are excluded from main-steam power sharing often develop their own forms 
of activism.  Without access to sufficient opportunities, their peer-group identities and place 
associations may become improperly channelled and potentially manifest in violent and 
destabilizing outcomes  Knowing this, Igoe (2006) concludes, allows elite members of the 
community to manipulate and exploit the marginalized and politically invisible, providing just 
enough social benefits to satisfice the needs of ostracised groups who then become temporarily 
co-opted.  Taydas & Peksen (2012) detailed this process of co-option, especially by semi-
authoritarian regimes, as being intended to shape the perceptions of the population by minimally 
meeting social demands, particularly for health care and distress food distribution.  In this way 
benefit programmes relieve today’s deprivation while maintaining its usefulness for tomorrow.  
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This dependence upon often crucial, government-supplied, benefits limits the likelihood of 
political agitation and so poverty is used as a means of social control.  Thus, poverty reduction 
must be seen as a layered phenomenon formed by an array of economic, social and political 
actors whose end goal may not be its long-term eradication. 
Chronic and Transient Poverty  
Two types of poverty are germane to this thesis: chronic and transient.  Bayucan-
Dacuycuy & Lim (2014) described their shared characteristics as including a generally low 
educational level of the head of household; individual employment in unstable and economically 
risk-filled occupations such as fishing or farming; a lack of adequate health care, especially 
following a catastrophic injury to the primary earner10; and a high dependency-burden ratio 
within the family unit that drains resources. 
Chronic poverty is generally described as long term and determined by household 
incomes which, over time, continuously fall below locally defined markers.  It may result in 
potentially undermining horizontal inequalities as otherwise equal actors escape it and become 
disproportionately successful in economic, political or social terms (Cloke, et al., 1995; Black, 
2003; CPRC, 2005; Liu & Werker, 2005).  Justino (2011) adds that chronic poverty establishes 
distinct social barriers to opportunities which might have otherwise been overcome to elevate 
family income (see also SDPRP, 2002; Brainard & Chollet, 2007; Collier, 2009).   
Other theorists (Muller, 1997; McKay & Lawson, 2003; Devereux, et al., 2012) contend 
poverty is more often transient than static, and therefore it is not truly chronic. Instead, the poor 
move in and out of it in response to temporary economic or social conditions such as may occur 
after a poor harvest or due to the economic destruction which can take place during civil 
disturbances.  Thus, it is the repeated exposure to shocks that results in transient poverty 
becoming chronically long-term.  This supports Elhadi, et al., (2012) who found that households 
with historically higher earnings, or that had relied more upon non-farm employment are less 
likely to become transiently poor due to the diversification of their economic portfolios.  In places 
such as Ethiopia, where rural populations have been highly dependent upon precarious 
agricultural production or have few non-farm income alternatives to mitigate their risk, chronic 
                                                             
10 This is not a situation confined to developing nations.  Himmelstein, et al., (2009) found that in the United States, 
fully 60% of family bankrupticies were due to medical costs following illness or injury. 
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poverty is likely to result from events such as forced displacement which are outside of 
individual ability to control or recover from. 
2.2.1 Deepening Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa  
 
In researching economic growth for the OECD, Maddison (2001) noted that after 17 
decades of development (including the colonial period) sub-Saharan Africa had, by 1992, only 
achieved the average per capita income Western Europe had attained in 1820.  The European 
Union’s “European Security Strategy, 2003” found that “In much of the developing world, 
poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns … [that] 
sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago” (EU, 2003: 2).  A decade later, the 
United Nations Millennium Development Goals Report confirmed the trend identified by both 
Maddison and the EU, noting “that sub-Saharan Africa is the only MDG region which saw the 
number of people living in extreme poverty rise steadily, from 290 million in 1990 to 414 million 
in 2010” (UNDP, 2012: 7).  Thus, what are essentially time-lapse studies conducted by the 
OECD, the EU, and the United Nations suggest that regardless of the intensity of development 
efforts, results may not end in beneficial outcomes if the social and political system does not 
provide sufficient economic opportunity.   
 
2.2.2 Poverty in Rural Ethiopia 
Conceding there are no simple definitions or causes, the World Bank noted that poverty 
in Ethiopia is most prevalent among the uneducated and agriculturalists (WB, 2005).  The Bank 
concluded that a complex mixture of a highly dense rural population and severe land shortages; 
recurring drought and declining soil fertility; inadequate access to inputs such as seed and 
fertilizers, as well as limited market opportunities contribute to an overall situation of pervasive 
rural poverty.   
Poverty among the rural population is, in part, also attributed to issues pertaining to land 
distribution.  Due to the extraordinary amount of individual labour which is able to be devoted to 
smaller holdings, the literature (e.g., Ali & Deininger, 2014; Helfand & Taylor, 2017) tentatively 
finds an ‘inverse relationship’ between farm size and higher productivity which can be realized 
by smallholders who are prone to intensively cultivating their plots11 and therefore can maximize 
                                                             
11 The literature is limited and suggests the ‘inverse relationship’ phenomena has not yet been adequately researched 
in Africa and so generalizable conclusions, or conclusions specific to Ethiopia, may be premature.   
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their harvests.  Yet even so, small-holdings in Ethiopia are often not of sufficient size to provide 
adequate incomes.   
Using findings from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey to interrogate these 
assertions of productivity, Savastano & Scandizzo (2017) concluded that while there is indeed a 
relationship with labour-intensity, ultimately it is individual skill, self-efficacy, and a willingness to 
innovate that are most important to success.  At the same time, the expense of seed and 
fertilizer, the lack of credit, and the decreasing number of agricultural development agents limits 
access to new techniques which might increase family income. Moreover, small holdings are 
often too fragmented to be economically viable (Akay et al., 2009; Paul & wa Gĩthĩnji, 2017).  
This fragmentation requires smallholders and their draught animals to walk longer distances 
from their homes, consuming valuable time which might otherwise have been spent working the 
fields or in off-farm employment.  
Further, as described by Moges (2013: 96) economic growth in Ethiopia is not neutral 
and most often obtains to those who “have the capability to initiate growth and it eventually 
reaches those economic agents who get employment opportunities and those who produce 
factor inputs for the production process.”  Small holder farmers and other rural residents may be 
among those who are most excluded from new off-farm opportunities, for example, by time 
constraints from farming or by their physical and social isolation.  While some may have the 
ability needed, their time is spent in labour intensive agricultural pursuits and so they lack the 
chance to fully participate through observation and adaptation in the employment opportunities 
that emerge as other sectors of Ethiopia’s economy develop.  Thus, poor rural populations 
simply have fewer technical and social opportunities to increase their income and, regardless of 
effort or inputs, poverty is still not significantly reduced. 
2.2.3 Job Creation and Under-employment in Ethiopia’s Formal and Informal Economy  
Among Ethiopia’s skilled and/or educated urban labour force, unemployment is a 
relatively new phenomenon.  Seid, et al., (2015) conclude this situation results from the 
unsustainable expansion in the number of university graduates who annually enter the labour 
market and a lack of suitable job creation.  The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2013: 
17) found particularly high and destabilizing rates of unemployment among educated youth 
(Figure 2.1) that was most profound among secondary school leavers.  Broussard & 
Tekleselassie (2012) specifically note that while there has been significant improvement in 
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educational attendance, the new jobs which have been created have not provided sufficient 
employment opportunities for Ethiopia’s now better-educated youth.  Similarly, Nayak (2014: 35) 
concludes that lower rates of economic growth “manifest in low economic activity, and low  
 
investment entails low overall job creation” (see also CSA, 2011; Richardson, 2011; and ADBG, 
2017).   
Formal and Informal Sectors 
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The formal sector of Ethiopia’s economy generally consists of employment which 
includes normal work hours and regular wages upon which income taxes are reported and paid; 
and within this sector businesses are registered and regulated (Spring, 2009).  In addition to 
these criteria, Hart (1973) suggested a useful distinction between formal and informal 
employment is whether labour is permanent and persistent or casual and temporary.  The 
informal sector is further characterised by low investment and low levels of productivity, poor 
working conditions, and lack of job security (Herrera-Idarraga, et al., 2013).  Agricultural 
employment is the mainstay of rural employment and the availability of wage-paying non-farm 
labour is scarce.  Lemi (2009) noted that aside from temporary day-wage employment on 
neighbouring farms, there are simply too few employment opportunities in most rural areas.   
The Informal Economy and Beginnings of Under-employment 
The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2009) concludes the informal economy 
arises from the transformation process in a developing state and exists because the formal 
economy is not yet able to offer employment opportunities to a sufficient portion of the labour 
force.  Thus, while it may employ a substantial number of individuals, the informal sector is 
indicative of an unstable economic system which is unable to create standardized opportunities 
for its population.  Benjamin & Mbaye, (2012: 5) found the overwhelming majority of businesses 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa are small and informal, selling primarily “low quality products to 
other micro-enterprises and low-income households in a highly competitive market”; that these 
enterprises are rarely engaged in exports and that they “operate in a completely unregulated 
labour market where their employees have no social security protections.”  Dibie & Diebe (2014) 
find although Ethiopia’s federal government has introduced regulatory reform such as 
prohibiting child labour and that it facilitates the creation of micro-enterprises, neither of these 
measures creates sustainable nor decent employment opportunities.  
Employment in informal enterprises in Ethiopia is dominated by those with low 
educational levels.  Loening & Imru (2009) found there is substantial competition for low and 
unskilled employment.  The 2011 Central Statistics Agency (CSA, 2011) report “Urban 
Employment Unemployment Survey” found the informal economy supported approximately 36% 
of workers in the metropolis of Addis Ababa, while the Central Statistical Agency reports a still 
high rate of 24.8% in 2014 (CSA, 2014c).   
2.3. Locus of Control, Self-efficacy, and Risk Aversion 
49 
 
While some researchers continue to define the poor primarily by their lack of material 
goods, others conclude it is a symptom of a lack of visibility, economic opportunity, social 
mobility and voice (Pettit, 2013: 9).  Recently, Onu, et.al (2013) and Abay, et. al (2017) 
described poverty as the result of a flawed self-perception, that people are deeply influenced by 
their ‘locus of control’ whereby events are determined by individual ability and willingness to 
adopt new technologies or to advance their educations.  Those with a high internal-locus of 
control, such as may be present among successful students, gives the individual license to 
believe in their own capacity for success and goal achievement.  Here, Avtgis (1998) gives the 
example of the development of a personal ethic that social mobility is possible with sufficient 
application of energy and perseverance.  In contrast, an external-locus of control indicates a 
belief “that the task at hand, whether it be schooling or in the workplace, is futile because 
however much effort is applied the desired [positive] result may not occur” (Lenton, 2014: 6).  
Rashid (2016: 3) likewise posits that imagined incidents of discrimination, or abstractly hostile 
social conditions, “tend to result in self-fulfilling expectations, that people with a high external-
locus of control realize failure far more often than those with a high internal-locus” and that 
responses to personal experience are often as responsible for continued poverty or joblessness 
as genuine discrimination by elite groups.   
Among Ethiopian smallholders with a high external-locus of control, Abay, et al., (2017: 
98) conclude that advanced cognitive skills often remain weak in the absence of supporting 
factors. This results in an inability to resolve complex problems such as whether to use a newly 
introduced fertilizer whose result they have not witnessed despite “substantial efforts and 
investments to promote modern agricultural technologies.”  In an earlier study of Ethiopia, Abay, 
et al., (2016: 108) attributed this to ‘hyperbolic discounting’, meaning that smallholders typically 
decline to think in terms of a distant future; that the limited “psychological capital (locus of 
control) of farmers” helps to explain their decision-making processes in those cases where there 
is little ability to control events.  This supports Legesse & Drake’s (2005: 388) earlier research 
which found these traits of internal and external locus of control were similar for male and 
female Ethiopian smallholders, and that it is primarily individual experiences and education 
levels which tend to influence the life-approach taken by the individual.   
Self-efficacy 
Parallel to locus of control, individual change and transformation are the result of self-
efficacy, the belief or lack of belief in one’s own ability to succeed or to accomplish specific 
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tasks.  Wuepper & Lybbert (2017: 2) conclude “Individuals who were not capable of something 
in the past due to external constraints are less likely to be capable of it in the future” even when 
circumstances may have changed dramatically, such as a result of land expropriation or 
education, and that their tendencies are coloured by “their experiences [and] their peers’ 
experiences” (Ibid, 8).  Thus, self-efficacy tends to be a learned response to either success or 
failure, and risk-averse behaviour is often intensified by peer group inclusion.   
The findings by Legesse & Drake (2005) and Abay, et al., (2016) are congruent with 
behavioural studies asserting successful goal achievement as being realized through an internal 
locus of control, especially in the completion of life-altering educational or vocational training 
regimens (Zimmerman, 2000; Zhao & Hills, 2005; Artino, 2012).  Bandura (1982: 122) noted 
that in general “the higher the level of internal self-efficacy, the higher the performance of 
individual accomplishments.”  Hence, it is individual adaptability which may determine 
successful outcomes in a rapidly changing social and economic environment. These changes 
can include instances of displacement such as are occurring in the study area or through 
vocational training and education and which may have the effect of separating the individual 
from the support of past group associations but fail to provide a future pathway.  
Risk Aversion  
According to Logan (2009) and Pawson, et al., (2011) the coping methods commonly 
exhibited by smallholders within sub-Saharan Africa suggest they are highly familiar with risk 
since reliance on erratic, rain-fed agriculture for one’s livelihood is inherently risk-prone 
behaviour (Zinn & Taylor-Gooby, 2006).  Wilkinson & Pickett (2010) similarly found smallholders 
were fully aware of risk, including the potential for crop disease and price fluctuations; livestock 
mortality, or debilitating personal injury and illness.  While these common risks are known and 
accepted as part of farming, smallholders are likely to attempt to avoid additional risk.  Hence, 
Henrich & McElreath (2002) and Yesuf & Bluffstone (2009) conclude that when presented with 
unproven and unwitnessed strategies Ethiopian smallholders display a strong tendency to 
choose the course which leads to the least risk and lowest probability of failure. Henrich & 
McElreath (2002) likewise find smallholders are likely to retain familiar yet low-return techniques 
rather than implement untested innovations that might result in higher output, but which might 
also end in crop failure.  Rijkers & Soderbom (2013) conclude that in Ethiopia this risk aversion 
may easily extend to the choice of whether to invest in vocational training programmes.   
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Unsurprisingly, youth are more likely to adopt new behaviours to more actively shape 
their own futures.  Hence, it is often youthful students who may discount political and social risk, 
feeling their education and the rightness of their demands will protect them and provide entrée 
to opportunity even where it is no longer available (Eight, 2013; Mulderig, 2013; IMF, 2016) in 
sufficient quantity. 
2.3.1 Business Risk Aversion and Cultural Obligations  
Micro-enterprises engaging in direct-to-consumer retail sales are the most likely to fail 
(Gebreeyesus, 2007; Bekele & Worku, 2008; Adam, 2014).  For risk-averse subsistence 
farmers with little excess capital to invest, and who accept lower returns for limited risks, the 
decision to open a micro-enterprise can be potentially costly and personally traumatic.   
Alby, et al., (2013) found that in traditional sub-Saharan social networks sharing is an 
important cultural norm which most people do not breach, while at the same time accumulation 
and conspicuous wealth are not virtues to be emulated.  Successful family members, Alby 
contends, have an obligation to share their earnings and resources with needier relatives.  
Those obligations, however, directly impede investment in one’s on-going enterprise or the 
establishment of a small business. Therefore, rather than support those relatives, many 
smallholding Ethiopians choose to consume their earnings as rapidly as possible rather than to 
meet cultural obligations (Eenhoorn & Becx, 2007; Hailesellasie, et al., 2013).   
Nevertheless, the economic importance of small business start-ups and growth to the 
nation cannot be over stated and, as Muske, et al., (2007) detail, small and micro businesses 
employ local residents even if only for a short time.  Small businesses cause cash to move 
throughout the local economy and their owners to remain in the community rather than 
migrating to larger cities, thereby stabilizing the most productive and innovative residents 
(Aurick, et al., 2017).  Enterprises which rely upon some non-perishable and low-technology 
vocationally-acquired skills such as tailoring, joinery, or furniture making are the least likely to 
close within a year of their initiation (Tybout, 2000; Kibert, et al., 2013).  Yet, it is unrealistic to 
expect a majority of individuals to possess the acumen to engage in a business of their own. 
Thus, the development of durable and marketable non-farm skills, short of dedicated business 
development programs, may be especially useful for livelihood regeneration following 
displacement.   
2.3.2 Horizontal Inequality 
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In studies of Ethiopian children’s educational outcomes, inequality is assumed to be a 
result of structurally imposed differences between groups with essentially common identities 
(Tesfay & Malmberg, 2014).  Stewart (2000: 249) defined the multi-dimensional nature of 
horizontal inequalities as resulting from “strongly shared group circumstances” which may 
include the inability of a culturally defined group12 to access the political process.  Group 
membership provides social stability and helps to define norms of conduct among its 
constituents.  It nurtures socialization and cooperation, resulting in a depth of reciprocal identity, 
with communal affiliations becoming based on an exclusivity derived from limited entry and the 
internal reinforcement of its members’ behaviour (Goette, et al., 2006; Swann, et al., 2012).  
However, this exclusiveness fosters a lack of adaptation, limiting members’ own human-capital 
development and agency.  Wilkinson & Pickett (2010: 18) concluded “among these, and other 
social problems, almost all are more common at the bottom of the social ladder and are even 
more common in more unequal societies.” 
Income Inequality and Poverty 
Income inequality, described as the earnings gap between the rich and poor, has 
widened in developing nations during the past decade and result in significant social problems 
(Maddison, 2001; EU, 2003; UNDP, 2012).  Those include shortened life expectancy associated 
with lifestyle, exposure to higher crime rates, and increased mental illness.  They also include 
lower achievement levels in school which has a long-term impact on earnings that further 
increases social stratification (Larsson, 2006; Webster & Kingston, 2014).  In terms of income 
inequality, Eriksen & Lind (2009: 818) contend that “change has uneven outcomes and 
inherently conflicting interests” because individuals and groups experience it at different rates.  
Moreover, social and economic disparities trap some people in generational poverty while 
allowing others to prosper, collectively widening already existing societal fissures (Rao, 2006).   
Horizontal inequalities may easily destabilize social systems including those among 
groups of people who otherwise share common interests and identities (Stewart, 2002; 2008; & 
2011).  This is an especially salient issue among younger males who are unable to find 
employment which is commensurate with their expectations after acquiring education or labour 
skills (Pape, 2005; Eight, 2013) and who are most likely to act upon their frustrations.  This 
                                                             
12 As defined by Stewart (2002: 2) “groups encompass common cultural identities.”  She very broadly extends her 
definition to a range of affiliations and identities, including a common language or history; lifestyle, values and 
behaviour; ethnicity or religious belief; regional differences, class or, most germane here, occupation.  
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further suggests instability is an outcome of inequality in the distribution of education and 
therfore economic benefits.  It likewise challenges the belief that higher education is always 
beneficial or that education will force ‘development from above’ to create new employment 
opportunities (Irizarry, 1980; Rasmussen & Sorheim, 2006).  Thus, horizontal inequality also 
results, in part, from educational-bias.  
Income and Horizontal Inequality 
Theories of persistent income inequality, described by Durlauf (1996) and Fukunishi & 
Machikita (2017) suggest the level of human capital investment in children is related to both the 
community in which a family resides and the economic ability of children’s parents to invest in 
their education. Smeedling (2013: 3) found these tendencies towards social stratification and 
the group associations of parents “are transferred to children by an early age; that in no country 
do low-SES13 children start out as equally prepared for schooling” as higher status children.  
This has an effect on both early education and later life aspiration to higher social status and 
earnings.    
Just as Oscar Lewis (1966) had suggested thirty years earlier, poverty shapes friendship 
networks and determines spending patterns.  Durlauf (1996: 77) found strong evidence of 
internal causation for social stratification and group identity where “the tendency is for agents 
with similar characteristics to interact only with one another.”  Despite their essentially equal 
origins, some individuals do attain higher levels of social status, education, and wealth.  Once it 
is sufficiently achieved, they begin to associate with others who they have become more alike 
and eventually they may even physically move house to be in a position to better associate with 
their new economic peers.     
However, the consequence of their movement to different social groups leaves behind 
increasingly isolated islands of poverty which may be characterized by scarcity, indigence, and 
illiteracy (Cooper, et al., 1993).  This isolation sustains itself over time.  It results in a tendency 
towards chronic inter-generational poverty which, in circular fashion, leads to a loss of 
interaction with mainstream society including the association with its more successful members 
who could provide role models for displaced smallholders or appropriate employment 
opportunities for recent graduates. 
                                                             
13 Socio-economic status. 
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2.4 Relative Disparity, Youth and the Beginning of Violence 
Reynolds & Baird (2010) conclude that unrealized expectations, especially among 
younger adults, result in feelings of depression, isolation and social disarticulation.  They note 
the emotional dissonance which results when people have envisioned their future yet have only 
attained lesser results, depends in significant measure upon the degree of adaptabilty which the 
individual possesses.  Baland (1989: 521) concluded that in developing nations, social 
disarticulation results from disparaties in employment and the resulting income inequalites.  
However, nationally improved economic conditions do not automatically result in equitable 
distribution of opportunity (Huang, 1995).  Newly educated or trained youth, for example, may 
find it difficult to obtain employment if the economy has slowed (Cerra & Saxena, 2007) or if it 
has become imbalanced through an emphasis upon only some sectors, i.e., agriculture rather 
than manufacturing, rather than through a broad approach to growth and employment. 
Peer Group Sustainment 
Consequently, there may be negative outcomes if the individual is socially sustained 
only by others who have also failed to attain their goals, such as the personally unrealized 
expectation of finding employment following the completion of an educational or training 
programme.  Pape (2005) concludes that among youth, the real or imagined feelings of unmet 
social and economic mobility following education, and the disparities involved, are likely to 
become shared sources of frustration, of mounting anger and potential violence.  This concept 
supports Stewart’s (2008) views of horizontal inequalities and relative deprivation which she, 
too, contends can lead to violence.  Taspinar (2015: 78) also explained the destabilizing effects 
of youth under-employment and their influence upon violence and security issues.  He noted “It 
is precisely when people develop high expectations, aspirations, and hopes for upward mobility 
that we have to pay more attention to the potential for frustration, humiliation, and 
radicalization.”  Thus, there can be negative effects of social disarticulation (Huang; 1995) which 
incite the activities of some group members and which, taken to the extreme, ultimately infringe 
upon the security of the larger society.  
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Fjelde & Ostby (2010) found that it is a combination of uneven access to economic 
goods, including education, that often lead to the differentiations which trigger destabilizing 
inter-group division and potential violence.  The socio-economic status of student’s parents has 
been shown to accurately predict entry to tertiary educational experiences and this is because 
households with greater incomes tend to demand better educational outcomes (Considine & 
Zappala, 2002; Jerrim, 2014).  Higher income parents, including those in rural Ethiopia 
purchase more and better-quality education for their children which prepares them to take 
advantage of subsequent employment opportunities (Lundberg, 2013; MoE, 2015).  
In Ethiopia then, the children of higher income rural parents may benefit from secondary 
and tertiary educational access more than the equally talented children of lower income parents 
(Dohmen, et al., 2005; Fukunishi & Machikita, 2017).  Despite initially high unemployment rates 
(ILO, 2017) school completion generally results in eventual financial earnings for the student 
who can then better support her own family and it elevates household-economic status in 
relation to that of neighbouring families.  Germane to this study, Stewart (2002b) and others 
(e.g., SDPRP, 2002; Mancini, 2005; Ostby, 2008; UNICEF, 2015) conclude that unequal 
availability and access among youth which results in horizontal disparities can lead to violent 
internal conflict, particularly within a still developing nation.  This can occur, for example, when 
scarce funding is disproportionately directed to programmes which would temporarily pacify a 
younger population through educational attendance, but which do not also result in sufficient 
employment if later opportunities are not available.   
Comparisons regarding unequal opportunity and relative deprivation tend to weaken with 
age and over time the potential for violence is reduced (Suls & Mullen, 1982; Smith, et al., 
2012).  Suls & Mullen suggested older populations do not engage in unrest due to their gradual 
disengagement from society especially as they begin to isolate themselves within familiar social 
groups, and particularly as their cognitive and physical capacities begin to deteriorate.  As their 
social and time horizons shorten, the reactions among older workers to obvious and on-going 
developmental inequalities are not as sharp or as violent as those of younger cohorts, even 
though their attachment to place and group identity often becomes stronger. 
2.5 Displacement Through Development 
Displacement is often associated with eviction or ousting from a place and this occurs for 
multiple reasons including conflict, rapidly developing natural disasters, slow-onset 
environmental change, or through other types of physical development.  Yet, it is the individual 
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connection to the land that Terminski (2015: 11) described as the “fundamental point of 
economic, social and cultural reference.”  The UNHCR (2015) estimated that, on a global scale 
in 2015, 12.4 million people were displaced by conflict including some 8.6 million people who 
were internally displaced.  However, this is fewer than the 15 million individuals Terminski14 has 
estimated are displaced annually by development projects, though this type of forced 
displacement receives relatively little popular attention.  Eviction ultimately results in what 
Cernea (1996: 1515) had described as “changes in the status quo and such change usually 
entails social disruptions and undesirable consequences for some population segments.”   
2.5.1 Common and Intersecting Categories of Displacement  
There are three primary categories of displacement: refugees, displaced persons and 
oustees.  The internationally accepted definition of a refugee was established by the 1951 
United Nations Convention on Refugees as someone who has been forced either by on-going 
war or by well-founded threats of violence or persecution to flee his/her country (Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1(A)(2), 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6216).  The 
Convention, though, applies only to persons who have crossed international borders.  A second 
category includes internally displaced persons (IDP) who are defined as: 
“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave 
their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or 
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized 
State border” (UNHCHR, 1997: 5; UNOCHA, 2004: 11).   
A third, and the most numerous category of displacement includes oustees, most often 
people who are forcibly displaced due to infrastructure construction, industrial, commercial or 
residential development.  Development–induced displacement is considered by some subject 
matter experts to be a ‘human-made disaster’ (Mason: 2000; Mehta & Gupte, 2003; Turton, 
2003).  However, the literature notes that while international responses are often raised for 
natural or conflict-induced displacement (Cernea, 1999; Robinson, 2003; Terminski, 2015) few 
efforts are made for developmentally induced ousting, even though its results are equally 
disruptive and more long term.  The former UN Secretary General’s Special Representative, 
Francis Deng (in Pettersson, 2002: 17) explained this lack of organized response regarding 
                                                             
14 An estimate conducted by the World Bank 20 years prior to Terminski found that 10 million people were, on a 
global scale, being displaced annually by dam construction, residential development, roads, electrical transmission 
lines or other infrastructure projects (WB, 1994).  Terminski shows the raw number of people who are being displaced 
as a result of development is increasing over time. 
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oustees, noting “governments naturally fight harder to maintain the concept of national 
sovereignty when the perpetrator of displacement is the state itself.” Unlike other groups, 
oustees have no international legal protections (Horst & Grabska, 2015).  They remain the 
responsibility of their own governments, which Ferris & Winthrop (2010: 8) concluded “is 
obviously problematic in cases where national authorities have contributed to the displacement.”   
Refugees, IDPs, and oustees, however, go through essentially the same loss of identity 
and social disintegration; they lose not only their physical place but also “undergo a major 
disruption in their patterns of social organization and culture” (Cernea, 1996b: 295; Ujang & 
Zakariya, 2015).  Mehta & Gupte (2003) described oustees as a subset of the internally 
displaced, noting both groups are similarly uprooted from their surroundings; from their 
traditions, livelihoods, and familiar associations by circumstances beyond their control as their 
land is repurposed.   
2.5.2 In situ and Ex situ Displacement 
Displacement is discussed in the literature as either in situ, in the original place, or ex 
situ in terms of the permanent loss of property rights and place.  These may emanate from 
development or other expropriation through the process of eminent domain which takes 
property for new infrastructure, housing, industrial parks or for other reasons which usurp land 
ownership rights (White, et al., 2013).  
Feldman, et al., (2003) depicts in situ displacement as resulting in exclusions, including 
the loss of welfare benefits, civil rights, and other entitlements.  Chaudhry (2010: 623) conveyed 
the phrase as it might apply to slum clearance programmes, stating “informal settlements and 
slums should be regularized, legalized, and upgraded in situ, where possible.”  Patel et al., 
(2015: 232) suggest in situ displacement is the failure of developrs to budget for basic services 
and replacement housing “within the profit-making projects that displace” urban poor.  Finally, 
Hindman, et al., (2015: 17) used in situ to recommend inner-city redevelopment techniques 
which provide “temporary accommodation for slum-dwellers until [new] construction is 
complete.”  Each of these definitions suggest economic growth or resource related in-place 
eviction, yet sanitizes the issue of the forced loss of livelihoods among an occupationally 
competent and still productive population. 
In contrast, ex situ displacement is defined by Burkett (2011: 346) as “forced from their 
original place of being.”  Vanclay (2017: 3) notes that ex situ displacement occurs as “large-
58 
 
scale development or infrastructure projects typically require land and sometimes very large 
tracts of land.”  Consequently, current tenants are forced to permanently relocate and the effect 
of these projects is to interrupt livelihoods and social networks; they disrupt place attachments, 
irretrievably damage income generation, and irreparably separate entire communities.   
Zimbabwe’s programme of coercive land acquisition is a combined example of both in 
situ and ex situ displacement.  Large and generally profitable commercial farms, which were 
primarily owned and operated by white farmers who, though born in Zimbabwe were seen by 
the national government as colonialists, were nationalized.  Magaramobe (2010: 361) describes 
how this resulted not only in “an exodus of white farmers from their properties, but the loss of 
jobs and livelihoods for thousands of farmworkers.”  Local workers, who were not forced to 
relocate, suddenly found themselves jobless, having “lost regular incomes as well as their 
access to basic social services such as housing, health and education” that had been made 
possible by the ousted farmers (Ibid).   
The incremental loss of rural land as the result of urban expansion and the construction 
of urban-use buildings in peri-urban areas is described as ‘rurbanisation’ by Bevan (2016) and 
results in its own form of ex situ displacement.  This occurs as the process of urban sprawl 
consumes land along the periphery of the municipal boundaries and heralds the gradual 
transformation of those areas from rural to urban uses (Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2017).  While 
this is clearly one form of the displacing development occurring in the study area, its incremental 
nature does not require the wholesale expropriation of large areas of land for the construction of 
new dwellings, something that is explored in chapter 4 as occurring in relation to the Addis 
Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan (Proclamation Number 
17/2004).  Yet the importance of ex situ displacement is that it is essentially invisible and 
creates no external constituency group to advocate for its oustees. 
2.5.3 Success Amongst Oustees  
Ousted smallholders are invested psychologically in their land, and its loss results in 
physical and social rootlessness and a lack of purpose (Relph, 1976; Pierce, et al., 2001).  
Importantly, in addition to the outcome of landlessness once they have been ousted, 
smallholders often become jobless because they have few marketable non-farm skills with 
which to transition to another viable livelihood (UNESCO, 1975; AU, 2007; Belete, 2011).  As 
they become disassociated from their previous agricultural environments, including their 
“beliefs, attitudes, norms, and roles” (Hung & Chen, 2007: 148) they must seek employment in 
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whatever work is available locally, including that which may be found in culturally and socially 
unfamiliar circumstances such as manufacturing operations.  In Ethiopia, a study by Belda 
(2016: 3867) found these necessary personal adaptations may be hindered due to structural 
issues, that federal and regional policies “have slowed the rural-urban transformation” and have 
actively restricted labour migration.  However, the social forces of groupism and identity which 
were developed and enculturated over the course of a life-time may also form barriers to the 
acquisition of new employment skills which would threaten the loss of important personal and 
social identities, and so resettlement and livelihood change are delayed by the desire to 
maintain group membership and identity (Douglas, 1992).  
Gebre (2002) found a broad continuum of success among internally displaced 
individuals, concluding those who voluntarily relocated were invariably more accepting and 
more successful in their new environs than those who had been forced to relocate by 
administrative fiat.  People who have been involuntarily ousted often lack the motivation to fully 
participate in displacement programmes or to help them succeed.  Gebre concluded they tend 
to be resistant to acculturation within their new communities or within a new livelihood, and 
typically spend their time planning ways to return to their former places or identities.  Ultimately, 
when they do become employed they are more likely to obtain part-time and much lower paying 
work then they had before (Brand, 2014).  Therefore, the manner in which individuals or groups 
are displaced, being either voluntary or forced, and whether through education or development, 
is important to their outcomes especially as social systems are disrupted and their support 
networks are no longer functional. 
2.5.3 Groupism and Social Systems 
Groups and group membership result from shared conditions and associations and 
represent “complex interactions of individuals with their communities” (Galbin, 2014: 84) which 
can be correlated with the social influences and pressures of ‘being authentic’.  Authenticity is 
the condition wherein individuals “need to be like others and to get on with them” (Owen, 1995: 
166).  It occurs when “people’s behaviours and choices converge to match the behaviours and 
choices of others” (Berger & Heath, 2008: 123) through assimilation.  While group members 
continue to display their individualities, groupism ensures they do so within bounded norms 
(Park, 1921)15.  In a more recent study, Mildenberger & Tingley (2017: 2) found that 
                                                             
15  Park (1921: 171) found that social groups “maintain their own organization, agencies and formal methods of 
behaviour on a basis and in a setting of instinct, of habit, and of tradition”; that groups have their own internal cultures 
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membership in a community of praxis “facilitates behavioural co-ordination.”  This is driven by 
“second order-beliefs, individuals’ perceptions of others’ beliefs, including those of peer groups 
and friendship networks which work to limit individual activities if membership in them is to be 
maintained.”   
Assimilation, Belonging and Liminality 
Assimilation is highly dependent upon the shared personal interactions over the course 
of time.  These result in a communal sense of belonging and place.  Acquaintances and 
personal histories form our worldviews and shape our decisions, and their loss in order to 
pursue a new livelihood or obtain training or education might come at the cost of leaving behind 
comfortable peer group associations.  The loss of that sense of belonging can create feelings of 
agitation until the individual has transitioned into, and been accepted, in his new environs.  
Turner (1987: 95) characterized this as the period of “betwixt and between the positions 
assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremony.”  This liminal period, which 
can be applied to both social and educational experiences, “changes one’s sense of who they 
were” and so it is both disorienting and isolating (Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010: 4).  Supportively 
and in terms of social risk, Brookfield (2005: 52) described the “emotionally sustaining groups of 
peers” who are consistently spoken of as “a second family” or as “the only people who really 
understand what I’m going through” but whose contact may be lost as the individual changes his 
position relative to that of other members of the peer group.  Zinn & Taylor-Gooby (2006: 37) 
found this perception of social risk is best understood “against the background of individual 
embeddedness in their social-cultural background and identity as a member of a social group.”   
The liminal period is the “transition from the old to new being and understanding” 
(Rutherford & Pickup, 2015: 706).  During this passage the oustee and student are no longer 
what they were, but are not yet what they will become and divergent responses by each group 
are made under conditions of uncertainty regarding their individual and group futures 
(Brookfield, 2005; Akay et al., 2009).  In the case of smallholders, it reinforces a sense of 
groupism and insularity, while among youth it may lead to a rise in risky civil disobedience 
(Douglas, 1992; Williams & Balaz, 2012). 
                                                             
and folkways which “impose patterns, with participants having both individuality and membership” in a recognizable 
and unique collective.   
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Assimilation into other groups, though, has been suggested as being patronizing; that in 
some cases it imposes cultural and ethnocentric requirements upon minority, and therefore 
weaker, social groups (Alba & Nee, 1997) who are conforming to the different standards of the 
majority.  The pursuit and acquisition of wholly new experiences, of new vocational skills and 
formal or informal education which all require some degree of assimilation, leading to decidedly 
different expectations and lifestyles, may threaten existing group cohesion.  Swift (1940: 220) 
noted these group influences are often pervasive and compelling, that they:  
“penetrate the lives of individuals so completely and in such subtle and illusive ways 
that it is not strange that some have come to believe it is really the group in the individual 
rather than the individual in the group.”   
Swift went on to discuss the dilemmas of groupism, including selflessness and sacrifice 
by the individual to the group.  Extreme kinship and social relationships may develop through 
place identity and attachment, through shared conditions such as farming or unemployment 
following displacement, or by under-employment after education.  In some cases he says, 
subordinating oneself to the group will hinder personal growth, change, and achievement 
among otherwise effective, productive and intelligent individuals.   
Groupism helps to distinguish social classes that are, in part, recognized through habits 
that are defined as “the unconscious actions and out-of-awareness choices and assumptions 
that include beliefs, attitudes, and values” (Rossiter, 2012: 89; Durmaz & Tasdemir, 2014).  At 
the group level, habits reflect Lewis’s (1966) ‘culture of poverty’, revealing other local culture 
and providing an understanding of preferences either for change, such as occurs among 
students, or for social stasis.  Individuals, acting as members of groups, become habituated to 
the reciprocal roles they play within that group and it is through on-going relationships with 
intimate peers that they maintain their sense of identity, whether as smallholders or students.   
Erikson (1975) contended that in times of significant personal and group change, such 
as during a forced displacement, people tend to cling to their previous habits and familiar social 
structures for emotional support.  Under duress, they solidify existing bonds with others who 
come from the same culture or who have similar religious or ethnic backgrounds.  These 
reinforce past lives and experiences; they validate a sense of both individual identity and group 
uniqueness in response to otherwise untenable circumstances of social change (Berry, 1974).  
Changes to those relationships are difficult.  The acquisition of advanced education or new skills 
training, and the subsequent employment which may result outside of the experience of other 
group members, can threaten the homogeneity of that group and potentially sever relationships 
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which had been based on shared conditions of identity or place over time.  The tendency, then, 
is to avoid potential threats or perturbations to the peer system.   
 
Social Systems and the Family 
Social systems are highly developed patterns of interaction consisting of group 
associations, of personal networks or cultural ties to the community, and were defined by 
Parsons (1951:14) as “a mode of organization of action elements” that incorporate individual 
personalities into the existing cultural system.  They may reflect the stratification of class 
structure, education or labour distinctions among members of either politically powerful or 
politically invisible groups (Blau, 1977).   
Gunduz (2004: 5) has posited that “a right establishes a relationship between a right-
holder, who has a title to the content of the right in question, and a duty-bearer, from whom it is 
claimed.”  This important social resource is lost when rapidly imposed displacement disrupts 
kinship relations and neighbour-networks and, with little time for adjustment, long-standing 
business, marketing, and social ties are terminated (Asthana, 1996).  Regarding the system-
consequences of displacement, the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights noted 
that social and physical group dissolution:   
“breaks up families, cuts social and cultural ties, terminates dependable employment 
relationships, disrupts educational opportunities, denies access to such vital necessities as 
food, shelter and medicine, and exposes innocent persons to acts of violence, 
disappearances and rape.”  
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, (UNHCHR, 1997) 
 
Impacts on the Family Structure 
Mahler (1999) noted that in the family systems of more traditional societies, men tend to 
be the primary or sole source of family income.  Their position of status within the family unit can 
be threatened by the displacement-induced loss of livelihood, especially if their wife suddenly 
begins to earn as much or more money.  This can result in significant intra-family disturbances, 
particularly in cases where downward social and economic mobility is taking place and where 
men are unable to find suitable employment.  Males who lose their provider status may become 
despondent or violent, and increases in spouse abuse are frequently seen (Fernandes, 2007; 
Mogues, et al., 2009; Akram, 2013).  Thukral (1996) and Gallo (2001) noted the much higher 
incidence of divorce following displacement as unemployment, economic insecurity, and 
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alcoholism become common and family poverty deepens, all of which have destabilizing effects 
upon society.  Further, the resettlement of displaced individuals and families tend to create local 
animosities as the influx of job seekers disrupts and overwhelms existing employment 
opportunities.  This also drives down local wages, pushing established families towards poverty 
(Crisp, 2002; Du & Dong, 2008).   
While men in developing countries are likely to provide the majority of household 
income, women often predominate in home garden production for the sale of vegetables in 
weekly markets.  The consequences of displacement reduces or denies this (and other) 
important source of secondary income over which women tend to have greater control and its 
loss may intensify intra-household economic inequality.  With the loss of farm and home-garden 
income, positive coping strategies for women, especially those without husbands, may be 
particularly difficult to re-establish.  Without the income of that primary wage earner, girls within 
the family may be forced to marry, or leave school to take low status and low pay employment 
at early ages.  They may take employment through international brokers where they easily 
become the victims of organized crime and trafficking (Babarinde, 2014).  
2.7 Economic and Conflict Displacement in Ethiopia 
The World Bank (WB, 2016b) noted that “forced displacement is a crisis centered in 
developing countries that host 89 percent of refugees and 99 percent of internally displaced 
persons” (see also Ferris & Winthrop, 2010).  A subsequent World Bank report (WB, 2017: 
48) further states that “Among potential safe destinations, and to the extent they can do so, 
the forcibly displaced are likely to move to places which are more developed, and where 
they might have better chances of avoiding impoverishment”, including movement to urban 
areas where greater economic and social development have occurred.  Yet, even strong 
central authoritarian states are not able to provide certainty regarding employment or social 
status and so social displacement occurs as well.   
Conflict Displacement 
An example of the consequences of rapid social upheaval involves the internal 
displacement of Bosnian villagers following the civil war which lasted from 1992 to 1995 and  
resulted in the sudden dissolution of lifestyles and social relationships.  Post-conflict, survivors 
reported high levels of stress resulting from their inability to assimilate into new urban 
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surroundings even though they may have only relocated a few miles from their former homes 
and mountain villages16.  They lost their livelihoods and position of social status in the 
historically familiar places where their families had resided for generations.  They also had great 
difficulty finding new housing and in obtaining alternate employment in urban areas due to skills 
mismatches (Plante, et al., 2002).  Jansen (2008) noted that displaced men had significant 
difficulty adjusting to their new environs and the loss of their previous livelihoods:  
“These men tended to stubbornly cling to their remembered personhood and to the 
place they recalled as having counted as someone.  That place was no longer present in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, only in the remembered forms of organized society in the same 
geographic location.”  (Jansen, 2008: 181) 
Effects of Displacement in Children 
Displacement also had an effect on the education of children.  In Bosnia, as in Ethiopia 
(Awgichew & Seyoum, 2017), parents were required to purchase school supplies such as 
textbooks and uniforms.  For an unemployed and displaced family, these can represent a 
significant financial outlay.  As a measure of future orientation Das, et al., (2013: 24) found that 
even small family expenditures made for “childrens stationary, classroom materials, and 
practice books” are related to positive educational outcomes.  Yet, internally displaced Bosnians 
were more likely to withhold this funding if there was a lack of employment and especially if 
there was continued uncertainity regarding the possibility of subsequent geographic or social 
displacement.  Uncertainity and lack of assimilation was still found five years after the end of the 
war, as Eder (2014) discovered, when displaced Bosnian families continued to spend far less on 
childrens’ educational needs than similar families who had not been displaced.  Moreover, many 
of the displaced children were not attending school and so their own concept of place and future 
orientation had not yet formed.  The ability of families to restore their lifestyles and livelihoods 
was degraded by a lack of employment opportunity as well as their lack of transferrable 
technical and social skills and this reverberated to their children whose educations suffered.  
These examples reveal the effects of displacement may occur within a short distance, or over 
no distance at all.   
However while the effects of displacement are gaining attention in failed states, the bulk 
of the literature shows that Ethiopia is not a failed state.  Its workers are not being ousted due to 
a lack of national political viability nor by the collapse of its chosen socio-economic system.  In 
                                                             
16 In 1996/1997, this researcher was the NATO liaison to the UNHCR in Sarajevo and responsible for monitoring 
refugee returns from Europe, including their successful repatriation throughout the former conflict area. 
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the study area, smallholders are losing their land and livelihoods as a result of a thriving 
economy and pro-growth infrastructure policies.  
2.7.1 Displacement through Infrastructure Construction and Land Investment in Ethiopia  
As urban areas grow, the predicted shift between rural and urban populations will require 
government at each level to take proactive measures to properly sequence physical 
developmental projects.  New infrastructure will be necessary to enable the delivery of services 
and to facilitate industrial growth.  If properly ordered, this will result in increased opportunity for 
manufacturing and trade and the subsequent creation of employment opportunities.   
In the study area, other large scale expropriations and displacement are occurring as a 
result of urban population growth and the sprawl of existing peri-urban boundaries.  
Infrastructure projects include new roadways additional water transmission lines and electrical 
generation facilities.  These projects often meet the demands of a growing population for new 
housing, as well as the need for new social service facilities such as medical clinics, courts, and 
schools.  While some projects are still underway in Ethiopia or have already been completed 
others, including additional rail lines and modern roadways, are still being planned.  Throughout 
Ethiopia, populations are being displaced for important infrastructure improvements, including 
construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renassiance Dam as well as by the practice of bundling 
and leasing agricultural land to international corportions.   
Despite their down-stream benefits, each of these projects will to some degree force the 
displacement of residents whose land will be required for their construction (Abebe & 
Hesselberg, 2013; Megento, 2013).  The literature shows the destabilizing human security 
elements17 resulting from large projects are often ‘administratively minimized’ in written reports 
prepared by planners during the concept phase (Bond and Hulme, 1999; Veilleux, 2013) even 
while their technical characteristics and societal benefits are emphasized (Polzer & Hammond, 
2008; Admassie & Abebaw, 2014; Aleman & Kim, 2015).  Two examples of large, displacing 
projects are provided here.   
The first, construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, demonstrates both the 
need and beneficial outcome of projects.  The second demonstrates forced displacement 
through foreign investment, yet finds once the adverse impacts are recognized, Ethiopia’s 
                                                             
17 Human security in this context was defined by El-Nashar & Elyamany (2017: 2) as “the stability, safety, and access 
to opportunity of an individual and a related community now and in the future.” 
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elected and administrative officials have been willing to take corrective action to limit and 
mitigate their effects.  Both, though, demonstrate that in a developmental nation such as 
Ethiopia displacement based on growth is inevitable. 
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam  
In Ethiopia “energy is the driver of development” (Chen & Swain, 2014: 11), it facilitates 
technology and education; it enables industrial innovation and expands manufacturing capacity 
which encourages new employment opportunities.  
The development of sustainable and renewable 
sources of electricity contribute to the federal 
governments’ goal of becoming “a middle-income 
country by the year 2025” (MoE, 2015: 11).  To that 
end, a hydro-electric project, the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam, located approximately nine miles 
from the Sudanese border along the Blue Nile River 
is under construction and when complete will 
produce 5,250 megawatts of electricity18.  Ethiopia’s 
electrical grid is presently capable of reaching “52% 
of the population” (Chen & Swain 2014: 12) while 
earlier estimates were as low as 17% (Tegenu, 
2006).  This suggests that a significant degree of 
improvement has taken place across the grid.  
However, in addition to the dam itself, new supporting infrastructure including overhead 
transmission lines (Photograph 2.1), as well as receiving and distribution stations will be 
required and at least some portion of these will necessitate further displacement.  
The benefits of electrical generation, irrigation, flood control, and a reduction of down 
stream siltation derived from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam are emphasized in the 
engineering estimates for the project (Tesfa, 2013; Basson, et al., 2014; Mulat & Moges, 2014).  
Displacement, though, did not figure prominently, if at all, in these reports and so the 
contentions made by Bond and Hulme (1999) regarding the general emphasis upon project 
management and beneficiaries rather than those who are being displaced and who will require 
some form of vocational rehabilitation or other livelihood generation, apply.  Indeed, in a speech 
                                                             
18 Multiple government sources list different estimates of the generative capacity of the dam once it is complete.  
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delivered on 2 April 2011 during the official ground breaking ceremony for the project, former 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi emphasized its beneficial impacts regarding rapid economic 
development throughout both Ethiopia and neighboring states and its effect towards the goal of 
poverty eradication.  He accentuated the technical benefits of the project, stating:   
“The Dam will greatly reduce the problems of silt and sediment which consistently 
affect dams in Egypt and Sudan.  This has been a particularly acute problem at Sudan’s 
Fosseiries dam which has experienced reduction in output.  When the Dam becomes 
operational, communities all along the riverbanks and surrounding areas, particularly in 
Sudan, will be permanently relieved from centuries of flooding.”  (Zenawi, 2013) 
However, Zenawi did not address the displacements that would occur as a result of its 
construction nor how they would be mitigated.  Similarly other government sources, including 
the head of Ethiopia’s Environmental Protection Authority, discounted the displacing effects and 
adverse social outcomes of the project, asserting instead that since financial payments had 
been made to local inhabitants little actual harm will have been done:   
“With regard to displaced people, I think the number is around 100 families.  When 
you consider the employment opportunities it gives - including to them - and the fact that 
they are being given land and money to resettle, it’s not an issue.  There is no development 
that doesn’t have a negative impact; only a country must be cautious and correct in its 
response to those negative impacts, and in this case those negative impacts of displacement 
are being taken care of.” (Worldegebriel, 2013)   
Regarding the displacement which the dam will necessitate, Hathaway (2008) suggested 
a better estimate of the direct physical dislocations required by this project reach approximately 
10,000 people.  Yet at least one other prediction, by Soliman, et al., (2016: 10), suggested the 
overall indirect social impacts are much more encompassing, and the “resettlement of millions 
of families” throughout the Nile basin will occur as water levels fluctuate from historic norms, 
and their livelihoods and relationships are irretrievably altered.   
Foreign Land Investment 
In addition to the displacement caused through the modernization of Ethiopia’s 
infrastructure, an issue of investment in agricultural land which involves its bundling and leasing 
to international food processing companies has arisen.  Though not confined to Ethiopia this 
issue, too, is resulting in widespread ousting and the loss of livelihoods.   
In response to the global food shortages of 2007-2008, food insecurity was “no longer a 
problem only of the poor and the underdeveloped, its reach was global and its consequences 
felt as much by the wealthy in developed countries as by the poor nations” (Said, et al., 2012: i).  
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When international business interests found that markets could not be trusted to provide an 
uninterrupted supply of food stuffs they began to invest heavily in a more secure source of 
production: the land itself.  The literature describes this as a system of long-distance farming 
whereby large agricultural areas are leased, farmed, and the production is then exported without 
entering the local economy (Lavers, 2012; OI, 2013; Rahmato, 2014).   
Deininger, et al., (2011: 10) noted that “countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and 
Sudan have transferred millions of hectares to investors in recent years” essentially removing 
the land from local production and displacing an unknown number of families and communities.  
The number of ousted smallholders is unknown because insufficient records of leases are kept.  
This has resulted in a serious gap in public awareness of the prices and terms agreed to or of 
the size of the areas involved.  Consequently, the number of families who are displaced remains 
opaque.   
Zoomers (2010: 429) described the acquisition process as land grabbing in that “large-
scale, cross-border land deals or transactions are carried out by transnational corporations or 
initiated by foreign governments”, and by Franco, et al., (2013: 3) as “capturing the control of 
land and other associated resources like water, minerals or forests, in order to control the 
benefits of its use.”  Regarding record keeping, the Oakland Institute (OI, 2011) found the total 
land area leased to international investors in Ethiopia is undeterminable since both the federal 
and regional governments have authority to expropriate land and then lease it to investors.  
There is insufficient information exchange between those administrative levels regarding what 
properties have been leased and so the total acreage is uncertain (Rahmato, 2014).   
Keeley, et al., (2014) conducted an investigation into Ethiopian land leases and 
development projects in the Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Oromia, Somali and SNNPR 
regions.  They, too, concluded that without a transparent and comprehensive registry the total 
leased area remains concealed and therefore, the number of oustees is unknowable.  Keeley, et 
al., (2014: 20) go on to describe the evolving efforts to gain back the programmatic control of 
the leasing process which was lost in the early days of international land leasing.  They 
observed that federal Ministry of Agriculture agents inspect properties under their control for 
compliance with lease terms and that in some cases the Ministry has unilaterally reduced 
overly-large holdings, giving the example of one holding that was reduced from 300,000 
hectares to 100,000 hectares because the property was not under active cultivation. 
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Large Scale Leasing as Federal Policy 
The importance here is that these displacing leases represent federal policy.  Ethiopia’s 
first Growth and Transformation Plan 2010-2015 (MoFED, 2010: 19) stated “Smallholder 
agriculture will continue to be the source of growth and the private sector will be actively 
supported in large scale commercial farms.”  International corporations are, the plan said, 
expected to realize a major increase in their investments and during the Plans’ implementation 
period the federal government anticipated “over 3 million hectares of land would be identified, 
prepared and, ensuring it will be used for the desired development purpose, will be transferred 
to investors” (Ibid, 26).  Despite record keeping issues, the Second Growth and Transformation 
Plan (NPC, 2015, 127) continued to endorse these seizures, stating “The total land identified for 
investment in GTP II period is estimated at 500 thousand hectare and this increases the total 
land identified so far at national level to 4.315 million hectare by 2019/20.”   
2.7.2 Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan  
The Integrated Development Master Plan, officially announced in April, 2014, can be 
traced to the City of Addis Ababa Proclamation 17/2004 which is entitled “To Provide for the 
Preparation, Issuance and Implementation of the Addis Ababa City Master Plan.”  The Plan was 
necessitated, according to Melesse (2005), by substantial and too-rapid population growth 
which had outpaced the ability of the city to provide necessary infrastructure and social 
services.  Wide spread squatter settlements had developed and were consuming large areas of 
the periphery which were not controlled by adequate planning.  The initial Proclamation was 
straightforward as an enabling document for planning purposes and did not direct any 
outcomes.  However, over the course of the project the Plan became a highly controversial 
attempt to expand the boundaries of the municipality of Addis Ababa by 1.1 million hectares.  
Changing Developmental Imperatives 
Early in the Oromia Special Zone process, Yntiso (2008: 53) noted that as incomes 
among some sectors of the urban labour force increased, the objective of urban planners 
became one of making Addis Ababa a ‘world class city’.  The World Bank (WB, 2015b: 26) 
agreed with Yntiso’s characterisation of the evolving nature of the Integrated Development 
Master Plan and synopsized its three objectives.  Those were, the Bank stated, to create “(i) a 
safe and liveable city; (ii) to ensure the national goal of becoming a middle income country; and 
(iii) to become Africa’s diplomatic capital and a world class city.”  Outcomes began to coalesce 
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and “the process of relocating people from the inner city to resettlement sites in the outskirts 
disrupted the relocatees’ business ties with customers, broke their informal networks of survival, 
caused loss of locational advantage and jobs.”  Upon completion, this development had the 
potential to displace “hundreds of thousands of farmers facing the threat of being evicted from 
their land” (Home, 2016).  While the previous Dergue government had sought to minimize the 
degree of income disparity in Ethiopia, Belachew (2014) observes that social and political 
conditions now highlight those inequalities.   
In order to accomplish this degree of widespread gentrification, Beyers (2013: 965) 
theorized that “forced relocations of poor people, or those deemed undesirable, is undertaken to 
preserve city centres as preserves of dominant class power.”  Planel & Bridonneau, (2017) 
contend this is precisely what is taking place in Addis Ababa as the urban poor are relocated to 
surrounding areas where new cities are built and former residents now reside not in single story 
shanties but in multi-story condominiums with few employment opportunities.  However, in the 
study area, including projects to the east of Addis Ababa, development is occurring in a manner 
different than Beyers had predicted.  These suburban areas are becoming characterised by 
“gated residential homes and communities” (Belachew, 2014: 1; Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 
2017).   
Thus in the study area, the usual rural-to-urban resettlement paradigm was, in part, 
being reversed.  Degraded and slum areas in the city centre were being cleared of their 
occupants for commercial projects, office blocks and new hotels.  This gentrification is resulting 
in the clearing of large areas for redevelopment and the movement of thousands of urban 
oustees to residential developments located on the outskirts of the metropolis where there are 
few amenities or social networks such as were available to them in the city (Megento, 2013; 
Planel & Bridonneau, 2017).  Even in their short-distance resettlement the poor lose their social 
grounding as large new residential areas are constructed for the emerging middle class who are 
seeking more comfortable living conditions.   
The FinFinne Special Zone  
Opinions found in Ethiopia’s legal journals maintain that despite being constitutionally 
designated as a ‘special district’, Addis Ababa remains a municipality with no greater authority 
to unilaterally change or expand its boundaries than any other city (Abdo, 2013; Stebek, 2013).  
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In 2008, the Finfinne19 Special Zone was created to better control the poorly planned and 
unregulated growth of Addis Ababa as peri-urban land was being haphazardly expropriated for 
industrial zones, private construction projects, infrastructure needs and other uses.   
The Finfinne Special Zone is administered by the Oromia regional state, not the city 
government of Addis Ababa and includes the six weredas of Akaki, Berek, Mulo, Sebeta, 
Sululta, and Welmera along with the eight surrounding towns of Burayu, Dukem, Gelan, Holeta, 
Legetafo, Sebeta, Sendafa and Sululta.  The zone was intended to better protect the interests of 
smallholders and others whose land was being condemned and taken through legal processes 
(Kumsa, 2011).  Tadesse & Imana (2017) state the genesis of the Special Zone lay in 
smallholders who had had their land expropriated and were being forced to rapidly change their 
livelihoods with little ameliorative assistance.  The payments smallholders receive for their 
property are spent, Tadesse & Imana say, on basic family needs since these farmers have lost 
their ability to engage in agricultural production and have few other earning opportunities.  
Smallholders who had previously relied upon agricultural production for their livelihood suddenly 
became consumers who were often ill-equipped to transition to non-farm employment and an 
urban lifestyle. 
Proxy Reactions to Resettlement and Relocation Programmes 
Megento (2013: 131) found slum clearance and relocation programmes were already 
being carried out by the city of Addis Ababa before the official mid-April 2014 announcement of 
the Integrated Development Master Plan and these were intended to support the public purpose 
of development.  They resulted in an increased “level of poverty, loss of livelihoods and asset 
bases, unavailability and/or lack of service facilities, poor housing conditions and unaffordability 
of condominium houses.”  Ethiopian Proclamation No. 455/2005 (To Provide for the 
Expropriation of Land Holdings for Public Purposes and Payment of Compensation) defines 
development in the name of a ‘public purpose’ very broadly, stating:  
“A wereda or an urban administration shall, upon payment in advance of 
compensation in accordance with this Proclamation, have the power to expropriate rural or 
urban landholdings for public purpose where it believes that it should be used for a better 
development project to be carried out by public entities, private investors, cooperative 
societies or other organs, or where such expropriation has been decided by the appropriate 
higher regional or federal government organ for the same purpose.”  
                                                             
19 FinFinne is the word for Addis Ababa in the Oromo language. 
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The evolving provisions of the Integrated Development Master Plan, which are 
consuming agricultural land and displacing large numbers of both urban and rural dwellers, 
have been referred to as one of the catalysts for the civil disturbances and violence now 
occurring in the Oromia region, particularly among university students (Home, 2016b; HRW, 
2016).  In a more global context, Klandermans (2014: 2) had predicted similar protests by 
students even though they may have little or no actual connection to either agriculture or vested 
interest in the expropriations of smallholders.  He found that social identity is a personal 
characteristic related to self-image and a collective identity, it refers to something shared by 
“members of a group or category.”  Klandermans concluded that people who may not be 
personally associated with a particular circumstance or grievance “take part in political protest 
because they want to change their own circumstances or to express their views and feelings.”  
Furthermore, people’s decisions to “participate in such [proxy] actions revolve around feelings of 
anger based in perceived unfairness, which are typically associated with relative deprivation 
theory” (van Zomeren, 2017: 3).  Protest movements, such as are now taking place in some 
areas of Ethiopia, fulfil a need to express similar political and social views even if those views 
are only peripherally tied to the issue of land use (see also Mannarine, et al., 2009; Stewart, 
2011; and Taspinar, 2015).   
As a result of widespread public opposition and the increasing violence, the Integrated 
Development Master Plan was officially rescinded in January 2016.  However protests 
continued and this can be interpreted as confirming Klandermans prediction of proxy violence.  
A new plan, the 10th Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan which encompasses 
just 52,000 hectares, was approved by the city council on 13 July 2016 (EBC, 201720) but that 
plan is outside of the research period and scope of this thesis.   
2.8 Social and Educational Displacement 
At one time land appeared to be an almost inexhaustible African asset.  However both 
rural and urban populations have increased, in part due to developmental interventions.  In 
Ethiopia, these interventions have included better diet and advancements in maternal and infant 
health care that have resulted in much higher infant survival rates, and elder care programmes 
which lead to longer lives (Singer & Ansari, 1988; ADBG, 2013; WB, 2017c)21.  This will, 
                                                             
20 The Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority was established as an autonomous federal agency by Proclamation 
533/2007 and is therefore an official source of information. 
21 Infant and child mortality rates are considered basic indicators of national health care and socio-economic growth 
(UNDP, 2007).  Throughout Ethiopia, women in Addis Ababa are the most likely to receive a postnatal check-up 
within two-days of giving birth, while in the immediately surrounding region of Oromia they are least likely to meet with 
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inevitably, lead to significant and potentially destabilizing social change within the population as 
its redistribution from rural to urban areas alters the current agrarian character of Ethiopia.  
Migration may be temporary, circular, or permanent; either forced or voluntary; cross-
border, regional, or rural-to-urban (Kettlewell, 2010; Vargas-Silva, 2011).  It allows individuals 
and families to escape poverty or conflict; and to abandon environmentally degraded agricultural 
lands for the considered potential of better employment, educational, or religious prospects 
elsewhere (Bruntland, 1987; Werz & Conley, 2012).  Thus, migration decisions are “shaped by 
multiple pull and push factors, primary among them are economic growth and its disparities” 
(IOM, 2003: 4).  Agriculturally, push factors include small farm size and rapid population growth 
while pull factors, especially among youth, include the expectation of higher economic returns 
from education and the lure of potential employment in urban areas (Bezu & Holden, 2014; 
Wolf, et al., 2014). 
Different Forms of Displacement Outcomes 
Rural-to-urban migration was defined by Rhoda (1983: 36) as “residential relocation from 
a predominantly agricultural area to an area in which a majority of employment is in non-
agricultural activities.”  His definition of migration did not distinguish between refugees, 
migrants, or displacees, nor did he define its distance or the size of the non-agricultural 
settlement relocatees adopt.  However, he did note that decisions which are more participatory 
in nature are associated with higher levels of individual or family education and that voluntary, 
rather than forced relocations, are often more successful.  Kurekova (2011: 4) found that 
neoclassical explanations for migration are reliant upon the “underlying assumption that it is 
stimulated primarily by rational economic considerations of relative benefits and costs.”  
Sattertwhaite, et al., (2010: 2813) concluded that in lesser developed countries “urbanization is 
overwhelmingly the result of migration in response to low returns from agricultural occupations 
and the anticipation of realizing better economic opportunities in urban areas.”   
The urban development process is defined as the “social, cultural, economic and 
physical development of cities, as well as the underlying causes of these processes” (UiO, 
2013: 3).  As economic growth increases disposable income, especially among the more 
educated elements of the urban population, prosperity leads to the parallel demand for 
                                                             
a physician.  The incidence of neonatal visits was found to increase in proportion to the education and wealth of the 
family (CSA, 2016). 
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improved living conditions, manifesting in short-distance migration to new commercial centres, 
more comfortable housing stock, and ever better employment opportunities (Harris & Todaro 
1970).  Yet, as Ethiopia’s rate of growth and development increase, economic opportunity and 
improvements are not distributed equitably and, while smallholders are usually compensated for 
their expropriated property, they are rarely provided with alternative livelihoods or livelihood 
training that would restore their former economic status (Huang, 1995; Cernea, 1997; 
Gebregziabher, et al., 2014). 
In the case of Ethiopian migration, Mberu (2005: 9) defined it as most commonly a 
“movement out of either a rural or urban place of origin which lasted for at least six months” 
regardless of destination, including local, regional or international migration.  Crush (2012: 2) 
found that under normal circumstances “migration is rarely a one-way one-time move, that new 
urban dwellers continue to speak of and feel attached to their rural home and that there is an 
expectation of returning home again.”  Thus while movement is not entirely unusual, it is most 
frequently circular and undertaken as a temporary measure with the implicit expectation of 
returning rather than being a permanent, forced condition which results in a highly disorienting 
loss of livelihood.  Despite social and cultural experiences and expectations, displaced 
smallholders lose their social grounding as they are forced from the land with little support other 
than the cash payment they have received for their property and so they cannot return.   
2.9.1 Ethiopia’s Education Policy 
Ethiopia’s fifth, and most current, Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP V) 
(MoE, 2015: 11) concludes that while agricultural production remains “dominant in economic 
composition and is the source of livelihood for a great majority of the population,” it is declining 
in its relative share of importance.  The predicted rural to urban population shift will have far 
reaching consequences, yet ESDP V confirms that despite a new emphasis upon 
industrialization, agriculture remains of “critical importance to livelihoods” (Ibid: 11).  
Paradoxically, ESDP V concludes the service and industrial sectors are ascending and their 
significance within the economy is increasing22.  It notes that while youth literacy had improved 
from just 34% in 2000 it remains low, and at 52% it is “still one of the lowest rates in sub-
Saharan Africa” (Ibid, 36).   
                                                             
22 ESDP V is consistent with the evolutionary objectives and developmental strategies found in the 2002-2005 
Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programmeme; the 2005-2010 Plan for Accelerated and Sustained 
Development to End Poverty; the 2010-2015 Growth and Transformation Plan; and particularly the 2015-2020 
Second Growth and Transformation Plan that emphasizes economic growth and industrialisation (MoE, 2015: 12).  
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At the opposite end of the educational experience, it recognizes the need for a better 
matching of out-comes between the educational system and the employment-market as high 
rates of unemployment are particularly prevalent among secondary school educated youth23.  
The focus of ESDP V (MoE, 2015: 34) is upon six areas, including (i) capacity development for 
improved management; (ii) general education quality; (iii) general education access, equity and 
internal efficiency; (iv) adult and non-formal education; (v) technical and vocational education 
and training; and, (vi) higher education.   
According to the plan, capacity development will involve internal improvements to the 
education system while greater access will increase the availability of pre-primary education and 
access to local schools.  Improvements to general educational quality are intended to motivate 
school children to complete their education through secondary school.  Adult and non-formal 
education will continue to focus upon basic literacy courses and community education, while 
technical and vocational education centres will increase the relevance of courses and 
technologies as well as their transferability to industrial settings.  The government intends higher 
education to promote knowledge and technology transfer based on national developmental as 
well as community needs.  
Enrolment and Goals 
Relative to the previous national educational plan, ESDP V notes “No coherent model for 
planning and delivering a relevant continuing education and lifelong learning programme at the 
federal and regional level was developed during ESDP IV” (MoE, 2015: 86).  The instant 
educational plan, released in August, 2015, emphasizes programmes to reduce illiteracy in the 
adult and youth population which it carefully notes has formed a barrier to Ethiopia’s goal of 
becoming a middle-income economy by the target date of 2025.  These will be reached, in large 
measure it predicts, through its fifth objective: the expansion of the current system of technical 
vocational education training.  ESDP V establishes an enrolment goal of 564,000 students in 
these vocational centres who will participate in ‘market driven’ programmes (described in 
Chapter 6).   
Seid, et al., (2015) note the number of students who were enrolled in technical and 
vocational institutions has already increased dramatically, from just 5,264 in academic year 
                                                             
23 Education, including the words ‘student’ and ‘graduate’ is used here to mean the range of experiences, from 
completion of basic levels of schooling to obtaining a university degree.  Vocation training provides credentials while 
education results in a diploma of some sort. 
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1999–2000 to 271,389 students by 2014–15, while university enrolment has increased from 
about 10,000 students in 1990 to more than 360,000 in 2015.  In terms of higher education, 
ESDP V states there were 36 public universities (at the time of publication) throughout Ethiopia 
and announced plans to establish an additional 11 institutions, as well as a goal of 94 private 
universities.  Ultimately, the enrolment capacity of these institutions will be approximately 
600,000 undergraduate and graduate students.  While the dramatic enrolment goals of ESDP V 
may be reflective of Ethiopia’s increasing population and its political aspirations, they strain 
pedagogical basics which rely upon the limited supply of educationally qualified instructors.  
Competent instructors who can achieve the desired outcomes are scarce, and the quality of 
university education has degraded.  This may account for instances of under-employment 
among graduates who discover they are not as capable as they are led to believe (Hanushek, 
2013; Regassa, et al., 2013; Yirdaw, 2016).   
Despite its continued robust economic growth, and as the number of university students 
and better educated youth has increased, Ethiopia exhibits a significant level of unemployment, 
especially in urban areas (Kibru, 2012; Nayak, 2014).  An update of its unemployment statistics 
occurred with the 2014 Urban Employment / Unemployment (CSA, 2014b).  That survey, 
compiled by the Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency24 found an unemployment rate of 38% in 
urban centres.  In the municipal area of Addis Ababa that are contiguous to the study areas 
unemployment rates differ dramatically by age group, with the 15 - 24 year old cohort suffering 
particularly high unemployment though this spikes again in the 60-years and older age group.   
2.9.1 Social Displacement Resulting From Education 
 
Social displacement (liminality) can occur following educational curriculums as students 
often outgrow and no longer cognitively belong to their prior social circles  (Rutherford, & 
Pickup, 2015; Murcia, 2018).  However, education may not result in all of the desired effects and 
can fail to result in higher earnings or employment.  In the United States, workers with advanced 
educational degrees are not necessarily hired for positions that are commensurate with those 
skills.  The wage penalty for these over-educated workers is greater than among lesser-
educated but adequately skilled employees (Tsai, 2010).  A  similar study of German workers by 
                                                             
24 The Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency was established by Proclamation 442/2005.  Section 6 of that proclamation 
provides it the mandate to “collect, process, analyse and disseminate the necessary socio-economic and 
demographic statistical data through censuses, sample surveys, continuous registration and administrative recording 
systems” and this applies to all federal government “economic, social and demographic data collection, compilation 
and dissemination.”  While the establishing proclamation titles it the “Central Statistics Agency” many of its own 
reports use the title Central Statistical Agency. 
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Leuven & Oosterbeek (2011: 20) concluded that while some “over-schooled workers move 
upwards, a large fraction remains over-schooled” and that where workers have more education 
than is required by the needs of their employment, relatively few have the practical skills 
necessary to function at higher levels.  In both instances, the over-educated often displace less-
educated workers who might otherwise perform adequately.   
Herrera-Idarraga, et al., (2013) found specific negative effects of over-education in 
lesser-developed countries such as Ethiopia.  They determined that a massing of qualifications 
earned at university do not necessarily improve national industrial characteristics; that a larger 
number of tertiary educated graduates may not result in an increase in the number of positions 
which require technical or even higher general educations.  They conclude that while tertiary 
levels of schooling are not intrinsically unproductive, the availability of employment opportunities 
constrain the ability of workers to utilize their skills.   
Regarding displaced smallholders who might enrol in rehabilitative training programmes, 
McGivney (1990: 4) noted that people who have no reported employment which might impose 
time constraints upon their activities are generally the most unlikely to participate in adult 
educational or training programmes.  She concluded that a combination of attitudes and 
expectations prevents them from taking advantage of whatever training opportunities are 
available.  Continuing education or training is, McGivney found, “not part of the value system 
and behaviour pattern of a disturbing number of people.”  Arnason & Valgeirsdottir (2015) also 
found people who are “unemployed and/or economically inactive; who have short formal 
educational experiences; and who are older” are frequently unmotivated to participate in 
rehabilitative educational programmes.   
Paladanius (2007) determined that low self-esteem was a major contributor to this lack 
of motivation among older adults to reengage in education or vocational training; that 
considerations of habitus and maintaining the social order are their key concern, not self-
improvement.  Adult education, Paladanius posits would “be interpreted as a suggestion to be 
positioned as a child once again” (Ibid, 5) rather than recognition as an adult who had 
accumulated meaningful life-experiences.  Kispalne-Horvath (2012) found that a significant level 
of anxiety occurs among returning adult learners who would be required to sit for 
comprehension testing at the end of the educational modules.   
Where adults do participate in vocational training programmes, Fukunishi & Machikita 
(2017: 9) confirm “in the context of the Ethiopian labour market, an increase in graduates 
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induces displacement of unskilled workers.”  Their research found that an increase in the 
number of vocationally educated students fails to generate labour demand and it actually harms 
the ability of some trainees to obtain employment.  Paradoxically, the found that a 10% increase 
in the number vocational centre graduates results in a 4.9% reduction in the “probability of 
having a formal job” (Ibid: 18) for young males.  This is due, they contend, to a close matching 
of training with employment demand that results in an over-supply of newly trained workers.  
Graduates who begin vocational training with less formal education or only lower-secondary 
education, rather than upper level, are particularly susceptible to unemployment or under 
employment following vocational training.  Thus, while vocational training is effective in 
transferring skills, it does not appear to be nimble enough to compensate for its’ own success 
and an over-supply of workers results.  
High and Low Context Participation 
Across studies of those who enrol in adult education, a pattern has evolved which 
demonstrates it is “higher social classes, the young, and those who are already well educated 
who participate more often” (Crowther, 2000: 479) while non-participants tend to be those who 
are minimally educated, working class, and older.   
Yamazaki (2005) contends that national cultures can be grouped and studied in terms of 
their high- and low-contextual patterns and that these often rely on peer group relationships.  
Low-context individuals tend to place greater importance on symbolic representations during 
individual and group learning.  Their learning style is less dependent on personal relationships 
while being more reliant on rational, scientific experiences.  Yamazaki offered Germany and 
Switzerland as examples of low-context cultures.  According to van Everdingen & Waarts (2003) 
workers in low-context cultures tend to seek information from reports and data bases rather than 
obtaining it primarily through close association with their social or place networks and peer 
groups.   
High-context cultures such as Ethiopia’s (Baker & Campbell, 2012), are generally more 
traditional and rely on personal relationships and place attachments.  Actors in these cultures 
depend on non-verbal communications and the physical environment to develop social meaning 
among peers and events.  High-context actors are better served if they are situated in familiar 
surroundings and circumstances where exchanges of concrete experiences and close social 
interactions among peers result in, and from, similar perceptions.  These cultures often build on 
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more emotional responses to events and the social environment, but there may be strong 
uncertainty avoidance among their members.  Individuals in higher-context cultures will, for 
example, wait until they have seen substantial evidence of a new technique’s success before 
making changes to familiar and proven patterns of behaviour than do people from low-context 
cultures who are prone to abstract conceptualization.  In this context, ‘new techniques’ also 
means enrolling in vocational training programmes which could be personally transformational, 
and Akay et al., (2009) found this to be particularly true in rural Ethiopia.  
Everdingen and Waarts (2003) describe low-context (focused on quantifiable information 
and reports) and high-context (based more on personal relationships) cultures.  Yama & 
Norhayati (2012: 2553) suggest the distinction is generally explained as the difference “between 
individualist and collectivist cultures”; that in high context cultures there is often less social 
variability and therefore less overall experience in responding to change.  In high context 
cultures individuals rely more upon the attitudes and experiences of their peers and co-workers 
for information and examples and therefore, they change slowly.  In low context cultures 
workers are more likely to rapidly adopt changes in technologies or livelihood practices.  For the 
purposes here, high-context can describe smallholder and subsistence farmers while recently 
educated students whose experiences and familiarities have become broadened may be better 
described as being more accepting of a lower context.  Hence, this may help to explain the 
differences in how each group has reacted to the social and economic environments which are 
changing around them, including the multi-dimensional physical and economic characteristics of 
development induced displacement as well as the liminal and social displacement which results 
from education.    
Group differences within these contexts can create power gaps between elites and 
secondary individuals who follow the example of the elite.  Ethiopia’s agricultural development 
agents, for example, have educational qualifications as well as administrative and bureaucratic 
power and therefore their elite status can easily influence individual and small group decisions.  
To willingly leave a high-context culture, or to step outside of the peer networks upon which they 
are based, is assumed to be an extremely difficult step to take among generally isolated and 
now displaced smallholders in the study area who may have little external support.  Doing so at 
a disorienting time of ex situ ousting, or post-educational liminality, would require an extreme re-
evaluation of relationships and at least partial abandonment of past livelihoods and place 
attachments.  
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2.9.2  Enculturation 
Culture is difficult to define and there is not complete agreement regarding what it 
entails.  Definitions include “the shared set of implicit and explicit values, ideas, concepts, and 
rules of behaviour that allow a social group to function and perpetuate itself … as the dynamic 
and evolving reality which exists in the minds of social group members” (Hudelson, 2004: 345).  
Lewis (1966: 19) more succinctly described culture as “a way of life handed on from generation 
to generation and which provides a ready-made set of solutions for the problems typically 
encountered.”   
Social capital derived from culture and one’s role within that culture is developed through 
place identity, from the sense of community and the degree of interpersonal support available 
within that community (Wind & Komproe, 2012; Lowe, et al., 2015).  In one study in the United 
States, the degree of social capital and closeness of personal relationships was tied to the 
degree of support they had depended upon, and continued to require, following a devastating 
and displacing natural disaster (Docena, 2015).  People who were wealthier and more 
independent were better able to withstand the perturbation of disaster displacement while the 
poor, who had previously relied upon a deeper reservoir of group support within the community, 
were far less resilient when their social network became displaced and dispersed.  The post-
disaster support networks which this second group of individuals had relied upon were often no 
longer available and the loss of their social connections and contextual relations was correlated 
to increased levels of post-traumatic stress. 
Enculturation is a life-long process which begins in infancy and continues throughout 
adulthood.  It encompasses the conscious and unconscious processes of assimilating “the 
totality of traditions which include the economic, social, religious, and linguistic reservoirs of 
culture” (Shimahara, 1970: 144).  The process of enculturation was described by Berger & 
Heath (2008) as the adoption and internalization of the standards of the social group.  Those 
may include the assumption of a specific occupationally-oriented vocabulary, styles of clothing, 
and other mannerisms needed for entry or acceptance into groups and which discourage others 
from attempting to breach these barriers.  Enculturation is especially strong when it is 
continuous and undisturbed and has been reinforced by institutions such as the local 
educational system; by the certainty that local laws, customs and morés represent; and, through 
the development of norms and values which are learned and absorbed over a lifetime (Nekby, 
et al., 2007; Rudmin, 2009). 
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2.9.3 Place Attachment and Farming 
 
Place, place attachment, and contextualized feelings of belonging, are well researched 
concepts in the literature.  Hauge (2006) discussed ‘place’ in terms of the built environment 
having influences that are as important as those of genetics, social or cultural influences.  Place 
gives coherence to social memories; it provides strong emotional attachment, not only to the 
location itself but also to the enduring memories of communal associations and lifestyles.   
Scannell & Gifford (2010: 3) propose “in general, individuals may connect to a place in 
the sense that it comes to represent who they are” and that those connections are formed at 
varying emotional levels (Figure 2.2).  These social connections are formed through religious 
and cultural norms; and by membership in friendship networks that develop within physical 
environments.  As a result of those processes, memory, behaviour, and group identities are 
moulded around shared lifestyles (e.g., I am a coal miner; I am a Texan) which are difficult to 
change in older individuals. 
 
As a livelihood occupation, farming is a shared and exclusive group experience which is 
not easily entered except through birth or inheritance.  Its life-long enculturation process forms 
strong, culturally distinctive bonds that are reflective of place identity, place attachment, and 
prevailing social structures.  While gate-keeping restrictions differ from nation to nation the 
literature (Laband & Lentz, 1983; Elder, et al., 1996; Leu & Muller, 2016) broadly suggests 
agriculturalists in such diverse settings as Sweden, the United Kingdom, or the United States 
display similar patterns of social behaviour.   
82 
 
Elder, et al., (1996) posited that as members of a distinct occupational group with its own 
social standards, farm children in the United States are enculturated differently than urban 
children.  Counterintuitively, their relative isolation develops a collective rather than an 
individualistic social pattern.  They form life-long agriculturally-related group depedencies which 
are characterised by particularly strong friendship bonds among their peers.  However, Elder, et 
al.,  found  those childhood bonds may become self-destructive as they become adults if they 
are not allowed the personal growth and recognition of the maturity that comes from economic 
independence, such as through taking control of their own farm or entry into a non-farm 
occupation.  Correspondingly, McLaren & Challis (2009: 263) found that among isolated and 
generally solitary Australian farmers, the development of social networks which are defined 
through place acculturation generate “a significant source of personal support which provide a 
sense of communal belonging; they create a sense of being needed, of personal value and 
relevancy.”   
In Ethiopia, Bezu & Holden (2014: 261) found “youth in rural areas often live with their 
parents in a household where they may have only limited influence on their own labor allocation” 
and so they may also be unable to exert sufficient control over their personal situations to be 
considered adults in their own right.  Thus, while their place attachment may be strong, their 
individual identity is often weak.  In the instant context, losing one’s agriculturally productive 
livelihood due to ousting leads to a loss of purpose and value as a member of an exclusive 
group.  It creates a loss of self-value and increased instances of adverse psychological 
conditions (Easter, 1996). 
2.9.4 The Process of Place Acculturation 
Redfield, et al., (1936: 149) described acculturation as “those phenomena which result 
when groups of individuals from different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with 
changes occurring in the original cultural patterns of either or both.”  Acculturation has effects 
upon both the newcomer and the host community, and may be viewed as positive, neutral, or 
negative.  Murcia (2018: 2) described this place identity as forming “strong social, psychological 
and emotive attachments.”  Erman (1998) for example, found that Turkish migrants who shared 
a common past, including origination in the same town or village, similar social strata or 
livelihoods, tend to follow earlier relocatees to the same new location.  Yet older migrants, 
especially, tended to insulate themselves from becoming fully acculturated into their new 
surroundings.  Rather than socialize broadly, migrants often maintain previous contacts and 
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customs, isolating themselves by predominantly frequenting such familiar touchstones as coffee 
houses, restaurants or shops that stock customary food items (Sumption, 2009; Kanas, et al., 
2011).   
2.9.5 Enculturation and Path Dependence 
Path dependence25 has a multiplier effect upon enculturation.  Individual practices 
among smallholders are not isolated from their larger agricultural groupism.  These may reflect 
local food preferences, technical and educational norms, and standards for relationships 
(Oakley & Garforth, 1985).  For example, although in open market economies the choice of the 
crops that are planted is not necessarily inevitable, “farming is not divorced from previous 
relationships” (Clark, et al., 2010: 248) between the climate, soil conditions and the enculturated 
experiences of the community.    
Being contractually or otherwise invested in the production of a particular crop helps to 
determine pathways which lead to life-long group identities and the development of personal 
and community networks.  Pathways that are based on production actively determine social 
relationships, including membership in commodity-specific growers associations; participation in 
communal demonstrations provided by farmer training centres; or, as a result of similar 
childhood educational experiences in farm-community schools.  Ultimately, these result in 
norms and values that are organically based and which contribute to the development of a 
distinctive localized culture (Stuiver, 2006) whose bonds are difficult to break even when the 
need to maintain membership in that social group is no longer necessary.   
Deculturation, on the other hand, is the process of ‘unlearning’ and discarding 
conscious, though obsolete methods or memories.  It is accomplished by the over-learning of 
new experiences (Thomas, 2011) although Clark, et al., (2008) contend that previous social 
experiences, including values or place attachment cannot actually be unlearned.  These 
experiences remain within individual memory and this explains why they are often referred back 
to if the individual becomes cognitively overloaded. This is something which might happen 
during a disorienting social or physical displacement process that induces a reversion to group 
                                                             
25 Path dependence was describe by Walker (2000: 126) as “choices made in the past, technologies embodied in 
machinery and product design, firm assets gained as patents, specific competencies or labour skills acquired through 
learning, influence subsequent choices of method, design, and practices.  It does not mean a rigid sequence 
determined by technology and the past, but a road map in that an established direction leads more easily one way 
than another and wholesale reversals are difficult.” 
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associations and norms or as an equally muddling educational experience causes personal 
change.  
The Social Loss of Place Identity and Culture 
The literature examples demonstrate that communities are spatial, emotional, and 
temporal; they provide a sense of continuity and social identity which binds individual 
attachment to small-groups and to a larger whole (Stedman, 2002).  A ‘place’ can be considered 
the communal centre of individual meaning and personal experience; it is often the touchstone 
of formative social relationships which represent ways of life, practice and customs.  The 
ideation of ‘belonging’; of social familiarity, individual rootedness and of being personally vital 
within the community can be derived from ‘place’ (Fried, 2000; McLaren & Challis, 2009).  
Social norms are adopted through membership in relatively closed communities and through the 
support networks that are afforded by personal connections (Ujang & Zakariya, 2015) while 
attachments are strengthened by the shared meanings which are derived from historic events.   
‘Place’ and community identity are often the primary source of social contact and 
memories.  Najafi & Kamal (2012: 7639) contend “people’s image of themselves is related to the 
physical places where that image developed.”  Nagel (2002: 718), for instance, described strong 
place attachment and nostalgia for Beirut, Lebanon, remembered as being a centre of “glamour 
and warmth, openness and kin-based insularity” prior to its self-destruction during the civil wars 
of the 1970s and 1980s.  In Beirut, place memory advanced a post-conflict effort by residents to 
reconstruct its previous physical appearance in order to replicate their earlier associations and 
identities26.  Walmsley & Lewis (1984) contend this sense of belonging to a distinctive 
community makes individual recovery from adversity far more likely than if there are no group 
interactions available.  Such attachments may be especially strong among people who consider 
their ‘personhood’ as being indivisibly linked to an occupation such as farming or through some 
other constructed memory and identity, including educational status. 
Displacement from one’s home or surroundings results in the loss of culture and identity, 
and Dreyfus (1991: 45) noted “When we inhabit something it is no longer an object for us, but 
becomes part of us.”  Thus, displacement terminates a fundamental means of personal and 
social control and the loss of culturally familiar places or group experiences engenders a sense 
                                                             
26 Similar behaviour was exhibited when the ‘Long Market’ (Długi Targ) of Gdansk, Poland and the ‘Old Town Square’ 
(Staroměstské náměstí) of Prague, Czech Republic were rebuilt to historic appearances after having been destroyed 
during World War II. 
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of abandonment as social connections are breached (Alexopolous, 2005; Rebok, et al., 2012).  
This arouses sensitivities of sadness, distress, and grief as strong support linkages are broken.  
Consequently, older displaced persons may have a tendency to revert to thoughts of the past 
and “after an initial period of increased well-being, some become alienated from the host 
society.  They either retreat into a troubled private world or show anti-social behavior” 
(Eisenbruch, 1991: 673).  
 
2.9.6 Loss of Place and Cultural Bereavement 
As noted earlier, the displacement literature does not clearly distinguish among 
migration distances and so there is no reason to consider displacement in purely geographic 
terms.  Rather, the literature actually describes transfers between familiar and unfamiliar social 
paradigms.  Among younger people, structural factors that include limitations upon their 
educational or employment outcomes often account for the abandonment of their physical and 
cultural environment and their migration from rural-to-urban areas (Kettlewell, 2010; Bezu & 
Holden, 2014) to obtain an education or to build their future.  However, the literature shows this 
results in a loss of support mechanisms, expecially during the liminal period where students no 
longer fit within their village or previous peer groups but are not yet accepted by professional 
society (Turner, 1987; Brookfield, 2005; Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010).  In explaining the wider 
communal loss that results from the rural-to-urban migration of better-educated youth, the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics concluded: 
“Rural areas that young people are moving away from usually experience associated 
declines in population and increasingly older age profiles.  In some areas, these population 
changes also coincide with a decline in key industries and the withdrawal of services, both 
public (e.g. schools and hospitals) and private (e.g. banking and retail).  In turn, such 
changes may make living in rural areas less attractive to young people, and further impact 
upon on the wellbeing and sustainability of the remaining older community.” (ABS, 2003: 22) 
In older people the loss of familiar physical places, such as when neighbourhood 
schools  are closed; commerical centres and local shops that are replaced by office blocks; or 
when long-time industries such as coal mining abruptly end, can pose especially acute physical 
and emotional challenges.  In his study of urban development and displacement in the United 
States, Fried (2000: 196) concluded older individuals who have been ousted from their homes 
and other places continued to “maintain a strong attachment and felt a profound sense of post-
relocation loss that resulted in widespread grief and mourning among the displaced residents.”  
His results showed it was the uncertainty of the future which made their loss so important, that 
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the dissolution of long-held place and group relationships was the catalyst of that grief process 
and which most delayed individual recovery and adaptation.  Place attachment and fear of 
separation from the known social environment are “particularly strong among people with few 
independent resources like poor, lower status groups” (Ibid: 196).  Among the poor, place 
attachment may become central to individual memory when there are few alternative social or 
economic opportunities.  Among those who voluntarily transition to a new status, such as 
students who obtain an education or others who choose a new livelihood, the loss of previous 
place associations and belonging may continue to result in substantial social and cultural 
dissonance. 
2.9.7 The Effects of the Loss Place Attachment in Rural Ethiopia  
In the literature, Stratford (2009: 796) described our attachment to place in terms of 
“historical and cultural values, economic and social uses”, while Devine-Wright (2010: 267) 
noted that ‘place’ pertains to “personal roles and attributes, the belonging to social groups or 
categories.”  Marshall, et al., (2012) referred to place in terms of livelihood attachment, while 
Kebede (2013) described it in terms of a memory of consistent values.   
Conversely, the sense of ‘placelessness’ was posited by Relph (1976) as a social 
condition which is exhibited primarily as a result of there no longer being a significant 
attachment and no opportunity to adequately develop new connections.  This sense of being 
ungrounded is also documented in refugee and oustee literature (Cernea, 1997; Mooney, 2005; 
Raymond, et al., 2010; Norvy, 2013).  Placelessness and a lack of grounding, though, are not 
exclusively geographic nor do they require physical movement.  
In this study of smallholders who have been ousted ex situ, place attachment refers 
generally to personal connections made to the land and livelihoods, to cultural and social 
surroundings.  Those decisions are often based on individual experiences with weather 
conditions and land degradation; upon the advice received from agricultural development 
agents or governance policies, all of which to some degree influence and shape young farmers’ 
decisions of whether to remain on the land or to adopt some other livelihood.  These issues 
similarly obtain to the students who are also subject of this thesis.  Individual choices to 
maintain an agricultural livelihood or to diversify into off-farm or non-farm income generation are 
made using an assortment of information and decision making tools (Bezu, et al., 2012).   
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Acerbi & Parisi (2006) suggest local culture is transmitted vertically between generations 
and between the modern and traditional, but that behaviours and values are learned horizontally 
from other individuals within the community, especially among peers of the same generation.  
Problematically in the terms presented here, older risk-averse Ethiopian smallholders may be 
unwilling to adopt innovative practices or techniques, or to change their own peer and friendship 
networks, and so their successful assimilation into a new livelihood paradigm becomes less 
assured (Schwartz, et al., 2006).  Bezu, et al., (2012) found that younger farmers, with their own 
friendship networks, may be more willing to leave the land yet face equally uncertain futures.  
 
The Value of Friendship Networks 
Friendship networks play an important role in risk reduction and the mitigation of 
economic shock in rural Ethiopia.  Shocks may derive from a variety of sources, such as the 
injury or death of a family member, crop damaging pest infestation, or the loss of key draught 
animals.  Pan (2007: 6) found in addition to “external aid from government sources and limited 
assistance provided by NGOs, mutual support is very common in rural Ethiopia“ and so peer 
networks are important  However, also specific to Ethiopia, Todo, et al., (2014) found that few 
smallholders have meaningful personal or economic ties outside of their neighbours.  When 
external ties do exist they are most often limited to agricultural extension agents who represent 
the wereda government and whose job is to promote both new agricultural technologies and to 
sell government controlled seed and fertilizer.   
A similar study by Spielman, et al, (2011: 195) regarding knowledge transfer and 
external innovation derived essentially the same results, finding that Ethiopian’s are often limited 
by the short distance of social networks and that agricultural development agents “exert a strong 
influence over smallholder networks, potentially crowding out market-based and civil society 
actors” who might provide different expertise or perspectives.  This isolation not only limits the 
range of coping mechanisms post-displacement, it also reinforces existing peer-group ties and 
place-derived culture.  Among a close group of similar individuals, it restricts the information 
which flows from outside actors regarding more complex technologies than are already at hand.   
Vaughan & Tronvoll (2003: 31) were also concerned with stake holding-local power 
elites who control access to local government; who determine the level of individual standing 
throughout the community; and, who govern land use decisions and therefore individual 
economic development and prosperity.  Highly germane was their estimation of the control 
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these elites have over “the social distribution of knowledge”.  They found that knowledge, belief, 
and convention are entwined and amount to individual and group expressions of social culture.   
Hofstede & Bond (1984: 417) held “culture does not only affect psychological processes, 
but also the sociological, political, and economic functioning of social systems.”  Their work 
suggested four generally distinguishable dimensions of national culture.  Those are:  (i) power 
distance, where decisions are made by the elite and less powerful members of society 
acquiesce to them; (ii) risk aversion and uncertainty avoidance, where people feel threatened by 
unknown and ambiguous outcomes of their own decisions or the decisions made by others; (iii) 
the polar opposites of individualism and collectivism, as people choose to belong to useful 
collectives and peer groups or are excluded from participation in them; and, (iv) masculinity vs. 
femininity, stressing the competitive values of acquisition and economic success or of more 
inclusive and cooperative relationships.  
2.10 Summary 
In this chapter, peer-reviewed and grey literature regarding poverty and place 
attachment, including personal connections to local culture, have been explored.  On a global 
scale millions of people are formally ousted each year in favour of modernization which provides 
benefits to the greater population.  The physical results of development-induced displacement 
such as are experienced through infrastructure or residential construction are unambiguous 
across the literature.  In the study, area physical development is displacing hundreds of 
thousands of smallholders (Home, 2016a), resulting in a loss of land and livelihoods, of 
individual and place identity.  Educational experiences also result in the loss of individual and 
place identity as the student transitions from one social paradigm to another.    
Where smallholders are concerned, the stress that social and economic displacement 
creates can be associated with vascular disease and alcoholism, spouse abuse and divorce.  Its 
effects solidify feelings of separation from the previously known community which, among a 
generally risk-averse group who had relied upon the support of life-long social contacts, are 
especially difficult to contend with.  Place attachments that develop over the course of a lifetime 
are key to building and maintaining individual identity but are also contingent upon the on-going 
maintenance of shared economic conditions, occupations, and social status.  Among these 
close-knit peer group memberships, symbolic and physical connections are shared through 
experiences of enculturation, of physical and social connections to locations and people, and 
89 
 
transitioning to a wholly new occupational identity is challenging (Tulloch & Lupton, 2003).  
Consequently, the literature suggests those who are formally displaced through the 
expropriation process may choose to isolate themselves within what remains of their social 
group rather than adopting new livelihood solutions, potentially creating new strata of poverty. 
A similar informal displacement and social disarticulation can also occur as individuals 
choose to leave their prior status to participate in educational or training programmes.  These 
can, first, socially separate them from their place identities and peer groups and are especially 
disorienting during the transitional period when one has left the former group but has not yet 
been accepted into the new group (Turner, 1987; Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010).  Then a second 
time, when they are unable to find employment and return to their place of origin, migrate, or 
accept under-employment.  In the case of education or skills acquisition, the consequences may 
be especially disruptive if sufficient opportunities are not available to accommodate the 
irreversible social transition that education imposes.  Where insufficient opportunity is available, 
youth, especially, may be prone to engage in destabilizing civil disobedience (Pape, 2005; 
Whitmore, 2010).  
Significant feelings of groupism, achieved through the enculturation process and one’s 
sense of potential loss of those connections often inhibits older, risk-averse smallholders from 
attending vocational training courses.  Although university students may have suffered few 
actual impacts from the Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master 
Plan, they appear to have used the on-going expropriations and ousting as a proxy for other 
social demands including improved employment possibilities (Desalegn, 2016; van Zomeren, 
2017) and this has resulted in an increasing degree of violence which is challenging basic social 
assumptions in Ethiopia.  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the study’s approach and rationale, describing the methodology and 
sampling strategies used during the desk research and field work phases to answer the question: “In 
what ways does development unintentionally contribute to new strata of poverty and internal 
instability?”  It begins with a discussion of the preparation for the field work and the revisions 
necessitated by conditions on the ground as they were encountered.  
 The research began with an examination of a wide body of literature regarding urban and 
rural development and migration throughout sub-Saharan Africa, including a review of educational 
programmes; conflict periods; agricultural and environmental conditions (Tadesse, 2007; HRW, 
2010; Ali, et al., 2011; Peluso & Lund, 2011; Leigh, 2012; Gizaw, 2013; Liu, et al., 2013; Keeley, et. 
al, 2014).  During that review, a substantial body of information was found that indicated Ethiopia is 
engaged in massive, forced relocation programmes wherein hundreds of thousands of smallholders 
are being uprooted and resettled in distant areas (Jemma, 2004; Hammond, 2008; Yntiso, 2008; 
Tadele, 2009; HRW, 2012; Lavers, 2012; Hagos & Holden, 2013; Makki, 2014).  This literature 
indicated these resettlement programmes were being carried out for three primary reasons: to 
relieve environmental pressures caused by intensive and unsustainable subsistence farming; to 
bundle small properties for their long-term lease to trans-national agricultural producers following the 
global food crisis of 2008; and to build massive new infrastructure.  However, little literature was 
oriented to the community level effects of displacement and upon arrival, evidence of this 
displacement was not observed, though that does not discount its occurrence.  What was found in 
the study area indicated other causes for ousting. 
Field investigation, utilizing constructivist and grounded theory approaches revealed the 
issues relating to development-induced displacement among smallholders are complicated: the 
involuntary physical displacement of farmers creates social displacement, while youth who 
participate in education become socially displaced when they are unable to secure approriate 
employment.  Interviews with a wide variety of respondents revealed that centralized policies are not 
providing sufficient employment opportunites for either group.  Older displaced smallholders 
described feelings of social isolation yet remained in their peer groups.  For similar reasons of 
marginalization, younger Ethiopians have begun to engage in anti-government demonstrations and 
security forces have met those with increasing violence.    
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3.1 Research Approach and Rationale 
During the desk-study phase, the forced relocation of Ethiopian’s described in the 
literature appeared to present opportunities for the observation of the generational transfer of 
agricultural knowledge in unique and highly stressful conditions.  Dislocated farmers were 
assumed to find themselves in a position which required them to ‘unlearn’ (Clark, 2008; Thomas 
2011) the agricultural techniques used in their previous regions; to adopt new methods of 
production learnt from other smallholders who may have lost part of their own property to the 
new comers; and then instantaneously transfer that new knowledge to their children since time 
is of the essence in such volatile circumstances.   
However, as field interviews progressed in each of three study areas and a large number 
of people were contacted, no respondents professed any knowledge of on-going physical 
relocation programmes.  What displacement was observed was found to be, essentially, an 
issue of evictions taking place in the peri-urban areas of the capital city that were the 
consequence of successful upstream programmes of economic growth.  Thus, the information 
presenting itself during interviews in the three field locations did not support the earlier desk 
research but did reveal an issue not previously found during the literature review.   
Among those who were being ousted, a pattern began to emerge.  Older smallholders 
and particularly men, needed to learn non-farm livelihood skills in order to cultivate alternative 
means of livelihood and income generation.  However, they were resisting the necessary 
personal and group changes needed to support new livelihoods.  Despite being physically, 
economically and socially displaced, they were observed as remaining passive, choosing not to 
engage in activities which would lead to the development of new, non-farm skills.  
In discussion with other respondents it became apparent that a second issue had also 
developed: that unemployment and under-employment among recently educated or vocationally 
trained youth, ages 15-24 was similar to smallholder displacement as their social displacement 
and disarticulation posed equally interesting questions.  Although youth in Ethiopia are 
achieving historically unprecedented education levels, the slowing economy (IMF, 2016b;  
ADBG, 2017; NBE, 2017) is resulting in too few employment opportunities for them to achieve 
economic independence and to realize their own social legitimacy (Honwana, 2012; Nayak, 
2014).  The outcomes range from limiting their ability to marry to increasing the likelihood of 
anti-government civil disturbances (Pape, 2005; Whitmore, 2010).  Thus as the economy 
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matures and changes, Ethiopia’s otherwise successful development programmes are 
sometimes resulting in unintended and undesirable social outcomes.   
Consequently, when this much different set of facts was confronted the direction of the 
project and the initial research questions required modification.  To gather and analyse the 
phenomena as they began to present themselves, a combination of research approaches were 
utilized including social constructivism and grounded theory analysis (Andrews, 2012). 
3.1.1 Social Constructionist, Constructivist, and Grounded Theories 
Tendencies towards a culture of poverty and self-isolation described by Lewis (1966) 
and Reynolds & Baird (2010) following displacement; a loss of locus of control referred to by 
Onu, et al., (2013) and Lenton (2014); and the loss of place identity following dispossession 
noted by Jansen (2008), can be observed through the lenses of complementary social theories.  
In combination, social constructionism and grounded theory help to explain their outcomes.  
These serve to illuminate and frame what may be the sub-optimal responses of some 
disarticulated smallholders to remain unemployed and isolated in their peer groups and of 
students who elect to protest their own liminal displacement and under-employment through 
increasing incidents of civil disobedience (Crossely, 2008).   
Social Constructionist and Constructivist Theory 
Social constructionist theory derives meaning from experiences and cognitive 
processes.  It is used here to draw together the shared paradigms of poverty and identity, of 
place and culture, income disparity and horizontal inequality which smallholders have 
experienced.  Social constructionist theory was described by Gergen (1985: 266) as “primarily 
concerned with the processes by which people come to describe, explain, or otherwise account 
for the world in which they live.”  Gergen also noted that human nature is partially explained 
through ‘groupism’, the tendency to think, act and generally conform to the immediate cultural 
environment.  Owen (1995: 161) contends that aside from “inherited and developmental aspects 
of humanity, social constructionism hypothesizes that all other aspects of humanity are created, 
maintained and destroyed in our interactions with others through time.”  These paradigms 
especially “emphasize the significance of context” (Cohen, et al., 2000: 133).   
Mills, et al., (2006: 2) conclude constructivist theory “denies the existence of an objective 
reality” even as the researcher performs a constant comparison of the data as it presents itself.  
Marton (1981: 181) described this in terms of “what is thought and what is lived”; that people 
who participate in research interviews, for example, are often unable to distinguish between 
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their own experiences, including their values and behaviours, and that their thoughts regarding 
those experiences are generally unformed and poorly articulated.  Though individual and place 
values are not immutable, they are immovable without significant difficulty since identity and 
place assignments originate externally and are assigned by wider social forces than the 
individual can control (Burr, 2003; Daubon, 2005). 
Young & Collin (2004: 375) describe constructivism as being the method by which “each 
individual mentally constructs the world of experience through cognitive processes.”  They 
suggest people mentally construct meaning from practices which are internal to the individual 
who synthesizes their experience and knowledge for assimilation into a group or community.  
Taber (2011: 40) notes constructivist learning theories assume “the learner comes to knowledge 
by recognising the meaning of what is found in the environment” and states “in human societies 
most of the knowledge we acquire is based on what is already part of the pool of available 
cultural knowledge.”  Galbin (2014) concludes social constructivism describes causality, that it 
underscores the complex interactions of individuals within their communities and peer groups 
and it emphasizes the importance of individual experiences and group social interactions.  This 
occurs during the construction of knowledge which is “inherently dependent upon communities 
of shared intelligibility” (Ibid: 84) and the degree to which two actors can understand each other.  
The constructivist learning style is different than rote memorization in that it “suggests that 
humans construct knowledge and meaning from their experiences” (Bada, 2015: 68). Taylor & 
Hamdy (2013: e1561) contend that constructivists “consider that learning is the process of 
constructing new knowledge on the foundations of what you already know.” 
Knowledge is often highly contextual and dependent upon the associations one enters 
into or is prevented from entering.  In analysing the establishment of programmes such as 
vocational training, Caffarella & Merriam (1999: 5) noted that constructivist theories posit such 
questions as “whose interests are being served by the programmes being offered; who really 
has access to these programmes; and, who has the control to make changes in the learning 
process and outcomes.”  These are economically, socially, and politically charged questions 
and so constructivist paradigms may lead or force changes in power dynamics, including the 
shared experiences of poverty or relative deprivation.  Hence the processes involved in social 
constructivism are unique to the experiences of the individual (Cohen, et al., 2004; Mojtahed, et 
al., 2014) and therefore they are suitable for use during qualitative research.  
Social constructionism similarly helps us to view society in terms of its shared 
experiences and meanings (Andrews, 2012); that our understandings are shaped by our identity 
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and place in society; and normative and cultural values are experientially based.  Thus, the 
views of respondents may be coloured by socio-political conditions which have become 
transparent to them.  Their compliance with government policies is influenced by pressure which 
becomes transparent.  Those perceptions become the structure through which life-decisions are 
made.  
A positivist approach to the research would suggest that knowledge of the social setting 
is gained through observation.  Positivist views propose that individual experiences can be 
explained through the application of rigorous scientific method, and that ‘truth’ and certainty are 
measurable quantities (Collins, 2010).  While positivism relates to a gathering of the facts, a 
more phenomenological approach would concentrate on the meaning of the research, 
demonstrating a greater interest in the ‘human aspects’ of the observations as they are made 
(Crowther & Lancaster, 2008).  
Grounded Theory  
Grounded theory is described by Elliott & Lazenbatt (2005) as providing an 
understanding of behaviour through continuous discovery.  It begins, according to Charmaz 
(2008: 156) with systematic “explication and emergence”, inquiring into and then explaining the 
nature of the question by utilizing open-ended methods to explore surrounding and contributing 
issues as they emerge.  This causes researchers to reconsider and include points which do not 
fit well with preconceived notions, such as those which had been derived from a desk review of 
literature that could not be personally authenticated in the field.  Grounded theory’s qualities of 
discovery and emergence, therefore, allow researchers the latitude to pursue incongruities and 
to investigate unanticipated avenues of inquiry.   
Hancock & Algozzine (2006) remind us that while grounded theory seeks to explain 
actions and interactions, it is the researcher who is the crucial data-collection instrument as he 
attempts to explain specific, though every day, situations.  Grounded theory relies on a 
continuous cycle of data collection and analysis.  It takes iterative steps throughout the process 
rather than being a series of singular or distinct strides, and so it does not lend itself to a line of 
rigidly predetermined questions or data collection strategies.  Rather, it relies upon the 
emergence of an incremental line of inquiry as information begins to coalesce and the 
researcher constantly analyses the evolving data for comparisons with initial data. 
Starks & Trinidad (2007: 13) likewise conclude the goal of grounded theory is to develop 
an explanation of “basic social processes that are studied in the environment in which they 
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occur” and that data is accumulated through a series of individual interviews and conversations; 
from focus groups; or by other methods.  Malterud (2001: 486) though, had cautioned against 
assuming that a simple accumulation of a large amount of data will necessarily guarantee more 
accurate understandings.  An inquiry which only relies upon a large number of interviews may 
simply lead to a superficial level of analysis as the quality of the information obtained is replaced 
by its sheer quantity. 
Thus, as the information and observations regarding displacement were gathered from 
educators, smallholders, rural shop owners, government officials at all levels, and others, issues 
of social processes and group dynamics began to coalesce, including the emergence of strong 
place and group identity.  Displaced smallholders, in particular, were observed to associate their 
identity as being that of a farmer despite the permanent loss of that livelihood and lifestyle.  
Among those interviewed, ousted smallholders displayed generally similar behaviour in regards 
to their ousting, choosing to remain within their peer groups rather than seeking training for new 
employment opportunities.  Statements made by local observers confirmed this tendency and 
are referred to throughout this thesis.   
Discussions with staff at four universities in the urban areas of Addis Ababa, Adaama, 
and Sheshamane revealed specific issues pertaining to students who obtain a tertiary education 
but then have insufficient opportunities to utilize their new knowledge and skills.  Interviews 
conducted in Technical Vocational Education Training centres in Lalibela and Sheshamane 
demonstrated the utility and adaptability of vocational training curricula to meet local 
employment needs.  In the aggregate, these interviews and conversations helped to better 
frame the characteristics of educational-induced displacement process and its social impacts 
upon a wider audience.  Interviews helped to explain how education often leaves students with 
few options other than to take lower employment positions than they are qualified for; that they 
are frequently coerced by circumstances to either return to their villages and family farms, or to 
emigrate.  Thus, observations made at each location are important to the outcome of this thesis. 
3.1.2 Power Typologies 
Understanding the different types of social power was also important during the field 
work phase and helped to explain behaviours and activities.  Five types of power were identified 
by French & Raven (1959) who concluded that while overlaps may occur among them, not all 
actors possess each type of power.  Those include (i) legitimate power such as that which is 
inherent in a government position; (ii) reward power, which includes neo-patrimonial and 
clientelist relationships that may result in the provision, or withdrawal, of support such as 
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distress food assistance in return for political support; (iii) expert power, which is based on in-
depth or special knowledge and expertise, though this may easily be independent of education 
levels; (iv) referent power that tends to emanate from the personal characteristics of a political 
leader or other respected individual; and, (v) coercive power, that imposes compliance through 
the threat or the use of repressive force.  Each of these helped to guide the selection of 
individuals and groups for interview.   
Gaventa (2016: 29) simplified French’s & Raven’s five power types to just three, 
including “viable power”, that includes political power and the institutional ability to enforce rules 
and decisions; “hidden power”, through informal influence mechanisms imposed by individuals 
or organizations; and “invisible power” which shapes the psychological and ideological 
boundaries of participation through the processes of socialization and enforced culture.  Pettit 
(2013: 9) suggests that a lack of power equates to a “lack of opportunities, resources and 
security”, that it is one more dimension of poverty, and unequal power relationships based on 
economic status which reinforces the conditions leading to individual or group marginalization.  
Pettit found a combination of age and poverty diminish individual and group political and social 
influence and this supports Daubon’s (2005) conclusions described in Section 2.2.  
Knowledge and Experientially Based Power 
Social actors can be defined by the power positions which are delineated by the 
normative activities they engage in (Ostrom, et al., 1994; Walton, 2011).  Subsistence-level 
smallholders, for example, are not in the same position of legitimate power as the local 
government officials who issue the land use certificates that are used as evidence of property 
ownership27 during expropriation proceedings.  Local officials generally do not possess the 
same degree of expert power as does a business school dean with a detailed knowledge of 
university graduation rates and the conditions of under-employment which affect various groups 
within the economy.  Yet, neither government officials nor the university dean are likely to 
possess the same level of expert power of smallholders regarding local soil types or the micro-
effect of erratic rains.  Though each actor has a stake in a complex interrelationship of rural 
matters, their stakes are firmly planted in different areas of the agricultural field and so they are 
                                                             
27  The 1994 Ethiopian constitution (Article 40) provides that all property is in the collective ownership of the state.  
However, tenants have rights to compensation when that property is expropriated and these are discussed in 
section 4.3. 
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able to offer unique perspectives of the same issue even though their abilities to influence 
events are unequal.  
Being open to these different levels of expertise and power helped to focus the research 
methods.  These methods included conducting a literature review which encompassed a wide 
variety of sources, the incorporation of key informant interviews; the review of agricultural, 
business, government and educational policies; and, close interaction with respondents in farm 
fields, shops, mills, and Ministerial offices.  These coalesced to describe and frame behaviours 
and situations common to groups of displaced smallholders and to their communities, while also 
illuminating the employment concerns and sometimes discordant reactions of students (Ostrom, 
et al., 1994; Matsaert, 2002). 
3.1.3 Positionality and Ethics 
An important aspect of any inquiry is the need to “minimize preconceived ideas about 
the research problem” (Charmaz, 2006: 155).  Bourke (2014) notes the process of research is a 
continuous one; that it carries on after the field work has been completed, and it includes not 
only the act of data collection but also the summation of findings as they are being reviewed and 
their implications are weighed.  During data collection and analysis, Bourke (Ibid: 3) states 
“positionality represents a space in which objectivism and subjectivism meet” and that to 
“assume one can achieve pure objectivism is a naïve quest.” 
Thus, it is proper to recognize that one’s personal or educational history; cultural and 
familial background, race or country of origin; prior research or professional affiliations, all 
combine to create biases which may elicit unconscious judgements regarding unfamiliar social 
norms (Merriam, et al., 2001; Baker & Edwards, 2006; Ganga & Scott, 2006).  Working through 
one’s positionality, then, relies on the self-conscious awareness the researcher has of 
relationships between himself, respondents, and even of the interpreter who filters the words of 
respondents.  Recognition of the presence of bias, based upon the positionality of the 
researcher, is of paramount importance.   
As interview responses accumulated they began to reflect this researcher’s own 
background in government and interests in both adult education and urban planning.  My 
background is one coming from a generally agricultural community and who later worked as a 
regional land use planner responsible for the compliance review of large scale development 
projects (5,000+ housing units) for their transportation, environmental and infrastructure impacts 
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to both the built and natural systems.  Despite local idiosyncrasies, my educational background 
and 30 years of working in various government agencies ultimately allowed me to more 
effectively observe that the bureaucratic processes of Ethiopia’s federal, regional and wereda 
governments (different than political processes) were generally similar to those I have 
encountered before and so they were relatively easy to understand and interpret.  Thus, while I 
was cognizant of the point of view of the smallholder farmer, I also understood the position of 
the project developer and that of wereda governments.  Ultimately, my personal and 
professional background allowed for a more detailed inquiry into the consequences of 
displacement that ousted smallholders were experiencing, as well as the recognition of under-
employment among young adults as a long-term social problem that can become a security and 
stability issue (Pape, 2005; Brainard & Chollet, 2007; McDonald, 2008).  
Positionality and bias were, though, assumed to be reciprocal.  Expectations and 
judgements were also being made from the cultural and experiential position of those who were 
being interviewed.  My status as an ethnic and cultural outsider in remote, often mountainous or 
otherwise isolated rural communities of Ethiopia was obvious.  At times it was a cause of 
temporary celebrity as well as substantial suspicion.  Therefore, throughout the field phase it 
was recognized that a combination of biases might influence the presentation of interview 
questions, the veracity of responses, and how those responses were recorded in narrative form 
after the interview had been completed.  This caused me to conduct more interviews than 
planned with related stakeholders whose broadly common interests allowed for the triangulation 
of opinions and observations regarding displacement; adult education; as well as emergent 
issues of youth over-education in light of too few fitting employment opportunities.  
Research Ethics 
One of the most important ethical principles of research is to respect the anonymity and 
safety of the participants.  According to Bryman (2012) research participants should be 
considered as ‘informants’ rather than ‘objects’; that during interviews they should be made 
aware their privacy will not be infringed upon, and that no harm will come to them.  In all 
instances the participants were informed of the researcher’s intent and that their responses and 
opinions would remain anonymous.  However, due to the sensitivities of conducting research in 
Ethiopia, including the semi-authoritarian and invasive nature of the Ethiopian government at 
each level (Aalen, 2006), there was no guarantee that notebooks or computers left in the hotel 
room would not be searched during the day.  Respondents were assured their participation was 
99 
 
entirely voluntary and this was guaranteed by neither asking their names nor recording any 
personally identifying information28.    
The interview responses quoted throughout this thesis include the category of 
respondent (i.e., smallholder or entrepreneur) with the month they were recorded but not the 
location of the interview.  With the nature of some of the responses providing their location 
might have allowed their individual identification.  This degree of anonymity, however, severely 
limited the amount of demographic data which could be collected and made it very difficult to 
conduct follow-up discussions or to provide statistical analysis of respondents’ characteristics.  
Nevertheless, these caveats ultimately worked to the benefit of gathering qualitative data as 
participants became more open to conversation once they accepted they could not be identified 
at some later date.   
Interview Format 
During the beta-test phase of interview questions in the Arat Kilo area of Addis Ababa, it 
was found that displaying a prepared format to record individual responses was obtrusive and 
provoked strong negative reactions among the micro-entrepreneurs who were interviewed.  
These initial participants were young men who were living in the capital city without sponsorship 
or government permission.  Questions regarding how local taxes are levied and paid were a 
particular source of concern especially when the reply was noted on a form and this was true 
even when no personal information had been solicited.  Therefore, to avoid the perception of 
recording identifying information, previously prepared questionnaires were simplified and then 
reviewed on a frequent basis with the interpreter to re-familiarize their content.  Interviews were 
thenceforth conducted in an informal, anecdotal and conversational manner even as they kept 
to predetermined lines of inquiry.   
A description of the research to be undertaken and the period during which it would be 
conducted; the proposed number of participant interviews; as well as protocols to ensure the 
anonymity of participants was submitted to the University and on 12 June 2015 ethical 
clearance was granted.  A majority of respondents encountered could neither read nor write.  In 
order to meet the intent of ethical compliance it was especially important to observe that all 
participants had in a recognizable way physically indicated their consent to participate rather 
                                                             
28 One exception to this exists, that of the interview with the Federal Ministry of Education’s Chief of Curriculum 
Development who gave his express permission for his specific position to appear. 
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than simply verbalizing it in another language through the interpreter or by signing a form they 
could not understand. 
Responses were recorded in a journal shortly after their conclusion and at some 
distance from where interviews had taken place.  Recollections were verified by summarizing 
the notes with the interpreter, even following the occasions when English was used as the 
medium of communication.  These were transcribed later each night.  This created a system of 
internal audit to verify what had been heard and recorded, especially in terms of the accuracy of 
the specific statements used throughout this thesis.  This procedure worked to further include 
the interpreter29 in the project.  This active participation maintained his interest since the same 
questions were repeatedly asked and it helped to generate discussion regarding other avenues 
for exploration among respondents. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to fill a gap in the literature concerning the unintentional 
outcomes of successful development practices, including landless and jobless smallholders who 
are physically displaced and students who become socially displaced.  The essential outcome 
of research is the production of knowledge and understanding and so the process is not 
necessarily limited to a single pathway (Hammersley, 2000).  Denzin (2009: 142) describes the 
politics of evidence, noting that qualitative research does not always collect countable and 
measurable information which can be analysed in a laboratory, and cautions that such 
“evidence is never morally or ethically neutral.”  He likens this process to the difference in 
investigative paradigms which utilize the mirrored approaches of looking at ‘causes and effects’ 
as opposed to ‘effects and causes’.  
3.2.1 Competing Research Approaches 
This study takes a social constructivist and grounded theory approach, however 
research methods have often been divided along ideological fault lines, with authors suggesting 
there are essentially three types of research, including Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed 
Methods (Mayoux, 2006; Cresswell, 2007; Driscoll, et al., 2007; Katsirikou & Skiadas, 2010; 
Pashaeizad, 2010).  Tuli (2010: 107) states these differences in approaching research problems 
raise the question of “the relationship between the knower and what is known.”  Perspectives 
                                                             
29 The interpreter was a 44 year old male who had recently completed a three year course at a private university in 
tourism development.  He was unemployed and awaiting a semi-annual government examination to become licensed 
as a tour guide.    
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leading to the proper research method are often as dependent upon the cultural and 
professional background of the researcher as they are upon the subject matter itself.   
Quantitative Method 
Wright, et al., (2004: 749) described quantitative approaches as physically measuring 
social phenomena rather than indirectly obtaining the information desired, despite where “the 
consequence of indirect measurement is some degree of error.”  In quantitative analysis, data is 
gathered in reliably measurable nominal (group); ordinal (place or size ranking); or interval 
(distance between two or more measurements) quantities and is variable-centered in terms of 
‘what’ rather than meaning-centered and ‘how’.  Quantitative research defines ‘what is’ rather 
than the divergent reasoning of what ‘ought to be’ and as such leaves little room for social 
interpretaton without the employment of some other method to put the results in context 
(Sukamolson, 2010).   
To be credible, quantitative research must be accurate in order to facilitate its use in the 
interpretation and evaluation of comprehensive policies.  Further, it must be considered 
accurate, and this is a far more subjective standard.  Research used for secondary studies must 
“provide sufficient information to assess the internal and external validity of the data” so as to 
preclude the need to conduct primary research for each new study (Hui & Phillips, 2014: 373; 
Johnston, 2014).  While quantitatively weighing and measuring the harvest may show the 
outcome of that year’s production it does not provide a depth of information and understanding 
of the personal activities of farmers; of their views regarding economic and social stability; or 
their perceptions of the changing climate and the impact of local market changes which may 
have influenced the decisions which produced that harvest.  Similarly, it is comparatively easy to 
quantitatively measure the number of students that universities graduate each year, but 
accurately measuring the percentage of people who are under-employed is more difficult.  Thus, 
the method chosen for research must engender a high degree of confidence in its reliability and 
validity in terms of application to new project proposals (Heale & Twycross, 2015). 
During interviews significant limitiations were presented by the aversion to any recording 
instrument which would have reliably documented responses to prepared demographic 
questions and this disallowed reliable accuracy through the data coding of responses based on 
word usage.  While the interpreter was adept at several local languages, linguistic nuances 
could change rapidly and often within the space of a few miles.  These isues limited the 
reliability of their quantitative analysis of word usage. 
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Qualitative Method 
Singh (2007: 28) notes qualitative research covers “the spectrum of the socio-
development sector”, and therefore it is fundamentally different than quantitative research.  
While quantitative research is grounded in statistical descriptions, qualitative studies focus more 
on the investigation of the intangible outcomes of programmes and policies.  The difference in 
purpose between quantitative and qualitative measures was summarized by Beck (2006: 349) 
who posited that it matters “whether our interest is in finding some general law-like statement or 
in explaining a particular event.”   
Importantly, the aim of qualitative studies is “not to be representative of the population”, 
rather it is the validity and meaning of the information gathered and the richness of its content 
that is important (Hardon & Hodgkin, 2004: 64).  The goal is to reach a point of saturation of 
similar responses, arriving at a place where the researcher is confident that no new information 
is likely to be discovered through additional interviews and that enough parallel replies have 
been triangulated to credibly substantiate the findings.   
Saturation, according to Hardon & Hodgkin, begins to occur when responses are 
sufficiently redundant and so the size and breadth of the sample needs to be large enough to 
reflect what may be important divergences and variations in the experiences or attitudes of the 
population.  Charmaz (2006: 114) advanced that small and incremental studies with “modest 
claims” tend to reach the data saturation point more rapidly than studies which purport to make 
wider findings and so their smaller analysis may be more reliable.  Yet it remains the 
responsibility of the researcher to explore the contextual meanings of the responses in order to 
determine when that point has been arrived at and to analyse them in an unbiased manner.  
When saturation is achieved, the core features of the issue have been revealed and no further 
themes are likely to be generated by the respondents.   
Qualitative studies “stress the socially constructed nature of reality” as they explore “entities, 
processes and meanings which are not experimentally examined or measured in terms of 
quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency” and stress individual opinions regarding social 
experiences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005: 10).  Qualitative research, then, is appropriately applied to 
the social consequences of physical or social displacement since it is intended to elicit the 
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views, and determine the anticipated outcomes pertaining to a wide variety of stakeholders who 
will be either negatively impacted or positively benefit from the result.  However, there is a 
danger the interviewer and respondent will understand the questions used in qualitative analysis 
to mean different things, especially where there are cultural or language barriers.  This 
complicates the interpretation of open-ended responses when the subsequent analysis of the 
discourse is undertaken.   
Mixed Methods  
This research takes a constructionist perspective.  Primarily a case study, it uses mixed 
methods including purposive sampling and ‘snowballing’; formal one-on-one interviews, focus 
groups and informed opportunity meetings to answer the research question.  Case studies are 
most appropriate when the researcher is seeking answers to ‘how and why’ questions, where 
explanations are sought rather than historical date or specific outcomes.  Yin (1994: 4) states 
the choice of method depends upon three factors “(a) the type of research question posed, (b) 
the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and (c) the degree of 
focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events.”   
Combining available methods recognizes that any of them, in isolation, have inherent 
limitations but that a combination may provide a more holistic interpretation of events and 
conditions (Creswell, 2003).  Bryman (2012) concludes the use of the term mixed methods pre-
supposes that quantitative and qualitative approaches are insufficient without some form of 
adaptation.  Brannen (2005) and Morgan (2007) each confirmed the importance of merging 
methodological approaches to achieve more reliable and generalizable results.  This 
combination utilizes both models to some degree and bridges the fault dividing them, 
strengthening the evidence and validating observations when a single methodology may not be 
adequate to the task (Palinkas, et al., 2013).   
Finally, once the collection of responses is completed there is no guarantee they will 
accurately reflect local attitudes over a long-term period.  Thus, perception gathering during 
social science interviews was likened by Gellner (1984) to temporary and issue-oriented public 
opinion assessments.  However, if recorded in an unbiased manner those perceptions reflect 
the revealed thoughts and concerns of the respondents relative to the questions and are, 
therefore, “the unassailable cultural norms of the place and the moment” (Ibid, 567).  The 
number of similar responses and their varied sources as presented here demonstrate their 
reliability.    
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3.2.2 Document Review 
Document reviews provide the researcher with an opportunity to unobtrusively learn 
about the conditions of an area as well as to triangulate the statements of respondents. 
Documents constitute widely varied sources of information.  Each source must be judged for its 
own legitimacy and need not be afforded a similar level of credibility since they may reflect the 
biased views of the responsible government agency, the organization, or the individual who 
prepares them.   
Bryman (2012: 381) found four salient points to assist in the determination of a 
documents’ empirical credibility.  Those are: “(i) authenticity, that the evidence is genuine and of 
unquestionable origin; (ii) credibility, concerning whether the evidence is free from error; (iii) 
representativeness, that the evidence is typical of its kind; and, (iv) meaning, that the evidence 
is clear and comprehensible.”  A nuanced consideration of documents helps the researcher to 
build both current and historic constructs regarding the information as it is communicated by the 
authors and then as it is discussed by informants in the field.  Numerous documents and reports 
prepared by the Ethiopian government, by non-governmental organizations or other sources 
concerning forced relocations which were reviewed prior to the field phase were found to be 
inapplicable when compared to the conditions observed in the study area.  This does not, 
though, suggest they are incorrect in other contexts throughout Ethiopia.   
In general, the population, social, and economic data utilized in this thesis come from 
just a few sources, including the family of United Nations agencies; the World Bank; and various 
Ethiopian ministries and agencies.  This represents a conscious decision to avoid chasing data 
sources that supported any preconceived findings, thereby reducing the tendency towards 
confirmation bias.  That said, in his own review of Ethiopian government policy documents, Di 
Nunzio (2014: 54) succinctly described many of them as being written in the “donor-friendly 
language of citizen participation.”  Vaughan (2011) also noted the tendency to wrap Ethiopian 
developmental policies in the softer terms of the provision of pro-poor services and programmes 
to its citizens in order to become more palatable to international scrutiny.  Despite the 
sometimes overly positive verbiage of some documents that called their reliability into question, 
the information provided by government sources such as the Central Statistics Agency or the 
National Bank of Ethiopia represent some of the most authoritative sources available.   
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Content Analysis 
Content analysis is not used in this research, though it is recognized as a powerful 
method for qualitatative analysis to facilitate the develop of interpretations about a subject of 
interest.  The content analysis process searches for distinct verbal elements of the conversation 
and anecdotes and becomes one of “organizing communication content in a manner which 
allows for easy identification of content relevant to research questions” (Kondracki, et al., 2002: 
224) to identify emergent themes.  Hsieh & Shannon (2005: 1279) found the advantage of 
content analysis is to “gain direct information from study participants without imposing 
preconceived categories of responses.”   
During field interviews, however, significant limitiations were presented by the aversion 
to any recording instrument that would have more reliably documented the responses to a 
series of predetermined interview questions.  Therefore, due to the lack of a highly accurate 
record; the potential for translation inaccuracies; and the possibility of unconcious linguistic 
biases made by the interpreter, a highly reliable documentation of recording units could not be 
guaranteed.  Thus, content analysis is not utilized here 
Triangulation of Responses 
In sum, the instant research employed a mixture of methods.  It relied heavily upon the 
selection of knowledgeable individuals for sampling and purposive qualitative interviews, while a 
reliance upon social constructivism and grounded theory helped to consider emerging 
information in order to analyse local perceptions of encroaching urbanization and the loss of 
livelihoods by the rural population.  Importantly, employing a variety of methods enabled the 
researcher to triangulate information and this revealed the issue of under-employment among 
students.  Triangulation utilizes multiple sources to better ensure validity and it helps to 
substantiate some statements while disproving and discarding others.  The significant 
advantage of triangulation is that it increases confidence in the interview data by using evidence 
derived from a diverse array of sources which will either verify or discredit new sources, though 
this must be approached carefully as outlier statements might be found to be true (Guion, et al., 
2002).   
3.2.3 Interview Access and Sample Size 
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Interviews are a primary source of data collection in social science research and are 
used to access people’s perceptions of events and their constructions of reality.  They are, 
according to Punch (2005: 168), “one of the most powerful ways we have of understanding 
others.”  Qualitative interviews of a range of key informants30 were conducted to capture the 
“insights, experiences and activities of consumers, family members and agency directors” 
(Palinkas, et al., 2013: 6) in order to provide the necessary depth of the chronicle.     
Access 
This research required both formal and informal arrangements to gain access to 
information and key informants.  Interviews were conducted in farm fields, homes, government 
offices, and places of business such as coffee houses and financial institutions, flour mills and 
construction sites.  A series of semi-structured interviews were employed to ascertain the 
experiences, views, and concerns of stakeholders.   
Smallholders were purposefully encountered by walking along rural roads and the edge 
of farm fields.  Walking, instead of driving, afforded more frequent opportunities for non-invasive 
and randomized meetings with both men and women in a variety of social environments.  This 
method was specifically chosen to provide a closer connection to the individual and it avoided 
surprising anyone with the team’s arrival.  Chance meetings with smallholders in their fields or 
with other residents proved a fruitful means of information gathering and were, by definition 
random encounters that helped to verify and deepen the understanding of the research 
environment.  Because villages tended to be visited on successive days the same respondents 
might be coincidentally encountered on several times and this gave the opportunity to verify the 
information gathered during previous discussions.  This also allowed for the ‘snowballing’ of key 
informants to obtain similar interview opportunities.  
As noted, the study used multiple methods of data collection but relied primarily on 
individual interviews.  These were weighted towards smallholder farmers who constitute the 
group considered to be most negatively and directly influenced by the encroaching urbanization 
process.  Figure 3.1 chronicles the number of interviews, their location and the broad 
occupational groups involved.  Using a constructivist approach, the objectives of the study, 
                                                             
30 Key informants are defined as “a select group of individuals who are likely to provide needed information, ideas, 
and insights on a particular subject” (Kumar, 1989: 1).  Two criteria are essential for key informant interviews.  First, 
that only the views of a small and manageable number of informants who have useful information are solicited.  
Second, that interviews are essentially qualitative in their nature, with the interviewer developing detailed notes of the 
questions asked and answers given that, in turn, enables a probing for deeper answers when necessary. 
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including the examination of Ethiopia’s state-led development policy and the identification of the 
social, cultural and economic dynamics of government-led development programmes, were 
informed by the viewpoints of the participants during conversation regarding their daily lives.  
While this occurred during individual interviews, opinions were also gathered during interactions 
among small groups (Mojtahed, 2014).  Participant opinions regarding such diverse topics as 
rainfall and crop prices, the sale of land and employment following displacement were recorded 
and, in the aggregate, demonstrated a sense of loss regarding disappearing livelihoods.  While 
generally well informed about issues central to their livelihoods, displaced smallholders were 
progressively ill-equipped to address emerging issues as they became larger, further from the 
farm, and more complex.  This context was reflected in the later reconstruction of these 
discussions during data analysis (Mills, et al., 2006).  
Relatively few conversations which occurred during field observations were of sufficient 
importance to be recorded as interviews and farmers, especially, were unable or unwilling to 
carry on a detailed enough exchange for a suitably long period of time to be considered an 
interview.  While this was often due to work exigencies and impatient cattle who wanted to 
continue ploughing the field, it also appeared to be the result of an embarrassing inability to 
communicate thoughts about matters that they’d given little attention to, such as how they went 
about teaching their children to farm or what they might do once their land was expropriated.  
Fruitful interviews were conducted with eleven educational institution professionals.  Those 
respondents were especially vital to understanding the issues involved with students who are 
finding fewer employment opportunities than were available to their parents, a phenomena 
described by Davies (1974).  Instructors at both university and vocational centres have had long 
experience with student aspirations and possess a keen understanding of the social pressure to 
find employment upon the completion of their studies.   
Sample Size 
Different circumstances may affect sample size.  Financial and time constraints 
unavoidably and legitimately limit the time spent in the field and therefore the number of 
respondents who can be contacted (Bartlett, et al., 2001; Lenth, 2001; Kondracki, et al., 2002).  
In this case time was of the essence due to Ethiopian visa restrictions.  Moreover, the 
availability of busy officials and their willingness to respond to queries, and even the issue of 
transportation were valid considerations in completing the research process.  As noted, 
although the volume of interviews must be numerous enough to achieve saturation their number 
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must remain small enough for analysis.  In the end, the depth and quality of interviews is 
important since there is no firm criteria regarding when the saturation point occurs in the sample 
process.   
The interview population included 104 informants who ranged from smallholder farmers, 
to government officials, to managers of financial institutions and informative conversations were 
conducted with hundreds of other individuals, including university students.  Because interviews 
were often conducted in fields when multiple family members were present it is difficult to 
accurately differentiate according to gender, however the 104 records roughly indicate the 
primary spokesperson was male 81 times and female 23 times.  Women who were individually  
interviewed were equally likely to operate farms and coffee houses as they were to own 
construction material shops.  Too few respondents could accurately relate their ages to be a 
useful metric, however most smallholders who were interviewed could easily recall childhood 
memories of the overthrow of Emperor Halie Selassie in 1974 and so their ages are assumed to 
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be at least 50 years.  Reported education levels ranged from illiterate with no schooling, to 
elementary education, to those who held doctoral degrees.  Respondents who displayed 
business ownership tendencies gravitated towards the lower-mid range of education and 
appeared fairly evenly divided among both male and females. 
In the majority of cases, office interviews with government officials were obtained by 
scheduling appointments with Ministries.  When the purpose of the study was explained federal 
officials were usually receptive to meeting and were often helpful in arranging subsequent 
interviews with regional officials, a process which was considerably simplified by the co-location 
of federal and Oromia regional ministries in the city of Addis Ababa.  Admittance to regional and 
wereda officials, though, necessitated adherence to a very formal system of obtaining 
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permissions and presenting a letter of introduction from the higher level ministry to them.  They 
could then choose to meet, possibly providing similar letters of their own to subordinate offices.   
These letters of introduction were taken very seriously and not all federal or regional 
officials were willing to provide one.  Their absence complicated matters and meant lower level 
officials might not agree to discuss their programmes.  Government officials representing 
specific programme offices, such as regional transportation ministries or land registration 
agents, were often very officious.  Letters of introduction were only accepted by the specific 
offices described in the document and conversations could not veer from the subject in the 
letter.  However, at some steps along the way interventions were made by persons of local 
importance.  University deans, for example, intervened with wereda officials and city mayors 
who then agreed to facilitate meetings with the sub-officials who were responsible for 
programme delivery. 
At the lowest level of government, the neighbourhood kebele, letters and introductions 
were generally not needed and the chance encounter with a foreign researcher appeared to be 
a surprising distraction, though a business card with the University crest facilitated the 
exchange.  Not all villages have the same social services or administrative infrastructure and so 
interviews could not be evenly distributed across the communities visited.  Therefore, no office-
to-office comparison was possible.  
Focus Group Discussion 
In addition to interviews with government officials, discussions with local business 
owners and random meetings with smallholders in their fields, focus groups were also employed 
(Gill, et al., 2008).  Focus groups are defined by Bryman (2012: 712) as “a form of group 
interview in that there are several participants and there is an emphasis in the questioning on a 
particular, fairly tightly defined topic within the group.”  Bryman is not, however, specific about 
how these groups come together.  During the field experience smallholders and others were 
interviewed in peer groups representing common interests as they worked in cattle and grain 
markets; as they gathered in multiple-family groups to weed adjoining fields; and in the more 
affable environs of tela31 houses.  To facilitate a deeper local understanding, the team visited 
the same tela houses and coffee shops while in the same village and this helped to form a 
familiarity with the proprietors, who were often women in their mid-30’s with small children.  
                                                             
31 Home brewed beer. 
111 
 
That, however-briefly established familiarity, assisted in evoking a spontaneity of responses 
during individual and group discussions when the owners entered the conversation and 
legitimized the subsequent interactions.   
Groups would vary in size from four to six persons to maintain manageability and control 
to the point where the interpreter could distinguish between the speakers for later recording of 
their comments.  It was generally easy to meet with small groups who had already gathered and 
while none expected to be paid for their participation, they uniformly indicated they should be 
provided with in-kind remuneration.  This did not seem to pose any ethical dilemmas.  Thus, in 
locations where they already felt comfortable smallholders were queried in small groups about 
their work, their views regarding the availability of educational, health care, and social services 
and how the advancing urbanization of the area might affect their own land; including their 
economic future and the future of their children.  Locations other than tela houses, such as local 
restaurants, were used when it was more appropriate to the social status of wereda officials or 
kebele administrators and their assistants.   
During a qualitative process the depth of individual interviews may not be substantial 
due to the time constraints of the respondent as he ploughs his field or attends to customers in 
her restaurant.  A balance of more measurements with length and depth was used to provide 
reliability of responses though relatively few of the conversations engaged in were detailed 
enough to be considered interviews.  This was considered likely to provide a better thematic 
sample of opinion, leading towards a more contextual appraisal of local conditions.   
 
 
3.3 Study Area Characteristics 
Ethiopia is located just beyond the extreme eastern edge of the Sahara desert in 
northeast Africa, between 3 and 15 degrees North latitude and 33 and 48 degrees East 
longitude (Map 3.1).  It is a poor, landlocked country surrounded by the six nations of Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.   
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Collier (2007) writes extensively about the trade 
and development barriers inherent to landlocked nations, 
pointing out that states with coastlines are better able to 
trade in the global market, while landlocked nations are 
restricted to trade along and through their borders.  Their 
economic potential, he says, is dependent upon the 
infrastructure of bordering countries and the absence of 
trade-inhibiting wars with their neighbours.  He further 
observes that where war or border conflicts exist there is 
little chance for development.  Gallup, et al., (1999: 180) 
had also described the influence of geography upon states 
and regions and they, too, noted that landlocked countries 
have far greater challenges in their economic and agricultural development.   
Environmental Characteristics 
Ethiopia’s population is predicted to double from the current 94 million to 187 million by 
the year 2050 (UNDP, 2012).  The population distribution is heavily rural, with approximately 
86% of Ethiopians living in agrarian, non-urban settings and fully 80% of all Ethiopians are 
directly engaged in farming activities.  Agriculture accounts for approximately 36.7% of 
Ethiopian GDP and though its importance in relative terms has lessened somewhat in recent 
years as the service sector has grown, the population imbalance has not changed appreciably 
since at least 1978 (Getahun, 1978; CSA, 2012; Seid, et al., 2015).  Climatically, while a slight 
increase in precipitation is expected, temperatures in Ethiopia are anticipated to increase by 1.7 
to 2.1 degrees Celsius by the year 2050.  These changes will shorten agricultural growing 
seasons by as much as 20% (Tadege, 2007; UNDPE/S, 2012; Kassie, et al., 2014).  As 
agricultural conditions worsen, the potential to cause smallholders to voluntarily leave the land is 
elevated, eventually aggravating food security issues and increasing the density of urban 
populations.  This was readily observed in Lalibela.   
3.3.1 Field Work 
The original date of field work was delayed due to the national elections which were 
conducted in May, 2015 and the possibility of national violence.  No violence was noted 
following the election and the outcome seemingly had no effect upon the research as it was 
being conducted.  Although 104 interviews were conducted, and hundreds of casual 
conversations occurred, no respondent mentioned the national elections and the only overt 
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presence of extra-ordinary security forces observed in any of the study areas occurred during 
the visit of the American president, Barrack Obama, to Addis Ababa in late July 2015. 
The field work was conducted between June and September, 2015 and this coincided 
with Ethiopia’s heavy summer (Meher) rainy season that occurs during June, July, and August.  
The time frame also enabled research to be conducted as the lighter autumn (Belg) rains of 
September, October, and November arrived.  Despite often wet conditions, roadways and 
walking paths were generally clear and there were no transportation issues which limited access 
to even the most remote areas.  Thus, data collection bridged the ploughing and planting 
season as well as the weeding season after crops had germinated.  Both periods presented 
ample opportunities to obtain easy access to smallholders and their families as they were 
working in their fields.  It also afforded entry to smaller urban areas, particularly in Lalibela, at 
the beginning of the ‘hungry time’ when local government food distribution programmes become 
necessary as stored stocks began to run low.  It provided an opportunity to observe those 
distribution programmes and the selection process used to choose recipients. The interval 
between the two climatic periods, when fewer smallholders were in their fields, was used to 
conduct interviews and conversations with government officials, university instructors and 
students, local business owners, manufacturing plant managers, and others who have a 
connection to agriculture or to other aspects of Ethiopia’s development.   
Therefore, the methods of data collection included extensive desk research; field 
observations, in-depth individual and focus group interviews, household and farm field visits; 
interviews of officials at the federal, regional, wereda and kebele levels of government; and 
conversations with shop owners, smallholders, and other residents.  These provided a good 
cross section of the different types of knowledge and power described by French & Raven 
(1959) and Gaventa (2016) regarding access to an array of informants.  
 
 
3.3.2 Research Locations 
The study population was observed in three geographically distinct locations throughout 
Ethiopia (Map 3.2), each of which presented a useful set of local characteristics including 
agricultural, industrial, and commercial developments.  These included the area surrounding 
Addis Ababa, consisting of eight smaller towns as far as 80 kilometres east and north of the city.  
Those included the communities of Entoto, Haregenion, Karaa, Legadado, Legatafo, Sabata, 
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Sendaffa, and Suluta that are included in the Oromia Special Zone Surrounding Finfinne 
(Tadesse & Imana, 2017).  Field work included secondary sites in and around Sheshamane 
including the towns of Adaama and Bishoftu, located some 260 kilometres south of Addis 
Ababa; and in Lalibela, 650 kilometres north of Addis Ababa.   
These three sites were selected following extensive discussions with aid and 
development workers who had long experience in Ethiopia and the decision to include them was 
finalized upon arrival in Addis Ababa 
following further discussion with 
United States and British embassy 
personnel, and with non-
governmental agency and agricultural 
development staff employed by non-
profit organizations.  Selection was 
intended to include a range of 
environmental influences, social 
conditions, and ethnicities.  Other 
towns, such as Dire Dawa and Ambo 
were not included in the study due to 
safety concerns and restrictions imposed by the University of Reading which were confirmed at 
the time by the regional security officer at the United States embassy in Addis Ababa. 
Lalibela 
Lalibela was chosen as a research site due to its gradual transition from an agricultural 
to a more urbanized centre of increasing regional significance as a result of its growing 
population.  Lalibela is best known for its religious importance to the Ethiopian Orthodox faith 
and for its eleven stone-hewn churches that are UNESCO World Heritage sites.  These include 
the frequently photographed Church of St. George, a monolithic structure carved into a hillside 
from a single block of living rock under the direction of King Gebre Mesqel Lalibela (r: early 13th 
century).     
Sattertwhaite, et al., (2010: 2813) found that in lesser developed countries, “urbanization 
is overwhelmingly the result of migration in response to low returns from agricultural 
occupations and the anticipation of realizing better economic opportunities in urban areas.”  The 
steep mountainsides (Photograph 3.1) surrounding Lalibela remain agrarian in character even 
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as smallholders there are voluntarily leaving the land.  Their movement is precipitated by 
agriculturally adverse weather conditions and by the frequent choice of their children to leave 
the farm (Wolf, et al., 2014) a 
situation which makes it more 
difficult for them to earn a sufficient 
living.  As elsewhere in Ethiopia, 
land in the Lalibela area is 
becoming a scarce commodity and 
the Central Statistical Agency 
(CSA, 2012b) notes the average 
farm size throughout Ethiopia is 
1.22 hectares, while the average 
size of a household is seven persons.  As inheritance further subdivides and reduces the size of 
holdings, farms are simply becoming too small to sustain new families and the movement of 
youth to local towns is increasingly common.  Bezu & Holden (2014: 266) contend that in 
Ethiopia livelihood choices are made by rural youth based on their rational observation of 
returns on their labour.  Specifically, they say that if the land is unable to support them, youth 
will seek other employment options.  Push factors such as “population pressures, land scarcity, 
lack of alternative livelihoods, and weather shocks” can become incentives for youth to migrate 
to urban areas.  
Lalibela’s population growth has resulted in added stress upon social services as more 
students attend local schools and more patients are being seen in medical clinics.  The 
population shift from surrounding areas has strained the employment capacity of the town since 
there is little commerce or industry other than religious tourism during observances in the 
months of October, December and January.  Seasonal tourism-related employment is one of 
the relatively few livelihood options (Crisp, 2002; de Chatel, 2014).  The towns’ population 
increase is leading to wider unemployment and a downward trajectory of local wages as the 
supply of unskilled labour exceeds demand.  Local officials noted petty crime rates are 
beginning to climb and that additional food distribution programmes are now required to 
accommodate the needs of residents, when in the past those programmes had only served the 
rural population.  Thus, Lalibela is a town and population in transition, though this transition is 
voluntary rather than programmatically induced by planned development or forced resettlement.  
It provides an example of local government response to increasing population pressures which 
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were generally similar to those of the peri-urban municipalities receiving oustees in the primary 
study area.  
Lalibela demonstrated the issues inherent in a rapid influx of unskilled smallholders who 
possessed few marketable skills.  Despite its challenges, Lalibela has a vibrant and well 
attended Technical and Vocational Education Training centre and its director has designed his 
curriculum to capitalize upon known labour shortages and economic opportunities.  As 
discussed further in Chapter 6, he has introduced new programmes that are intended for rural 
workers who are relocating, offering an example of a successful local government adaptation to 
changing population concentrations and as well as the relocation of unskilled workers.   
Sheshamane  
Sheshamane is actively engaged in social and economic change as it rapidly evolves 
from a small agricultural crossroads to a thriving regional commercial centre.  An extensive 
building programme in its increasingly dense central-business, commercial, and services area is 
employing the bulk of the construction-curriculum graduates from the local vocational centre.  
These changes made it an attractive location to investigate social and economic resettlement 
and the expectations of increasingly educated and vocationally trained youth who were either 
enrolled in the local vocational training centre or a satellite branch of Africa Bezu University.  
At the time of the field work, an area of drought was forming about 150 kilometres west 
of Sheshamane and its predicted encroachment was a cause for concern among the agricultural 
agents at the local Farmer Training Centre.  In response, smallholders were adapting to 
reduced rainfall by planting crops which required less moisture, such as teff instead of maize.  
New crops however, cause changes in local diets as well as induce wider modifications to 
agricultural activities including long established marketing relationships (Magnan, 2016).  
Managers at the Farmer Training Centre said local markets were, at the time of field work, 
responding well to the change to teff and that no farmers had left the land as a result of the 
decreased rains.  While Sheshamane was described during interviews and conversations as 
changing in character to that of an important trading crossroads and employment centre, there 
was no forced displacement noted.  No individuals or families where being ousted from the land.  
Rather, what relocations into the increasingly urban area were occurring were gradual and 
voluntary.   
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Without a rapid influx of additional workers, employment prospects remained generally 
good in Sheshamane for graduates of the vocational centre who had carefully chosen their field 
of study, though prospects were reportedly less so following university.  Poorly chosen 
academic programmes were a significant cause for concern among university instructors who 
recognized that a majority of students were not going to be successful in obtaining their 
employment goals; that they would need to settle for work which is outside of their field of study.  
Discussions with university instructors at the Africa Bezu University in Sheshamane revealed 
specific issues pertaining to students who obtain an advanced education but then have 
insufficient opportunities to utilize their new knowledge and skills.   
In addition, conversations with university students suggested an over-estimation of their 
economic value in the employment market.  These conversations helped to explain how 
education often leaves students with few options other than to take lower positions than they felt 
themselves to be qualified for; to better understand their return to their villages and family farms; 
or, or take decisions to emigrate.  Those interviews and conversations were particularly helpful 
in better framing the characteristics and social impacts of under-employment.  Sheshamane 
was valuable for the insights gathered regarding a more orderly resettlement and the skills-
training offered by the local vocational centre and which are almost immediately put to practical 
application in the rapidly developing urban core.  Each town provided useful insights into 
general relocation issues; the gentrification process; and unemployment among former 
smallholders as well as the outcome of youth education as students sought employment upon 
graduating from university or following completion of vocational training.   
Addis Ababa and the Surrounding Area  
Addis Ababa is a thriving metropolitan area with a fast growing and increasingly 
prosperous population.  The areas to its east and north became the primary study sites, though 
the city is clearly expanding in all directions.  Founded in 1886 by Emperor Menelik II, and 
named by his wife Empress Taytu Betul, Addis Ababa (meaning ‘New Flower’) is a 
comparatively young city.  While the official population is about six million, the presence of 
undocumented and unsponsored residents was unofficially reported by respondents, including a 
former city transportation department director, as increasing the figure to approximately ten 
million.  As a result of its growth and actual population, Addis Ababa is expanding to 
accommodate its emerging middle-class, a newly prosperous group who are increasingly 
relocating from the crowded urban core to more comfortable suburban lifestyles. 
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As noted, the primary study area came to be east of Addis Ababa, extending to the town 
of Sendafa, a rural zone that consisted of smallholders whose work primary concerned growing 
teff and wheat.  Extremely rocky soil prevents the introduction of mechanized agriculture even 
though most fields are flat to gently rolling.  It is here that large residential developments are 
being built along existing roadways which parallel newly installed electrical and water 
transmission lines.  Another distinct study area extended north of Addis Ababa as far as 
Chancho that, according to local agricultural officials, is a dairy producing region.  There, new 
roadways and rail lines are planned to open trade routes to the west-central area of the country 
and thence to Sudan.  These two areas, north and east of Addis Ababa, provided the 
researcher with suitable access to smallholders and others who were in some stage of the 
displacement process, or who had already been displaced either from rural or urban homes.  
Their location enabled easy access to federal, regional and wereda ministries for the 
triangulation of data as it was being gathered during field interviews. 
Yet, city growth is rapidly engulfing the small peri-urban municipalities surrounding Addis 
Ababa and whose de facto boundaries are expanding into these catchment areas (Map 3.3).  
Addis Ababa is designated in Ethiopia’s Constitution (Article 49) as the capital city of the federal 
government and it is referred to in that Article as ‘being located in Oromia’.  It is one of the two 
‘special districts’ listed in the Constitution, a designation which grants it a general degree of 
autonomy and self-governance making it, at least partially, independent of the Oromia regional 
government.  The city administration is exerting its status as a special district, and as the 
national capital, to engage in both the redevelopment of its internal core and to build new 
residential and commercial areas along its periphery.  Areas within the urban core are being 
cleared for new high-end commercial, office and hotel construction as the city continues to 
entice continental and global governmental agencies to locate there (Yntiso, 2008; WB, 2015b) 
and this is adding to resettlement pressures in peripheral areas.   
The significant expansion of its boundaries is considered in Ethiopian legal journals to be 
an unlawful land grab that would substantially increase the size and political power of the city at 
the expense of smaller communities (AACG, 2012) and of the Oromia region.  The Addis Ababa 
and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan was proposed in April 2014 by 
the city administration as a way to manage its rapid growth and redevelopment (Abebe & 
Hesselberg, 2013).  The Plan was authorized by the Provisional Government of the city Addis 
Ababa though planning staff relied upon its own Revised Charter of the Addis Ababa City 
Government (Proclamation Number 361/2003) for legal authority to proceed.   
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Prior to the adoption of the Plan, city authorities in Addis Ababa were already creating an 
environment conducive to investment, re-development, and gentrification which required 
significant, large-scale displacements of the population.  Gentrification of the area is forcing the 
poor to relocate and a large development, consisting of over 18,000 flats, is being built to the 
immediate east in the town of Yeka Abado to accommodate them (Planel & Bridonneau, 2017).  
Construction of other single-family housing areas along the periphery of Addis Ababa are also 
displacing large numbers of people in the peri-urban and rural areas (Belachew, 2014; Noorloos 
& Kloosterboer, 2017).  Yntiso (2008: 54) noted “carried away by the euphoria of nation building, 
policy makers tend to view the disruptive effects of urban development on certain sections of 
society as justified sacrifices for the greater good” and found most dislocated households in 
Addis Ababa suffered from loss of income, higher rents, smaller homes and a social 
disarticulation which resulted from the loss of friendships and networks.  This was observed to 
be occurring in rural areas bordering the city as it continues to expand and the farmland along 
its periphery is converted to urban uses.  
Land in rural and peri-urban communities is the mainstay of crop and livestock 
production and therefore of rural livelihoods and earnings.  As small holds are expropriated for 
development those livelihoods and their complimentary social networks are disrupted, often with 
no income generating alternative.  At its zenith, the new city boundaries created by the Plan 
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would have extended as far as 100 kilometres from the current city centre, ultimately annexing 
up to 1.1 million hectares of land and potentially displacing hundreds of thousands of 
smallholders and their families (ARC, 2016; Home, 2016)32.  Thus, the municipal expansion and 
gentrification process was forcing smallholders in the study area to relocate as their properties 
are expropriated by the city and wereda government and then resold to developers who build 
residential, commercial or industrial structures with higher-use purposes. 
Illustrative Value of the Three Study Areas 
The selection of Lalibela and Sheshamane as secondary study sites allowed for the 
illustration of the differences in the approach those two municipalities have used regarding 
movement and displacement versus that of the kebele and wereda governments located near 
Addis Ababa.  Resettlement issues in those two communities appeared to be similar to the 
primary study area, though nearer to Addis Ababa they were greatly accelerated.  Specific 
issues noted in each area included the need for job creation, youth and older cohort 
unemployment, and newly overcrowded schools and medical clinics.  The slower and more 
voluntary resettlement in Lalibela and Sheshamane afforded social systems such as schools to 
better accommodate resettlement and other needs of the community even if these may have 
come at the price of closing and relocating some rural services.  The ability to changing 
municipal needs was discussed with local administrators in Lalibela, Suluta, Sheshamane, 
Legatafo, and Sendaffa as an on-going planning and funding problem.   
3.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of a research study is to answer the question posed by providing results 
which are reliable and objective.  Social science research is useful in evaluating the 
effectiveness of existing policies, identifying shortfalls in those policies, and providing practical 
and implementable recommendations to their resolution.  Results though must be derived from 
reliable sources and interpreted properly with minimal bias.  Qualitative studies may not be 
entirely replicable since opinions change according to the social circumstances and temporal 
conditions of the individuals or groups interviewed.  Thus, they reflect only an instant in time.   
Regardless of the method employed, whether qualitative or quantitative, results must be 
compelling.  While gathering the data, a triangulation method was employed and the facts and 
                                                             
32 The centralized ownership of land; the method of land expropriation; and individual compensation rights in Ethiopia 
are described throughout section 4.3. 
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opinions that were being presented were compared to the literature, government documents, 
and interactions with stakeholders who represented a variety of differing views of the same 
issue.  In this case, a reliance upon secondary sources was heavily dependent upon accounts 
published in the grey literature.  These represented the views of non-governmental 
organizations because of the almost complete absence of academic articles depicting Ethiopia’s 
ousting of smallholders for residential development.  The recent nature of student protests 
meant that little reliable academic literature was available regarding their demands.   
In summary, the methods used for this study were varied and sufficient responses were 
collected to provide internal reliability.  Their importance lies in the overwhelming 
acknowledgement that displacement in the study area is not unanticipated and that smallholders 
often avoided the inevitable consequences, with few personally mitigating actions being taken 
among those who were encountered.   
The following chapter describes the history of Ethiopia’s land use laws which enable the 
expropriation of smallholder properties.  It also describes Ethiopia’s history; the structure of its 
government; the iterative state-led development plans and pro-poor policies that the federal 
government has initiated. 
  
122 
 
Chapter 4 
Stage Setting 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an over-view of Ethiopia’s extensive history.  It describes the origins of 
its constitutional authority to expropriate property and the evolving system of state-led 
developmental programmes which the federal government has introduced.   
Ethiopia is a society whose political landscape has evolved dramatically in the past 45 years.  
In 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie’s absolute monarchy was overthrown by the Dergue, a 
revolutionary government strongly influenced by the Soviet Union and the nation rapidly transitioned 
to a totalitarian governance system which curtailed social and economic rights and imposed wide 
ranging political repression.  The Dergue levied reforms wherein properties were seized without 
compensation and land became centrally owned by the federal government.  Almost immediately a 
period of continuing revolution began, and in 1991 the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democrat 
Front (EPRDF), that was influenced by its own version of Marxism, ultimately took power.  The 
current political structure remains influenced by a period of Cold War-era hegemony, especially the 
lingering political and social influences of the former Soviet Union.   
Following its assumption of power, EPRDF policies resulted in a time of euphoric economic 
growth and the higher standards of living which tend to accompany the end of civil conflicts (ILO, 
2010; Cevik & Rahmati, 2013; Del Castillo & Bunche, 2015).  Though Ethiopia’s economy quickly 
expanded post-1991, it did so erratically until a series of state-led development plans, first 
introduced in 2002, brought greater stability.  However, slowing economies are common in the 
second decade post-conflict.  In 2005, the cycle began to show slower GDP growth and therefore 
less plentiful employment, including among a better educated and potentially restive youth cohort 
who had witnessed the earlier success enjoyed by their parents following the EPRDF’s seizure of 
power (Pape, 2005; Desalegn, 2016; ADBG, 2017; IMF, 2017b; WB, 2017d).  
The slowing economy is making it more difficult for youth to find appropriate employment 
opportunities and their expectations for economic and therefore social mobility are going unmet 
(Honwana, 2013).  Further, a semi-authoritarian government has now evolved that restricts 
individual freedoms and political expression and Ethiopian “democratisation, which made generally 
acclaimed progress … seems to be seriously reversed” (Pausewang, 2009: 549; Aalen & Muriass, 
2017).  
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4.1 Historical Synopsis of Ethiopia 
Ethiopia’s history has witnessed the earliest emergence of civilization.  It has survived 
the ebb and flow of the great religions and endured numerous internal and external political 
threats and wars.  While more ancient finds of human habitation have been made elsewhere in 
Africa, the story of Ethiopia generally begins with "Lucy”, one of the earliest examples of a 
bipedal walker whose 3.2 million-year-old skeletal remains were unearthed in 1974 in the north-
eastern Awash valley.   
The first recognized Ethiopian emperor was Menelik I, who began his rule circa 950 B.C.  
Thereafter, economic and social advancement came quickly.  As early as 300 B.C., Ethiopians 
held the regional advantage by employing technologies that were not widely used anywhere 
else in sub-Saharan Africa, including such innovations as the wheel and the plough; dry-land 
farming that included the cultivation of drought-resistant crops; the employment of moisture 
conservation methods; and the introduction of sophisticated irrigation practices.  These 
techniques resulted in larger harvests then regional competitors could achieve.  As an early 
nation-state, Ethiopia developed higher-level cognitive concepts including a formal written 
language and numeracy that accelerated its agricultural and trade dominance.  The wealth 
which accumulated from those practices enabled the early development of Ethiopia as a 
formidable regional power.  By 330 A.D. Christianity had become the state-religion under King 
Ezana, though scriptural verse attests to its even earlier arrival when Philip the Evangelist 
converted a visiting court official in the 1st Century A.D.   
“But an angel of the Lord spoke to Philip saying, ‘Arise and go south to the road that 
descends from Jerusalem to Gaza.’  And he arose and went; and behold, there was a Ethiopian 
eunuch, a court official of Candace, queen of the Ethiopians, who was in charge of all her 
treasure; and he had come to Jerusalem to worship.”  
(Acts 8:26-38, KJV)  
This biblical reference is not gratuitous.  A wave of European colonization of the African 
continent began with the Berlin Conference of 1884 yet it by-passed Ethiopia, which may have 
been spared because of the dominating influence of its Christian religion (Marcus, 1994; 
Heldring & Robinson, 2012).  Despite its malignant conditions, European colonization brought 
modernising influences to the continent such as railways, formal education, and rudimentary 
centralized governance systems (Said, 1978; Rabinow, 1989; Stoler, 1995).  Thus, other African 
nations were better prepared for entry into the modern world of global trade networks than was 
Ethiopia which had been insulated from technological development and so it had fallen behind 
relative to the colonized nations.   
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4.1.1  Emperor Menelik II  
Three thousand years after the reign of Menelik I, the first modernizing emperor was 
Menelik II (r: 1889 - 1913) who is credited with bringing schools and printing presses to Ethiopia.  
Those machines allowed the publication of newspapers and other materials including the first 
indigenously written textbooks.  Those books were used in a fledgling secular educational 
system introduced in 1908 as the Ecole Imperiale Menelik II, though the Ethiopian Orthodox 
church had operated religious schools and seminaries for centuries.  Instruction in this new, 
non-religious school was reserved for the sons of the nobility and initially its curriculum focussed 
on mathematics, law and calligraphy (Bishaw & Lasser, 2012).  Menelik’s schools were quickly 
mimicked by regional nobility and by 1935 over 100 others had been opened throughout the 
country.   
Given the lack of formally educated Ethiopians who were qualified to teach in his 
schools, Menelik II imported a succession of foreign educators.  This resulted in a period of non-
indigenized education when, from 1908 to1935, instructors were primarily Egyptian and French.  
Upon Menelik’s death in 1913, his grandson, Lij Iyasu took the throne but his conversion to 
Islam so thoroughly alienated the powerful Ethiopian Orthodox church he was deposed in 1916 
(Negash, 2006).  Menilek’s daughter, Zawidtu, subsequently became empress (r: 1916 to 1930) 
and his eldest nephew Ras Tafari, a graduate of Menelick’s II’s school and later known as Halie 
Selassie, was appointed heir.   
4.1.2 Emperor Haile Selassie I 
Upon Empress Zawidtu’s death, Emperor Haile Selassie I (r: 1930-1974) ascended the 
throne.  He began the present modernization of Ethiopia and introduced innovative systems of 
centralized government.  He constructed roads to facilitate communication and economic 
growth; instituted anti-slavery programmes and advocated religious liberties.  He also increased 
the number of elementary and secondary schools, expanding their offerings to include 
arithmetic, the natural sciences, social studies and agriculture, eventually broadening the 
curriculum with instruction in physics, chemistry, civil engineering and veterinary science 
(Marcus, 1994).  In 1931, Selassie’s wife, Empress Menen, established the first Ethiopian 
school for girls, though initially its syllabus only provided instruction in dressmaking, drawing, 
and home management including basic sanitation and hygiene.  These were skills thought to be 
essential to diplomacy since proper wives and a well-managed and presentable home would 
reflect well upon the nation when visitors were invited to meet with government ministers.    
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Though it is perhaps a distinction without a difference, Ethiopia was never colonized, 
even though it was occupied by Italian forces beginning in 1935.  Upon taking control, the 
Italians closed Ethiopia’s’ schools and these remained shuttered until 1942 when they were 
reopened shortly after British military forces defeated the Italians.  During the British period, 
educational curriculum became focussed upon the development of a workforce that could serve 
as government administrators.  The schools came under American influence from 1954 as yet 
another set of foreigner’s exerted influence over Ethiopia until 1974, when the Dergue assumed 
power and adopted an eastern-European, Soviet-influenced model of government (Bishaw & 
Lasser, 2012).  
Property Rights in Selassie-era Ethiopia 
Over the 44 years of Selassie’s reign, a system of land ownership evolved which 
strongly favoured the wealthy and influential.  Tenancy became common among the poor and 
rental contracts were taken by 80% of farmers across Ethiopia.  This resulted in subservience to 
landlords and it created a significant level of personal risk and financial uncertainty regarding 
whether to make needed improvements to property from which they could be ousted at any time 
(Clapham, 1988; Chala, 2016).   
During the Selassie period, three forms of property rights which favoured the elite were 
common.  In the northern areas of Tigray, where the early leadership of the EPRDF originated, 
rist land tenure was hereditary and assured by residency in local villages (Ayalew, et al., 2005; 
Gebremeskel, 2011).  While rist was simultaneously very individualistic and farmer-oriented it 
was essentially a communal system of ownership.  Property disputes were adjudicated by local 
custom or through tribal proceedings rather than by central courts or a review of other records 
(Teklu, 2005).  Under rist, third-party sales of land parcels were prohibited even as the farmer’s 
individual choice regarding how to use the land was virtually absolute.  The rist system, though, 
did not apply universally across Ethiopia.  Large tracts, especially in the fertile southern areas, 
were often appropriated by the Selassie government for presentation to local nobility (maderia 
tenure) and their gifting was used to cement fidelity to the crown.  In other instances, land was 
appropriated by powerful church interests (samon tenure) or it was lost through debt 
foreclosure.  In these and other ways, land could find its way into private ownership (gebbar 
tenure) and this often resulted in a poor, dispossessed, and landless population (Jemma, 2004; 
Crewett, et al., 2008; Makki, 2014; Srur, 2014).   
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Toward the end of his 44 year reign, Selassie’s monarchy began to collapse under the 
weight of external events and internal pressures.  Following the 1967 Egyptian / Israeli war, the 
Suez Canal was closed by Egypt.  This substantially raised the price of goods imported into 
Ethiopia from European and southern Mediterranean ports.  The canal’s closure constricted 
exports as well and this resulted in widespread unemployment in Ethiopia’s influential markets 
for coffee and unfinished animal hides.  The 1973 Yom Kippur war further constrained shipping 
and the price of imports, especially of food and petroleum, increased sharply (Singer & Ansari, 
1988).  In 1974, a combination of international economic and trade issues, and uncontrollable 
environmental conditions, triggered a revolution that ended the 3,000 year line of Ethiopian 
monarchy.   
4.1.3 World War II and the Cold-War Influences 
Ethiopia’s current system of state-ownership of the land, and its educational and 
governance systems, are traceable to World War II and its later status as a Cold War proxy-
state.  During the era of the 1960’s and 1970’s, the developing world was often characterised by 
political and economic fragility.  One theory as to why sub-Saharan Africa states remained 
constantly fragile, despite their increasing self-determination, was their status as proxy states for 
the competing superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States (Hemlan & Ratner, 
1992).  Article 1 section (2) of the 1945 United Nations Charter confirmed the principle of “equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples.”  However, as put into practice this principle often 
worked to their detriment as emerging nations in the developing South could not adequately 
sustain themselves economically and socially without the political patronage and support of one 
of the superpowers.   
Policy makers and military leaders on both sides of the ideological spectrum used 
various types of aid for economic development including military foreign aid and humanitarian 
foreign aid to better exploit local conditions in order to achieve their global political goals 
(Morgenthau, 1962; Stokes, 2003; Warmerdam & de Haan, 2011).  
Super Power Contestations  
Even before the United States formally entered World War II in December 1941, 
President Roosevelt had declared that Ethiopia was eligible for military aid in order to resist the 
Italian occupation that had begun in 1935.  At about the same time Roosevelt made his 
determination, British and Commonwealth forces seized Ethiopia from the Italians.  They took 
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control of a communications base, a regional listening post consisting of a 3,400 acre facility 
known as Kagnew Station in Asmara, now the capital of Eritrea.  The following year, 1942, the 
British granted combined access to the United States military and the Americans established 
what would become a permanent Cold War facility which monitored events across the Middle 
East, including shipping traffic through the Red Sea (Lefebvre, 1992).   
In 1948, the British invoked a long dormant provision of the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty 
that had been agreed with Emperor Menelik II.  This affected the transfer of Somali grazing 
areas in the Ogaden region, now known as Ethiopia’s Somali region, to Ethiopia and that 
transfer resulted in a protracted border war between Ethiopia and Somalia (Zolberg, 1989).  
Beginning in 1972, and in return for permission to build naval support facilities, the Soviet Union 
began to supply Somalia with a US$100 million military equipment and training package and the 
cross-border war intensified.  
Though the United States had long supported the Ethiopian government, in May 1977 as 
part of an emerging policy emphasis on human rights advocated by the newly elected Carter 
administration, the United States withdrew its military contingent from Dergue-controlled 
Ethiopia and ended its 35-year presence at Kagnew station (Keller, 1992; Lefebvre, 1992).  That 
withdrawal created an expansionist opportunity for the Soviet Union which quickly improved its 
diplomatic and military relations with Ethiopia”33.  It brokered a short-lived peace agreement with 
Somalia and, as relations rapidly warmed, provided Ethiopia with a US$400 million military aid 
package.  Russian support continued to grow.  As the Dergue government became increasingly 
friendly towards the Soviet Union, it began to more closely emulate that political and social 
system, eventually “adopting overtly Marxist policies” (Darch, 2006: 138; Vaughan, 2011; 
Mehretu, 2012) including state-ownership of land.  Thus, remnants of World War II and on-going 
Cold War politics in the Horn of Africa facilitated Ethiopia’s transition from an absolute monarchy 
which was a nominally pro-western ally, to a repressive regime supported and protected by the 
Soviet Union.   
4.2 The Dergue Government 1974 - 1991 
In 1973 a ruinous drought occurred in the Tigray province though conditions were, at 
their outset, ignored by the Selassie government in Addis Ababa.  When a response was finally 
mounted, relief efforts were badly managed and famine-induced deaths reached more than 
                                                             
33  During the field work phase of this thesis an aging former member of the Dergue security apparatus said “the KGB 
was easier to work with but the CIA paid better.” 
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300,000 (Eshete, 1982).  The survivors, desperate people who had exhausted their family food 
stocks, sold their remaining assets and migrated to larger towns to seek relief.  Once there, they 
spread stories of government indifference to their plight.  
Early the following year, a small demonstration by military personnel which was initially 
fuelled by complaints of low pay, the lack of proper food and other issues was joined by 
teachers, university students and workers who were reacting, in part, to the continued plight of 
Tigrayian famine victims34.  The demonstration grew into general strikes and these led to even 
wider protests over general social conditions (Lefebvre, 1992, Klandermans, 2014, van 
Zomeren, 2017).  Ultimately, a group of military officers known as the “Coordinating Committee 
of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army” (colloquially known as ‘the Dergue’) and 
whose leadership was predominantly from the Tigray province where the famine had developed, 
deposed Emperor Selassie on 12 September 197435.  Led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, an 
Ethiopian army major, the Dergue quickly consolidated its power by merging the legislative and 
executive branches of government into a single entity known as the Provisional Military 
Administrative Council (PMAC) (Jembere & Woldemelak, 2011).     
The Dergue sought to correct imperial excesses of class and wealth differentiation by 
implementing a hard-line socialist system.  To accomplish this goal, the PMAC began to enact a 
series of pro-poor social and economic reforms.  These included a far reaching system of land 
redistribution that was intended to prevent the restoration of the rural oligarchy that had formed 
under Selassie (Rahmato, 1984).  In response to growing internal opposition among the 
intelligentsia to its policies, in 1975 the Dergue closed universities and secondary schools.  It 
confiscated properties, including banks and insurance firms; took control of every important 
manufacturing or commercial enterprise throughout the country and seized and nationalized 
rural lands.  
4.2.1 Dergue Land Distribution and Resettlement 
The vehicle to accomplish those land seizures was Proclamation Number 31 of 4 March 
1975, Public Ownership of Rural Lands.  Chapter 2, section 3(1) stated “as of the effective date 
of this Proclamation all rural lands shall be the collective property of the Ethiopian people.”  
                                                             
34 Regime change is rarely a direct result of food insecurity and, in isolation, scarcity seldom causes civil unrest.  
However, when combined with other conditions such as environmental change, high unemployment among youth, or 
general housing shortages, food insecurity can create political fragilities that propel a society towards increased 
lawlessness, civil disturbances and civil war (Gutner, 1999; Johnston, 2007; Taydas & Peksen, 2012).  
35 Selassie died 27 August 1975 under uncertain circumstances, though his death is often attributed to Mengistu 
Haile Mariam who allegedly smothered the 83 year old emperor in his bed. 
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Section 3(2) further clarified “No person or business organization or any other organization shall 
hold rural land in private ownership.”  Consequently, virtually all real property in Ethiopia then 
held under any of the existing tenure systems became the possession of the state.  Large farms 
were seized by local Dergue committees, divided, and then reallocated to peasant farmers 
according to formulae based on family size and land quality.  But, the allocations made were 
often too small to achieve sustainable production and Kiros (2006: 56) found that following 
redistribution “the majority of holders cultivated tiny plots, the largest of which was no bigger 
than 0.25 hectares.”    
Provincial Origins of the Dergue Leadership 
The executive leadership of the Dergue was primarily from the Tigray province and so 
the fundamental characteristics of its land redistribution programme paralleled the cultural and 
institutional norms of the rist system with which they were most familiar.  Following its 
distribution, rural land became for practical though not legal purposes, family owned and 
controlled.  Farmers retained usufruct rights and were allowed to choose their own methods of 
cultivation.  Land could be subdivided and passed to the sons within a family, but sales to third 
parties were prohibited.  Nevertheless the Dergue’s land proclamations went further, even 
prohibiting farmers from hiring non-family labourers to work their fields.  This had the unintended 
effect of reducing output by constricting the availability of additional labour when it was most 
needed during planting or harvesting.  It also eliminated the livelihood alternatives of day-
workers who were not themselves land holders.  Still, the Dergue’s system of collective land 
ownership did have the positive effect of preventing its alienation through distress sales, 
especially in circumstances of famine or other economic failure.  This not only precluded the 
formation of a landless class of dispossessed smallholders (Gebreselassie, 2006) it also 
prevented the return of the social stratification that had resulted from the concentration of land, 
and therefore wealth, into the hands of a small elite.   
Forced Resettlement and Food Shortages 
To accomplish its goal of land redistribution, in 1984 the Dergue began a series of wide-
scale forced resettlements of the population.  A 10-year development programme was 
announced to relocate approximately 33 million Ethiopians, a sizable majority of the population 
then estimated to be 42,600,000 (CSA, 1991).  According to Marcus (1994: 208) the Dergue 
government approached the resettlement issue “as if it were a military campaign, not a humane 
programme” and by 1986, some 600,000 people had been moved.  In its zeal the Dergue had 
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broken up families and villages but failed to sufficiently prepare receiving areas, which had only 
been fitted with minimal housing and wholly inadequate social services such as schools and 
medical clinics.  Resettled families were often sent to where the land and moisture conditions 
were dissimilar to their own farms and where they had no experience with local pests, crop or 
livestock needs.    
Contemporaneously, Steingraber (1987) described the Dergue justifications for 
resettlement, including the concentration of scattered homesteaders into central communities, 
as being necessary for ecological reasons including land degradation from over-population and 
over use.  Contrary literature though, contends resettlement was an effort to prevent the 
formation of an agricultural middle-class that might have become powerful enough to challenge 
the Dergue.  Hammond (2008) suggested this resettlement was really the ‘invisibilization’ of 
recalcitrant groups and was carried out by selectively relocating those who were politically 
opposed to the Dergue.  Lavers (2012) also described how these forced resettlement 
programmes were used to combat the rise of guerrilla groups opposed to the Dergue regime.   
The problem of food shortages created by resettlement increased as the Dergue 
attempted to pacify potentially restive municipal areas.  Agricultural policies were implemented 
that forced the delivery of artificially low-priced grain to urban markets, however price controls 
discouraged production and further impoverished producers since their own input costs were 
not similarly controlled by the government (Henze, 1989).  Rahmato (1984) described how a 
complex agricultural tax assessment system which had developed during the Selassie 
monarchy was over-simplified.  The Dergue imposed an assessment of ten Ethiopian birr for 
agricultural production along with another ETB 10 for a land use tax, which at the time were very 
large sums.  The imposition of these taxes was seen as being highly inequitable since all 
farmers paid the same amount regardless of their output or the size of their holding.  At about 
the same time the Dergue government began its resettlement campaign a wide spread drought 
resulted in another famine that became an internationally-publicized relief effort to once more 
feed a starving population (Keller, 1992; Seleshi & Zanke, 2004).  The attention given to these 
simultaneous events was highly embarrassing to the Dergue since it had been a weak reaction 
to a previous drought and famine which had triggered the overthrow of the Selassie monarchy. 
4.2.2 Educational Reforms 
Under the Dergue, education reflected Soviet ideals.  An expanded delivery system was 
introduced which, often for the first time, brought schools to rural villages where few educational 
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opportunities had been available before.  A highly centralized curriculum was introduced that 
focussed on instruction in agriculture, industrial technology, political education, home 
economics, and business (Negash, 2006; Engel & Rose, 2011).  To assist in the Dergue’s 
curriculum development, policy advisors arrived from the politically hard-line Soviet-satellites of 
East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary.  Further, to eliminate possible urban unrest and to 
diffuse potential counter-revolutionary movements, the Dergue instituted a Development 
Through Cooperation campaign and through it, six thousand university students, primarily those 
who had participated in the revolution, as well as almost 50,000 secondary school students who 
had only completed the 12th year of school, were sent as untrained teachers to work in rural 
schools (Balsvik, 2009; Bishaw & Lasser, 2012).  However, rather than provide a well-rounded 
educational experience which would be useful in an industrial and commercially advancing 
economy their focus was on political indoctrination, centring on "better serving the interests of 
the masses" (Zewdie: 2000: 79).   
Combined with the newly politicised curriculum, the infusion of untrained teachers who 
lacked basic classroom skills resulted in generations of deficient educational experiences as 
their poorly prepared students eventually became Ethiopia’s teachers whose own students now 
attend university.  Proclamation Number 31 also created Soviet-style Peasant Associations.  
These were highly politicized and became responsible for implementing both Dergue land 
reforms and for the indoctrination of farmers and their children regarding the political and social 
goals of the revolution.   
As the wider Soviet system began to collapse beginning in 1989 its food, financial, and 
military support for outer-ring satellite states such as Ethiopia dwindled.  Following a protracted 
struggle with the EPRDF, the political and military collapse of the Dergue government in May 
1991 narrowly predated the fall of the Soviet Union in December of that year. 
4.3 The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, 1991-present 
Upon taking control of the nation in 1991, the EPRDF quickly announced that it would 
decentralise power away from a small group of political elites in Addis Ababa in favour of greatly 
expanded local authority over issues of governance, agriculture, and educational matters.  
Decentralization was considered a viable method to more directly address the root causes of 
Ethiopia’s on-going poverty, including its underdevelopment and recurring famines (Vaughan & 
Tronvoll, 2003).  In practice however, while more responsibility had been given to officials at the 
wereda and kebele levels of government, political authority remained concentrated in Addis 
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Ababa among the central party apparatus (Aeynew, 2002; Alemu, 2015).  Consequently, local 
officials are charged with service provision but have little authority to set policy and few local 
decisions are made which are not directed by the federal ministries and then communicated to 
subordinate levels of administration (Egziabber, 1998; Chanie, 2007).  This has obvious 
implications for governance as the reorientation of scarce programmatic funding, that might 
otherwise be shifted between accounts in order to meet rapidly developing local needs, is 
inhibited in order to meet distant national goals.   
4.3.1 Constitutional Articles and Current Property Takings  
Continuities are visible between Dergue policies and those of the EPRDF, including 
weak property rights which, in modern liberal-democracies, tend to be based on guarantees of 
transferability (sale or rental) and right of ownership that include exclusionary rights (who may 
enter) (Klein & Robinson, 2011).  However, property takings that result in the permanent loss of 
individual ownership of land are sometimes necessary to achieve wider goals (Azuela & 
Herrera-Martin, 2009; Katz, 2010) and ultimately it is the state that has supreme authority to 
determine the highest and best use of land, including its redevelopment.    
Such government-initiated development projects are routinely deemed to be in the public 
interest and the right of government to expropriate property is a matter of settled law in even the 
most egalitarian of political systems (Dyrkolboltn, 2016).  In the United States, for example, the 
power of eminent domain is provided to all levels of government through the 5 th Amendment to 
its Constitution (the Takings Clause).  In Britain, a series of ‘Inclosure Acts’ were passed 
between 1604 and 1914 which resulted in a wide-spread loss of tenancy.  Those Acts forced 
population transfers and enabled the enclosure and privatization of approximately 11,000 
square miles of previously common lands.  In assessing their impact upon the social make up of 
Britain, Thompson (1991: 237) noted the Inclosure Acts were “played according to the fair rules 
of property and law laid down by a Parliament of property owners and lawyers.”   
On 8 December 1994, the federal government adopted a new Ethiopian constitution, 
including Article 40 that closely resembled the Dergue’s Proclamation Number 31.  It stated 
“The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively 
vested in the State and in the Peoples of Ethiopia.”  Proclamation 89/1997, Rural Land 
Administration subsequently reiterated that land is held in public ownership and confirmed that it 
can be expropriated by the wereda through administrative condemnation processes.  More 
recently, Proclamation 455/2005, titled To Provide for the Expropriation of Land Holdings for 
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Public Purposes, explicitly authorized expropriation for the purpose of development, reasoning 
that: 
“Whereas urban centres of the country have from time to time been growing and the 
number of urban dwellers has been increasing and thereby land redevelopment for the 
construction of dwelling houses, infrastructure, investment and other services has become 
necessary in accordance with their respective plans as well as the preparation and provision 
of land for development works in rural areas has become necessary.” 
Thus, the unambiguous intent of the national government to accommodate urban 
expansion through the expropriation of land from rural owners for the purposes of construction 
and physical development was codified.  Therefore, both constitutionally and administratively, 
smallholders have no standing to contest such takings because no actual ownership rights are 
involved.  After its expropriation, land continues to remain in state ownership even as the federal 
and regional government bundles and transfers it through a lease system “that has led to the de 
facto sale and purchase of lands” (Hagmann & Abbink, 2011: 585).  As described in Chapter 2, 
leasing places land in the long-term control of private interests who consume it in ways which 
may permanently remove it from local agricultural production.  Land taken from smallholders is 
required to be paid for, but following its expropriation there is no further government 
responsibility to educate, train, or in any other way consider the needs of ousted individuals and 
families. 
4.3.2 The Structure of Ethiopia’s Federal and Subordinate Governments 
An understanding of the differing levels of government and their authorities is necessary 
to an appreciation for the state-led development process (Figure 4.1).  The essential supremacy 
of government and the people’s subservience to it, especially among rural and mountain 
Ethiopians, is described by the word ‘mengist’ indicating “that God and the mengist are the 
same” (Vaughan, 2011: 622) and that Lefort (2007: 254) defined as accepting of government’s 
“absolute nature of power that is immanent and intangible.”  This has repercussions regarding 
who the people will support in elections and their acquiescence to the expropriation of their land.  
This deference is not, Gaventa (2006: 24) notes, specific to Ethiopia or even to developing 
nations.  He found it was also common in highly developed, yet poor areas of the United States 
where “violations of democratic rights, enormous inequalities in wealth and appalling 
environmental living conditions” resulted from the enforced acceptance and inevitability of the 
living conditions that were imposed upon coal miners by powerful owners and reinforced by 
politicians and social structures.   
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Federal Ethiopia 
The first tier of government in Ethiopia is the federal level that is differentiated through a 
tripartite model establishing a separation of powers (Fiseha, 2007).  Constitutional Article 50 
describes the “Structure and Organs of the State” and provides that government shall have 
executive, legislative and judicial branches.  It defines the highest level of national government 
as including the bicameral House of People’s Representatives, that has the power to levy taxes 
and to enact legislation (Article 55) and the House of the Federation which has authority to 
interpret the Constitution and to determine the division of the revenues realized through tax 
levies (Article 62).  The highest executive authority is vested in the Prime Minister and the 
Council of Ministers (Article 72).  
4.3.3 Regions  
In 1995, Ethiopia reorganized its primary administrative jurisdictions, then consisting of 
13 provinces, into nine ethnically based regions (kilils) and two special administrative zones of 
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.  The exact authority of the two administrative zones, especially as 
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they pertain to annexation of land outside of their established boundaries, is the subject of 
intense debate among those who are opposed to the development that is now taking place 
along the periphery of Addis Ababa (Kumsa, 2011; Abdo, 2013; Srur, 2014).  Their argument is, 
essentially, that administrative zones are little more than large local governments which have no 
inherent ability to act unilaterally or contrary to the interests of the region.  Article 49 of 
Ethiopia’s constitution supports this interpretation.  It provides that “Addis Ababa shall be 
responsible to the Federal Government” yet it also states “regarding the provision of social 
services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint 
administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, the 
interests of Oromia shall be respected.” 
The nine regions (Map 4.1) which now constitute the second tier of government, were 
drawn to generally align with tribal boundaries rather than follow recognizable geographic 
features.  Their design had the intention of giving “tribalism a central role in governing by 
dividing Ethiopia into regions with tribal designations” (Mehretu, 2012: 119).  Kefale (2010) 
describes the issues inherent in the redrawing of regions along tribal boundaries, that 
establishing boundaries along ethno-linguistic lines imposes limitations upon which groups are 
recognized as either ‘a nation, nationality or people’ and therefore the rights and privileges of 
groups who are not recognized are problematic.   
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These ethnically based regions have politically and socially isolated people, including 
those who do not choose to identify with a particular tribe or who refuse to declare their 
membership in a particular ethno-linguistic group, and so they essentially have no homeland, 
with no political voice or identity (Ayele, 2014; Bach, 2014; Moreda, 2015).  Consequently, 
minority linguistic groups have not been included in the power sharing arrangements with 
majority groups and the choice to include or exclude persons within those groups has 
ramifications relating to access to “entitlements or representation which is otherwise reserved 
for members” (Aalen, 2006; Kefale, 2010: 621).  In practice, politically motivated officials may 
choose to withhold selection for food distribution or selection for ‘Work for Food’ programmes 
from minority members.  Further, regions can become exclusionary zones that result in the 
persecution of people who do not belong to the dominant social structure.  In this way blame 
and responsibility for communal strife or shortages can be more easily shifted to unpopular 
minorities or other groups, such as students, who may originate from other regions of the 
country and are attempting to relocate to urbanizing areas. 
Balcha (2008: 4), though, offers other justification for establishing these ethnically 
oriented regional areas.  He posits they can give direction and certainty to populations who have 
been marginalized and persecuted by government.  They build cultural identities and facilitate 
state formation and they form supportive links among their residents that reinforce local co-
operation.  However, Fiseha (2012: 436) likens regions to the same “ethnic federalism” that 
eventually led to the fragmentation of the states within the former Yugoslavia presented in 
Chapter 2 as resettlement examples.  
The decision to pursue regional loyalties following the EPRDF’s assumption of power 
visibly distanced itself from the policies of the Dergue, that had been to build a strong and 
unifying sense of a singular Ethiopian identity.  However, this more laissez-faire regional 
strategy changed dramatically during the 1998-2000 war with Eretria when the EPRDF 
government found it was too difficult to mount an effective military campaign without having first 
established internal loyalty to a single, national government.  Thereafter, the central government 
began to build a more encompassing national identity which has now been solidified by the 
EPRDF’s own semi-authoritarian political influence and repressive brand of governmental 
authority (Hailu, 2014)36. 
                                                             
36 The French historian and philosopher Ernest Renan (1882: 10) noted that “What makes a nation is not speaking 
the same language or belonging to the same ethnographic group, it is having done great things together in the past 
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Regional Government Structure 
Each of the Ethiopia’s nine regions are empowered with their own executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches, and are further divided into subordinate administrative levels of 
government that include weredas (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 2008; Bach, 2014).  Wereda are 
roughly equivalent to an American county or a British district and it is at this level of government 
that the controversial expropriation of property from smallholders actually takes place.  At the 
lowest level of administration, 18,000 kebeles were formed from the remnants of the Dergue 
government’s system of Soviet-oriented Peasant Associations (SDPRP, 2002).  Neither 
weredas nor kebeles have the authority to set tax rates, since those are fixed at the federal and 
regional levels.  Their responsibility is in the equally political process of assessing and collecting 
taxes and then providing direct services (Ayele, 2014).   
4.3.4 The Wereda 
Weredas are the fourth tier37 of government and are responsible for providing local 
services and administration for approximately 100,000 citizens.  Thus, the total number of 
weredas per region are not fixed and fluctuate with population growth.  Wereda administrators 
prepare annual development plans and budgets; they select local infrastructure improvement 
projects and, in so doing prioritize the expenditure of the taxes collected.  This evokes a return 
to Caffarella & Merriam (1999) whose interpretation of constructivist theories ask questions 
regarding the intent and audience of government programmes.  Following the initial EPRDF 
decision to decentralize the authority of the government in Addis Ababa, weredas gradually 
became responsible for providing all manner of basic services such as water, road maintenance 
and agricultural development programmes; for the administration of health care services, the 
operation of local schools and farmer training centres, as well as providing land registration and 
certification, and for carrying out expropriations of small holds (Ayele, 2014).   
Land Valuation at the Wereda  
Regarding the process of expropriation, it is important to understand the non- linear 
ways in which land is valued and the legal mechanisms that allow its taking.  Despite the 
                                                             
and wanting to do more great things in the future.”  Unlike a state then, a national identity cannot be a forced 
contrivance. 
37 The third tier of government in Ethiopia is the zone.  These are administrative units that play active oversight roles 
in some regions but that are almost non-existent in others, including the Oromia region (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 2008).  
Where they do operate they tend to be technical in nature and engage, for instance, in the letting of contracts for 
labour and materials to construct large infrastructure projects. 
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Dergue’s history of the seizure and nationalization of land, and the current constitutional articles 
that confirm state-ownership, small holders have compensation rights.  In Ethiopian law when 
land is taken, section 8(1) of Proclamation 455/2005 requires that smallholders are “paid 
displacement compensation that shall be equivalent to ten times the average annual income he 
secured during the five years preceding the expropriation of the land.”  This calculation is 
dependent upon the accuracy with which farmers had reported their taxable earnings and those 
who under-stated their income will be compensated accordingly.  To press larger claims, 
smallholders would be required to explain the reporting discrepancies.  
Valuation assessments are made by a committee who have been appointed by the 
wereda administrator (Belachew, 2013).  The system takes into account both the square metres 
involved in the sale and any physical or structural improvements made to the property38.  As a 
practical matter though, the smallholders interviewed related that during the expropriation 
process they would ask a reasonable sum for their property and all said that despite formulae, 
valuations, and proclamations to the contrary, they were usually paid the asking price by the 
wereda which then recoups its cost from the developer through the subsequent leasing process.  
In practice, the price paid by the wereda to smallholders fluctuates with the time of year and 
when food stocks are low, land is cheap.   
Land Registration Certificates 
As expropriation has become more frequent, smallholders are turning to systems that 
measure the dimensions of their property, then map and record it.  They are then provided with 
either a First or Second Stage certificate as evidence of their claim.  The authority for certificate 
programmes is derived from Proclamation 456/2005 which includes the phrase “using cultural 
and modern measurement equipment” to conduct mapping.  Section (6)3, states “Any holder of 
rural land shall be given holding certificate to be prepared by the competent authority and that 
indicates size of the land, land use type and cover, level of fertility and boarders (sic), as well as 
the obligation and right of the holder.”  Certificates confer not only the right to access and 
                                                             
38  Proclamation 456/2005 states that compensation paid will be made in proportion to “the development he [the 
smallholder] has made on the land and the property acquired.”  Proclamation 455/2005, section 7(2) states 
“compensation for property situated on the expropriated land shall be determined on the basis of replacement cost of 
the property” and other physical improvements that have been made and section 4(2) provides that 90 days notice 
will be provided for each expropriation action.  Smallholders are, therefore, entitled to replacement costs for the 
improvements made and these are added to the initial compensation that is determined through a review of the 
taxable income claims previously made by the farmer.  
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manage the land, but also the ability to exclude others from the property, even as the national 
government retains final ownership. 
First Stage certification involves the demarcation of properties, and their subsequent 
registration without the use of global positioning systems or other digital mapping strategies.  
This process is inexpensive, it requires little technology, and relies primarily on field markings 
such as a large immovable rock or a recognizable tree stump as well as the individual memories 
of land holders and their neighbours.  In Ethiopia, where millions of individuals had been 
relocated during and since the Selassie period individual or communal memory is often missing 
and so the accuracy of First Stage certificates is tentative, at best.  More precise Second Stage 
certificates (Figure 4.2) are based on a far more formal process of geo-referencing to arrive at 
the exact measurement of land parcels and they also depict the boundaries of adjoining parcels 
for greater clarity.   
Yet, while certificates provide an accurate description of the property, and the digitized 
land registries maintained by the wereda more accurately depict its location in relation to 
adjoining properties, they do not protect the owner from expropriation or other seizure by 
government.  Their best use, according to the registrars interviewed, is to document the size of 
the parcel and this gives the owner an accurate measurement and description of the land if it is, 
ultimately, expropriated.   
Field discussions with land use registrars in municipalities north and east of Addis Ababa 
indicate that most farmers are unable to provide the accurate, legally acceptable proof of long-
term tenancy that is necessary to obtain either form of land certificate (Interviews 51 & 71).  
That proof may be letters showing long-term occupation; bills of sale; church records, or similar 
documentation that the committee of appointed officials use to verify the claim.  In cases where 
evidentiary record of possession is missing, the wereda registrars said no summary 
dispossessions are carried out and farmers remain on their land even though they cannot be 
issued a certificate. 
While land certificate programmes are increasing in their popularity and use, not all 
farms have been registered and so the national system of mapping and registration is 
incomplete.  Thus, an accurate and comprehensive record of tenancy is not yet available for 
analysis and the true extent of the expropriation and internal displacement issue remains 
unknown.  This constraint impedes the larger study of expropriation and has been noted by 
previous researchers (i.e., Azuela & Herrera-Martin, 2009).  However, as the accumulation of 
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digitized information pertaining to individual tenancy becomes more common further analyses of 
its effect upon social groups will be possible. 
 
In addition to expropriation, smallholders may also lose their property to administrative 
determinations that find they have not sufficiently ‘improved’ the land.  In conversation with court 
officials, Srur (2014) found that seizure of property may take place if good stewardship is not 
maintained or improvements are not made39:   
                                                             
39 Constitutional Article 40(7) states “Every Ethiopian shall have the full right to the immovable property he builds and 
to the permanent improvements he brings about on the land by his labour or capital. This right shall include the right 
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“If this concept of improvement is taken seriously in the Ethiopian context, peasant 
and pastoralist … have been using their land for centuries; they yet still find it difficult to eke 
out a living. They are either bad improvers or are incapable of being improvers; in both 
cases, they ought to be dispossessed and hand over their land to real improvers.” [sic] 
Supreme Court judge of Oromia Regional State, 29 April, 2013 (in Srur, 2014: 295) 
 
Therefore in law and practice, smallholder farmers who cannot afford to make improvements to 
their property are subject to ousting and the property will be redistributed to other farmers.  This 
further impoverishes the ousted smallholder by creating landlessness within what may be an 
already poor or marginally performing family and the prospect of a quick cash payment may 
facilitate their acceptance of the expropriation of their land.  
4.3.5 Kebeles 
Kebele are neighbourhood councils and as the lowest official administrative level of 
government are the first point of citizen access to programmes and administrators (Yilmaz & 
Venugopal, 2008).  The kebele system is not native to Ethiopia.  It was introduced by the Soviet-
inspired Dergue government as peasant associations.  The current government has found 
kebeles to be a useful administrative tool to provide services and for monitoring the loyalties of 
residents (HRW, 2005).  The kebele is responsible for tax collection but has no budgetary 
authority of its own; they operate social courts which resolve minor disputes; they select and 
organize local work parties to perform the community labour required to complete wereda 
directed infrastructure projects; and they arrange social and political activities within villages to 
demonstrate support for the wereda and regional government (Tadesse, 2007; Hanjra, et al., 
2009; Cohen & Lemma, 2011). 
Kebele councils are made up of 300 elected members (Badwaza, 2015) and include an 
executive cabinet usually consisting of a chairperson, the kebele manager, the local agricultural 
development agent, judges from the kebele social court, local police and military officials; and 
school directors.  Council leaders determine and control the receipt of social benefits (Yilmaz & 
Venugopal, 2008; Ayele, 2014).  All of these actors serve as gate keepers to enforce political 
and social compliance with the dominating structure of the EPRDF government.   
An illustration of the very real coercive power of the kebele is that wereda-level medical 
clinics often require an official letter which verifies an individual’s place of residence in order to 
receive treatment (Interview 100).  Without the support of the kebele administration in return for 
                                                             
to alienate, to bequeath, and, where the right of use expires, to remove his property, transfer his title, or claim 
compensation for it. Particulars shall be determined by law.”  As Srur found, and as opined by the court, this clause 
creates a proactive duty on the part of the land holder to make improvements to the property.  
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individual or family compliance with, for example, local work requirements or having expressed 
the proper amount of support for the wereda government, those letters are easily withheld.  
Kebele administrators are also responsible for selecting which families will have access to 
government food distribution programmes during the ‘hungry time’ prior to the harvest.  
Therefore they have multiple tools to enforce social and political compliance among the 
population.   
4.3.6 Local Observations of Expropriation Outcomes 
In the study area smallholders are being displaced by encroaching development with no 
practical potential to re-engage in similar agricultural livelihoods because no nearby land is 
available that will not also be expropriated, nor are they in most cases qualified to be admitted 
to vocational training programmes due to a lack of prior educational attainment.  Similar 
observations were made by locally elected officials.  One kebele manager, who said he had 
been forced to conduct evictions of his neighbours, neatly summed the results of the social 
dispersion which is occurring as a result of the development-induced displacement east of Addis 
Ababa as:   
“The government is doing nothing to support farmers who are being forced from the 
land.  The payments they are given for their property can support a family for one or two 
years, but once the money is gone most of them become low paid day labour.  There are no 
programmes for farmers who have lost their livelihoods and so they are left entirely to their 
own to obtain a living.”  
Kebele Manager, August 2015 (Interview 52) 
Each of the four elected kebele officials who were interviewed in the area east of Addis 
Ababa said they deal with ousting issues on a daily basis.  Their anecdotes and comments 
clearly indicated they did not, as a group, support the current expropriation and eviction of their 
neighbours and constituents, but admitted they are powerless to resist or influence decisions 
made at the wereda.  They related the payments made for expropriated land are most often 
spent in local beer houses rather than in the pursuit of vocational training or in some other 
livelihood investment.  When the money is gone, transiently poor families often become 
chronically poor but they are now landless as well and so they have no means of support.  The 
kebele managers interviewed considered the current developmental-displacement programmes 
to be inadequate to the long-term coping needs of their constituents but had no alternative 
programmes to recommend.  Previous research (Cernea, 1997; Yntiso, 2008; Tadele, 2009) 
substantiates the observations of the kebele managers, confirming that cash compensation 
programmes can actually lead to further impoverishment since individuals tend to spend their 
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payments on alcohol or transitory luxury items rather than reinvesting in housing, in property, or 
in the development of a new skill or business enterprise.  
In summary, differing bundles of Ethiopian rights are in conflict.  Various Articles and 
Proclamations regarding land ownership have created protections for smallholders.  These have 
provided inheritance and usufruct rights to agricultural land while reducing smallholder’s 
exposure to impoverishment through distress sales, yet they have effectively eliminated any 
legal basis to oppose expropriations (Crewett & Korf, 2008).  Displaced smallholders can 
scarcely claim legal protections on the one hand while disputing the coercive qualities of those 
same policies on the other.    
However while expropriation causes immediate displacement, in the instant case 
eviction does not necessarily result in forced geographic movement.  Their situation resembles 
the displacement noted by Thompson’s (1991) earlier comment regarding land rights having 
been determined by property owners and lawyers.  Rural youth to the east of Lalibela related 
they are finding it increasingly difficult to engage in farming due to the ever-smaller size of farm 
plots and the increasingly tentative nature of residency and they are increasingly choosing to 
engage in non-farm employment or higher education (Bezu & Holden, 2014).  Yet without 
sufficient opportunities, they are often only able to obtain low-paid, unskilled labour and 
therefore they remain in competition with older, displaced smallholders for employment (Paul & 
wa Githinji, 2017).   
4.4 Development-induced Displacement and Mega Projects 
Expropriation, displacement and the subsequent loss of productive land to permanent 
redevelopment are not issues which pertain only to Ethiopia.  They are international in their 
character and annually displace millions, yet they also provide benefits to millions more.  
However, there may be few employment alternatives for those who are displaced and the 
training and education programmes available do not necessarily result in employment for 
displaced smallholders or their children (Cernea, 2004).  Even higher education among youth 
cohorts does not always result in employment because there are so few opportunities available 
in the nearby areas where smallholders chose to resettle.   
Urbanization 
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In developing nations such as Ethiopia, Henderson (2002) contends urbanization results 
from individual shifts out of subsistence agriculture towards the higher level economies where 
technology is inherent in commercial and industrial processes.  Satterthwaite, et al., (2010: 
2810) described the urbanization process as “the increasing share of a nation’s population living 
in urban areas” while Hove, et al., (2013) find that in an historic context, urbanization occurs in 
countries where industrialization and sustained economic growth are already occurring.   
This economic and cultural shift, though, requires a skilled and educated labour force 
rather than a simple massing of people who are resettling from the land. The urbanizing 
paradigm was described by Harris & Todaro (1970:126) as when “the bright lights of the city act 
as a magnet to lure peasants into urban areas.”  Their relocation choices are based on an often 
false assumption that anticipated incomes will exceed their current subsistence levels, rather 
than the more frequent reality of the pervasive poverty experienced by unprepared rural-to-
urban migrants.  Yet, a too rapid influx of migrants can change the economic dynamics of an 
area where there are insufficient employment opportunities or where there is an over-educated 
cohort.  Without proper skills or applicable opportunities, individuals who relocate to peri-urban 
or urban areas may only deepen their poverty.  Thus, an ill-coordinated expansion of training or 
education programmes may only compound the problems of horizontal inequalities, of the 
under-employment and unmet expectations that result from a failure of rural people “to acquire 
new skills, new attitudes and new technology” if opportunity is insufficient (Luvalo, 2014: 1207; 
Bohnet, et al., 2016).  
As noted in Chapter 2, social invisibility and marginalization are the result of “being 
unable to exert enough influence to change the conditions under which people live or to even 
speak for themselves, given their position in the arrangement of power” (Hammond, 2008: 518).  
This reduces the ability of smallholders to recover from external threats to their lives and 
livelihoods (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013), especially threats that result from mega-projects which 
increasingly consume large areas and permanently displace entire populations.  
4.4.1 Mega-projects 
The term ‘mega-project’ is used to identify ventures that are very large-scale; focused 
upon a single purpose; and which create irreversible structural commitments.  Van Marrewijk, et 
al., (2011: 591) described mega-projects as “complex infrastructure projects usually 
commissioned by governments and delivered through partnerships between public and private 
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organizations, with multiple partners, high uncertainties, and considerable political stakes.”  
While there are other definitions of what a mega-project entails (see Bornstein, 2011; Dixon & 
Woodcraft, 2013; Othman, 2013; Lehtonen, 2014; Littau, et al., 2015) most are in agreement 
regarding their support of government objectives regarding economic growth and social 
development.  Mega-projects necessitate the coordinated use of both public and private capital, 
and they often rely upon the coercive power of the state to displace existing populations such as 
is occurring in the primary study area.  Once built, mega-projects have little other direct use 
beyond their original design.  Hydroelectric dams, for instance, often have secondary benefits 
but they cannot be fundamentally repurposed.   
In the extreme, mega-projects uproot, displace and disperse entire communities.  In a 
study of the effects of mega-projects in Canada and Botswana, Scudder (1996) noted that 
relocated people are apt to take resources and jobs away from the population they are being 
assimilated into.  Employment disputes arise when oustees are relocated to nearby receiving 
areas which are not prepared to suddenly incorporate them and the oversupply of workers 
drives wages down (Crisp, 2002; Buryan, 2012; Fakih & Ibrahim, 2016).  Without adequate 
planning, social services also become strained due to over subscription or as children contend 
for seats in already crowded local schools.  Adverse impacts also occur with the loss of habitat 
and bio-diversity that nearby residents may have depended upon for their most basic forms of 
sustenance-by-gathering or hunting.  Conflict may erupt as already-occupied agricultural land is 
redistributed by government officials to resettled families, thereby reducing the earnings 
capacity of the original owner.   
Large scale projects, such as the Three Gorges dam in China and the Hirakud dam in 
India are two specific examples of development which generate permanent change in the 
physical landscape as well as perturbing the political and social structure of the communities 
into which oustees are resettled.  As a result, the existing livelihood networks of both the 
displaced and host communities were disrupted (Terminski, 2015).  In China, the Three Gorges 
dam inundated 140 towns and villages, displacing 1.2 million people by creating an inland sea 
approximately 1,000 square kilometres in size (Stein, 1998).  Similarly, India’s Hirakud dam 
displaced 22,000 households with a lake 743 square kilometres in size.   
However, the conclusion can also be drawn that the needs of competing stakeholders in 
any mega-project are simply too complex to manage to the point of creating no harm.  Any 
analysis of the adverse consequences must be measured against their benefits.  At peak 
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capacity, the Three Gorges dam provides 18,000 megawatts of electricity through its 26 turbines 
and is predicted to generate 3% of China’s energy needs, providing service to roughly 
48,000,000 people (Priddle, 2000).  Though tens of thousands of hectares of land was 
permanently inundated, the dam reduces the need to construct new coal fired electrical 
generation plants.  Similarly, the Hirakud dam generates 290 mega-watts of electricity and the 
lake region it created has become a major tourist attraction, creating jobs in secondary and 
tertiary hotel and fishing industries as well as providing the originally planned source of irrigation 
water (Baboo, 2009). 
Yet, re-employment following dislocation by mega-projects may be slow since sufficient 
industry is not always locally available to absorb displaced workers, especially those without the 
necessary skill sets.  To address this issue, the local government of Chongqing is responsible 
for rehabilitative training for displaced smallholders whose land was inundated.  Municipal 
planning included the relocation of one million people with the goal of providing vocational 
retraining to just one member of each effected family within five years of their ousting (Yuqing, 
2007).  This indicates the enormity of the problems inherent in the vocational rehabilitation of a 
large population and the limits of even a well organized, centrally planned government to 
respond quickly to the consequences of displacement. 
Ethiopian Mega-projects 
In Ethiopia, a ‘mega real estate project’ was defined in Proclamation 721/2011, Lease 
Holding for Urban Lands, section 2(16), to mean “a housing development involving the 
construction of at least 1,000 residential units with a view to alleviating the shortage of housing 
in urban centres by way of sell or rent.”  Section 4(26) of that Proclamation describes the power 
of the local government “where it is in the public interest, to clear and take over urban land upon 
payment of commensurate compensation.”  The land throughout the study area has been 
redesignated40 by the regional government from ‘agricultural’ to ‘residential’ uses and it has 
become de facto urban even if it has not yet been properly annexed (Yirdaw, 2013).  In urban 
development parlance, this creates ‘the highest and best use’ of the parcel, meaning its new 
designation will generate a higher tax rate and this has been precisely the case in the study 
area where the land was redesignated.  Among impacted residents “poor treatment during the 
expropriation process; vulnerability to corruption; and non-participatory urban planning policies 
                                                             
40 ‘Land Use Designations’ determine the larger categories of land use, including agricultural, residential or industrial, 
while zoning determines the particular use allowed, such as multi-family structures at a density of eight per acre. 
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creates public distrust and unsolved grievance in the peri-urban areas” (Mohammed, et al., 
2017: 4). 
 
 
Minimalist and Maximalist Takings 
Takings can be either minimalist or maximalist in their orientation and in an article 
appearing in Ethiopia’s Mizan Law Review, Abdo (2013: 185) differentiated between these in 
terms of the Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan.  
From a minimalist point of view, a taking must achieve a public interest41, meaning “property 
taken through eminent domain must provide its intended use to the public.”  This perspective 
would preclude the wereda from initiating an expropriation which would transfer the property 
from the ownership of one person to the control and benefit of another.  Therefore, subsequent 
to a taking, the public would be entitled to use and enjoy the land as a park, a government 
building, or to benefit from it in some other way.  However, Abdo (Ibid: 189) continued, in a 
maximalist context takings are seen in a much broader setting and include “anything which 
tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies … or that leads to the growth of 
towns and the creation of new resources.”   
As a result of these maximalist taking actions a large area of predominantly subsistence 
agriculture will be depopulated (Home, 2016) and turned over to other uses.  Therefore, the 
government of Ethiopia has assumed the same responsibility, albeit on a smaller scale, to train 
displaced workers that had resulted from China’s own Three Gorges dam project.  Ethiopia, 
though, has not instituted programmes which adequately fulfill this obligation (Mohammed, et 
al., 2017).   
4.5 State-led Programmes of the Developmental-state 
As a result of numerous pro-poor policies, international interventions, and state-led 
development programmes, Ethiopia achieved an economic growth rate that peaked at 12.6% in 
2005 (WB, 2014, NBE, 2017, Nyasha, et al., 2017).  The successful implementation of its pro-
poor policies and developmental programmes resulted in an overall diminution of pervasive 
poverty; it created a newly prosperous urban middle-class; and a small wealthy class (Seid, et 
                                                             
41 Public interest is defined in Proclamation 721/2011 section 2(7) as meaning: “the use of land defined as such by 
the decision of the appropriate body in conformity with urban plan in order to ensure the interest of the people to 
acquire direct or indirect benefits from the use of the land and to consolidate sustainable socio-economic growth” 
[sic].  
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al., 2015).  The stimulus for Ethiopia’s mega-projects, including the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam; new electrified rail lines connecting the nation internally and externally; and 
new motorways, are derived from a confidence in the economic future of the nation.  While 
those projects displace local populations they are a positive outcome of the centralized 
development which has occurred in Ethiopia.   
Four iterative plans have become foundational during Ethiopia’s process of development 
and economic growth.  Those are (i) the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan 
(SDPRP, 2002); (ii) the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
(PASDEP. 2006); (iii) the Growth and Transformation Plan (MoFED. 2010); and (iv) the Second 
Growth and Transformation Plan (NPC, 2015).  Since their recommencement in 2002, these 
and other plans have been effective in reducing volitility in the economy (Figure 4.3) and have 
avoided the unpredictable economic swings Ethiopia experienced during the first decade 
following the defeat of the Dergue.   
 
Quasi-government agencies, including the International Monetary Fund; the World Bank; 
and the African Development Bank Group, as well as the private market research firm Trading 
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Economics, were used to construct the above graph which demonstrates the GDP growth rate 
peaked at 12.6% in 2005.  The African Development Bank Group (ADBG, 2017) concluded that 
real GDP in Ethiopia grew by approximately 8.0% in the 2016 reporting period and that this 
represented a slowdown from the 10.4% rate it had estimated during the previous year.  The 
ADBG (2017) predicted a 2017 growth rate of 8.1%, attributing slower growth to both the 
agricultural sector which has been affected by drought and to civil disturbances in the Oromia 
region which were the result of concerns about political and economic marginalisation and 
violent demonstrations42.  
The private-sector market-research firm, Trading Economics, calculated the growth rate 
for 2016 at 7.6%, and attributed the slow down to “systemic trade deficits, an under-developed 
financial system, and unemployment.”  The World Bank estimated 2016 GDP growth at 7.5%, 
noting ”An economy's growth is measured by the change in the volume of its output or in the 
real incomes of its residents” and which slowed economic growth may result in higher 
unemployment.  The International Monetary Fund’s estimate for 2016 was 8.5%.  While robust 
at any of the estimates, Ethiopia’s economy slowed since the inception of the five-year 
development plans in 2002 and the 2005 high.  Each of these sources remain optimistic about 
the future and suggest that the sequencing of infrastructure, as well as the end of the current 
drought in the south west, will allow a return to previous growth rates.     
4.5.1 Ethiopia’s Developmental Plans 
The iterative and centralized state-led development plans are supplemented by 
documents which are crafted by individual agencies and give greater detail for their 
implementation.  Policy formulation according to Chanyalew (2006: 81) “is determined in the 
political arena and policy decisions are fundamentally political decisions.”  Chanyalew goes on 
to note that, beginning with the 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan 
Ethiopia’s series of five year economic and social plans have set a guiding strategic framework 
for economic growth and social development. 
A reading of these plans, which have been released at regularized intervals beginning 
with the first five-year plan during the Selassie monarchy (1958-1962) finds that, until recently, 
                                                             
42 In 2017, Ethiopia’s GDP growth rate rebounded from its 2016 low of about 8% to a much more robust 10.6% (WB, 
2018).  This was well above previous predictions and driven, according to the African Development Bank Group by a 
lessening of the drought in the south west that resulted in substantially increased agricultural production; by increases 
in the services sector; and, the completion of infrastructure especially electrical generation capacity and 
transportation facilities (ADBG, 2018).  However, this much improved growth rate also demonstrates that forces that 
are not responsive or controllable through economic planning have a disproportionate effect on growth. 
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they had remained essentially reliant upon continued and increased rain-fed agricultural 
production that is labour-intensive in nature rather than upon industrial development43 which 
might employ an increasingly educated youth cohort or displaced smallholders.  However, the 
Second Growth and Transformation Plan, that is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, has 
now reversed that trend and industrialization has become a more clear focus of planning though 
agriculture remains the primary emloyment driver.  In the rapidly urbanizing environment in 
which displaced families are finding themselves, the inculcation of non-farm technical or 
vocational skills is becoming of increasing importance to the stability of the developmental 
government. 
Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan, 2002-2005 
On 15 August 2002, the national government transmitted the first of its four iterative 
plans, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP) to the managing 
director of the International Monetary Fund.  In its opening pages, the SDPRP concluded the 
main feature of economic growth in Ethiopia would be a continued dependence upon labour-
intensive agriculture44.  The SDPRP (2002: 20) noted that over the previous 40 years, economic 
and social development in Ethiopia had been inconsistent and a generally downward trend in 
capital formation had worsened an already low concentration of industrial capacity.  Further, the 
report described how wars with Eritrea (ibid: 44), and other ‘civil strife,’ had interrupted and 
dramatically slowed the national growth process.  This was gradually causing the loss of the 
nation’s ability to produce goods as human capital was atrophying and infrastructure was 
becoming degraded due to age and a lack of upkeep.   
SDPRP Development Strategies 
The development strategies of the original SDPRP (2002, 38) were built upon “four 
pillars (building blocks).”  Those were (i) Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization; (ii) 
reforms within the justice system and the civil service; (iii) a decentralization of government 
including the empowerment of local officials; and (iv) capacity-building in both the public and 
                                                             
43 Two additional plans, for the periods between 1963 and 1973, were also advanced.  The process was curtailed 
following the 1974 revolution and only revived in 2002.  
44 The SDPRP (2002: 17) specifically noted Ethiopia’s intent to increase the cultivation, local and international sale of 
“a new export crop”, the mildly narcotic khat.  The primary psychoactive component of the plant Catha edulis is 
“cathinone” that may cause hyperactivity and disrupted sleep; cause aggressiveness or anxiety; and worsens some 
pre-existing mental health problems.  Carrier & Klantschnig (2012: 19) conclude that heavy khat consumption is 
particularly problematic among younger, jobless males who have “little in the way of opportunity, but regular access 
to remittances sent from abroad.”  The use of khat has an obvious effect upon the ability of those young males to 
obtain employment and to hold their positions.   
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private sector.  Ethiopian poverty was primarily rural, and the SDPRP noted “the proportion of 
people who are classified as poor are 37% in urban areas and 45% in rural areas” (Ibid: 7).  The 
plan made little attempt to advocate the development of manufacturing as an employment 
strategy, instead only noting that local industry utilized outdated technology and its workers 
operated at very-low skill levels.   
Criticism of the SDPRP found it had not been adequately socialized at the regional or 
wereda levels and consequently the policies it introduced were neither broadly accepted nor 
what the local governments felt was required to achieve sustainable growth (Haile, 2015).  
Ethiopia attempted to include the usual industrialization phase of economic and social 
development.  SDPRP (2002: 23) noted “the service sector has been an important source of 
growth, especially in the past decade.  In order to translate this growth into both employment 
enhancing and redistributive policies, new business enterprises and employment among blue-
collar classes are necessary.”  However, subsequent plans noted little overall progress in 
reducing joblessness and chronic poverty among the lesser educated in the rural areas.  Rather 
than industry and manufacturing, Ethiopia concentrated on the development of a ‘National 
Network of Information System’.  
The National Network of Information System was developed by the Ministry of 
Communication and Information Technology and new sub-agencies were created, including The 
Ethiopian Information and Communication Technology Development Agency; The Ethiopian 
Telecommunication Agency; and The Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation.  These 
communication facilities and agencies set the stage for the development of the insurance and 
banking industries which are now creating a wealthier middle class who are, inadvertantly, 
displacing smallholders.  They also created the framework for electronic monitoring of the 
internet and of cell phone users as well as the ability to view every bank account in the country.  
These resulted in employment opportunities for a relatively small and narrowly educated 
segment of the population but did little to increase employment among rural residents whose 
on-going poverty was seen as an existential threat to the authority of the central government 
(Gebresenbet, 2014; HRW, 2014).  They did result in an increased ability of the government to 
conduct internal surveillance of the population.  
The SDPRP explicitly stated “Ethiopia harbours a large poor population which by itself is 
a threat to the basic foundations of prosperity, stability and peace” (SDPRP, 2002: 25) and so 
the “public issue of poverty was changed into a security problem” for the Ethiopian state 
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(Balzacq, 2005: 176).  This securitization of public issues such as poverty, which is declared to 
be a threat to the state, is characteristic of semi-authoritarian governments (Nwaka, 2008; 
Fisher & Anderson, 2015).  Securitization limits the discussion of individual concerns and the 
exploration of problem resolutions. 
Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty, 2005-2009   
The priority of Ethiopia’s second planning document, the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP, 2006: 2), was to: 
“Accelerate the transformation from subsistence to commercialization of smallholder 
agriculture through attaining increased productivity and increased share of marketed 
production and continued support to pro-poor basic agriculture within the framework of the 
national food security programme.” 
Like the SDPRP before it, the PASDEP was similarly pro-poor in its focus.  Its 
programmatic emphasis remained upon agricultural populations with the intent to achieve 
poverty reductions through better rural health care programmes; specialized education for 
farmers; and the deployment of agricultural development agents who would provide location-
specific information rather than a generalized national perspective of production.  PASDEP 
(2006: 3) continued to rely upon Ethiopia’s “most abundant resource, labour” rather than upon 
the development of industrial enterprises that might employ smallholders in non-farm 
enterprises or the increasingly educated cohort of younger people who were leaving the farm 
(Bezu, et al., 2012) and who are now demanding non-farm employment opportunities.   
PASDEP Reliance on Agricultural Employment 
As with previous government policies, PASDEP concluded that technical advances in 
rain-fed agriculture would be able to increase production yet essentially neglected other 
strategies for improved non-farm employment opportunities45.  The approach used by the 
Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development was to expand the land area under cultivation by 
3% and to provide training to smallholders which would assist them in increasing their yields.  In 
this case, the national government had selected a target-growth rate in a single sector rather 
                                                             
45 Other reports, including a 2005 ‘Report on the Ethiopian Economy’, were not as supportive of the continued 
reliance upon agricultural production as the primary means of development.  That Report stated “Even though 
considerable increase in production can be attained through intensification of the rain-fed agriculture, it is bound to 
fall short of the ever increasing population” (EEA, 2005: 224).  It particularly cites “low technological inputs, soil 
degradation, diminishing farm size and the dependence on the vagaries of nature” (Ibid, iii) as inhibiting both 
increased production and the future employment which might be generated by a continued emphasis in a single 
market sector.  It also notes that for many, agricultural employment is “unstable, casual work paid on a daily basis” 
(Ibid, 127).   
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than broadly increasing the overall capacities of its human resources to achieve more holistic 
national growth (Dercon & Zeitlin, 2009) or to employ a more diverse cross-section of the 
population.  In its original 104 pages, though, the Plan uses the word ‘education’ just four times 
to describe its policies and programmes and while it advocates the development of vocational 
training, it uses that term just one time.  It does not contain even a single use of the word 
‘manufacture’ and ‘industry’ is also used only once. 
However, throughout the PASDEP implementation period, modifications were made to 
its emphasis upon agriculture and new areas of developmental focus were incrementally added 
to supplement non-farm sector policies.  PASDEP began to tentatively address industrial 
production and employment by slowly emphasizing the need for urban development.  Over time, 
the programmatic emphases of PASDEP were modified and the federal government began to 
accentuate the construction of new infrastructure.  It promoted the empowerment of women and 
youth (but not necessarily that of men); and sought to deepen the capacity of government 
though this was only narrowly defined in terms of “Inadequate capacity for domestic revenue 
collection” (MoFED, 2010: 5).  
Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010-2014 
The first Growth and Transformation Plan (MoFED, 2010), that followed the PASDEP, 
was prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.  It continued the national 
focus upon agriculture as a means toward development with what it characterized as a shift 
towards high value crops, including the creation of a niche export market in cut flowers shipped 
to Europe (Box 4.1).   
The Growth and Transformation Plan declared “The agricultural sector continues to be 
the major source of economic growth” (MoFED, 2010: 10).  However, it began to set the stage 
for industry by advocating the development of modern infrastructure to improve the conditions 
that are conducive to increased manufacturing.  It advocated a new focus upon 
“telecommunication, railway, road, energy and irrigation development” (Ibid), all of which result 
in labour intensive employment that can substitute for agricultural work among the semi-skilled 
population and these improvements have better positioned Ethiopia for industrialization.  
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The Growth and Transformation Plan also began to advocate increased emphasis upon 
education and training, with a particular focus on women and girls46, and it promoted the 
Technical Vocational Education Training (TVET) system as the mechanism best suited to 
initiate the technology transfer that is needed to increase capacity among small and medium 
enterprises.  However, the plan relied to a significant extent upon “higher education and adult 
education” as the engine of employment and entrepreneurship (Ibid, 10) and these were seen 
as the key to reducing poverty and unemployment.  That argument, however, is addressed in 
Chapter 6, which will show higher education is a significant contributor to Ethiopia’s youth 
under-employment problem since appropriate opportunities in the industrial sector have failed to 
match educational output. 
 
                                                             
46  In the context of educational opportunities, Crivello & Van Der Gaag (2016: 7) noted the revisiting of the 
“assumption that boys do not need the same attention as girls because they benefit from the status quo”; that boys 
and young men may be ignored in the development paradigm, and this results in irreparable economic harm as “their 
life chances” are increasingly inhibited. 
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Industrial Development Strategic Plan 2013 – 2025 
A corollary to the Growth and Transformation Plan is Ethiopia’s “Industrial Development 
Strategic Plan 2013 – 2025.”  That document noted the primary industrial sectors of the 
economy continued to be comprised of “textile and garment, leather and leather products, sugar 
processing, flowers and high-value fruits and vegetables” (MoI, 2013: 2), production that does 
not require a skilled, literate, or educated labour force.  Because of the oversupply of unskilled 
labour, the IDSP found little employment stability existed in these industries and there was little 
wage growth.   
The IDSP recognized the importance of micro and small-enterprises as the bulwark of 
employment generation and it noted that in the 2011/2012 reporting period “job opportunity was 
created for about 1.7 million youth and women” though it omitted men from its written 
assessment (Ibid, 2).  It further contemplated that, as individual skill sets developed, small and 
medium businesses would eventually lead to the establishment of large-scale industries and 
that national employment stability would become based on the industrial need for workers who 
possess technical and manufacturing skills.  Both the first Growth and Transformation Plan and 
the Industrial Development Strategic Plan advocated increased central coordination of 
economic growth to “create a conducive environment and direct support for selected sectors” 
(Gebreeyesus, 2014: 22).  It relied upon aspirational changes in governance, financial, and legal 
reforms that would make industrial and commercial development both less risky and less 
corrupt.  This, however, required the further development and sequencing of industry-supporting 
infrastructure and the training of skilled and effective workers.   
Second Growth and Transformation Plan, 2015-2019 
The period of the first Growth and Transformation Plan (NPC, 2015) resulted in a more 
predictable macro-economic environment although there was a period of hyper-inflation when 
the rate spiked from 7.6% in January 2010 to 40.6% in August 2011.  This inflation was primarily 
due to a drought that affected domestic food production and occurred concurrently with steep 
increases in global food costs resulting from increases in oil prices.  Inflation returned to a more 
manageable 7.1% as of December 2014 as oil and food costs stabilized and drought conditions 
abated (WB, 2014).  However, the economy has not fully recovered and data continued to show 
a sustained downward slope in the GDP.  
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To facilitate further reductions in poverty levels, the Second Growth and Transformation 
Plan now better emphasizes employment generating industrial development as well as 
construction related activities to increase employment.  Further, the Plan has inaugurated 
behavioural changes such as a national savings programme which created a category of bank 
accounts specifically for the purchase of new homes.  Unlike previous plans, GTP II strongly 
advocates labour intensive agriculture.  However, to stimulate mass employment it promotes 
light manufacturing that would be located in planned industrial parks near new transportation 
infrastructure.  If sustained, this approach is anticipated to eventually develop the broader 
economy and the stimulation of heavier industry (NPC, 2015) as a pool of increasingly better 
skilled labourers becomes available.  
 Most importantly though, the Second Growth and Transformation Plan was not written 
by an individual agency.  It was centrally coordinated by the “National Planning Commission” 
established by Council of Ministers Proclamation 281/2013.  The Commission is now 
responsible for advancing both the vertical economy, that meets the needs of specific market 
sectors such as agriculture, while concurrently crafting horizontally coherent policies to increase 
the availability and demand for the skills necessary for industrial development.  These polices, 
Ocubay (2018: 15) contends, have been generally ineffective due to a lack of coordination 
“among and across government agencies” that substantially increases administrative costs.   
4.6 Post-conflict Economies 
Ethiopia was in a state of permanent revolution from the time the Dergue deposed 
Emperor Selassie on 12 September 1974 until the EPRDF assumed power on 21 May 1991, 
when Mengistu Haile Mariam fled the country for Kenya and the civil war ended.  However, 
Collier, et al., (2006) note the high likelihood of states which have recently been engaged in a 
civil war returning to civil disorder and that the potential for violence is particularly elevated if 
there is lingering high-unemployment.  They further note that spending by recent-conflict states 
military armaments and security remain high in order to guard against a recurrence of fighting  
and so the term ‘post conflict’ should not be mistaken for the simple cessation of hostilities 
without the resolution of underlying animosities.  Maintaining a large residual military force 
drains capital which could be used to rebuild damaged infrastructure and stimulate the 
economy, thereby creating the jobs in which the younger cohort or displaced smallholders would 
become employed.   
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Cevik & Rahmati (2013: 5) concluded that while the duration of a conflict and the loss of 
key infrastructure as a result of battle damage have a strong negative effect upon economic 
restoration, it is the presence of strong “human capital and institutional factors” that most 
contribute to economic recovery.  However, recovery should not simply recreate the conditions 
which led to the conflict in the first place (Luckham, 2004) and significant changes to the 
economic and social structure are required for sustained growth and development.  Dobbins, et 
al., (2007: 14) found this is especially true where there exists a cohort of young males who have 
been militarily trained, since employment “bolsters security, offering former combatants an 
alternative to violent crime.”   
Post-conflict Peace and Stability 
Del Castillo & Bunche (2015) contend that for successful post-conflict peace and 
stability, there are four distinct and predictable social and economic stages.  Those are (i) the 
transition to public security, including the control of street crime, violence and the collection of 
taxes which are used to repair infrastructure; (ii) a political transition during which repressive 
government authorities must allow the rule of law and democratic institutions to prosper; (iii) the 
social transition, which includes the difficult reintegration of former fighters and enemies, who 
are sometimes neighbours, back into their villages; and (iv) the important period of economic 
transition, during which imbalanced economies must reduce their military spending in favour of 
civilian sector growth and development.  These stimulate individual and national stability 
through the provision of employment and elevates artificially low per capita income while 
motivating the economy.    
The initial decade following conflict is crucial, but may become illusory.  Collier & 
Hoeffler (2004: 1130) found that while the ability to utilize foreign development aid in the first 
three years of the decade immediately following a conflict is minimal, it increases substantially 
during the rest of that decade as the economy becomes more robust and this was seen in 
Ethiopia’s 2005 GDP growth rate.  However, they also found those economies typically “follow a 
pattern”, that while during the first first post-conflict decade growth and development come 
rapidly, it tends to slow dramatically in the second decade.  Ethiopia’s economy has followed 
their predicted pattern, though it was also adversely affected in that first decade by a cross-
border war with Eritrea which took place between May, 1998 and June, 2000, and by local 
droughts (IMF, 2016).   
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One by-product of Ethiopia’s predictably slowing post-conflict economy is a rapidly 
growing youth bulge (Figure 4.4) for whom there are fewer prospects for social or economic 
advancement.  Urdal (2006: 612) found that “when countries respond to large youth cohorts by 
expanding tertiary education, it produces a much larger group of highly educated youth than can 
be accommodated in the normal economy.”  This results in social grievances if the ability of that 
cohort to achieve an adult status goes unfulfilled (Honwana, 2012; Carling, 2015).  
 
Ethiopia’s State-led Development and the Middle-class 
State-led development has enabled a recognizable middle-class to emerge in larger 
urban areas, but this newly prosperous group is displacing smallholders in contiguous rural 
areas with their housing demands, all while failing to generate sufficient compensatory 
employment or livelihood retraining for the displaced population or for socially displaced youth.  
Schmidt & Bekele (2016) found that while each of Ethiopia’s iterative five-year plans has led to 
increased prosperity, their over-all effect upon industrialization and non-farm employment has 
remained minimal without the growth necessary to accommodate a rapidly expanding 
population.  They conclude (ibid, 936), as did the Central Statistical Agency (CSA, 2014d), that 
rates of “economically active people working in agriculture only decreased by approximately 
3.6% between 2005 [peak GDP growth] and 2013.”  Thus, in rural areas the federal government 
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has continued to rely upon labour intensive agriculture for the majority of national employment 
and centralized policies have only recently begun to emphasize employment through industrial 
development.  Those plans have not yet produced the type or quantity of employment that is 
necessary to accommodate a youth bulge that has resulted from other highly successful social 
and health care policies and the greater availability of better educational opportunities (Nordas 
& Davenport, 2013).   
4.7 Chapter Summary 
Ethiopia’s early history was one of great power that was based on its early development 
of a written language and the adoption of innovative agricultural techniques that allowed it to 
dominate regional trade relations.  Since the overthrow of Emperor Selassie in 1974 Ethiopia’s 
social system has been dominated by political repression and continuing revolution, it has 
weathered tectonic political and economic shifts, changing from the rule of an absolute 
monarch, to a Marxist Soviet-style government, to one nominally less repressive and more 
actively development-oriented.   
Following the EPRDF’s victory over the Dergue government in 1991, droughts, cross-
border wars and poor educational delivery have hindered its economic advancement.  While 
there had initially been a focus upon state building rather than nation building, this this changed 
with the Ethiopian-Eritrean war as a new focus was recognized.  Following a period of 
significant economic upheaval, Prime Minster Zenawi introduced a strong system of centralized 
development that generally rejected Northern neoliberal ideas of governance in favour of a 
programme that is more indigenous in nature.  Zenawi’s economic theory resulted in a quick 
stabilization of the economy and rapid economic growth.  However, the previous rate of growth 
has declined since its peak in 2005, though it was still enviable at about 8% in the 2016 
reporting period.  
Continued Reliance Upon Agricultural Employment    
Zenawi’s planning documents and subsequent national policies have stabilized the 
economy but, they continue to rely upon agriculture for the majority of employment.  This is not 
surprising given the overwhelming majority of Ethiopians continue to reside in rural areas and 
fully 80% of citizens are engaged directly in subsistence farming for their livelihood.  However, a 
growing population now requires new solutions.  Small plot sizes and continued high birth rates 
make the continued subdivision of farms untenable.  The Second Growth and Transformation 
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Plan now better prioritizes manufacturing and industry as employment generators and Ethiopia 
has engaged in a programme of infrastructure construction which is placing the country in a 
better position to industrialize.  This will enable the creation of both low and medium-skill blue 
collar jobs for the working poor including displaced smallholders, as well as employment 
opportunities for the more highly educated youth.   
Educational programmes over the course of Ethiopia’s modern history have been 
inconsistent in their quality.  While the Dergue government significantly expanded educational 
availability, instructors were often unqualified and untrained in pedagogical techniques.  Current 
programmes have expanded significantly in their reach yet are now increasingly reliant on 
instructors who themselves had received a substandard education during the Dergue era or 
were taught by minimally qualified instructors (despite the presence of foreign educated 
instructors and government ministers) who had been relocated to the countryside by the 
Dergue.  Their charges are now secondary school and university students who are vying for 
limited employment opportunities.   
With the stage now set, Chapter 5 discusses Ethiopia’s state-led development 
programmes facilitating economic growth.  These have led to a vibrant middle-class that is 
seeking better housing opportunities outside of the urban core.  Their desires for more 
comfortable accommodations are displacing farmers along the periphery of Addis Ababa and 
this is affecting hundreds of thousands (Home, 2016) of smallholders whose land is being 
expropriated.  Though smallholders are paid for their land, they have few non-farm skills with 
which to engage in alternative livelihoods.  Once ousted, they have few options other than to 
take low paid work in the communities they have relocated to, but their increasing numbers then 
drives down the price of labour for other workers in those towns. 
Chapter 6 describes the state-led educational system that has increased the availability 
of basic educational opportunities, which are now almost universal.  Chapter 6 will show this is 
resulting in strata of youth who are better educated than at any time in Ethiopia’s history.  A 
large number of those secondary school leavers subsequently enter university but at the 
completion of their studies they are finding there is insufficient employment available for them.  
They have few options other than to either remain unemployed, to emigrate, or to become 
under-employed.  This situation of under-employment causes a cascade effect which impacts 
lesser skilled workers.  The inability to find employment has other significant outcomes.  It 
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prevents these youth from being accepted into adult-hood and so they cannot marry nor begin 
independent lives as socially recognized adults.   
A combination of these issues is resulting in civil disturbances that have begun to 
destabilize the nation.  Students are increasingly likely to be under-employed while displaced 
smallholders eventually become only minimally employed.  Under-employment has been shown 
to have a cascading effect that ultimately results in the unemployment of the least skilled in 
society.  It also has shown to have long term effects on the ability of workers to later obtain 
employment that is commensurate with their educational backgrounds or previous skill levels.   
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Chapter 5 
Ethiopia’s Development and In Situ and Ex Situ Displacement   
5.0 Introduction  
This chapter analyses Ethiopia’s evolving programmes of development and addresses 
the first objective of the study:  to investigate the effects and challenges to its pro-poor 
development policies.  Since their introduction in 2002, Ethiopia’s centrally led development 
initiatives have steered substantial national economic growth, calmed the erratic economy, and 
built critical infrastructure.  Pro-poor policies have also facilitated social development (IMF, 
2016, Shiferaw, 2017) and created improvements ranging from health care delivery, to 
expanded access to education.  While these policies have led to cumulative improvements in 
living conditions, some have exacerbated smallholder displacement, particularly where rural and 
peri-urban small holders are being ousted to construct new development projects, thereby 
creating conditions which often lead to their poverty and group isolation. 
Until recently, the primary emphasis of Ethiopia’s development policies has been the 
promotion of labour-intensive agricultural production (MoE, 2015; NPC, 2015; Seid, et al., 
2015).  This is changing as Ethiopia’s population approaches the predicted figure of 187 million 
by the year 2050 (UNDP, 2012) and a 2017 World Bank report projects the number of available 
workers will increase to 82 million by 2030 (WB, 2017c).  This labour force will necessitate a 
substantial revision of the development focus to maintain social and economic stability (MoE, 
2015; Shiferaw, 2017) among those who require suitable non-farm work.  Thus, pro-poor 
development policies must meet the capabilities and demands of the current and future work 
force (Pape, 2005).  This will include those of development-ousted smallholders who are 
displaced ex situ and educated youth who are socially displaced in situ if Ethiopia is to continue 
its substantial economic growth and social development.   
Where the economic growth rate has slowed (ADBG, 2017; NBE, 2017) and sufficient 
opportunity does not exist, a destabilizing environment of un- and under-employment is 
emerging.  Students are demanding more economic opportunities and some demonstrations 
have erupted into violence, only to be met with a disproportionate use of government force 
(Balzacq, 2005; Trombetta, 2007; Fisher & Anderson, 2015).   However, Ethiopia’s history of 
absolute monarchy and the legacy of the Marxist Dergue have facilitated a semi-authoritative 
government, while too-rapid growth and strong cultural obligations have challenged 
development and modernization.    
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5.1 Ethiopia’s Development Approach  
Centralized development occurs as national governments “adopt development as a 
purpose to which state power is put” (Skocpol, 1987: 4).  These initiatives build infrastructure, 
provide services for the common good; and stimulate the economy.  Whyte (2009: 375) asserts 
there are two primary approaches to development.  The first is his “big bang approach”, 
reminiscent of the economic and social revolution that occurred in 1917 Russia and again as the 
Soviet Union rapidly dismantled and restructured its economy almost in its entirety after the 
Second World War (Woodward, 1995).  This strategy is resource intensive and inherently 
destabilizing; it emphasizes the establishment of heavy industry and agricultural mechanization 
at the expense of labour-intensive agriculture.  The second approach, according to Whyte, 
emphasises utilizes a far more gradual strategy which incrementally modernizes a nation while 
retaining much of the existing labour intensive agriculture.  According to Whyte (2009: 375) 
China best exhibits the latter approach, steadily replacing traditional institutions with a locally 
acceptable “form of capitalism and semi-private enterprises”47 under central direction.   
Though the Chinese model maintains a focus upon agricultural employment, it also 
initiated a series of very large and modernizing infrastructure projects such as the Three Gorges 
dam.  This project provided electrical energy for tens of millions but was also socially and 
economically disruptive to hundreds of thousands of smallholders who were forced from their 
farms and villages as they were inundated by rising waters.  To compensate for their ex situ 
displacement (“forced from their original place of being” (Vanclay, 2017: 3)) China invested in 
academic education and rehabilitative-vocational training for displaced families, while also 
investing in new technology and manufacturing industries (Galipeau, et al., 2013; Wong, 2014).  
These, in addition to other strategies, have proven to be largely successful, leading to the 
International Monetary Fund’s conclusion that China has become the second largest economy 
in the world.   
State-led development not only centralizes and focuses the process of economic 
planning and implementation, it also provides the cohesive and coercive force sometimes 
required for development and modernization.  Such centralized economic stimulus is often 
necessary following periods of conflict, such as those experienced in Ethiopia after first 
overthrowing the Selassie monarchy in 1974 and then as the Dergue were violently ousted in 
                                                             
47 Marshall (2015:42) contends that when former Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist 
Party of China, Deng Xiaoping “coined the phrase socialism with Chinese characteristics, he actually meant total 
control by the Communist party in a capitalist economy.” 
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1991 (UNDP, 2008; Cevik & Rahmati, 2013).  As early as 1888, Marx and Engels described the 
destabilizing tensions which stem from rapid economic growth and its inherent social changes.  
While changes which are too aggressive, that cause a too-rapid growth and too hasty 
modernization might lead to elevated incomes, they may also create social inequality as uneven 
development alters the social order in fundamental ways (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; UNDP, 2008; 
Shiferaw, 2017).  Paffenholz (2008: 17) asserts such aggressive developmental transformations 
are not only intrinsically destabilizing, but those “countries in transition from traditional to 
modern forms of society have a much higher likelihood of suffering violence.”  As economic 
gains are not shared equally people lose their community grounding and social group, and this 
may set nations on a path towards civil conflict.     
5.1.1 Prime Minister Zenawi’s Development Vision 
In his unpublished doctoral thesis, former Prime Minister Zenawi posited “economic and 
social stagnation can grip nations and slow their growth” (Zenawi, 2006: section 6.3).  In another 
article published after his death, Zenawi (2012: 164) further stated that lesser developed 
countries such as Ethiopia “often fall into a sort of downward spiral” which is generated by a 
powerful combination of a lack of education and cultural aversion to technological 
modernization.  He characterized Ethiopia’s then-economic malaise as having become “deeply 
rooted in pervasive market failures that create poverty traps” (Brechenmacher, 2017: 2).  This, 
Zenawi said, had led to a national inability to absorb innovation which had in turn, fundamentally 
undermined Ethiopia’s growth and development.  His conclusion was that where market forces 
are non-responsive due to local tradition, culture, or social constraints it becomes an imperative 
of the state to proactively rebalance and artificially stimulate growth through centralized 
development.  Zenawi caveated this, saying “development is a political process first and an 
economic and social process later” and noted that developing nations cannot simply purchase 
the latest technology, that it must be accumulated, assimilated, and only then distributed 
throughout the society (2006: section 6.3).  Therefore, his conclusion was that social actors 
should become subordinate to the needs of the developmental government and in this way the 
Ethiopian-state would rekindle its sluggish economy.   
Given Ethiopia’s largely agricultural economy, Zenawi established a state-directed 
version of development which was more reminiscent of China’s model than it was of the Soviet 
model (Hess, 2015).  Beginning in 2002 and in the midst of an economic downturn (Figure 4.3), 
the government adopted Zenawi’s innovative state directed development policies and rejected 
the structural adjustments recommended by Northern donors and development organizations 
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(Moyo, 2008).  Zenawi’s plan stressed agricultural development and the rural employment it was 
expected to generate.  However, the small size of agricultural holdings, averaging just 1.22 
hectares (CSA, 2012b), coupled with a declining yet still high birth rate (Seid, et al., 2015) and 
traditional inheritance practices which further subdivide small holds, make it difficult to earn a 
living through agriculture.  Such small plots are, though, also a cultural and structural form of 
economic displacement.  Unable to undertake a viable agricultural livelihood, rural youth often 
seek non-farm employment in urban and peri-urban areas.  Increasingly however, their high 
number and sudden arrival are changing the employment dynamics of those labour markets 
(Schmidt & Bekele, 2016).  Historically, construction sector employment has been able to 
absorb these rural youth, yet as infrastructure projects are reaching their completion and as the 
availability of funding for new projects is becoming scarce employment is declining.  This is 
producing a new stratum of urban poverty among relocated youth (Fantini, 2013; NPC, 2015; 
Clapham, 2017).    
Basic Manufacturing Skills 
As noted earlier, the priority of Ethiopia’s development programmes has chiefly focused 
upon labour-intensive agricultural output.  Yet, this strategy has led to unemployment and 
under-employment as the rural population increased while land availability remained generally 
constant (MoI, 2013; MoE, 2015; Shiferaw, 2017).  Although growing, the employment-
generating manufacturing base remains embryonic and Ethiopia continues to chiefly produce 
very basic items, including “sugar, cement, liquors, flour, plastic, soft drinks, structural metal, 
textiles, basic iron and steel, and detergent and soaps” which require little innovation or higher-
level industrial skills (NPC, 2015: 15).  Seid, et al., (2015) contends that agriculture still accounts 
for about 37% of Ethiopia’s GDP and observed that during GTP I, the employment generating 
manufacturing sector continued to account for only 4.4% of GDP48.  This suggests that, thus far, 
the manufacturing sector is insufficient and will be unable to absorb the natural population 
growth or accommodate the labour force which is predicted to become available in the next 12 
years (WB, 2017c; Oqubay, 2018).   
 
Moreover, the national government has promoted technical and academic education 
without concurrently creating the conditions necessary for employment producing 
                                                             
48 The Second Growth and Transformation Plan generally confirms this, finding that at the end of the GTP I period the 
industrial sector had “an average annual growth rate of 20%” that “the share of the industry sector in overall GDP has 
reached 15.1% (manufacturing 4.8%, construction 8.5%, electric and water 1% and mining 0.8%)”  It particularly 
noted that industrial sector growth “has been largely driven by the construction sub-sector” (NPC; 2015: 28).   
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industrialization.  This is demonstrated by high unemployment and under-employment rates 
among Ethiopia’s youth (CSA, 2014c; ILO, 2017).  Despite these issues, the World Bank 
predicts that if the development pattern achieved over the previous decade can be sustained, 
Ethiopia’s rate of growth will allow it to rise from its current status as a lesser developed nation 
to achieve “its goal of becoming a middle-income country by the year 2025” (MoE, 2015: 11; 
WB, 2016: 86).  To that end, Ethiopia’s planning emphasis has changed and with the Second 
Growth and Transformation Plan (NPC, 2015) the government has elevated the priority of 
industrial investment and the creation of employment through manufacturing.  
5.1.2 National Development Priorities and Transformation Plans  
National plans and budgets delineate government priorities (Muhumuza & Rwakakamba, 
2015) and in Ethiopia the timing and sequencing of government policy indicates the evolution of 
its political and social policies (Chanyalew, 2006).  Ethiopia’s original development plans, 
including the 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP); the 2006 
Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP); and, the first 
Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I) released in 2010, provided little direction regarding the 
development of industry and manufacturing.  Rather, they primarily emphasized agricultural 
production to generate sustained employment for smallholding and subsistence farmers who 
constitute the overwhelming majority of the population.   
According to the initial priorities of the first national plan, the SDPRP (2002: i), Ethiopia’s 
primary focus was “rapid export growth through production of high value agricultural products.”  
However, a 2003 progress report submitted to the International Monetary Fund had already 
identified issues including population growth and limited human resource capacity which were 
hindering accomplishment of its mid-term targets and the larger developmental goals.  
Specifically, that report (MoFED, 2003) noted the overall lack of sufficiently skilled workers who 
were available to implement large, though often localized, infrastructure projects such as road 
building, rural electrification, or the construction of water purification plants.  This absence of 
suitable workers highlights the known challenge presented by “the low percentage of the 
population that has completed their primary education” (Ibid: 11).  The report further concluded 
that “reasons for falling short of the target included shortages of equipment, slow labour 
mobilization and a shortage of skilled manpower, and poor management of the projects” (ibid, 
78).   
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The priorities found in the second national development plan, the PASDEP (2006: 1), 
built upon those of the first plan and similarly stated that its foremost resolution was “on growth 
in the coming five-year period with an emphasis on greater commercialization of agriculture”49.  
PASDEP asserted that “in order to accelerate and expand industrial development and increase 
overall economic growth, it is essential to develop the agricultural sector which is crucial to 
ensure both the provision of inputs for industries as well as to fulfil food security requirements” 
(Ibid: 6).  Ethiopia subsequently initiated the first of its two growth and transformation plans to 
meet this evolving objective of national modernization.   
5.1.3 The Growth and Transformation Plans 
The first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I) “focus(ed) on growth with a particular 
emphasis on greater commercialization of agriculture in order to accelerate and expand 
industrial development … [and] to ensure that agriculture becomes the main source of growth 
for the next five years, the key strategy to be pursued concerns scaling up the best practices of 
modern smallholder farmers” (NPC, 2015: 23). The underlying strategy of GTP I had been to 
“support strongly the intensified production of marketable farm products for domestic and export 
markets” (ibid: 22) but this required only an updating of low-level skills.  Industrial development 
that was independent of agriculture has remained a secondary priority. 
The GTP I states further that “in the industrial sector, the government will focus on 
strengthening micro- and small manufacturing enterprises because they are the foundation for 
the establishment and expansion of medium and large-scale enterprises” (NPC, 2015: 24).  
GTP II notes this did not happen, that micro- and small manufacturing enterprises performed far 
below expectations (NPC, 2015: 28).  The educational objectives of GTP I, developed in concert 
with the Ministry of Education, included both academic education and vocational training.  
Henceforth higher education institutions were expected to provide well rounded academic 
experiences which focussed on the general social needs of the nation and the requirements of 
“manufacturing industry in particular” while vocational training would meet similar industrial 
needs (Ibid: 88).  
                                                             
49 Etana & Tolossa (2017: 62) note that poverty remains rampant in urban areas and those with higher education 
levels are guaranteed neither economic success nor even basic food security.  Their study of two sub-cities of Addis 
Ababa (Arada and Akaki-Kaliti) found that while 96% of those who had only completed primary school are food 
insecure, fully 78% of residents with a tertiary education are food insecure as well.  However, Frankenberger and 
McCaston (1999: 31) caution that “it is misleading to treat food security as a fundamental need independent of wider 
livelihood considerations.”  It requires they say, “a comprehensive understanding of relationships”, among them are 
the “political economy of poverty, malnutrition and the dynamic and complex strategies that the poor use to negotiate 
survival” (Ibid). 
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The Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) (NPC, 2015: 29) was initiated to 
address the shortcomings of GTP I.  It noted that while the emphasis during the GTP I period 
had been given to “micro and small enterprise development in order to stimulate employment; 
manufacturing efficiency, productivity, competitiveness, technological and working systems”; 
these remained “limited by the low level of skill and efficiency of human power.”  Moreover, and 
as Fantini (2013) had predicted, GTP II described that even the unskilled export industries of 
“flowers, fruits and vegetables, coffee, sesame and cereals” had fallen short of their targets 
(NPC, 2015: 16) and this has restricted export earnings (Oqubay, 2018).  Moreover, GTP II 
found that despite the planning emphasis upon the establishment of new manufacturing 
industries, the relatively low-skilled construction subsector, rather than manufacturing,  had 
been the major driver in terms of employment and national growth and was therefore largely 
responsible for the bulk of Ethiopia’s gross domestic product (NPC, 2015: 7).   
First Post-Zenawi Plan 
The GTP II was the first post-Zenawi plan and a significant departure from previous 
agriculturally-intensive plans, signalling an acknowledgement of the need to further stimulate 
and substantially redirect the economy.  It charted a new strategy and direction which 
emphasized manufacturing as an employment generator, and refocussed investment in the 
establishment of “light manufacturing industries that are labour intensive” (NPC, 2015: 28) to 
facilitate economic growth.  While it continues to strongly encourage agriculture, GTP II stressed 
the construction of capacity-enabling infrastructure such as roads and especially industrial parks 
which are intended to concentrate mutually supportive manufacturing in designated zones.   
According to Gebreeyesus (2014: 4), despite the advances made through its 
development policies, industry in Ethiopia “in the modern sense of the term only emerged at the 
turn of the 20th century” but that it has not fundamentally improved since then.  He notes 
Ethiopia’s relatively few manufacturing plants are technologically outdated and increasingly 
uncompetitive across international markets.  Low skill and low technology manufacturing, such 
as food and beverages, textile weaving, and bespoke furniture-making continue to be the most 
common employment generators within the manufacturing sector.  This emphasis upon a 
technically capable labour force impedes industrial investment (Hanushek, 2013; Yirdaw, 2016) 
and subsequently the anticipated employment that is suitable for university graduates.   
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Infrastructure and Exports 
Foremost among Ethiopia’s improvements are the reestablished rail link connecting 
Addis Ababa to the Port of Djibouti50 and numerous roadways radiating from the capital to 
support future industrial development.  While infrastructure alone cannot substitute for the lack 
of employment opportunities, Bezu & Holden (2014) assert new infrastructure facilitates 
manufacturing and encourages rural-to-urban migration of better educated youth who feel their 
prospects for employment will be improved in large cities rather than in their villages.  As the 
only country to share common borders with all of the nations in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is 
poised to assume the role of a job-creating transportation corridor.  Yet, Ayogu (2007: 115) 
asserts “building infrastructure may not overcome an unskilled labour force” rather, systems and 
skills must develop simultaneously rather than waiting for the other to be completed.  In this way 
technical and manufacturing skills become available at the time infrastructure enables industry 
to develop.  However, for Ethiopian’s to once again enjoy high economic growth rates, 
appropriate employment must be created for the millions of new workers entering the labour 
force (WB, 2017e) as well as for existing workers who are being displaced both ex- and in situ.   
Ultimately, Ethiopia’s export market for finished goods is undeveloped and consequently 
has not attracted foreign direct investment in manufacturing which would lead to either 
employment opportunities or demand for higher-level technical skills than are currently available 
(Ocubay, 2018).  Thus while Zenawi’s iterative policies have led to substantial growth and 
development, his approach is no longer sufficient to encourage the creation of the upper-lower 
class and lower-middle class employment opportunities which will be necessary to meet the 
demands of a better educated and much larger population (CSA, 2014b; Nayak, 2014; NPC, 
2015; WB, 2017).   
5.1.4 Development and Land Expropriation at the Micro-level 
Beginning with the absolute monarchy of Halie Selassie, an evolving combination of 
internal and external changes have substantially transformed Ethiopia’s governmental role in 
development , these extended past the Marxist Dergue regime in to the current system of 
centrally directed development.  These changes have clearly enriched and improved the lives of 
those who have been able participate in, or adapt to, the social and economic transition that is 
                                                             
50 The rail line from Addis Ababa to Djibouti was initiated by King Menelik II and completed in 1915.  The refurbished 
link was built with Chinese funding and opened at about the same time China established its first overseas naval 
facility, also in Djibouti. 
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occurring.  Nevertheless, other groups have been impoverished, particularly those who are 
physically displaced by development and who have not been able to otherwise genuinely 
assimilate into the new economic model.   
Extent of Expropriations 
Smallholders in the study area to the east of Addis Ababa explained they have been 
notified of their wereda’s intention to expropriate and convert their land to residential 
development (Interviews 61, 70, 73 & 80).  Smallholders as far east as Sendafa (Interviews 62. 
63) described how they had been opposed to development related changes but also submitted 
they are powerless to contest them and recognized they have few livelihood options once their 
small holds are taken.  An assistant kebele manager (Interview 52) encountered while he was 
inspecting a recent series of expropriations and oustings, stated that an area extending to a 
hillside some 10 kilometer’s from the main road will be taken for development to accommodate 
the population increase which Addis Ababa is projected to experience over the next 35 years.  
He confirmed that no specific plans for rehabilitative training programmes for displaced adults, 
or their children, will be offered to prepare them for a life which is not farm related, nor were 
there plans to relocate residents to any other location to renew their agricultural livelihoods.  
This circumstance is likely to contribute to permanent economic and social displacement and 
poverty in two ways.   
First, according to kebele officials, tela house owners, and manufacturing plant 
managers (Interviews 19, 52, & 75) who were interviewed, smallholder social networks are 
formed among highly independent agriculturalists who cooperate throughout the planting 
season for mutual benefit.  Thus, when smallholders are dispersed, their support network in 
times of hardship is lost.  Second, displaced smallholders who were observed in the areas east 
of Addis Ababa as well as in the hillsides surrounding Lalibela displayed difficulty responding to 
change.  Particularly among the older smallholders who were being ousted a consistent theme 
was a self-acknowledgement that they are ill equipped to renegotiate their new lives; that they 
have neither suitable non-farm employment experience, nor other coping skills.  Critically, they 
believed it is unlikely they would be able to develop the skills necessary to work in the new 
industries being established in the area surrounding Addis Ababa, thus their economic failure 
appeared certain to be tied to a lack of internal locus of control: 
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“When we were younger we could dream of the things we’d do, the land we would 
farm and good lives we would lead.  We had those lives for years and years but now we have 
nothing and there is no way for us to restart, none of us can work in the mills they’ve built.  
We’re too old to begin again.”  Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 72) 
Their observations support similar arguments found in academic literature and those 
made by former Prime Minister Zenawi (in Brechenmacher, 2017), describing the inability of 
high-context cultures to take full advantage of technical opportunities (see also Schwartz, et al., 
2006; Todo, et al., 2014; Arnason & Valgeirsdottir, 2015).  Thus, unskilled smallholders are 
particularly vulnerable to unemployment and chronic poverty after their displacment as they 
become economically and socially unmoored from their communities and livilhoods.  Some 
smallholders however, both dismissed the inevitability of displacement and feared the already 
observed consequences of too-vocally protesting their ousting:  
“My farm is very far from the nearest road and the steep hillsides mean there’s little 
chance of it being taken by the government for development.  But, I know many of my 
neighbours are concerned about losing their land as they watch the new houses and the new 
mill coming closer and closer.  They’ve discussed organizing against the wereda but they’ve 
seen what happens to people who resist the government.” 
Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 63) 
At the same time smallholders are being ousted by a process of development that is 
creating increased prosperity among a select urban population, youth and student groups are 
becoming socially displaced by their new education when they cannot find appropriate 
employment (Taylor, 2008; Dorosh & Schmidt, 2010).  They, too, must adjust to their changing 
paradigms as slowing economic conditions are making employment more difficult to secure.  
This condition among better-educated youth is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 6.  
5.1.5 Smallholder Response to Developmentally Imposed Changes 
In terms of the expropriation that is taking place, land prices in the primary study area 
were discussed by smallholders who were interviewed outside of a wereda land registration 
office.  They recognized that increases in value were occurring due to an influx of new resident 
who were relocating from Addis Ababa and who were building new homes in what had recently 
been farm fields.  While several of the participants in the group were generally satisfied with the 
price they had received for their property, most understood that once they sold their land they 
were left with few options other than to take menial day labour jobs.  This has resulted in a loss 
of identity among them which becomes a fundamental form of social displacement:   
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“Land prices are increasing and some farmers I know are selling their property to 
receive better prices than if the government takes it.  They are paid what they ask for it, but 
after they’ve sold it most of them have no support.  They have no skills and once the money 
is gone they can only take menial day labour jobs that other people in town used to do.  They 
are not who they once were in the community and are not as well thought of.”   
Smallholder, July 2015  (Interview 67) 
 
“We all have neighbours who’ve sold their land because they see that living on a farm 
is becoming much more difficult as the town expands.  People from town buy land and build 
houses on it and you can’t blame them for wanting someplace nicer to live.  But once you’ve 
sold your property and spent the money on new things like a television or even a car you’ve 
got nothing left.  You can start a small vegetable window from your house, but too many 
people are doing that and selling a few onions is not a way to make a living.” 
Smallholder, July 2015 (Interview 68) 
Although some of those who have become displaced were able to begin a business or 
find non-farm employment in nearby peri-urban areas, a majority of the 41 smallholders who 
were interviewed in areas peripheral to Addis Ababa related they had not re-established 
themselves financially and no assistance had been provided to them by the same government 
which had forced their displacement (Ferris & Winthrop, 2010).  Of those who had found new 
livelihoods, fewer than 15% felt they would ever be able to recoup the income or the lifestyle 
they had previously enjoyed.  They explained they were offered menial employment as night 
guards to watch over the construction site which had taken their property (Interview 90), or that 
they might find sporadic and unskilled employment on small construction sites.  In no case did 
any displaced smallholder report the offer of a steady income or employment which provided the 
same autonomy they had previously enjoyed.   
Moreover, respondents felt they had little control over the events reshaping their lives 
especially as the political process and social services become less responsive to their daily 
needs.  These smallholders recognized they no longer constituted a recognizable voting bloc, 
and at least 50% of the smallholders offered that elections increasingly represent a meaningless 
community participation requirement rather than opportunity for political and social change 
(Carter, 2009; Badwaza, 2015).  Thus, a sense of marginalization51 emerged from the 
discussions among oustees and revealed an undercurrent of vulnerability and futility stemming 
from the lack of employment or other opportunities.  Smallholders in the study area were also 
keenly aware that potential alternatives, including those obtained through any political pressure 
they might have previously been able to bring, are rapidly diminishing.  Hence as their own 
                                                             
51 Cernea (1997: 1574) described the beginning of marginalization as when “families lose economic power and slide 
on a downward mobility path; when middle income farm households become landless and when small shopkeepers 
and craftsmen are forced to downsize and slip below poverty thresholds.”  It occurs when displaced families cannot 
use their prior skill sets in their new locations and so their human capital is lost.  
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group numbers decrease due to displacement, oustees recognized they are essentially on their 
own with little outside support: 
“We used to have a large farmers association with more than 50 members and we 
could talk to the wereda leaders about our problems.  But now that the land is being taken 
there are fewer than 15 members and they won’t listen.  In the past, the association would 
provide training to younger farmers and their children, or it would help to plough the fields 
and assist wives who had lost their husbands due to accidents or divorce.  Now, there are not 
enough of us left and so we cannot help each other or fight being forced from the land.”   
Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 72) 
5.2 Pro-poor Policies in Ethiopia  
Ethiopia’s federal government is committed to development through its pro-poor policies 
and as early as 2002, released its Industrial Development Strategy (MoI, 2002).  That plan 
detailed a programme of institutional reform which would stimulate non-agricultural employment.  
It outlined budgetary commitments to rural education and health care, agriculture, and 
infrastructure development including rural electrification and new roads (Altenburg, 2010; IMF, 
2015; Gebreeyesus, 2016).  These foundational improvements are now enabling the current 
developmental policy, the Second Growth and Transformation Plan, to provide a new emphasis 
to manufacturing and industrial growth, yet years later continues to lag (Mbate, 2016). 
 An update to the Industrial Development Strategy was released in 2013 entitled: The 
Ethiopian Industrial Development Strategic Plan (2013-2025) (MoI, 2013).  This revision to the 
core plan for industrialization specifically identified structural constraints which were limiting 
further development of the sector including “inadequate human resource capability (both 
technical and managerial); an unstable supply of electrical power; and lack of access to efficient 
and effective credit and other services” (MoI, 2013: 1).  Like planning documents before it, the 
new Plan found the majority of Ethiopia’s existing manufacturing base required few technical 
skills and concluded that within the sector “38% of the persons are engaged in the manufacture 
of food products and beverages, 8% in the textile industry, and almost 11% in non-metallic 
mineral products” (Ibid, 18) rather than being employed in value-added manufacturing for either 
domestic use or export.  The repetitious nature of these findings suggest that on-going issues 
have been well explored by Ethiopia’s economic planners but that few clear resolutions have 
been devised or implemented. 
Although poverty reduction is a core goal of Ethiopia’s pro-poor developmental policies 
including accelerated, sustained and people-centred economic growth and development, the 
outcomes have been uneven among groups.  Urban areas have grown and prospered even as 
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they continue to harbour high unemployment rates and poor living conditions (WB, 2005; CSA, 
2014c; MoE, 2015).  Rural areas have remained generally less educated and poor, and labour-
intensive subsistence-farming prevails as the dominant livelihood among the 86% of the 
population who live there.  Despite the solid economic development which Ethiopia has 
experienced since the initiation of former Prime Minister Zenawi’s development plans, and its 
goal of becoming a middle-income nation, the country continues to be ranked among the world’s 
poorest nations (Oxford, 2017).  Hence, while pro-poor programmes are vital, it is “their 
outcome that is the important unit of analysis” not the policies themselves (Blum & Grangaard, 
2018).   
5.2.1 Adaptation and Social Obligations  
Farmers form specialized social groups (Klandermans, et al., 2004; Price, 2011) within a 
generally closed occupational category that is not easily entered other than through birth and 
heritage.  Students, too, constitute a distinct social group.  Like farmers, they participate in 
activities which distinguish themselves from non-students, often adopting distinctive signs of 
their status such as clothing, hair styles or vocabulary.  The shared internal dynamics of these 
groups form the basis of strong and lasting peer linkages which can be resistant to change and 
that survive after their farming livelihoods are lost or their university associations become 
obsolete (Stedman, 2002; Young & Collin, 2004; Berger & Hearth, 2008; Galbin, 2014).   
Ethiopia’s fast-growing economy has created strong group and place identifications 
among both smallholders and students in terms of resistance to change.  This may impair 
individual willingness to participate in necessary rehabilitative programmes after ousting or ease 
their adaptation to new situations, including the unexpected lack of employment following the 
end of education or training.  Common reasons for resistance to change include existing cultural 
mores, potential loss of economic security; the perceived personal risks that are inherent in new 
social relationships; and the likely loss of known friendships, lifestyles, and place.  Yet, culture 
and resistance to change has three important implications for the livelihood retraining of 
displaced smallholders and for the industrialization envisioned by Ethiopia’s developmental 
policies (Picchio, 2015).   
First, Ethiopia is not a saving culture (Lusardi, 2007; Abera & Gebreslassie, 2016).  
Instead, there is a strong social obligation for individuals to share earnings with extended 
families or within their group after one has met personal obligations.  In a survey conducted in 
preparation for the Second Growth and Transformation Plan, the federal government found that 
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just 7% of households held a savings account in a financial institution (Hailessellasie, et al., 
2013).  The same survey determined if there is “excess money after fulfilling expenditures the 
last option will be saving that money” (Ibid: 7) due to these social pressures.  
Social Sharing Obligations 
The obligation to share with family members and social groups was more fully described 
during an encounter with two recently ousted smallholders (brothers) and two wereda land use 
agents sent to monitor a recent set of expropriations which were conducted to allow a textile 
manufacturing plant to expand its facility (Interview 75).  As the agents arrived the former 
owners of a small plot had just finished ploughing the final furrow of what had recently been 
their property (Photograph 5).  The brothers stated they were attempting to grow one more crop 
before the ground was broken for construction.  The agents explained that many former owners 
do not understand that once their land has been expropriated and paid for they are no longer 
allowed to cultivate it and that construction was scheduled to begin in a matter of weeks.  
Furthermore, the agents explained that because of the social conventions obligating them to 
share the proceeds, displaced smallholders quickly spend the payment for their land on luxury 
items or among their small peer group rather than saving or investing it in a new business.  As a 
result, after about two years these windfall financial resources are exhausted and displaced 
smallholders have nothing with which to rebuild their livlihoods.    
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Second, while describing the acculturational difficulties endemic to migration and 
change, including the loss of place and status, Phinney, et al., (2001) noted the tensions of 
balancing personal and social incongruities.  This includes adaptation of new ideas, values, and 
behaviours which must be juxtaposed with deeply held ideas of acceptable conduct.   
The land use agents were in agreement that few of the displaced smallholders have 
taken employment in the textile mill which now occupies their property.  Instead, the 
overwhelming majority have taken lesser-paid but personally appropriate work as unskilled 
labourers at outdoor construction sites.  They went on to say this, too, has been locally 
destabilizing.  Not only are the unskilled displaced smallholders competing for the same 
employment opportunities as other unskilled workers in the town or villages, but their high 
numbers have caused wages to drop dramatically, causing new hardship throughout the 
wereda.   
Difficulty in Hiring Displaced Smallholders 
A floor manager at the MNS textile mill who was encounted shortly after the land use 
agents departed echoed their observations (Interview 75).  He also described the difficulty in 
hiring smallholders who are accustomed to working at their own time schedules.  He stated that 
despite manufacturing work paying almost three times the daily wage of an unskilled labourer at 
construction sites, most oustees are unsuited for industrial labour.  His own observation was 
that they are too often unable to transition from outdoor work to the rote processes of milling 
and that the routine and repetitious manufacturing processes only magnify the loss of autonomy 
which smallholders had previously enjoyed (Bandura, 1982; Pierce, et al., 2001).  Operating a 
machine both deepened smallholders sense of loss of self-efficacy, it underscored the lack of 
control they now have over their daily activities when they had recently been successful 
independent business owners who set their own schedules.  Thus, while non-farm employment 
opportunities are available, ousted smallholders generally display a strong preference for 
unskilled construction work or for unemployment in order to remain within their peer groups.  
Third, worker health and reliablity were consistently identified by key informants at 
educational institutions as being culturally based issues that adversly affect local industrial 
development and export markets.  As an example, a business school dean whose field of 
expertise is in the development of medium and large manufacturing enterprises described the 
impediments to more rapid Ethiopian development.  He affirmed infrastructure shortages such 
as a reliable source of electricity that is necessary for the continuous operation of machinery 
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and computing systems; a water supply which has been purified to the point of being useful 
during manufacturing; the lack of a robust internet system free of censorship and political 
interruptions are hindering industrialization.  He highlighted cultural and behavioural issues 
among workers which affect their dependability in the manufacturing process: 
“Ethiopian workers are unreliable. The younger workers especially, choose to drink or 
engage in risky behaviors such as khat chewing instead of showing up on time.  The country 
could easily develop itself economically if this were not the case; workers are easily trained 
in about six months and are potentially as productive as any others. But their health 
conditions also hinder development.  The sanitation here is terrible and every individual I 
know has some sort of stomach parasite from the water.  These may sound like small issues, 
but they prevent employees from showing up to the job and they hurt productivity.  This 
makes, I think, Ethiopian workers about 40% as productive as workers in other developing 
nations and it inhibits investment and national growth.”   
Dean, Business and Economics Department, July 2015 (Interview 4) 
At the same time, the frequent lack of seemly post-education employment among 
secondary school and university graduates was also noted by Farmer Training Centre staff who 
have observed that upon receiving degrees in their chosen academic disciplines, an increasing 
number of youth are unable to find professional work.  At least some of these graduates are 
returning to farm and in their villages, but as they do they bring a much different and more 
cosmopolitan perspective back to the community.  Staff at each of the eight Farmer Training 
Centres visited independently noted that despite some reintegration difficulties returning 
graduates have frequently become model farmers and de facto community leaders.  Graduates 
are, staff said (Interview 36) likely to successfully advocate for improvements to the local 
infrastructure and increased social services for their villages from the kebele and wereda 
governments then those who have never left are able to achieve.   
5.2.2 Gender Bias in Agricultural and Development Programmes  
In his research of gender and identity among farmers, Brandth (2002: 191) asserts that 
“for men, the farm represents a place of birth, a workplace, a residence, and a lifestyle … 
Women on the other hand, never anticipate being a farmer, a masculine coded occupation.”  
Price (2011: 2) echoed that conclusion, finding that in Northern nations “from birth, men are 
usually socialised as ‘a farmer’s son’ while daughters have been shown to learn, predominantly, 
to be supporters of farming men.”   
These conclusions regarding gender role assignments made by Brandth and Price 
contrast sharply with observations throughout the study areas.  Field encounters with informants 
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consistently showed women, especially land owners, hold the same deep personal and social 
connections with the land and to their livelihoods as men and that they likewise benefit from 
agricultural training and assistance:   
“My parents were farmers here and taught me at a very early age.  When they died in 
an automobile accident nine years ago I took over the farm.  Now I have 10 dairy cows, I grow 
maize and other grain in the fields across the roadway to feed them and I raise chickens.  I 
also run this tela house in the evening for extra money.  Today our women’s group [24 
women who each own their farm] from the Farmer Training Centre are coming over to help 
build the shed where we will operate the refrigeration unit and the cream and butter separator 
the Africa Agricultural Production Programme provided us.  That will allow us to gather milk 
for several days at a time rather than making daily trips to town to sell it.”  
Female Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 82) 
“The [farmer] association is good to belong to because I can purchase seeds and 
fertilizer cheaper than in town, but the training centre is where we learn new techniques and 
where my children go to play.  The children watch and see things and come home to ask why 
I don’t do them.  I used to want to live in town but now that I’ve worked this farm for many 
years I can’t see myself doing anything else.   
Female Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 82) 
 
Model Farmer Participation in Government Programs 
 
Farmer Training Centre staff who were interviewed related they identify model farmers 
as those with high production but also specifically select those who display other important 
‘lifestyle’ criteria, including good health and hygiene practices, and income saving (Interviews 39 
&, 40).  These tend to skew the selection of model farmers towards women in relation to the 
total number of land title holders.  In most Farmer Training Centres approximately 20% of all the 
farmers listed were model farmers and about 20% of the names of model farmers were those of 
women, despite there being numerically far fewer who owned title to their own farms.  
Therefore, women farmers are assumed to have the same sense of attachment and loss of 
group attachment when their small holds are expropriated. 
Model farmers are provided with additional instruction regarding how to apply the newest 
technologies including irrigation, row cropping and improved animal hygiene.  In addition to their 
farming expertise, selection and continued inclusion in this programme is also made for political 
reasons.  Regardless of gender, training centre staff who were interviewed were clear that 
personal advocacy and support for the wereda government would result in additional individual 
assistance being provided to this group of farmers: 
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“This is a large wereda and in our 37 kebeles we have about 6,330 farmers, with just 
190 men and 21 women being model farmers who we use to teach and train the others.  We 
give the model farmers a bit more seed and more fertilizer and they show the others what can 
be done with extra work and what can happen for them when they support the government.” 
Framer Training Centre Staff, July 2015 (Interview 34) 
Bias in Business Development  
Ousted smallholders must find other sources of income when their land has been 
expropriated for development.  However, the opportunity to enter into a new business venture 
often appears to be more supportive of women then men and Ethiopia’s small-scale business 
training programmes and business loans have been predominently focussed towards assisting 
women (Berhane & Garderbroek, 2011; Campbell, 2015).  During interviews, managers from 
five lending institutions demonstrated a clear bias towards women which affected the abillity of 
men, including displaced male smallholders, to obtain loans.  In Sheshamane, where very 
substantial small-commerical development was occurring, women were seen by those 
managers as being far more likely to obtain a business loan than were men:   
“Our policy is to charge farmers, especially men, a higher rate of interest than any 
others who take out loans.  Women get a smaller interest rate because they pay us back more 
often.  There are not many new businesses here but those that do open are mostly operated 
by women who have attended the vocational centre.  They’ve been guided into courses that 
will assist them in opening a business52, even if it’s small.  Men most often think in a short-
term way and attempt to sell products for that the market is already saturated and their 
businesses fail.”     
Financial Institution, September 2015 (Interview 42) 
 
“Women are generally more risk averse than men.  This makes them better loan 
candidates for us than men and so 85% of our loans are to women.  Women are now owning 
most of the businesses in this neighbourhood, from small food sellers to construction 
material shops.  They will soon dominate the area and in time they will change the entire 
make up of Sheshamane.”          
Financial Institution, July 2015 (Interview 46) 
 
Similarly, financial institution managers in the study area east of Addis Ababa, asserted 
that as a group men were not a priority for lending since they are seen as being short-term in 
their thinking and therefore a poor risk.  These managers also related that rural women tend to 
take out loans for durable agricultural purposes such as livestock; to purchase machinery; or for 
clearly commerical ventures, whereas men often tend to take out loans to purchase a small 
                                                             
52  The business management courses taught at vocational centres date to the 2002 Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Programme (p. 95). 
180 
 
amount of produce to sell in the local market but if they do not sell that produce they cannot 
repay the loan.   
New businesses observed in each of the three study areas were overwhelmingly 
operated by women of all ages and a majority of the owners related that they had relocated from 
larger urban areas to seized upon the opportunities which were available.  The development of 
their micro-businesses often appeared to be based on experience in non-farm employment and 
in rural areas this was especially common with younger women.  Among the business-owning 
respondents who were interviewed was a woman who had previously been employed in a 
coffee house in Addis Ababa (Interview 27).  She had erected a small tent just outside of an 
Orthodox church which draws hundreds of tourists each week and from which she now sells her 
own coffee and hand crafted baskets as souvenirs.  Another woman who had been relocated 
from Addis Ababa to redevelopment in the core city, opened a coffee and lunch shop that 
catered to the construction workers in a nearby housing project.  Still other women had left their 
positions with federal government ministries and opened construction material shops which 
supplied those projects.  A director of the federal Micro and Small Enterprise programme related 
the social changes that his agency is attempting to create through his agencies’ small business 
development policies that favor women:   
“As a programme we make loans to almost any type of individual business.  Our 
programmes are actually conducted at the wereda levels; even the kebele administrators 
become involved because they know the people better, and whether they are likely to 
succeed or are deserving enough.  People who are anti-social don’t get our loans very often.  
We’ve been trying to filter out those sort of people and make a better country because of that.  
Women are much better loan risks while men tend not to be able to pay back the loan due to 
frequent crop failures rather than any fault of their own.“ 
Small Business and Micro-enterprise Development Agency, Addis Ababa, July 2015 
(Interview 47) 
 
This has two significant outcomes.  First, it tends to relegate men to a secondary status 
and impedes their ability to adapt to changing economic realities through the development of 
non-farm livelihoods.  Second, when their land is expropriated older unskilled men remain 
distanced from local development opportunities while at the same time younger entrepreneurial 
males are also less able to secure capital to form a new enterprise.  Although such barriers to 
obtaining a business loan do not close all other avenues for income generation for men, they 
limit the available opportunities and in some cases may contribute to family poverty following 
expropriation. 
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A similar degree of entrepreneurialism among older, male oustees was not observed 
and a lending institution manager in Lalibela noted most farmers are concerned with developing 
their farms rather than being interested or having the time to devote to a new commercial 
enterprise.  Smallholders, he said, are seen as generally having neither the education nor the 
vision to begin a business.  During a visit to a rural health clinic east of Lalibela, approximately 
20 smallholders and their families were waiting for treatment.  In conversation, they both 
affirmed that medical care is becoming less available and less affordable and that none of them 
had had time to consider opening a business of their own.  Further, none of those who were 
engaged said they had any particular skills to sell other than their agricultural abilities.  
Although vocational programmes exist to help establish a non-farm enterprise, lending 
managers and business developers who were interviewed concluded there is little interest 
among smallholders and often little success when they leave their current lives and social 
networks for the unknown:  
“I don’t know of any farmers who are ready to start a business.  They’re too busy to 
give it any time and most just have no interest or aptitude, even when they’ve lost or sold 
their land.  Farmers who come in from the countryside are usually disappointed because they 
thought things would be easier for them here.  But, there are few jobs if you don’t have a skill 
and they are now causing wages for unskilled workers to decline.  There are not as many 
services as we used to have and there are lines of people waiting at the medical clinics when 
there never used to be.”    
Financial Institution Manager, July 2015 (Interview 44) 
Still, the 2013 Ethiopian Time Use Survey (CSA, 2014e) found that while women make 
important contributions to family income, it remains men who are the primary wage earners.  
Smallholding men though, appeared to have become functionally unskilled and unemployable 
even as women may be gaining useful non-farm business skills by operating their own small 
enterprises.  Thus, while men have undoubtedly benefited economically and educationally from 
their gender-status in the past, they now require renewed assistance as the expropriation and 
ousting process leave their families landless.  To date, no policies or programmes were found 
among Ethiopia’s developmental plans that specifically addressed the needs of displaced rural 
men.  Thus, coupled with men’s tendency for greater risk taking and short-term planning, 
business development assistance and loans often favored women.   
Family-based Farm Loans  
Family-based loan policies provide a unique means for families, rather than individuals, 
to receive assistance, and their use has produced strongly postive outcomes.  Eligible families 
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not only receive a monetary loan, but must also participate in life-style enhancement instruction 
and the varied topics include the importance of children’s education, citizenship, and household 
financial management.  These classes are reminiscent of the instruction found in Empress 
Menen’s original schools for girls that had included lessons in home economics, basic 
improvement in sanitation, hygiene, and child nutrition.  Requirements to obtain a farm loan 
were explained by one lending institution manager north of Addis Ababa who related the clear 
intention of the regional government to use them to change rural behaviours: 
“Farm loans come with the stipulation of social training that includes family planning, 
that is a primary focus of the government, as well as hygiene instruction and money 
management.  This is a training programme that is mandated by the Oromia regional 
government and applies to all farm loans.  Here we have three staff members who provide 
this training.  Those staff members are university educated with a background in social 
welfare.  I think this has helped to reduce the default rate for this branch.”  
Credit Union Manager, July 2015 (Interview 43) 
Farm loans are made to small cooperatives that are generally composed of two or three 
neighboring farmers.  Hence if an individual defaults, the loan is subsequently collected from the 
other members of the cooperative.  This helps to ensure repayment is made by spreading the 
risk the institution takes. In all cases, lending managers stated the location of the farm often has 
a significant impact on loan approval.  Smallholders who reside in austere and mountainous 
areas such as those surrounding Lalibela related they are increasingly unable to produce 
adequate crops due to changing weather conditions, and are becoming unable to repay the 
loans.  Consequently based on low production, smallholder loan applications are often denied 
and so they are increasingly relocating to where they consider to be a more favorable, often 
peri-urban, location.   
Uncontrollable climactic conditions and the inability of smallholders to obtain loans were 
typical explanations given by both adults and their children for their departure from hillside 
smallholds, even as they tend to possess few skills that are in demand in the nearby 
municipalities (Bezu & Holden, 2014).  Hence, many of the same issues pertaining to forced ex 
situ displacement also applied to voluntary relocation.  However, in the study area nearest Addis 
Ababa the displacement effects are rapidly accelerated, affecting thousands of smallholders in a 
a densely populated area each year (Home, 2016b).  
5.2.3 Youth Small Enterprise Development 
Overall, observations of small business owners in the study area suggest the more 
successful economic adaptees tended to be younger and surprisingly few business owners 
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were university graduates.  Successful entrepreneurs in the study areas appeared able to easily 
migrate from one location to another and from one livelihood to another quickly, without a 
prolonged period of nostalgia or remorse for their earlier lives and group associations.  This 
appeared especially true if they had not yet become fixed upon a career path, such as long term 
agricultural employment.   
In instances of recently graduated students, some were found who had quickly solidified 
their career decisions and this limited the range of their choices just as it did among 
smallholders who chose to remain farmers even after their land had been expropriated.  One 
graduate, who had been awarded a master’s degree in psychology, related in a conversation 
that he had turned down offers to work in the marketing department of large retail shop because 
he felt the positions were not commensurate with his education.  In contrast, older oustees were 
the least likely to change their livelihood paradigms, avoiding employment in new occupations 
that would have disrupted and redefined their group identity.   
Interviews (#12, 19, 21) confirming this were taken with entrepreneurs who owned the 
only commercial establishments in small villages: tela houses.  Regardless of location, the 
consensus observation among these business owners was that smallholders feel the 
government has forgotten their hamlet and that there are no social services offered.  Further, 
their patrons say there are no longer any governmental or local non-governmental organizations 
to assist in agricultural development.  Proprietors, though, said that a large part of the problem 
is that ousted farmers do not want to work in any other occupation; that these smallholders say 
they and their families have always been farmers and don’t know any other way of life.  They 
speak, each of the tela house owners said, about the ‘old days’ but have little view of the future 
for themselves or their families even as they confirmed the development of a small business is 
relatively easy to engage in:   
“My grandfather started this tela house almost 70 years ago.  I have no education and 
no business training but it’s easy to make a good living from the farmers who come in here 
every day.  They complain that once they lost their land the government forgot them; that 
there are no jobs.  But there are plenty of jobs just in the next village and it’s easy to get to 
them using the footpath, but they say it’s the younger crowd who apply for them.”   
Entrepreneur, June 2015 (Interview 19) 
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“I bought this tela house about 2 years ago and hope to have the loan paid off in 
another 5 years.  I gave up farming after just a few seasons because I could make more 
money from this.  The farmers you see sitting here could have done the same thing with the 
money they were paid for their property, but they chose not to take a risk.  They no longer 
farm and are here waiting for me every day when I open.  I ask them why they don’t try to get 
work in town or take a job at the new clothing factory, but they tell me they’ve got no interest.  
They say they’re farmers and that’s what they will always be.”   
Entrepreneur, July 2015 (Interview 21) 
These first-hand observations made by long-time residents affirmed that displaced 
smallholders in the study area are resistant to leaving their social groups and their place 
identities in order to establish new livelihoods.  Over the course of their life-time smallholders in 
the area have been acculturated through their vocational attachment to the farm, the land, and 
their peer groups (Klandermans, et al., 2004; Gebregziabher, et al., 2014).  Engaging in a sea-
change to their identity, including the attitudes and values of their farming community to that of 
some other livelihood or industry through new training or educational experiences would 
irreversibly change their social status and group associations (Ujang & Zakariya, 2015).  
Further, Arnason & Valgeirsdottir (2015: 3) found that “people with less formal education 
participate proportionately less in organized learning activities than people with a higher level of 
formal education.”  None of the respondents who were interviewed were aware of any 
government programmes that could assist them in making a life-transformation nor had they 
sought out information from the government that might have addressed their fundamental fear 
of a loss of group identity through new educational or vocational experiences.  These 
opportunities are discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.3 Ethiopia’s Authoritarian Structure 
Upon taking power, the EPRDF repealed Dergue programmes including the previous 
policies of the forced sole-use of the Amharic language in schools.  Rather, it installed a form of 
ethnic federalism based on a system of tribalism and the recognition of local ethnicities.  The 
EPDRF reversed the previous highly centralized government structure and returned more 
responsibility to the regional and wereda governments.  Restrictions on private enterprise were 
likewise substantially eased by the more growth-friendly EPRDF (Aalen, 2006; Chanie, 2007; 
Balcha, 2008; Mehretu, 2012; Alemu, 2015).  However, the federal government has now 
imposed a system of electoral authoritarianism that enables it to enforce developmental 
authoritarianism. 
According to Bach (2014: 107) the challenge put to this developmental government was 
to proactively create “a regime capable of absorbing the inherent tension of state-building” in 
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what Tronvoll (2008: 49) had described as a “new era of minority and group rights protection”, 
all while simultaneously integrating the different tribal and linguistic groups into a coherent 
character.  However, the implementation of Ethiopia’s vision of ethnic federalism, with an 
empowered local authority, was ultimately incompatible with an encompassing central party 
whose principals of development.  This depended upon direction by a single political authority 
rather than true regional autonomy or local independence (Aalen, 2006; Zenawi, 2006).  This 
has now contributed to the establishment of the present semi-authoritarian governance system. 
Semi-authoritarian States  
Ota (2003: 146) contends there are three types of political systems53: “democracy, 
authoritarian regimes, and totalitarian regimes.”  These can be imagined as being arranged in a 
triangle with each system holding one of the points, though no nation is completely represented 
by a single point but by a combination of them.  The hybrid practices of individual states will be 
located somewhere within that triangle, being closer to one point than the other during different 
stages of political, economic and social development or as perceived threats may require 
temporary political resolutions.  The term ‘semi-authoritarian’ describes political regimes 
somewhere within the triangle that are not totalitarian but neither are they genuinely democratic.  
Ethiopia best fits the semi-authoritarian model, as its structure restricts human rights, especially 
the right of free speech and the right to redress the government (Terfa, 2012).   
To maintain its current hegemony, the EPRDF-led national government holds close 
control of the political and social process (McDonald, 2008).  At the authoritarian point, it has 
established a de facto single party-rule that makes citizens reliant upon the government for 
social benefits that range from state-sponsored health care, to local employment, to the sale of 
agricultural fertilizer and seed.  To solidify its monopoly the federal government established an 
organizational structure that extends from the federal level to the village and even to blocs of 
individual households, known as ‘lema’t budin’ (Figure 5.1, repeated from Chapter 4) (Yilmaz & 
Venugopal, 2008; Bach, 2014).  This structure gives the appearance of local governance but 
acts as a controlling mechanism of the central government.  
                                                             
53 No single definition is adequate to describe democracies, authoritarian or tyrannical regime types.  Abridged 
definitions include that of the Canadian Parliament (Parliament, 2017) which describes democracy as occurring when 
“all eligible citizens have the right to participate, either directly or indirectly, in making the decisions which affect 
them.”  Hadenius & Teorell (2006) describe authoritarian systems as generally consisting of monarchies, relatively 
short-lived military regimes, and repressive electoral regimes that can ignore the demands of the populace; while 
Flavius (2014: 107) contends totalitarianism exists where “the force of law has been replaced by the law of force.” 
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Aalen & Muriass (2017: 58) note the EPRDF’s “outright military victory [in 1991] 
produced an authoritarian result” and conclude that while elections are now regularly held, they 
“are by no means democratic” or representative.  The pervasive semi-authoritarian political 
organization not only limits opposition, it suppresses individual initiative which might challenge 
official development policies that would otherwise provide wider avenues of mobility out of 
poverty.  Political and economic policies typically remain beyond the influence of individuals and 
this restrains the social choices which smallholders can demand from the government. 
 
Authoritarian governments direct the core features of development, such as Ethiopia’s 
decision to facilitate the industrial sector through university education policies that strongly 
weight science and technology programmes over other fields of study (MoI, 2013: 1).  They 
become electoral-authoritarians when they impose restrictions upon groups that might organize 
a credible political opposition to the policies of the government (Hadenius & Teorell, 2006; 
Terfa, 2012; Fisher & Anderson, 2015).  The imposition of Ethiopia’s systems of electoral and 
developmental authoritarianism directly impact both smallholders and job seeking youth who are 
affected by the controlling nature of the state and who cannot be spearated from it.   
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5.3.1 Electoral Authoritarianism 
For a nation to be considered a democracy its electoral system must, at a minimum, be 
characterized by uncertainty in the outcome of elections and by a reliance upon the 
irreversibility of those outcomes no matter how unfavourable they may have been to the 
incumbent (Schedler, 2006).  Ethiopia’s form of electoral authoritarianism is a wilful, organized 
system of achieving power and then maintaining it through generally legal means in order to 
marginalize the voice of the opposition and to limit political agitation (Levitsky & Way, 2002; 
Abbink, 2017).  Electoral-authoritarian regimes hold regular elections but those exercises do not 
meet the requirements of democracy and their outcome is all but preordained (Aalen & Tronvoll, 
2009; Fisher & Anderson, 2015).  In them, competition between viable parties is not allowed and 
political contests are little more than a means to keep the dominant party in office and to limit 
social dissent (Abbink, 2017).   
Although there is a democratic constitution and Ethiopia is at least superficially 
amenable to multiple political parties, its system of electoral-authoritarianism has become one 
premised upon outcomes which favour the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (Schedler, 2006; Badwaza, 2015).  Kebede (2013: 272) described this type of capture of 
government adminstrative and legislative systems dominated by a single political party as where 
a “small pool of people may be simultaneously the principal actors in government or business; 
fluidly regrouping as needed.”   
Electoral Peril and EPRDF Responses 
During the 2005 elections the EPRDF came perilously close to losing its majority and 
soon therearter, the federal government severely limited “political opposition and civil society, 
coupled with the launch of new and repressive laws and the expansion of local structures of 
control and coercion” (HRW, 2010: 19; Proclamation 621/2009).  Abbink (2017) described the 
authoritarian political traditions in Ethiopia which had reasserted themselves following those 
elections.  These resulted in legal limits being placed upon the efforts of democratizing non-
governmental organizations and in additional candicacy requirements that have limited 
legitimate political opposition.  
Changes to candidacy requirements began with the 2008 elections for kebele and 
wereda posts, creating almost insurmountable requirements for opposition parties to be placed 
on ballots (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009).  In particular, the government increased the number of 
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seats required at the lowest level of elected representation, the kebele councils, from 15 to 300 
and simultaneously required that challenging parties nominate a complete slate of candidates 
for each of those seats (Badwaza, 2015).  Hence the government did not legally prevent local 
challenges, but it did cripple opposition parties who could not immediately muster 300 
candidates.  This constricted the formation of emergent groups opposed to the authority of the 
ruling party and limited their ability to demand political and social reforms, including an end to 
wide-spread land expropriations.  These changes ultimately resulted, as of the May 2015 
national elections, in the complete EPDRF control of each of the 547 seats in Ethiopia’s 
Parliament.  However, this was an increase of just one seat from the previous legislature and so 
the practical consequences of that election may be minimal.   
To accomplish this degree of pervasive control, the national government has imposed a 
number of barriers which maintain its dominance while leaving a credible through not possible 
political opposition in place to challenge the ruling EPRDF.  These barriers include the 
imposition of arbitrary registration requirements for voters who support other parties; conducting 
frequent purges of voter registries; and, the repeated redrawing of electoral districts to dissipate 
the influence of local opposition groups.   
While Davies (2009: 53) noted “a functioning multi-party system is vital for a healthy 
democracy”, electoral authoritarianism should not be confused with simple, substandard 
election procedures in which ballots are not delivered or where polling places are not opened 
(Carter, 2009).  Rather, as Freedom House concludes, to maintain its one-party dominance 
Ethiopia’s “leaders devote full-time attention to the challenge of crippling the opposition without 
annihilating it and flouting the rule of law while maintaining a plausible veneer of order, 
legitimacy, and prosperity” (FH, 2014: 3).  This veneer of democracy complements findings 
made by Vaughan (2011) and Di Nunzio (2014: 454) regarding Ethiopia’s frequent use of 
“donor-friendly language” to maintain sources of foreign aid and other international support 
while its use of soft power maintains tacit dominance.  
Developmental Authoritarianism 
Nevertheless, since the inception of its centralized development policies Ethiopia has 
maintained a high economic growth rate.  Its pro-poor policies have included quick 
improvements in the delivery of health care and an almost universal access to basic education.  
The construction of new roadways has rapidly opened the country to increased trade 
possibilities and other modernizing infrastructure projects have demonstrably, if perhaps only 
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temporarily, increased employment in the construction sector (Wondifraw, et al., 2015).    
However, rapid improvements may also come at a social cost that Matfess (2015:182) broadly 
described as developmental authoritarianism.  This refers “to nominally democratic 
governments that provide significant public works and services while exerting control over 
nearly every facet of society.“   
In a global framework, Matfess continues, governments that are characterized by 
developmental authoritarianism are similar to semi-authoritarian regimes in that they impose 
severe constraints upon social freedoms.  These may include the freedom of association; 
freedom of speech; and of communication, that have eventually led to anti-government 
demonstrations opposing its developmental and political decisions.   
The literature asserts the developmental state is derived from a combination of the usual 
executive, legislative and judicial functions which are dependent upon the pre-existing 
capacities of the authoritarian governments’ bureaucratic and administrative machinery (Gupta, 
1995; Trouillot, 2001; Vu, 2007).  These are enabled by a close relationship between the 
leadership of the government and that of supportive business interests in which success is 
defined in terms of mutual self-interest rather than by more democratic outcomes which benefit 
the greater society.  Leftwich (1995: 409) had suggested that to achieve its developmental goals 
the government bureaucracy must be kept separate from the influence of special interests.  This 
includes both those voices demanding immediate though short-sighted economic relief for the 
poor, as well as those of an elite segment of society which might be seen as advocating a too-
rapid or too-political change that “subordinates or marginalizes political groups, organizations or 
socio-economic classes” standing in the way of otherwise self-interested goals.   
According to Evans (1995), at their extremes the degree of autonomy which 
developmental states exert is widely divergent.  They can be predatory, extractive, and socially 
restrictive, or they can demonstrate a surprising degree of cooperation that results in significant 
economic improvements benefitting a far wider audience.  Evans gives formerly authoritarian 
South Korea and Japan as examples.  Pritchett & Werker (2012: 26) found that in terms of 
overall economic development, autocracies often have a wider variance in their growth rates 
than more democratic governments.  However, in the instant case of Ethiopia and as graphed at 
Figure 4.3, the degree of economic volatility which took place during the highly authoritarian 
Dergue period flattened soon after the EPRDF had taken control even though it, too, imposes a 
significant degree of social control especially in its single party dominance of the electoral cycle.    
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Saez & Gallagher (2009: 91) found there is no clear association between authoritarian 
governments and economic growth.  They conclude that while periods of fast growth may occur 
in centrally planned economies “the relationship between GDP growth and socio-economic 
development is not uniform” and therefore developmental authoritarianism can be considered 
just one more form of control rather than a lasting economic imperative.   
Regarding the Ethiopian context, former Prime Minister Zenawi specifically advocated 
for a limited form of developmental authoritarianism, saying “Structurally it [the state] has the 
capacity to implement policy effectively, that is the result of various political, institutional, and 
technical factors that, in turn, are based on the autonomy of the state.  This autonomy enables 
the state to pursue its development project without succumbing to myopic interests” (Zenawi: 
2012: 167), yet this remains predicated upon the imposition of repressive electoral 
authoritarianism to maintain control.   
5.3.2 Using Soft Power As Means of Repression 
De Meritt (2016: 2) contends repression occurs when force is employed by a variety of 
“agents including military forces, militia, and mercenaries” and may be imposed through either 
institutional means or by physical force.  Soft power was described by Gallarotti (2011: 11) as 
when “relations are embedded within some greater constellation of social dependencies and 
which thereby influence final outcomes.” and it promotes change without the use of hard power, 
including force or violence.   
The World Bank particularly recommends the use of soft rather than hard power to 
stimulate the economy and to influence the populus through the introduction of programmes 
which encourage employment and meet demands for equity and social stability (WB, 2017b).  
This active use of influence can achieve ends where force and compulsion might have resulted 
in resistence and rebellion, and therefore it obviates the need for violent repression.  Soft power 
can be used to either increase social services as a reward or to terminate them as a form of 
punishment or social coercion (Nye, 1990; Gallarotti, 2011).  Soft power is also particularly 
effective when it uses the distribution of government services to tacitly change behaviour, such 
as through increasing or decreasing access and availability of higher education and vocational 
training; providing or witholding health care and other sevices; or offereing entrepreneurial 
training and other small business opportunities. 
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5.3.3 Soft Power and Service Deserts   
To facilitate the ousting which is necessary for the on-going gentrification process in the 
study area east of Addis Ababa, the government is creating ‘service deserts’, areas from where 
social benefits and other services are being withdrawn.  Service deserts are characterised by 
the closure of medical clinics, schools and other facilities; reduced routine maintenance of local 
roads; or the withdrawal and reassignment of agricultural development agents (Beaulac, et al., 
2009; Jiao & Dillivan, 2013; Hillman & Weichman, 2016).  Where targeted expropriations of 
smallholder property are planned, the wereda government withdraws its support and becomes 
increasingly unresponsive to community or group needs.  This use of soft power can serve as a 
political attack on communities and groups by simplifying the ex situ expropriation of land as it 
becomes more difficult for smallholders to remain in place without the benefits and services 
upon which they are dependent.   
The elimination of development agents, in particular, represents one of the most evident 
forms of coercion (Liverpool & Winter-Nelson, 2010; Todo, et al., 2014) which induces some 
smallholders to leave their land (Interview 78).  According to smallholders in the study area, 
development agents who had been key to the dissemination of new cropping techniques have 
been withdrawn from areas where residential developments are planned.  At a time of changing 
climates and growing seasons54 in Ethiopia (Morton, 2007) this eliminates a primary source of 
information regarding weather forecasts and innovative agricultural methods, especially the 
proper application of recently modified fertilizers which the government has more precisely 
tailored to individual agricultural areas (Interview 68, 83).  If these fertilizers are not correctly 
applied and then quickly followed by rainfall they can easily burn crops.  Development agents 
provide the training for smallholders to avoid those crop losses.  Other informants related that 
local schools had been closed and health clinic staffing has been reduced.  Recent oustees 
were able to display a keen awareness during interviews and conversation of the economic 
deprivations and the social instability they now endure as an outcome of the loss of these 
services.   
 
                                                             
54 Of the 46 smallholders who were interviewed in nine towns and villages, 33 stated the autumn, Belg, rains have 
become unpredictable and are often arriving more than ten days following the traditional date by which seed must be 
planted.  When the rains do arrive, they have become strong enough to wash away much of the seed, further 
contributing to existing poverty traps.  
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Smallholder Recognition of Government Hegemony 
However, informants also concluded they are powerless to contest the series of 
government decisions that are dramatically impacting their families: 
“Most of us do not want to sell our land.  We know that we are not wealthy, but we are 
better off owning our own property than we would be if we’re forced to move into the town.  
We fight as best we can but the government is just too big and powerful.  In the end, we all 
leave and have nothing.” 
Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 78) 
Several smallholders perceived the withdrawal of services is intended to force them to 
relocate away from the peri-urban agricultural areas which have recently been designated for 
residential development.  Although not all smallholders have been physically compelled to sell 
their property, they generally felt they are given little actual choice in the matter and were aware 
of the outcome of becoming landless:    
“Once the land is taken there are no jobs.  We are not able to find work because all we 
know is farming.  The government had always encouraged us to stay as farmers and to 
increase our production but now they are forcing us out and we have no say in the matter 
because they do it slowly enough that we don’t see it coming.  Our children can go to school 
and then to the vocational centre just down the road, but there is nothing for any of us once 
we are forced to move.”  
Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 71) 
“When I was very young, boys learned about farming from their fathers, they went to 
the fields and tended the animals as a natural thing and never thought about what or how 
they were learning.  The emperor brought schools and we began to learn about the world.  
But the village is changing and the wereda has told us our land is going to become housing.  
Because of that they ended the farmers associations and development agents no longer help 
us with marketing our crops or learning to apply new techniques.” 
Smallholder, September 2015 (Interview 100) 
Local residents and smallholders indicated the withdrawal of services is widely perceived 
to be a threat to communal and group solidarity.  During an unusually frank discussion, an 
elderly farmer and his wife who live near Lalibela described the differences between 
government policies today and those of the former Dergue regime (Interview 100).  Their 
memory of the Dergue is that it was far more willing to assist farmers and to guarantee their 
livelihoods.  Under the Dergue their recollection is of a government which taught agriculture in 
schools and of children who learned to work the farm with new methods.  Today, they say, the 
schools have no such classes and so children essentially learn only what their parents know.  If 
their parents are poor farmers, she says, the children only learn poor methods.  This leads to 
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smaller harvests, poverty traps, and to children leaving both the land and the community in 
search of better opportunities.  Other services such as health care are also degrading they said 
and she further contended the rural health clinic near Lalibela has become unable to see the 
same number of patients as in the past due to budget and staff cuts.  Health care professionals 
are adept, she said, at only very limited treatments.  Anything of consequence increasingly 
needs to be taken to a private clinic but, she continued, those are very costly and few people in 
the area can afford to travel to them or pay for treatment.   
Official’s Recognition of the Withdrawal of Local Services 
Kebele officials to the north and east of Addis Ababa confirmed the general validity of 
these individual observations, acknowledging that services were being withdrawn from the study 
area.  A first-hand account of this tactic was obtained from one official east of Addis Ababa who 
pointedly stated that decisions to reduce social services are being made by the wereda with the 
intention of forcing people out of the newly designated residential and commercial development 
areas: 
“The entire area that you see here is now designated for residential development and 
so people’s property taxes have tripled.  The regional and wereda governments have been 
working to force farmers from the land by reducing the number of teachers in the local 
schools and they are reducing staff in the health clinic, all to make it uncomfortable to live 
here.”  
Kebele Manager, August 2015 (Interview 52) 
Wereda employees further confirmed these events, describing how funding is being 
repurposed to primary and secondary roads rather than to the maintenance of rural feeder 
roads which facilitate easier marketing for crops (Stifel, et al., 2016) and that rural schools are 
being closed and moved towards the more urbanized areas of the wereda.  The almost surgical 
precision of these reductions in social services and the precisely targeted land expropriations 
have curtailed the ability of affected farmers to remain on their small holds and two who were 
interviewed described the effects upon their livelihoods and their families:   
“My father and I had more than 4 hectares of land, but five years ago the kebele forced 
us to sell one to build a new school.  Then the army made us sell two more along a tree-lined 
ridge for what they said was going to be new soldier housing, but there are no soldiers here.  
The school was built but so far the military has not constructed the barracks.  Land near the 
road is being used to build new homes and I think that is the plan the military has, too.” 
Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 80) 
 
“I’ve seen people who were forced from their land, not physically but who sold parts 
of their property to the developers for quick money to pay bills or send their children to 
school and they are now unable to earn a living.  They’ve got nothing to fall back on because 
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they have no other skills; they’ve become desperately poor even by the standards here.  Our 
women’s groups have tried to help them but at some point you need to take care of yourself.”   
Smallholder, July 2015 (Interview 66) 
Hence a slow marginalization of smallholders resulting in their political and economic 
invisibility, makes government decisions to oust them increasingly uncontested (Admassie & 
Abebaw, 2014).  Pressure to vacate in favor of residential development has become highly 
destabilizing as it results in the loss of group networks and individual income streams.   
Further, neighbors are increasingly unable to provide each other with support and, as 
smallholders lose their farms to development, they also lose their social positions in the milieu.  
Their powerlessness is magnified by their individual dispersion as they find whatever housing 
and employment is available in the nearby peri-urban municipalities, while adaptation to their 
new situation is made difficult by a lack of useful non-farm skills (AU, 2007; Belete, 2011) even 
in municipalities where manufacturing employment is being created. The imposition of these 
deserts creates hardships as shortages of services and economic opportunity are artificially 
created and social deprivation ensues where it was not present before (Brinkman, et al., 2013; 
Must & Rustad, 2016).   
5.4 Vote Buying Through the Absence of Choice 
Despite the threat of expropriation, the loss of services, and the semi-authoritarian 
nature of the political process, the Ethiopian public remains loyal to the government.  This 
continued and overwhelming public support for the incumbent party was explained by Lefort 
(2007).  Lefort notes that mountainous and rural people tend to be risk averse and often 
demonstrate an extraordinarily high social need for stability and the maintenance of deference 
for the hierarchy of government authority.  This often leads them to vote for the party or person 
already holding office, and decreases the possibility of political change or social upheaval.   
Among a still largely-illiterate smallholder community that is often dependent upon 
government food distribution or health care programmes, it becomes “immediately beneficial to 
vote for the likely ‘winner’ of an election rather than a candidate from a minority party who might 
only begin to represent local interests in the unknowable future” (Logan, 2009).  Nevertheless, 
Lipset (1959: 71) noted that political systems will destabilize if “peaceful play” and meaningful 
political inclusion is disallowed for those who are not in positions of power or economic 
prominence.   
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Local Perception of the Lack of Social Choice 
During field interviews there emerged little perceived ability or desire among rural 
residents to alter their social environment through the electoral process and smallholders 
acknowledged that voting results in few changes that will benefit from.  They saw little capacity 
to shape social issues of importance to them or their families.  Among the few conversations 
where smallholders offered their opinions on this issue, most had concluded that voting for the 
party candidate who is likely to win the election is the only effective means to ensure continued 
receipt of government social benefits or assistance from the remaining agricultural development 
agents.  Friedman, et al., (2016: 3) confirms this, finding the poor are more accepting of 
repressive political systems because they have had their votes ‘bought’ by the government 
through such in-kind programmes as ‘Food for Work,’ or for selection to receive other distress 
food assistance during the ‘hungry time’ when household stocks are low.  Maintaining vital 
individual or family inclusion in those programmes comes at the small cost of voting for the 
presumed victor once each lustrum (Singer, 2009). 
This degree of political authority and control, as well as the mengist ethic of support for 
the government, is so pervasive that it even influences the ability of youth to obtain what might 
be considered marginal work in local shops, nascent small industries, or other occupations:   
“I am from this town and so it was easy to get a job as a horse cart driver and to 
become a member of the association of drivers.  There are lots of small businesses that were 
started by people who’ve relocated here from Addis Abba, like the coffee houses and food 
shops.  But I don’t know of anyone who’s gotten a job in one of them who didn’t also come 
from here.  The elders in the village control who can work and who can’t.  That way they keep 
an eye on who lives here and who supports the wereda government and who doesn’t.” 
Horse Cart Driver, July 2015 (Interview 25) 
 
This absence of choice perpetuates the political and social status quo and frustrates a 
growing, educated youth cohort.  As example, in a study of Kenyan secondary school students, 
Friedman, et al., (2016) note while higher education among youth does not necessarily increase 
latent tendencies to become politically engaged, it does reduce their willingness to accept the 
status quo. More specifically, they found that a higher level of education has a direct correlation 
to an acceptance of violence as a legitimate tool to force change when the political process has 
proven itself to be unresponsive (see also Davies, 1974; Pape, 2005; Stewart, 2002b).  Hence, 
Ethiopia’s large educated youth cohort whose growing numbers and increasingly frustrating 
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unemployment has been described as “an economic and social problem, which is increasingly 
feared to create political problems” (Krishnan & Shaorshadze, 2013: 6).     
5.4.1 Youth Related Political Instability 
Stewart (2000; 2008; 2011) asserts that horizontal inequality and political instability in 
developing countries, particularly among youth, almost directly leads to civil war.  Collier (1992: 
2) had earlier noted “If young men face only the option of poverty they might be more inclined to 
join a rebellion than if they have better opportunities”.  Smallholders, though, do not appear to 
present an existential threat to the government and in their own analysis, Must & Rustad (2016: 
2) concluded  “horizontal inequalities may be widespread but they do not always trigger 
mobilization.” 
Urdal (2006), though, is less certain than Stewart whether inequality among youth, 
alone, leads to political instability (and civil war) even when educational achievement concludes 
with a frustrating lack of economic and social mobility.  The youth bulge, who Urdal (2006, 608) 
defines “as large cohorts in the ages 15–24 relative to the total adult population” tend to be less 
willing to accept the status quo.  He concludes this age group tends to be responsible for a 
majority of civil distrubances, and like Collier, finds youth’s lack of employment rather than any 
inherent revolutionary passion is the underlying issue.  Pape (2005: 200), too, emphasises it is 
economically disaffected youth that is otherwise “educated, socially integrated, and highly 
capable people” who are the most likely to foment civil disturbances.  Tying these together, 
Annan (2014: 2) more recently expressed that conflict and civil strife are “a violent expression of 
disagreements and frustration often arising from unmet needs and aspirations.”  
Thus, in Ethiopia, high youth unemployment, internal displacement, and a failure to 
attain wide-spread and equitable economic growth have resulted in a new political and social 
fragility (Okafor, 2017: 209).  This condition is particularly acute among the under-employed 
youth (Kibru, 2012; Eight, 2013) such as those in the Oromia region’s university towns of Ambo, 
Adama, and Dire Dawa (HRW, 2016).  In these towns there are both highly educated youth and 
new transportation infrastructure, which is a precursor to industrial development, yet there is 
simultaneously an absence of appropriate non-farm income prospects and hence, significant 
unemployment (CSA, 2014d).  Moreover, as these areas modernize, there are increasing losses 
and disruptions to traditional lifestyles.  These have collectively contributed to a climate of 
unrest in the university towns, rising to a series of demonstrations as students are demanding 
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employment, and those demonstrations have challenged authority and threatened the stability 
of the Ethiopian government (Map 5.1).   
 
The government has declared this potentially radicalized segment of its population “a 
threat to the basic foundations of prosperity, stability and peace” (SDPRP, 2002: 25) and 
considers itself to be “existentially threatened” by student civil disobedience (Home, 2016: 6).  In 
December 2015, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn warned his government “will take 
merciless legitimate action against any force bent on destabilizing” the Oromo region (BBC, 
2015).  Yet, the Prime Minister later acknowledged unemployment and not politics was the 
actual catalyst for the protests among students, stating:  
“The root cause of protests in this country is not politics.  It is having so many young 
people who are unemployed.  We haven’t addressed the unemployment problem in Oromia 
and also in other parts of the country.  We have a 16.5% unemployment rate, that is very big.  
It’s higher among the youth, and 70% of our population is below the age of 30.  Even though 
we are trying our best, we haven’t addressed it properly.  The protest is triggered by 
unemployed youths.  If you create hopefulness in this society, then it’s possible this kind of 
unrest will be vanishing.  We want to focus on the young people and creating jobs as quickly 
as possible.  We must be very fast in creating jobs for the youth – both in self-employment as 
well as in wage employment.  If we don’t do that, then unrest will be there.”  
(Desalegn, 2016)  
Government Response to Student Demonstrations 
Despite acknowledging their need for employment, the student-led disturbances which 
erupted in 2015, and again in 2016, have not only been directly met with violence by security 
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forces but the families of protestors have been punished administratively.  Reports by non-
governmental organizations claim security services “have used excessive lethal force against 
largely peaceful protests” with over 400 people killed and thousands injured (BBC, 2015; HRW, 
2016: 24).  Demonstrators have reported the government withdrew social support from their 
families including access to health care benefits; termination from employment; and, exclusion 
from food distribution programmes (HRW, 2016).  
This soft, yet highly coercive social and economic control gives the government the 
ability to moderate individual and group behaviour and encourages the concentration of 
power into a dominant class of political actors.  This is reasonably assumed to also dampen 
the enthusiasm of observant smallholders to demand additional assistance from the 
government especially since they may have developed little political organization in their 
new peri-urban areas.  Their lack of political presence has led to the local government 
devoting fewer assets to increasingly atomized groups of invisible poor.  This targeted 
neglect contributes to oustees’ own fragility as it diminishes their ability to make demands 
for critical rehabilitative vocational training programmes or by student groups who are 
seeking appropriate employment after their education. 
5.4.2 Delaying the Youth Employment Problem 
 
Industrialization has not yet created sufficient decent work55 for the youth cohort that 
would be necessary to adequately meet the employment needs of the future labour force in 
Ethiopia.  Indeed, Mbate (2016: 93) notes Ethiopia’s leather industry, responsible for a 
significant amount of the nations’ export trade, had only expanded from 6,989 workers in 2000 
to 10,700 workers in 2010.”  Coincidental with the introduction of its five-year development plans 
the government began to expand university enrolment to address the potential of the 
unemployed youth cohort (Figure 5.2).  This initially delayed, but ultimately exacerbated the 
problem of under-employment and unmet expectations among youth as significantly more 
students compete for fewer openings at their now increased education level (Eight, 2013).  This 
imbalance of graduates-to-employment opportunity is affecting both the youth cohort and newly 
displaced unskilled smallholders who are also seeking employment in peri-urban areas where 
                                                             
55 Decent work was defined by the International Labour Organization as “work that is productive and delivers a fair 
income, security in the workplace, social protection for families, freedom for people to express their concerns, to 
organize and participate in decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and 
men” (ILO, 2013: i).  
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sufficient non-farm development has failed to keep pace with the rapidly growing pool of 
workers.  
This absence of employment opportunity, and the increased visibility and recognition of 
horizontal inequalities gained through education, has allowed some of the better-educated youth 
to conclude they are being marginalized as the benefits of development by-pass them, and as 
they have left their traditional ways of life for what should be secure employment opportunities 
(Turner, 1987; Brookfield, 2005; Friedman, et al., 2016).  Thus, as Must & Rustad (2016) assert, 
the current elevation in violence among this broad youth group should not be surprising.  
 
Moreover, the cumulative effects of groupism and fraternalism; of economic and social 
inequalities, are not exclusively reserved for older smallholders, they also apply to younger 
segments of Ethiopian society.  This conjecture supports Stewart’s (2000; 2002; 2008; & 2011) 
predictions of the outcome of economic, social, political or cultural inequality that, if not properly 
addressed she says, will conclude in violence.  Likewise, Goldstone (2002: 10) found that rapid 
population growth, especially in the bulge of newly educated youth (Figure 5.3) where there are 
few opportunities for employment and restricted freedom of movement, explicitly increases the 
risk of developing economically de-stabilizing anti-government violence.  He finds “conflict can 
be avoided if the urban industrial economy provides sufficient jobs to absorb an expanding 
population.”     
200 
 
Ironically, these societal threats from youth are exacerbated by the longer average life 
expectancy which has been achieved through pro-poor health-care programmes.  The older 
population is not only living longer, but remaining physiologically and economically viable longer 
as well.  This phenomenon generates a need to accommodate their continued employment in 
addition to the new employment opportunities for youth that are needed to compensate for the 
delayed retirement of older workers.   
 
5.5 Movement Restrictions and the Surveillance Society 
Where populations remain locked into a subsistence level of existence, even 
governments with strong social development and education programmes are likely to be 
unstable (Collier, 2009).  A tendency toward rebellion increases as education and income 
increases (Pape, 2005) though only until a certain per capita income threshold is met which 
Collier & Rohner (2008: 534) suggested is “around US$2,750” in 2008 dollars (see also Zakaria, 
2003).  Beyond that income level, and as literacy continues to rise, a decrease in the likelihood 
of rebellion is noticed as the population begins to accumulate sufficient assets which might be 
damaged or looted during fighting.  Bhatia & Ghanem (2017: 8) likewise conclude “the tendency 
toward violent extremism falls with increased income” and that “where a person [physically] lives 
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does not seem to affect their views on violent extremism.”  Thus, in growing economies such as 
Ethiopia’s, where per capita incomes are rising, yet barely reach US$60056 per year, and as the 
level of education has dramatically improved, the potential for rebellion remains high, hence 
repressive means become a rational response to maintain social control despite other uses of 
soft power. 
Aalen & Tronvoll (2009b: 197) assert the EPRDF’s shaping of place and identity by all 
levels of government is made possible through the “party’s network of control through local 
administrative structures [that] enables it to pressurise many rural voters.”  Accordingly, there is 
little room to express individual choice due to the perceived consequences of casting a ballot in 
opposition to the EPRDF.  This ‘pressure’ on the voters is part of a pattern, Levitsky & Way 
(2002: 52) assert, of electoral-authoritarian governments that they characterized as simply 
“diminished forms of democracy”, wherein agents spy on journalists, and members of opposition 
groups are routinely harassed, jailed, or exiled.   
Therefore, to avoid detection or punishment, activities and interactions which are 
external to trusted group members were obsreved to be defensively self-limited.  This has the 
effect of restricting political diversity and constrains information exchange.  As the population is 
collectively unable to make informed decisions about their own future or that of the nation, or to 
organize a peaceful opposition, individuals isolate themselves into small peer groups.  It is this 
political marginalization of the population which the African Development Bank Group contends 
has contributed to the student-led demonstrations and responding security force violence, which 
are ultimately attributed to Ethiopia’s markedly slower rate of GDP growth (ADBG, 2017).   
5.5.1 Movement Restrictions and Illegal Residents 
The population of Ethiopia is predicted to double by the year 2050 (UNDP, 2012) and as 
noted in Chapter 1, substantial changes in settlement patterns will almost triple the density of 
municipal areas (UNHABITAT, 2007; UNESCO, 2011).  However, despite the long-term and 
sustained imbalance of rural-to-urban population ratios, Ethiopia’s semi-authoritarian 
government has introduced restrictions which effectively limit spontaneous relocation. 
Mandatory individual registration creates an official place identity, verifiable by kebele and 
wereda  administrators; it regulates residency transfer between weredas and ensures 
government control of too-rapid population movement.  Registration also limits undocumented 
                                                             
56  The per capita annual income of Ethiopia was estimated to be US$590, as of 24 April 2017 (WB, 2017b).  
202 
 
access to government social resources that municipal budgets have not been funded to 
accommodate.  Thus, individuals must locally register themselves, residency requirements must 
be met and individual identity cards must be presented to obtain government benefits (Dorosh & 
Schmidt, 2010; IRB, 2014).     
Self-relocation to Urbanized Areas 
Interviews and conversations conducted in both Addis Ababa and the surrounding areas 
confirmed relocation requires that a willing sponsor, usually a relative or family friend, is present 
in the new urban area.  That sponsor assumes legal responsibility for the actions of the migrant, 
including the payment of any debts which may be incurred; for any criminal activity that may be 
engaged in; and, for ensuring the sponsored individual maintains employment or attends school 
(Interview 15).  While official restrictions significantly inhibit movement, they do not fully prevent 
the arrival of unregistered rural workers in urban areas.  The intended effect of these movement 
restrictions is to discourage smallholders or newly educated graduates from leaving their current 
wereda in search of better employment conditions elsewhere which would destabilize urban 
labour markets (Fukunishi & Machikita, 2017).  Young men who were interviewed in Addis 
Ababa were often from farming communities and explained they were unable to earn a living on 
the family farm or in their villages.  They had been encouraged by their parents and teachers to 
resettle in larger urban areas where it was thought better prospects would be available to them: 
“I was encouraged to move here by my parents when I completed elementary school 
and my father said he could not give my brothers equal shares of our small farm.  I arrived in 
Addis Ababa as an unregistered individual and didn’t have a sponsor.  Without a sponsor you 
can’t get an identity card and so you can’t get medical care, you can’t open a bank account, 
and you can’t even go to school.  They say the population of Addis is only 6 million, but 
that’s because they don’t count those of us who come illegally.”   
Entrepreneur, June 2015 (Interview 14) 
 
Speaking informally, two former Addis Ababa city officials who were encountered east of 
that city acknowledge that because of these registration requirements the actual population of 
the city is under-reported by at least four million persons.  This ultimately has a negative effect 
upon budgets and programmes.  Without accurate population figures areas can become under-
served (McCabe, 2013) as rural-to-urban migrants who are employed informally consume basic 
services such as police enforcement or communal water sites without being taxed to pay for 
them.  
5.5.2 Securitization of Dissent and the Surveillance Society 
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Semi-authoritarian and single party systems can give the veneer of social homogeneity 
through the imposition of strong central control, leading to a state in which few competing ideals 
of political choice are allowed.  Although the power of the Ethiopian state is nearly certain, social 
activists are viewed by the government as an existential threat to its continued political 
dominance and to the fabric of society (Nwaka, 2008).  Hence the student-led demonstrations 
that have occurred on university campus’s and in towns throughout Oromia are indicatiative of 
the scope of the problem of under-employment (Desalegn, 2016) and are becoming a political 
as well as a social issue.  While the government has often publicly explained these 
demonstrations are in support of smallholder’s in the study area whose land is being 
expropriated, it seems unlikely that university students are reacting to the conditions of ousted 
smallholders as their primary catalyst.   
In describing "identity politics" where groups who have been excluded from the political 
process engage in their own forms of organization and protest, Gergen (1999) predicted youth 
and other groups would engage in a form of activism which could develop into violence, and as 
former United States President John F. Kennedy stated “Those who make peaceful revolution 
impossible will make violent revolution inevitable” (Kennedy, 1962).  Hence Marshall & Cole 
(2014) contend that protests and civil disobedience are not simply exercises in free speech or 
emerging democracy.  They are also indicative of a political and developmental process which 
has failed to recognize the legitimate concerns of the citizenry.   
Political Dissension and the Securitization of Speech 
This political dissension provides an opportunity for the securitization of demonstrations, 
and other speech acts, that are declared existential threats to the fabric of society rather than a 
threat within the society.  Securitization defines “acts as a threat to survival, which in turn 
enables emergency measures and the suspension of ‘normal politics’ in dealing with that issue” 
(McDonald, 2008: 567).  While internal and external threats do exist for any government, Buzan, 
et al., (1998: 5) reminds that securitization must mean “something more specific than just any 
threat or problem.”  In Ethiopia “the successful process of labelling an issue a security issue 
results in the transformation of the way of dealing with it” (Trombetta, 2007: 2).  The 
repression57 of speech has in some cases escalated to a general use of force and following 
demonstrations “in many locations security forces went door-to door-at night arresting” students 
                                                             
57 Repression is defined by Davenport (2007: 487) as “coercive socio-political control used by political authorities 
against those within their territorial jurisdiction.” 
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who had been identified as protestors and whose locations had been quickly ascertained 
through identification card address registries (HRW, 2016: 2).   
The influence of these student protests extends beyond their immediate outcomes.  
DeMeritt (2016: 4) found with each successful protest that ends in concessions by the 
government, new demonstrations and “internal dissent can spread” sympathetically.  This 
makes the escalation of anti-government opposition leading to the ouster of the government 
more likely.  Hence, the imposition of violent repression becomes likely if displaced 
smallholders, who have little discernable economic future, should begin to take part in their own 
protests as “the relative magnititude of labour market under-utilization” increases (Wilkins, 2007: 
148).  
5.5.3 Displacement and Liminality  
In a similar way that an influx of refugees will eventually over-burden a host community, 
Ethiopia’s ousted smallholders create high demands for limited local resources including health 
care and employment.  Their ex situ release into the labour market drives down the wages for 
existing groups of other workers in the community (Crisp, 2002; Buryan, 2012).  As finite social 
resources are increasingly consumed by new arrivals, animosities towards the newcomers are 
created among the established residents who have long ago formed their own group 
associations and who are resistant to increased competition for jobs and services (Plante, et al., 
2002; Rossiter, 2012; de Chatel, 2014; Fakih & Ibrahim, 2016).  Hence, an influx of landless 
smallholders or newly-educated job seeking youth may become a locally incendiary issue as 
new and existing groups become economic rivals. 
Brookefield (2005:  51) asserts this is a form of cultural suicide wherein those who 
develop new skills or obtain a new education become socially estranged from their peer groups 
and cultural grounding.  As a result, when the newly skilled or educated are most likely to need 
the social support of their peers they have become alienated: they no longer fully belong to their 
previous group nor have they been accepted into their new group.   
These destabilizing effects are not only economic and physical but also psychological as 
the obsolescence of one’s previous social or occupational position becomes apparent (Atherton, 
1999).  The severing of these connections creates a loss of group status and individual identity 
where one may have previously been a respected member of the community.  However if 
identity among smallholders is about how individuals see and define themselves, then to 
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radically transform through the acquisition of new occupational skills may become a threat to an 
already eroding sense of group cohesion and therefore, to their own identity (Easter, 1996).   
This is a condition which Turner (1987) described as the liminal period between 
significant social transitions.  It was further illuminated by Noble & Walker (1997) as a period of 
personal and social instability that occurs during a significant transitional period.  In youth, this 
can occur as they enter an educational or vocational programme which presents them with new 
information and challenges that are substantially different than their previous experiences.  For 
smallholding adults, it can occur as they are forced from their land through the ex situ 
expropriation process and are forced to physically relocate, often to a more urbanized area.  
This requires them to transition from their familiar and comfortable role as an independent 
agriculturalist to a foreign one as a factory employee, a construction worker, or to adopt some 
other lifestyle in which they no longer control their own schedule nor make independent 
decisions.  
5.5.4 Shoe Shine Surveillance   
In the semi-authoritarian state of Ethiopia, opinions which challenge the government are 
often reported through kebele leaders.  Political reprisals for anti-government speech can result 
in internal exhile, or in extra-judicial detention by military and police forces (HRW, 2016).  This 
reduces the ability of either displaced smallholders or graduated students to make even 
reasonable demands from the government. 
One of the most common means of community-level surveillance to monitor counter-
government opinions is through the ‘shoe shine boys’ who are ubiquitous in Addis Ababa and 
the streets of other municipalities throughout the study area.  They monitor the comings and 
goings of the neighbourhood; watch for thieves and pickpockets; and they are responsible for 
reporting when outsiders are in the neighbourhood.  They are particularly aware of, and report, 
anyone who might agitate politically or voice too-strenuous objections to government policies 
including such issues as expropriations or the lack of employment following graduation from 
vocational or academic institutions.    
Shoe shine boys who were interviewed in two municipalities reported that if they are not 
properly registered with local police, they will not be allowed to operate as a micro-business 
(Interviews 1 & 14).  Those who do not make frequent political reports to the police can lose 
their licenses.  That would deprive the (mostly) young, generally poorly educated rural men of a 
very lucrative urban livelihood which reportedly earns many of them as much as ETB 450 per 
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day when casual labour at nearby construction sites pays just ETB 80 per day.  Thus, their 
reports are compelled, they said, through the very real threat of the loss of their livelihood:   
“Being a shoe shiner gives me a better income than I could have ever had on the farm 
where I grew up.  It lets me live here in the city where life is easier, and I’m hoping to get into 
other businesses once I have enough money.  We’re registered with the police and because 
we’re on the same corners all the time we get to know the neighbourhood.  We know who 
belongs here and who doesn’t and the police ask us what we’ve seen and heard about new 
people or about the feelings on the street.”   
Entrepreneur, June 2015 (Interview 14) 
 
The fear of having their seemingly innocuous opinions overheard by any of a variety of 
informants was suggested by several ousted smallholders as one reason they remained within a 
tightly knit group of their peers, rather than engaging in casual conversation with new 
acquaintances in shops or on the street.  This limited the formation of new groups who might 
eventually challenge the government.  With little means to organize into new social or political 
groups, existing peer associations remain highly important and insular.  The wider consequence 
is a substantial loss of individual and social freedom and this contributes to their social isolation 
and the further diminution of their political voice (Ritter, 2014; ADBG, 2017).  Thus, while the 
lack of employment opportunity among both students and smallholders may be an inadvertent 
outcome of an imbalanced education and development process, Ethiopia’s surveillance society 
which limits political activity has been its active invention.    
Surveillance and Societal Repression  
During the interview process, a majority of the 46 smallholder respondents who were 
interviewed displayed a palpable fear of political reprisals including a concern for their own 
incarceration by military and police forces for speaking against the government or for discussing 
unpopular policies such as their ex situ displacement.  Thus, the ability of both smallholders and 
newly educated students to organize into forward thinking and politically self-interested groups 
appeared to be limited by a fear of the repressive nature of the state.   
Academic researchers have found political and social repression is inversely 
proportional to the degree of government effectiveness, concluding that where a government 
can provide reasonably expected protections and benefits there is little need to subjugate the 
citizenry (Nordas & Davenport, 2013; DiPietro, 2016; Brechenmacher, 2017).  Political and 
social repression in Ethiopia exists along a continuum including a gradual loss of rights, where 
intrusion may begin with the occasional visit by local police officers; escalating to arrests, 
detention, and eventually the disappearance of anti-government agitators as the level of 
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violence increases.  Political repression consists of a wide variety of means of social control, 
including electronic and physical surveillance, censorship of political views, arbitrary arrests 
based on political speech, and violent police actions (Davenport, 2007).  Disappearances 
suggest that individuals are seized by government forces and imprisoned without rights or trial 
(Hagmann, 2014)58. 
5.5 Summary and Emerging Findings 
This chapter has explored the outcomes and effects of Ethiopia’s legacy of development 
and pro-poor policies by examining the destabilizing effects which rapid economic and social 
change create.  Successful growth and development have unintentionally contributed to 
economic instability and social fragility (Huang, 1995; Paffenholz, 2008) for smallholders who 
are ousted by development and for newly graduated students who are unable to find suitable 
employment.  
Ethiopia’s centrally directed development programmes and political and economic 
choices have resulted in a significant rate of economic growth and social development at all 
levels of society and for improvement in the living conditions of millions of citizens.  Those 
programmes have restructured the national economy, changing it from one which has 
traditionally been reliant upon labour-intensive agricultural employment towards becoming a 
more modern, service and information-oriented economy of white-collar workers, even though 
agriculture remains the dominant employment generator (NPC, 2015; Seid, et al., 2015).  
While there have been undeniable benefits from the national programme of economic growth 
and social development, an adverse consequence of success is that a large area encircling 
Addis Ababa is being cleared of its residents in order to construct housing for newly 
prosperous urban residents.   
In the study area to the north and east of Addis Ababa, displaced smallholders were 
frequently observed to have been unable to adapt to non-farm employment including in-door 
manufacturing labour.  They chose to remain within their sheltered peer groups rather than 
enrol in unfamiliar and threatening vocational retraining programmes or to take repetitive, 
indoor industrial employment.  Thus, despite the success of Ethiopia’s economic, social and 
                                                             
58 These techniques have been primarily applied by the Ethiopian police and military in the areas that are 
experiencing student-led civil disturbances. There has been little use of these within the study area due to 
the current docility of ousted smallholders (BBC, 2015).   
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educational development programmes, improvements are also leading to new stratum of rural 
poverty as the expropriation of land is displacing hundreds of thousands of unskilled 
smallholders who become unemployed (Home, 2016b).   
A return to agricultural employment, and therefore to the identities which displaced 
smallholders once knew, is not an option since the land in the study area is either already 
occupied by other farmers or has been designated for intensive residential development.  As a 
result, groups of rural smallholders who are displaced ex situ are increasingly atomized and 
marginalized without political identity, economic livelihoods, or social voice (Moreda, 2015).  
This creates both landlessness and joblessness among internal-migrants who must find 
livelihood alternatives or become chronically poor within their own community (Admassie & 
Abebaw, 2014).   
Concurrent with the joblessness stemming from expropriations, successful education 
programmes have significantly increased the number of secondary and university graduates.  
Expectations of appropriate employment are not being fulfilled since opportunities are 
currently, though not inevitably, unavailable in adequate quantities.  This is likely to lengthen 
the liminal transitional periods each group experiences as they transition from their previous 
lifestyles (Mbate, 2016).   
Outside of the study area, in university towns such as Dire Dawa, Ambo, and Adaama 
this cohort of better educated students are among those who are unable to find employment 
that is appropriate to their new educational level and this has led to the activism Gergen (1999) 
had predicted nearly two-decades earlier.  A continued lack of employment and conditions of 
social and political marginalization have erupted into student-led civil disobedience.  These in 
turn have attracted the attention of a government which considers such civil disobedience to be 
an existential threat to the state.  It has met demonstrations with aggressive responses and 
violence by security forces, despite the African Development Bank Group (ADBG, 2017) 
warning that the escalation of that violence was a contributing factor in the slowing of the 
Ethiopian economy.   
Throughout the study area multi-level systems of government surveillance and political 
control have led to the substantial loss of human rights and social freedoms.  These restrict the 
establishment of civil society organizations which might contest the decisions made by the local 
government.  The securitization of protests and demonstrations reduces the ability of 
smallholders and rural residents to petition for new government programmes which would 
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provide rehabilitative job training following expropriation and ousting, or for students to call for a 
new developmental direction which would create additional employment opportunities.  Thus, 
the combination of movement restrictions and a sense of pervasive surveillance effectively 
inhibits the mobility that might stimulate greater economic growth and stability in Ethiopia.  
Therefore, successful growth and development have unintentionally contributed to 
economic instability and social fragility.  While it may appear to be in the developmental 
interest of the government to continue to commit substantial financial resources to youth 
education and training programmes, considerable numbers of displaced and older 
smallholders are equally jobless.  Although they are not now the instigators of social violence, 
their own economic needs are as great as those of youth.  Therefore, in addition to stimulating 
the creation of employment which students are demanding, the government should consider 
programmes to offer retraining to displaced agriculturalists in work fitted to their own needs and 
capabilities in order to continue the long-term objective of a prosperous and stable Ethiopia.     
Chapter 6 analyses Ethiopia’s educational and vocational training structure.  It describes 
the history of Ethiopia’s present curriculum and demonstrates that even among the Ethiopians 
who become educated beyond the mandatory eight years of elementary school, opportunities 
for social and economic advancement are limited.  As already introduced in this chapter, as the 
economy fails to grow in proportion to the number of newly educated youth an increasing 
number are becoming un- and under-employed, contributing to social and political unrest, 
eventually deepening the impoverishment of displaced smallholders.   
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Chapter 6 
Ethiopia’s Education and Training Systems 
6.0 Introduction 
Ethiopia’s centralized system of development has enabled the nation to achieve a rapid 
rate of growth through the focus of government programmes and institutions.  This chapter 
addresses the second objective of the study, to identify the social, cultural and economic 
dynamics of these government-led development programmes, and this is particularly true as its 
education and training programs relate to displaced smallholders and students.  Importantly, 
these programmes have helped to direct business objectives and achieve national development 
goals.  In addition to economic growth and social development, these programmes have 
resulted in increased agricultural output, reduced child mortality rates and longer life spans.   
Since 1991, the national government has very substantially broadened the availability of 
education programmes at all levels.  This has produced two highly significant yet unintended 
and adverse outcomes.  First, the quality of instruction has declined as a sufficient number of 
properly qualified educators have yet to be trained.  This results in graduates who are less well 
prepared for employment than in the past (Semela, 2011; Adamu & Addamu, 2012; Regassa, et 
al., 2013).  Secondly, while Ethiopia’s newly emerging service sector has expanded and 
employs an increasing number of educated individuals, the overall number of graduates 
produced each year exceeds demand (ILO, 2013) as there is insufficient employment in all 
sectors to absorb these youth (Broussard & Tekleselassie, 2012; CSA, 2014c; Nayak, 2014).  
University graduates are therefore increasingly under-employed as they take positions below 
their skills and abilities.  This intensifies the effect of unemployment among lower-skilled 
workers and further affects smallholders who are forced to take positions below their own often 
meagre skill levels.   
This adverse spiralling effect throughout the labour market directly influences down-
stream opportunities and social development; it contributes to new stratum of poverty among 
both graduates and oustees; and it weakens public confidence in the Ethiopian government 
(Barnichon & Zylberberg, 2015; Yirdaw, 2016).  Coupled with policies which have emphasized 
agricultural rather than industrial development, the unintended outcomes of increased 
secondary and tertiary education act to undermine Ethiopia’s modernization even as other 
developmental conditions have clearly improved.  
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6.1 Background of Ethiopia’s Education System 
Education, as with all social or economic benefits of government, is ultimately political in 
nature.  Ethiopia’s education programmes, that are selected from a range of policy alternatives 
to develop human capital, contribute to further stratification within the society as they result in 
widening income gaps and horizontal inequalities (Buchmann & Hannum, 2001; Geda, et al., 
2009; Belachew, 2014).   
As discussed in Chapter 4, Ethiopia’s secular education system emerged in 1908 when 
Emperor Menelik II opened the doors to the first non-religious school.  Since then, the system 
has substantially expanded and it now provides almost universal availability of elementary 
education and greater access to secondary school.  The system has also increased the 
availability of opportunities to attend either university or vocational training.  However, disparities 
in the access to education for rural children due to long distances to junior elementary and 
secondary schools; their hidden cost; safety and security concerns; and, the need for farm and 
household labour precludes at least some children from attending (Pereznieto & Jones, 2006).  
Further, prospects for employment among rural youth who attend additional schooling are few.  
The development of the industrial and manufacturing sectors, including its export markets, have 
not kept pace with the increasing numbers of secondary school leavers and so unemployment 
among that group is particularly high (Desta, 2012; ILO, 2017; Oqubay, 2018). 
6.1.1 The EPRDF’s New Educational Direction 
Education for all Ethiopians was a major policy initiative based upon the Soviet-styled 
social and political system that was adopted by the Dergue, where its emphasis was to 
accelerate modernization and to move the largely agricultural nation toward industrialization.  
Following the 1974 ousting of Emperor Selassie, curriculum developers from East Germany, 
Bulgaria, and Hungary replaced British and American educational advisors as they instituted a 
highly centralized syllabus.  Their instruction focussed on agriculture, industrial technology, 
political education, home economics, and business, all of which sought to instil a common 
communist identity and nationalist values (Marcus, 1994; Negash, 2006; Engel & Rose, 2011) 
as much as train technical skills.   
In 1991, upon seizing power from the Dergue, the EPRDF government eliminated the 
Marxist-oriented syllabus, including instruction in agriculture, from elementary and secondary 
schools and abolished the fees that had been required to attend school. It also implemented a 
decentralized system which was more open to local cultural characteristics.  ‘Mother-tongue’ 
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languages were, for example, again allowed in the classroom in order to promote the social and 
cultural norms of each region rather than the exclusive use of the Amharic language which had 
been mandated by the Dergue in their attempt to form a national-collectivist identity59. These 
and other reforming policies dramatically increased the number of students who attended school 
and who have now become better educated, even if not all complete their studies (MoE, 2015).   
As a result of this rapidly expanded educational system three interrelated and 
unintended issues have emerged.  First, while the ubiquity of elementary schools provides 
almost universal availability, hidden social and cultural barriers mean access is not similarly 
available.  As children grow older, their home responsibilities increase and completion rates for 
more advanced schooling decrease.  Second, there is insufficient employment for better 
educated youth and this has an effect on student attendance (ILO, 2017).  Third, even among 
those who do attend and graduate from secondary school or university too few employment 
opportunities exist to fully utilize their education and so they are forced to take offers that are 
both outside of their field of study and below their technical abilities.  This can result in social 
dissonance and civil disobedience as their reasonable expectations for economic mobility go 
unmet (Desalegn, 2016; ADBG, 2017).   
This third outcome is particularly significant.  High unemployment among an educated, 
youthful population “is one of the most destabilizing and potentially violent phenomena in any 
regime” (Urdal, 2006; Azeng & Yogo, 2015: 4).  As Honwana (2012) notes unemployment 
results in the inability of young men (and women) to marry, to begin a family, and to be 
recognized as ‘adults’ in society.  Yet, these issues notwithstanding, Ethiopia’s education 
system has contributed to economic growth and social development which have improved living 
conditions, resulted in better health and longer life spans, as well as increased income levels for 
a majority of the nation’s citizens.  
6.1.2 What Comprise Ethiopia’s Education System  
 
Taking a broad view of growth and development, the purpose of Ethiopia’s educational 
programmes is to provide a foundation of more advanced human capital (MoFED, 2005).  This 
includes people who can perform in low and semi-skilled, blue-collar manufacturing positions as 
                                                             
59  There are 77 recognized languages in Ethiopia, though the most prevalent are: Amharic; Gurage; Oromo; Sidamo; 
Somali; Tigrinya; and Wolaytta (MoE; 2015).  In the primary study area near Addis Ababa, Oromo is spoken most 
frequently followed by Amharic, though local dialects were common. 
213 
 
well as in the middle-level management openings that are expected to develop as the economy 
grows.   
Ethiopia’s educational system begins in kindergarten at about age five, colloquially 
described as when a child is physically developed enough to reach over his head to touch his 
left ear with his right hand.  The availability of basic education for Ethiopia’s children is almost 
universal and achieving its standards is increasingly common.  Completion of secondary school 
remains a pre-condition for admission to informal vocational training centres or formal university 
(Figure 6.1).  The formal education system leads to bachelors and master’s degrees, and 
culminates in advanced degrees in veterinary and medical sciences, in law and in Doctorates of 
philosophy.   
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Ethiopia’s Ministry of Education notes there are over 32,000 elementary schools serving 
both rural and urban areas, dropping to just 2,330 secondary schools, or grades 9 -- 12, as 
these schools are located in “urban places” with far higher student concentrations to make them 
more cost effective (MoE, 2015: 17).  As a result, availability and access to schooling decreases 
as rural children advance through the system, chiefly due to the distance to secondary schools, 
and the cost of transportation to them, or for safety issues especially for girls.  The most current 
national plan, the Education Sector Development Programme V, acknowledges “The urban/rural 
divide disadvantages those living in more isolated rural areas and those of lower socio-
economic status who do not have equal access to education after Grade 4” (MoE, 2015: 77).  
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Since admittance to career producing vocational centres depends heavily upon the completion 
of secondary school, an unequal distribution of training opportunities is experienced among 
lesser educated populations.  Thus, while geographically concentrating secondary schools 
provides economies per student, their distant location forms economic barriers to rural 
attendance that continues on among adults, including displaced smallholders.   
6.1.3 Ethiopia’s Educational Objectives 
For the basic and general levels of schooling, the national educational objective 
developed by the Ministry reads: 
“to provide all children with access to pre-elementary education for school 
preparedness and access to nearby institutions in that they can complete the full eight years 
of elementary and two years of lower secondary education” (MoE, 2015: 35). 
The overarching goals of the current national policy directive for elementary and 
secondary programmes are twofold.  They are (i) to improve access to quality education, 
ensuring children attain the competencies that will “enable them to participate fully in the 
development of Ethiopia” and (ii) to provide sufficient availability of secondary educational 
opportunities to “bridge the demand in the economy for middle- and higher-level human 
resources” (MoE, 2015: 14).   
The Ministry has accomplished much of its first goal by increasing the number of 
elementary schools, resulting in expanded access and a surge in attendance from an estimated 
enrolment of 3 million students in 199460 to reportedly more than 18 million in 2015.  The 
second goal however, remains aspirational.  A cooling economy and still-slow industrialisation 
has created little demand for middle- and higher-level human resources within the 
manufacturing sector (ILO, 2017).  Yet students continue to choose to attend university in the 
hope of increasing their competitiveness for employment, adding to the surplus of university 
graduates who must be accommodated within the economy (Bloom, et al., 2014).  
The implications of the lack of employment opportunities are interconnected and lasting.  
First, the imbalance of education-to-opportunity has led to the under-employment61 of better 
                                                             
60 The total population of Ethiopia was estimated to be about 54 million in 1994, approximately half of the current 
population (CSA, 2012; 2014). 
61  In an American context, Abel, et al., (2014: 1) characterized under-employment among university graduates as 
“working in jobs that typically do not require a bachelor’s degree.”  In the Ethiopian experience, the issue was more 
broadly defined by the International Labour Organization (2017: 5) that stated “Under-employment is prevalent.  Due 
216 
 
educated attendees and this eventually creates a frustrating lack of prospects for lower- or 
unskilled workers who are pushed out of the job market by better qualified applicants (Barnichon 
& Zylerberg, 2015; NBE, 2017; Nunley, et al., 2017).  While the expansion of the education 
system may have served to delay the issue of youth unemployment by temporarily removing 
that cohort from the market, it has also deepened the problem of unemployed and under-
employed youth (ILO, 2017).  Second, the Ethiopian government heavily subsidizes student 
education, thus unemployed graduates are unable to contribute to maintain schools and 
universities through repayment to the government for their education.  Third, the scarcity of 
employment increases the likelihood of cronyism and corruption which undermines public 
confidence in the government and threatens its own national investment and goals for 
development and modernization. 
6.1.4 Rural Literacy  
Kirschner, et al., (2006: 77) state the goal of education is “to give learners specific 
guidance about how to cognitively manipulate information in ways that are consistent with a 
learning goal, and to store the result in long-term memory.”  Sustainable economic growth in 
Ethiopia, as in other developing nations, requires a literate and skilled workforce to support an 
innovative society.  Ethiopia’s Education Sector Development Programme IV for 2010 – 2015 
had recognized this outcome in terms of economic and social development, particularly as 
adults are concerned, and it notes:  
“A literate population is a precondition for any nation to become competitive within a 
global economy.  Without a significant increase in the adult literacy rate Ethiopia will not be 
able to achieve a middle-level income status within a foreseeable time.”  
(MoE, 2010: 13)  
Yet the Ministry of Education has defined literacy at a very low threshold, concluding that it is 
achieved: 
“when people have adequate knowledge and skills and are able to use the tools of 
reading and writing for any purpose for which they need those skills” (MoE, 2006).   
The Ministry asserts this situational level of literacy is acquired in different ways, through 
both passive and active means, including the acquisition of skills and learning which occur in the 
home, in social situations, and in schools.  Nevertheless, despite social improvements, pockets 
of the rural labour force continue to be functionally illiterate even by Ethiopian standards and the 
                                                             
to the high level of poverty, individuals seek some form of employment, even if no full-time job is available.  As a 
result, the informal economy is gaining in importance.” 
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Central Statistical Agency estimated the rate as low as 2.5%62 in some pastoral areas.  These 
lower, or virtually non-existent, literacy skills tend to be more prevalent among those who derive 
income through pastoral and subsistence agricultural activities in which 80% of the population is 
directly involved, including workers throughout the informal labour market (CSA, 2012).  Yet 
even with the governments’ greater focus upon industrialization, labour intensive agriculture still 
remains its primary employment strategy (NPC, 2015) and literacy has not increased 
concomitant with the skills that are required by an industrializing society.  Thus, Ethiopia is 
faced with a mix of policy choices regarding whether the continued emphasis should be placed 
upon a narrow theoretical and higher-level education or the accentuation of lower-level industrial 
and labour related skills which would be applicable to the majority of the population (Bloom, et 
al., 2014). 
EPRDF Restructuring of the Educational System   
Shortly after assuming power, the EPRDF made substantial policy changes to the 
Dergue’s educational system via the governments’ first Education and Training Policy (MoE, 
1994).  Despite early post-conflict enthusiasm, curriculum changes did not always meet local 
needs, especially those of the 80% who are subsistence smallholders living in rural areas.  As 
example, the 1994 decision to remove agricultural instruction from rural classrooms has resulted 
in a noticeably decreased level of interest in agricultural careers among early school goers and 
in their later interest in crop sciences at university.  This was specifically described by a local 
primary school teacher who, over the course of almost four decades, has witnessed the shifting 
programmatic emphasis.  While his opinion was valuable, further investigation of the school, 
and conversation with local farmer training centre staff confirmed his statements regarding the 
lack of agricultural instruction:   
“The government no longer allows us to teach agriculture to our students.  We used 
to have small demonstration plots where they could learn about farming and experts from the 
farmer training centre in the village would visit to instruct the children.  I have been a teacher 
here for 38 years and saw the government discontinue agricultural training about 20 years 
ago.  Since then I have seen much less interest among the children to learn about 
agriculture.”  
Elementary School Teacher, August 2015 (Interview 11) 
However, the federal government has recognized that some of its early political decisions were 
overly hasty; potentially counter-productive; and, that some require revisiting.  At the time of 
                                                             
62 This is an extremely low literacy rate and clearly does not apply throughout Ethiopia.  It is indicative, however, of 
the substantial challenges the government faces.  
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field work, the federal Ministry of Education was reviewing its early decision to eliminate 
agricultural instruction from the rural school curricula:  
“After the 1991 revolution, we saw many knee-jerk reactions by the new government.  
Dergue policies were discarded with little thought for their usefulness.  In those days, 
inexperienced overly zealous bureaucrats saw no need to teach urban children how to 
plough a field and so in a time of overreaction all agriculture instruction was removed from 
the classrooms.  We’ve only begun to look at things again because it had other serious 
consequences as well.” 
Chief, Curriculum Development, Federal Ministry of Education, Addis Ababa, September 2015 
(Interview 55) 
Thus, the Ministry demonstrated itself to be receptive to curriculum changes that are proving 
themselves necessary for the future of Ethiopia’s rural students, especially those who continue 
to depend upon agriculture for their livelihoods.  
6.2 Ethiopia’s Formal and Non-formal Learning Systems 
Education is rightly believed to enhance development; it increases personal income; it 
improves civic skills; and it results in greater social and political participation (Franzese, 2001).  
It has been associated with economic growth and it elevates the “human capital inherent in the 
labour force; it increases innovative capacity throughout the economy; and facilitates the 
diffusion and transmission of knowledge needed to process information” (Hanushek & 
Wossmann, 2010: 245). While the quality of a nation’s educational system is a close predictor of 
its ability to develop economically and socially, competency in very basic skills such as reading 
and simple mathematics arguably provide greater returns on investment than does an 
expansion of education at university level until that nation is ready to utilize those advanced 
capabilities (Tripney & Hombardos, 2013; Shiferaw, 2017).   
During the design of Ethiopia’s modern educational system, a key planning 
consideration of the Ministry has been that children whose parents are literate tend to stay in 
school longer (MoE, 2015).  To encourage parents and other adults to engage in their own 
“lifelong learning opportunities so that all can contribute and benefit from rapid growth and 
economic change“ (MoE, 2015: 13) the Ministry of Education adopted three broad forms of adult 
learning, each of that achieves different goals:   
(i) Formal learning, wherein systems are organized and have explicit intentions that 
ultimately lead to recognized diplomas or degrees.  In a formal system, information is transmitted 
through structured, written syllabi that are characterised by defined aims and objectives (Misko, 
2008).  Three criteria distinguish formal programmes: their duration, fixed curricula, and whether 
completion leads to a recognized qualification (Werquin, 2007). 
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(ii) Non-formal learning programmes that can be any organized activity that takes 
place outside of a formal, disciplined and structured system.  Non-formal learning is semi-structured 
in nature yet it delivers information and develops hands-on skills that facilitate personal growth and 
meet industry requirements.  In adult education, non-formal programmes are usually highly flexible 
and closely contextualized.  For older learners, especially, a strong participatory approach to meet 
immediate and practical needs is required (Knowles, 1973; Kolb, 1984).   
(iii) Informal learning is “a residual category to describe any kind of learning that does 
not take place within, or following from, a formally organised learning programmeme or event” 
(Eraut, 2000: 114).  For example, people who lack reading skills frequently gain knowledge through 
such means as observing and imitating those around them.  Informal learning is most often 
experiential and achieved through “the combination of grasping and transforming an experience” 
(Kolb, 1984: 41).  These experiences build upon group roles.  Familiarity and practice are important 
in the adult learning process and occur when observations are assimilated and result in the 
internalization of previously abstract concepts.  However, without a continuous stream of new and 
more technically complex examples to learn from, the acquisition of higher level skills is difficult to 
achieve and the learning and skills acquisition process stagnates (Scribner & Cole, 1978; Fanta-
Vagenshtein, 2008).  
Particularly among adults, educational goals vary with age and so these three 
educational models address the needs of very different audiences and their goal orientation. 
Malcolm Knowles (1973) observed adult learners are more focussed in their learning needs 
than children; and that adults have a ‘deeper pool of knowledge and experience’ from which to 
draw.  Hence, adult learners are more involved in their learning process and they tend to 
become more open to their own internal-locus of control and self-efficacy to achieve their goals 
(Onu, et al., 2013; Abay, et al., 2017).  Yet at the same time, adults are more prone to remaining 
within their previously established peer groups and fields of endeavour, and as Mildenberger & 
Tingley (2017: 5) note, “an individual’s second-order [group] beliefs may shape or constrain their 
first-order [individual] beliefs.” 
Thus, while adults may have a more defined self-concept and a greater readiness to 
learn that enables them to direct their own programmes, their individual focus is often limited to 
refining their present experiential base in order to immediately apply their new skills (Kolb, 
1984).  This utilitarian motivation often limits adults’ avenue of exploration to current interests 
rather than attempting to master a new subject field.   
6.3 Elementary and Secondary Education 
After decades of foreign influence, including educational systems introduced by the 
Egyptians, French, British, Americans and Bulgarians, Ethiopia now follows an essentially 
western model of education (Negash, 2006; Bishaw & Lasser, 2012).  However, to understand 
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the principal drivers of Ethiopian under-employment a review of its educational system is 
required. 
6.3.1 Elementary Schools 
Several hidden barriers to entry are associated with Ethiopia’s educational institutions. 
Rural basic elementary schools, intended for children ages 5 – 12 and grades K - 6, are located 
in each kebele.  They are often within eyesight of small hold farms and so students can safely 
and easily walk to them (MoE, 2015) (Interview 59).  However, junior elementary schools, 
grades 7-8, are often located further from home than basic elementary schools.  They are 
usually located in towns and village areas that may require a walk of one hour or more.  
Although schools are ‘free’, structural issues such as the cost of school uniforms and books 
were described by respondents as often being unaffordable.  Thus, by the end of the 
elementary school stage at grade 8, the rural student completion rate is just 47% nationally 
(Pereznieto & Jones, 2006; MoE, 2015).   
An absence of school resources poses an additional impediment to student completion.  
Teachers interviewed during an elementary school registration day described the funding issues 
which further degrade the educational experience.  The wilful creation of educational service 
deserts (Hillman & Weichman, 2016) was a recurring theme among the educators east of Addis 
Ababa who were interviewed and it was their general opinion these were being implemented to 
more easily displace smallholders in the study area:   
“Over the past 15 years the government has reduced funding for rural schools.  We 
have no facilities to teach here except bare walls - not even a chalkboard.  There are no 
books or paper or other supplies.  The government pays no attention to people who live off 
the paved road and this is their way of forcing them to move from the land so the government 
can sell it to investors.”   
Elementary School Teacher, September 2015 (Interview 59b) 
Parents were equally troubled.  Field journal notes indicate that among a crowd of 
approximately 30 who were inside a classroom that was being used to register children for the 
new school year, nine willingly voiced their own concerns regarding the low levels of funding 
and the unavailability of supplies including text books and, they too, recognized this as leading 
to inadequate learning outcomes.  Just as the school’s teachers, parents recognized the 
adverse local changes that have occurred in recent years regarding rural education and their 
statements reinforced the earlier noted observations of kebele and wereda employees regarding 
the general withdrawal of social services, including adequate schools.  Collectively, these and 
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other barriers constrain rural students from receiving a satisfactory early education or attending 
secondary school.   
6.3.2 Secondary Schools 
To achieve greater economies of scale the Ministry of Education locates the majority of 
secondary schools in urban areas where there is a higher concentration of students to attend 
them (MoE, 2015).  However, the daily transportation costs from rural or peri-urban 
municipalities, though low, are often a prohibitive expense for subsistence-level rural families 
(Dom, 2016).  Hence, economic disparities become educational disparities, which are then 
carried forward as rural students are unable to qualify for higher education or vocational training.  
This tends to reinforce opportunity-inequality and often results in negative social stereotyping of 
rural students.  In addition, it reduces self-esteem and undermines economic growth within 
under-served rural areas (Tawil & Harley, 2004).  As early disparities persist through adulthood 
the insufficiently educated rural class remains unable to qualify for the opportunities created by 
Ethiopia’s new service economy, even as farming livelihood prospects continue to shrink.  
Compounding the structural lack of access to secondary education is Ethiopia’s rural 
drop-out rate, especially where children decide at a very early age not to finish school.  This is 
described by Desta (2012), who confirmed that children in Ethiopia’s junior elementary and 
lower-secondary schools see previous students or older friends who have graduated yet have 
few employment prospects.  Their individual observations, even at a very young age, suggest to 
them there is little benefit from continued school attendance; they become discouraged and quit 
school.  Desta (Ibid: 19) asserts this lack of opportunity, observed by young students in their 
slightly older friends, makes secondary schools the beginning of “fertile grounds for agitation 
and the arousal of the students' unrest against some of the economic policies that are initiated 
by the existing political order.”  Among the unintended results is a less literate rural population 
that cannot compete in the changing employment environment that Ethiopia’s otherwise 
successful developmental programmes are creating, and in which displaced smallholders now 
increasingly find themselves.   
6.3.3 Upper-Secondary Education 
Upon successful completion of 10th grade and the attainment of sufficient entrance 
examination scores, students may choose to enter upper-secondary education in preparatory 
schools that constitute grades 11 – 12.  Here they are groomed for placement testing and 
potential entry to university.  During these 11th and 12th years, rural students must take 
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transportation to a larger city where the preparatory schools are located.  Here too, living and 
travel expenses form barriers that limit attendance to students whose families can either afford 
daily transportation or who can afford to house the student in the city during the week, 
something that also foregoes the labour that student would provide to the farm (Interview 85).  
In the case of chronically poor rural families, these educational expenses can be prohibitively 
costly.  Nevertheless, it is this upper-secondary age group that is “markedly more likely … to 
have five-year ambitions; more likely to have detailed plans; and, more likely to see themselves 
as having a career” (Anderson, et al., 2005: 146).  Critically, it is among this age bracket of 
secondary schoolers that Anderson found a large percentage of youth formalize a view of their 
own future and initiate long-term life-decisions.  It is where they begin to “lay out well-developed 
plans that would take them right through to retirement” (Ibid).   
6.3.4 Elementary and Secondary Education Exclusions  
Notable disparities exist between rural and urban school attendees and these are often 
gendered.  Drop-out rates among rural girls in junior elementary and secondary school are 
especially high and by the time they reach grades 11-12, girls account for just 27% of 
graduating students (Van Deuren, 2013; UNESCO, 2015).  In addition to the financial costs of 
education and the demand for their household labour that increase as they age, physical safety 
issues limit the ability of girls to attend secondary schools.  Several respondents in the study 
area described the frequent threat of marriage by abduction that often occurs as maturing girls 
walk to school.  This creates especially dire consequences for rural women’s educational 
achievement (MoE, 2015) and as they reach puberty girls begin to stay within the safety of the 
home enclosure.  Thus, while they participate in the activities of farming and take on an 
increasing role in household reproductive responsibilities, they may also become educationally 
and socially isolated from the larger community (Tafere & Woldehanna, 2012).  
This cloistering contributes to chronic rural poverty as girls come of marital age (Dom, 
2016) and results in nearly 70% of rural women being functionally illiterate (Tafere & 
Woldehanna, 2012).  This directly reduces their ability to participate meaningfully in the 
employment market once their family farms have been expropriated.  Therefore, the cumulative 
failure of girls to attend and complete even a general level of education may have a 
disproportionately high effect upon Ethiopia’s larger industrialization and developmental success 
as their lack of education fails to prepare them for non-agrarian work.   
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The physical demands of farming impacts boys’ education as well.  At about the same 
age girls reach puberty, boys become physically capable of tending livestock or handling 
ploughs.  They provide an immediate source of family labour and several respondents related 
they had kept the most promising farm worker from school to utilize that labour (Interview 78).  
Counterintuitively, smallholder families stated the embryonic accumulation of household wealth 
actually discourages their children’s attendance at school.  As home and farm assets such as 
cattle or land accumulate, more labour is needed to manage them. Hence, the formal education 
of the most talented boy may come to an end if he is also the best farm worker.   
Therefore, bright and innovative children may be denied educational opportunities until 
the family becomes economically comfortable enough to divert their children’s useful labour to 
non-productive activities including time consuming attendance at primary and secondary school 
(Frost & Roleston, 2013).  As a result, rural students, including potential business operators or 
entrepreneurs, tend to remain only marginally educated and are also denied the opportunity to 
obtain skills through formal manual trades’ instruction at Ethiopia’s vocational training centres 
because they have not met the compulsory educational qualifications (MoE, 2008).   
6.4 Tertiary Education and Vocational Programmes 
According to Kolb, et al (2010), education increases the quality of labour inputs and 
enhances workers’ abilities to adjust to new challenges.  Educated people are likely to be more 
abstract in their thinking and pioneering in their utilization of emerging industrial or agricultural 
technologies and they have a greater ability to analyse, synthesize and apply innovative 
practices (Kolb, et al., 2010).  Therefore, they are able to contribute to Ethiopia’s growth in ways 
that lesser-educated workers cannot.  Hence, the Ministry of Education’s statement of its higher 
education goals opens with the phrase:  
“To produce competent graduates who have appropriate knowledge, skills and 
attitudes in diverse fields of study; to produce research that promotes knowledge and 
technology transfer based on national development and community needs …” 
(MoE, 2015: 37) 
Moreover, the goals conclude with:  
“… to ensure that education and research promote principles of freedom in exchange 
of views and opinions based on reason, and democratic and multicultural values.”   
(MoE, 2015: 37) 
These ambitious national goals are likely to raise the expectation of social mobility 
among both vocational and university students who are led to believe their education will result 
in the attainment of economic success and greater social freedoms. 
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Tertiary education63 in Ethiopia includes two types of programmes: those that are 
academically and theoretically inclined and those that are vocational and not intended to lead to 
university level credentials.  The Education Sector Development Plan V notes there were 98 
private and 36 publicly funded universities in Ethiopia in the 2013/2014 reporting year (MoE, 
2015).  The majority of these private institutions are located in the capital city of Addis Ababa 
though some have branch campuses in smaller municipalities such as Sheshamane, Dire Dawa 
or Ambo.  Vocational centres are similarly distributed in both urban and peri-urban areas. 
6.4.1 The Paradox of Tertiary Education  
Contrary to expectations, increased tertiary education has not resulted in a generally 
developed upper-level economy.  The overwhelming majority of the nation continue to engage 
in subsistence-farming despite those who are employed in the narrow service sector.  Relatively 
few positions are available for the highly educated (Abate, 2016).  
Tertiary education creates, in general, four conditions (Collier, 2007; Eight, 2013).  
Those include: (i) employment, as graduates obtain positions that are commensurate with their 
expectations, or (ii) unemployment, when either no work is found or offers are not taken.  
Relatedly, students may have graduated university or received training certifications in fields for 
that there are too few opportunities in Ethiopia, thus (iii) they may leave the country in search of 
work elsewhere; or, (iv) they succumb to various forms of under-employment.  Critically, this 
latter group takes lesser positions which lesser skilled and displaced smallholders might 
otherwise aspire to.  Consequently, lesser skilled groups are socially displaced as they are 
pushed further down or entirely out of the employment market (Bashshur, et al., 2011; 
Barnichon & Zylerberg, 2015).  Under-employment and its downward mobility are not merely 
unpleasant social and economic conditions.  They result in significantly decreased family 
income potentials; increased substance abuse; and, social stagnation.  This ultimately increases 
the likelihood of new strata of poverty among the displaced (Wilkins, 2007) and the affected 
groups lose their political and social influence.   
Skills-related under-employment, where the individuals’ technical abilities or schooling 
are in excess of the requirements of the job also result in an inefficient utilization of scarce 
educational resources (Bhatia & Ghanem, 2017). While under-employed graduates have work 
                                                             
63 Tertiary education includes academic and vocational education.  Its goal is to achieve a higher level of theoretical 
complexity or vocational skills specialisation then are achievable at lower educational levels (UNESCO, 2011). 
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and are therefore better off than the unemployed, they may work in areas that are far outside of 
their educational fields and, over time, lose the skills and up-to-date expertise they acquired at 
government expense (ILO, 2007).   
Ethiopia’s developmental policies, that until recently relied primarily upon low-skill and 
labour-intensive agricultural employment, have been augmented by educational policies that are 
delivering substantial opportunities to engage in higher education (NPC, 2015).  Though 
Ethiopia’s service sector is rapidly growing and is now the economically dominant segment of 
the economy, it is not able to absorb all the university graduates who are produced annually. 
Consequently, the presence of better-educated university graduates bids down the price of their 
labour as well (Geda, et al., 2009).  A downward drift of higher educated and higher skilled 
workers causes pay to become depressed and economically displaces lesser educated 
workers.  
Workers who are over-educated for their positions generally earn more than their lesser-
educated co-workers, yet they earn substantially less than their scholastic colleagues who have 
found more appropriate employment (Irizarry, 1980; Herrera-Idarraga, et. al., 2013). Yet, even 
this lesser employment is not guaranteed and this situation was noted by a local TVET director 
whose own educational background over-matched his employment:    
“I can earn more money as the director of a vocational centre than I could after five 
years of training at university to become a doctor of veterinary medicine.  But my supervisors 
here are uncomfortable with my education.  They say I am over-qualified for this position and 
that they have other people with skills that are less than mine who need a job.  They ignore 
my success here and want to terminate my employment.”   
TVET Director, July 2015 (Interview 8) 
Cascading under-employment tends to result in stress and psychological issues, 
including depression characterized by low self-esteem, eating disorders, alcoholism or drug use 
(Catalano, 1994; Dooley, et al., 2000).  As under-employment becomes the norm, social 
mobility stagnates.  This also perpetuates the period of liminality that graduates experience as 
their education has separated them from their previous life-experiences and peer groups but 
they have not yet been accepted into a new social strata, new peer groups, or achieved 
economic success (Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010).  
Politically, as the rate of economic growth slows, the imbalance of education to 
opportunity-outcomes sustains the contention that government is subsidizing unnecessary 
university attendance at the expense of training programmes and employment strategies that 
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may benefit the rural poor, including displaced smallholders (Frost & Roleston, 2013).  This 
issue was elevated by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs as it chronicled the lack of 
appropriate economic opportunity in Ethiopia:  
“The narrow base of the modern industrial sector in terms of job creation in the face 
of rural-urban migration is believed to have contributed to increased poverty levels.”  
(MoLSA, 2009: 5-8) 
6.4.2 Educational Standards   
As part of its overall modernization and development programme the government has 
increased capacity throughout the publicly-funded university system, especially in comparison to 
its neighbouring nations (Figure 5.2).  In doing so, it has broadened the range of available 
curricula as well as built new university infrastructure and facilities to accommodate greater 
numbers of students (Tessema, 2009).  Yet, it is not simply the availability of Ethiopia’s 
expanded number of educational institutions that is important to economic development, its 
social growth, or to under-employment rates.  Quality and depth of instruction are also crucial 
and in Ethiopia the supply of educated instructional staff has not matched demand (Materu, 
2007; Regassa, et al., 2013; Masino & Nino-Zarazua, 2016).  Moreover, in his report entitled 
Higher Education Quality Assurance in sub-Saharan Africa, Materu (2007: 14) concludes that a 
reduction in Ethiopia’s educational standards has taken place as a result of a too-rapid 
expansion of the system and that “rapid enrolment growth was intended to meet increasing 
social demand.”  Importantly, Materu found the physical growth of Ethiopia’s university facilities 
was not necessarily to meet the educational requirements of the developing nation so much as 
it satisfied demands for “political patronage that flowed from contracts for construction, 
equipment, supplies and other needs” (Ibid, 16).   
Despite earlier success in establishing a system whose quality of instruction approached 
international standards at the turn of the 21st century, a pattern of underfunding and 
employment of poorly qualified teachers have caused substandard schools to reappear64.  
Semela (2011) found that instructors possessing only a bachelor’s degree were teaching 
bachelor degree-level courses, and so educational quality deteriorated.  Furthermore, Ethiopia’s 
secondary schools and universities were reported to have become “regimented in their 
management and conservative in their intellectual orientation, they displayed declining 
                                                             
64 Recall that following the 1974 revolution, the Dergue sent almost 50,000 secondary school students to villages as 
teachers (Zewdie: 2000; Balsvik, 2009; Bishaw & Lasser, 2012).  Their own students were completing secondary 
school and university at the time these reports were being written. 
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educational content and were weak in their research output” (Saint, 2004: 86).  The World Bank 
(WB, 2003) likewise observed that productivity gains and standards in Ethiopia’s secondary 
schools and universities were eroding.  These independently produced reports only slightly 
predated the gradual slowing of the Ethiopian economy 65 following its 2005 peak (ADBG, 2017; 
NBE, 2017).  Although these findings were made over a decade ago, current sources confirm 
insufficient improvement has been made, and that other social issues have emerged which 
adversely affect industrialization.   
For example, Arega Yirdaw (2016), chief executive officer of MIDROC Ethiopia 
Technology Group66 noted the dissatisfaction some larger employers have with recent 
graduates including issues that are beyond the scope of their education.  Yirdaw found that in 
many cases, graduates from Ethiopia’s universities must be retrained not only in technical 
matters but also in fundamental life and business skills such as proper diet, timeliness, and 
sobriety before they are able to become productive employees.  Other education professionals, 
who both research and teach business development in Ethiopia’s universities, concur with 
Yirdaw’s assessment of the personal deficiencies exhibited by a significant number of university 
graduates as well as those among blue collar workers:  
“Approximately 10% of all Ethiopian’s have earned a bachelor’s degree, yet Ethiopia 
has a very unreliable work force.  Even when they are highly educated and paid a good wage, 
workers here spend their money on alcohol and other unhealthy lifestyles that result in high 
rates of absenteeism from their jobs.” University Instructor,  July 2015 (Interview 9) 
Lenton (2014: 6) found individual personality characteristics often correlate with 
educational attendance.  Specifically, high “internal and external locus of control, 
conscientiousness and extroversion” are connected traits, and that among male employees it is 
extroversion rather than the technical competence achieved through education which employers 
actually seek.  Similarly, Lundberg (2013) also posited that what Ethiopian employers want is 
not necessarily subject matter expertise so much as it is the personal qualities that are 
displayed by graduates.  Those include an openness to new experiences and ideas; a 
conscientiousness in their organizational abilities, and a level of agreeableness which reflects a 
                                                             
65  Declining educational standards and the slowing economy also roughly preceded the 2005 national election which  
almost resulted in electoral losses for the EPRDF.  Ethiopia suddenly faced system-wide social, political, and 
economic problems that threatened the continued hegemony of the party.  
66 MIDROC (Mohammed International Development Research and Organization Companies) is owned by Ethiopian-
born Mohammed Hussein Ali Al-Amoudi, who is the largest individual investor in Ethiopia.  Al-Amoudi has holdings in 
Ethiopia’s gold and silver mining industries and its oil production; in cement manufacturing and the construction 
industry.  He introduced industrial steel production to Ethiopia.  Thus the observations and opinions of his CEO, Dr. 
Arega Yirdaw, concerning the state of education and labour training in Ethiopia are relevant and timely. 
228 
 
cooperative personality.  These traits, Lundberg finds, are essentially qualities of internal locus 
of control and which are imitated through the examples set by educated and/or successful 
parents (UNESCO, 2012; MoE, 2015).  
However, hiring graduates who must be re-trained in basic skills increases the risk to the 
employer who may not be able to absorb either the socialization costs or the losses involved 
after having hired an under-skilled and underperforming worker.  Hence, business expansion 
may be slowed by the lack of social skills exhibited by recent graduates.  
6.4.3 University Education and Under-employment  
The over-production of university graduates is not peculiar to the developing nation of 
Ethiopia.  Indeed, expanded access to higher education is a frequent strategy of governments to 
delay youth entry into the employment market (Dvorkin & Shell, 2015).  It is also seen as an 
attempt to force change from above (Irizarry, 1980; Rasmussen & Sorheim, 2006; Bloom, et al., 
2014).  In those cases, economic growth is expected to occur through the sheer force of 
educated professionals whose numbers in society are considered likely to spontaneously 
stimulate innovation and entrepreneurial activity.  However as several key stakeholders 
asserted, and the literature strongly suggests, a diploma or vocational training completion 
certificate may actually increase the likelihood of post-graduation unemployment as graduates 
demand salaries that are in excess of those paid to other workers who perform adequately but 
do not hold a degree or certification (Oketch, 2007; Kibru, 2012; ILO, 2017) (Interview 10).   
In Ethiopia, students require three to five years to obtain an undergraduate degree; and 
two additional years are typical for a master's degree.  Doctoral programmes are offered at a 
small number of universities in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Ambo (Shibeshi, 2005) with 
completion times varying by subject. Notably, Dire Dawa and Ambo are the primary locations 
where student demonstrations have occurred (MoE, 2015; UNESCO, 2015).  
 
The Focus of Ministry of Education-operated Universities 
Ministry-operated universities continue to focus on science, engineering or other 
technology curricula.  In contrast, private university administrators stated they had reached an 
accord with the Ministry of Education to provide instruction in liberal arts, concentrating on 
degree programmes such as business administration, finance, and information technology.  
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Regardless of the field of study, the number of graduates has risen much faster than national 
economic growth and industrialization can absorb (ILO, 2017).  Interviews with educators in 
university settings likewise found that increased enrolment has exacerbated both unemployment 
and under-employment as the number of graduates exceed market requirements.  Several 
university educators (Interview 5, 9 & 10), noted this presents additional issues for the 
government: 
“There are not enough quality employment positions anywhere in Ethiopia for all of 
the university graduates each year, especially if they have not carefully chosen their field of 
study.  Because of the lack of good jobs when they do find employment, graduates are often 
displacing other workers who have fewer skills and less education.  Even business degree 
graduates cannot find work and so many take small positions or return to their farms.  But 
that has an effect, too.  They become better farmers and better community leaders and they 
are putting pressure on the government to provide more social services, but it doesn’t repay 
the nation for its investment.”  
Dean, private university, July 2015 (Interview 10) 
The administrator of a private business college also noted that graduates are frequently 
employed in positions which are below their educational levels:  
“Many of my students do receive job offers from businesses before they graduate 
though the offers are for lesser positions than the student is capable of.  Still, it’s a way to 
enter the job market so most accept the offer.” 
Administrator, Business College, July 2015  (Interview 6) 
Thus, the utility of a university education becomes increasingly questionable, even 
detrimental, as the combined over-supply of university graduates, poor employment readiness-
skills, and increased wage pressures force them to accept employment that is below their 
education level.  This is likely to continue until market conditions can improve sufficiently to 
justify a greater demand for educated professionals.  In the interim, the under-employment of a 
large educated youth cohort contributes to social and political instability (Pape, 2005).  
 
 
6.4.4 Technical Vocational Education and Training 
Mouzakitis (2010: 3915) asserts “general education is often too academic and does not 
prepare young people adequately for the world of work and vocational education and training 
have a closer and more direct link with their professional development.”  Especially in rural 
areas where resources and adequately trained teachers may be scarce, “math, science, 
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language, and social studies” are far more relevant to the educational needs of developing 
nations than are courses in “Greek mythology, prime numbers, or tectonic plate movement” 
(Epstein & Yuthas, 2012: 19).   
While “improving access to primary education has been recognised as having the 
highest economic returns in developing countries” (Masino & Nino-Zarazua, 2016: 53) it is 
crucial to the industrial development of the nation that relevant vocational instruction is available 
to enable the development of a widely-based, employment–generating, manufacturing sector 
(Graff, 1998; MoE, 2008; Aghion, et al., 2009).   
Early Vocational Training Pilot Programme  
To facilitate growth and to promote manufacturing, the government has heavily invested 
in primary infrastructure, from improved rural feeder roads to electrified rail lines linking the 
capitol to the sea port of Djibouti (Stifel, et al., 2016).  This investment in infrastructure created 
an environment in which construction projects resulted in thousands of temporary jobs for 
workers who possess the requisite skills.  Thus, to meet the demand for these skills non-formal 
adult vocational training became an increasingly important element of Ethiopia’s poverty 
reduction strategies (MoE, 2015; NPC, 2015).  Vocational training was defined in UNESCO’s 
Shanghai Consensus as: 
“Those aspects of the educational process involving, in addition to general education, 
the study of technologies and related sciences and the acquisition of practical skills, attitudes, 
understanding and knowledge relating to occupations in various sectors of economic life.” 
(UNESCO, 2012) 
In 1965, the government of Ethiopia petitioned the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for assistance in organizing and implementing a ‘work-
oriented, adult literacy’ pilot project whose aim would be to teach basic literacy and numeracy 
skills.  Five demonstration sites were established in the towns of Jima and Agaro; in Wolamoh 
and Asela; and, within the population and commercial centre of Addis Ababa.  In addition to 
teaching basic literacy and numeracy to adults, this was a broad-based test that included a 
range of agricultural and farm cooperative education; industrial manufacturing, including sugar 
and coffee refining; and construction skills.  It also introduced home weaving as a potential 
cottage industry for family income generation (UNESCO, 1975).  Though the weaving 
programme proved untenable due to equipment maintenance issues, other outcomes were 
encouraging.  Soon thereafter a nascent system of Technical and Vocational Education Training 
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centres (TVET) emerged which were intended to meet the Selassie government’s 
developmental goals and which were “motivated by the fact that the labour productivity in 
Ethiopia was very low” (Krishnan & Shaorshadze, 2013: 11).   
6.4.5 Adult Learners and Threats to Ethiopia’s Political Hegemony 
As a group, adult learners are practical in their information needs and tend to engage in 
retraining programmes that concentrate upon acquiring specific new skills which they can 
readily apply rather than being interested in larger theoretical concepts.  Their personal qualities 
of motivation, focus and perseverance tend to make the adult learner a more engaged, problem-
centred, and goal-oriented student than are younger learners (Kolb & Goldman, 1973; Knowles, 
1978).  Moreover, once the individual decision has been made to seek retraining, adults tend to 
arrive in the classroom with a substantial reservoir of personal experience which they channel 
into fields that are already familiar to them (Dollisso & Martin, 1999).  Hence it can be said adult 
learners may not learn something new, so much as upgrade their existing knowledge and skills.  
However, in an industrializing society learning to be a better subsistence farmer has limited 
utility.    
Older adult learners pose additional challenges.  As they begin their non-formal 
programmes, these students may be in a highly insecure state, having significant practical 
expertise but no theoretical foundation or experience in their chosen vocational subject.  Thus, 
while they bring previous knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes to their retraining programmes these 
may be obsolete or false, something which Taylor & Hamdy (2013: e1564) describe in terms of 
“the dissonance between this and the concrete experience that is provided as the learning 
opportunity.”  Adult learners often require the internalization of unfamiliar basic theory even in 
fields with which they are familiar in order to assimilate new knowledge.  Consequently, at the 
same time smallholders are being displaced from their livelihoods and homes, they may also 
need to undergo other uncomfortable changes in their traditional attitudes and behaviour if they 
enrol in a vocational training program (Gordus, 1986; Clark, 2008) .  Yet, Hammond & Feinstein 
(2005: 266) found that while more self-efficacious adults have a higher likelihood of engaging in 
continuing education, it is the decision to participate in the experience of adult learning itself that 
“raise levels of self-efficacy.” The decision itself marks a life changing moment, leading to 
greater ability to accept new information.  Nevertheless, education is empowering as it promotes 
a greater degree of awareness and prospect for economic and political participation (Bellu, 
2011; Awgichew & Seyoum, 2017).   
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Sanborn & Thyne (2013: 778) have noted the educated are more willing to “take to the 
streets to force the government to make meaningful reforms.”  At the same time, adult education 
has not been demonstrated to directly change attitudes or political opinions.  Instead, it may 
only result in better trained individuals who maintain the same social attitudes but who are more 
apt to vocalize their demands (Preston & Feinstein, 2004; Friedman, et al., 2016).  Thus, 
increased adult education may also be perceived as a possible threat to the semi-authoritarian 
control by the Ethiopian government due to an increased demand for greater democratic 
freedoms and economic opportunities in rural areas, just as students are demanding them in 
urban places.  
Ethiopia’s Vocational Training Audience  
In a report titled the Art of Adult Learning and Education, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Education 
asserts non-formal adult education programmes enhance the ability of rural youth to diversify 
their vocational experiences into non-farm employment (MoE, 2008).  TVETS are stand-alone 
tertiary educational institutions which result in terminal educational outcomes (Oketch, 2007) to 
prepare students for work in blue-collar occupational and manual trades as well as offering very 
rudimentary training in the operation of select small businesses.   
The basis for the programmes are found in Ethiopia’s foundational pro-poor policy, the 
Productive Safety Net Programme, had identified TVETs as the vehicle to deliver training for 
employment via “curriculum for livelihood pathways” (MoA, 2014: 5-6).  Notably, Ethiopia’s 
vocational training is not a continuation of secondary school instruction.  The African Union 
describes the positive and wide-ranging impact which these vocational programmes can have 
regarding the reduction of chronic poverty among its target audience:   
 
 
 
 
“One of the most important features of TVET is its orientation towards the world of 
work and the emphasis of the curriculum on the acquisition of employable skills.  TVET 
delivery systems are therefore well placed to train the skilled and entrepreneurial workforce 
which Africa needs to create wealth and emerge out of poverty.  TVET institutions can 
respond to the training needs of learners from different socio-economic and academic 
backgrounds, and prepare them for gainful employment and sustainable livelihoods.  The 
youth, the poor and the vulnerable of society can therefore benefit from TVET.”  
(AU, 2007: 17)  
6.5 The Challenges of Community Training Centres and TVETs   
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The curricula of the non-formal educational programmes observed at each of the 
vocational centres visited were similar.  TVETs provide a range of training or retraining 
instruction in twenty distinct fields (Figure 6.2) emphasizing construction, service, and 
industrial occupations, while micro-business development courses are offered at the 
Community Skills Training Centres (Biazen & Abegaz, 2009).  
 
Community Skills Training centres provide literacy and numeracy classes as well as 
short courses through a limited range of 15-day business development courses.  The 15-day 
subject specific courses are followed by an additional 15-day general course of basic business 
management skills such as money management and market forecasting.  Although these short 
courses are only intended to develop very simple skills they have been highly impactful in 
helping residents transition to ownership of a micro-enterprise.    
The men and women who were observed in TVET classrooms and shops during field 
work tended to be enrolled in longer-term industrial arts programmes such as furniture making 
and construction rather than offerings such as basic book keeping, information technology, or 
health care occupations.  In some fast-growing peri-urban locations of Ethiopia, construction 
and related services accounted for as much as 65% of local earnings, hence TVET programme 
offerings are particularly weighted towards those subject areas (UNDP, 2014).  From entry to 
completion of the programme, individual TVET courses have five progressively difficult, and 
costly, levels of instruction (Figure 6.3) and participation decreases as the instructional 
complexity increases.   
234 
 
 
Course offerings are limited by the availability of qualified instructors especially at the 
higher levels of instruction (Hunde & Tacconi, 2017).  Particularly in rural areas where 
languages and dialects can change substantially within the space of several miles, there is little 
opportunity to centrally organize a wider pool of instructors to support several TVETs.  This 
limits the number of vocational programmes that can be offered as well as the number of 
students who can be enrolled (Awgichew & Seyoum, 2017), thereby frustrating any economies 
of scale.  Where land is being expropriated, programmes that could be used to re-educate and 
retrain displaced smallholders were said by TVET administrators to be unable to accommodate 
a surge of recently displaced smallholders due to a lack of qualified instructors. 
Administrators noted that while annual Ministry of Education funding is routine, TVETs 
are also funded by student fees.  Unlike university education, attendance at a TVET requires the 
payment of course fees immediately upon registration and as the fees increase for more 
advanced courses, students rapidly drop out of the programmes (MoE, 2015).  To an outsider, 
the TVET fee schedule appears reasonable, but as the administrator of one vocational centre 
explained, many families cannot afford them and therefore otherwise well-qualified and 
promising students who would benefit from vocational training do not complete the full 
programme.  As a negative consequence of depressed enrolment due to fee schedules, course 
offerings and programmes remain small since Ministry of Education subsidy formulas fund 
TVET centres based upon previous year student numbers.  This results in both long term socio-
economic inequalities and a slowing of Ethiopia’s economic growth due to a lack of qualified 
workers. 
Gendered Aspects of Vocational Education and Training    
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As Knowles (1973) described, adult students tend to focus their non-formal education 
programmes in subject areas with which they are already familiar.  An administrator of the 
Lalibela TVET noted that his urban agriculture programme, which was just one-year old at the 
time of the field interview, already comprised 15% of the increasingly rural student body and that 
women made up the bulk of those enrolees.  Women were especially interested in his poultry-
raising program because that field is quickly and predictably profitable and they saw the long-
term earnings potential upon which their prior agricultural experiences could build.    
In order to correct past biases, Ethiopia’s vocational programme strategy promotes non-
formal programmes which “cater to the education needs of out-of-school children and adults, 
with special emphasis on women” (MoE, 2008: 12).  Reduced entry requirements compensate 
for the traditionally low level of emphasis that both families and the school system have given to 
girl’s education (Belete, 2011; MoE, 2010).  Thus, each of the eight vocational centres visited 
had enrolled women with lower entrance scores than men must attain.  Yet, according to each 
of the centre administrators who were interviewed, women graduated with the same degree of 
proficiency as men.  A representative response from administrators was:   
“Women come here with lower scores than men have achieved but the Ministry policy 
is to admit them.  They generally turn out to be very good students and are very practical 
minded.  They take classes to develop business opportunities.  Sometimes a wereda or 
kebele official will ask me to admit a woman who can’t pass the entrance exam and since 
they control my budget I don’t see any problem with doing a small favour for them.  Often, 
those women turn out to be some of our best students.” 
TVET Director, September 2015 (Interview 2) 
Women, who slightly outnumbered men in the eight TVET institutions visited, were more 
likely to register for curriculums that resulted in long-term employment opportunities such as 
furniture making rather than in a field such as construction which rapidly expands and contracts 
according to economic pulses.  Perhaps not coincidently, women own 65% of Ethiopia’s micro-
enterprises and 26% of its small manufacturing shops (Adam, 2014).  However, several TVET 
administrations stated women’s programmes tend to lack connectivity within other departments 
of government.  Coordination between vocational training and micro-credit programmes, for 
example is both uncommon and ineffective, and so larger returns on the investments made in 
woman’s training may be lost (Cohen & Lemma, 2011) until these differences are addressed.     
While women are rightfully recognized as having been denied adequate primary and 
secondary educational opportunities, the vocational centre administrators interviewed also felt 
the current emphasis upon women may be failing to take into account the growing retraining 
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needs of displaced adult men who are losing their livelihood to land use changes and 
expropriations.  Thus, a gender-based admittance policy may artificially limit the availability of 
vocational and livelihood training opportunities for male smallholders who are culturally the 
primary family wage earners. Ultimately as with academic programmes, the effectiveness of 
vocational training is not only dependent upon standards of quality assurance but also whether 
it addresses the short and long-term needs of the community (Baraki & van Kemenade, 2013).   
6.6 TVETs and Stakeholders 
Stakeholders within the TVET programme include students and administrators, as well 
as local business owners who meet with programme administrators to exchange the newest 
techniques and discuss the short term occupational needs of local markets.  Administrators at 
each of the TVET centres described this as a powerful feedback mechanism to improve the 
quality of instruction and to make curriculum changes, as well as to learn why some graduates 
were not being hired.  Their meetings produced three reported observations.  
First, TVETs and Community Skills Training centres are operated by the Ministry of 
Education, not by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.  This results in a gap between the 
vocational programmes offered and the needs of the community as anticipated by labour 
surveys (CSA, 2014d).  Thus, a simple expansion of the capacity to enrol additional students in 
a vocational training programme that is unsupported by economic and labour market forecasts 
could easily result in an under or oversupply of manual trades workers as those markets 
cyclically shift their requirements (ILO, 2017).  
Second, as Cernea (2004) asserts, while new skills can be adequately learned through 
vocational training experiences there are few times where local demand for those skills is not 
already being filled by the market. In practice therefore, a too-rapid growth in the availability of 
newly-trained carpenters, electricians, brick masons, equipment operators or some other 
transiently popular programme may only depress local wages if sufficient and suitable 
employment is not available to absorb new workers.  This is a condition that mirrors the situation 
created by an over-supply of university graduates where course curriculum is not matched to 
projected needs throughout the national economy.   
Third, despite what should be observable market demand most male students have 
short-term planning horizons and frequently enrolled in courses for which there was an 
immediate shortage of workers rather than taking a longer view of local employment markets or 
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national economic trends.  Although TVET administrators advise these students avoid the 
situation of labour saturation, administrators and career counsellors concluded that it is 
ultimately the student’s decision regarding what programme they will enrol in:    
“We want to be known as successful and so we always advise students regarding 
what sort of jobs we think are going to be available, though we don’t have access to any 
market surveys to prove our recommendations.  Students enrol in the classes they want to 
enrol in and we hope they are successful.  Many are, but many others are not because there 
just isn’t a need for all of our offerings.  Currently, construction and furniture making are 
popular choices because building projects are all around us and workers have money to buy 
furniture.  But if the economy slows there will be fewer construction projects and the workers 
will no longer be able to afford furniture.”     
TVET Administrator, July 2015 (Interview 7) 
The consensus of the TVET administrators who were interviewed was that if the student, 
including both younger and older students, insists upon making the wrong career choice; is 
unable to assimilate into non-farm employment; or is simply not adept in the chosen 
occupational field, there are no curriculum adjustments that can guarantee successful 
employment. 
6.7 Older Vocational Students 
To build on TVET success, a programme known as “Integrated Functional Adult 
Education” (IFAE) is available to youth and adults from the ages of 15 to 60 years and who have 
not been able to attend or complete earlier schooling; with instruction in reading, writing and 
arithmetic skills.  The principal objectives of this programme are to create measurable 
improvements in basic adult literacy, sustained economic development that is achieved through 
non-formal education programmes, and improvements in democracy and governance (MoE, 
2010).  Successful graduation from this two-year programme allows the individual to apply for 
admission to local Technical Vocational Education Training centres without having graduated 
from secondary school (MoE, 2015).   
In their study of ‘Integrated Functional Adult Education’, Awgichew & Seyoum (2017: 90) 
found IFAE was likely to provide a range of primary and secondary educational outcomes 
including “literacy, numeracy and other skills development … making use of inputs from other 
development workers” and so its influence is, potentially, very broad.  Yet, among the older 
smallholders interviewed none were aware of the programme or its potental to provide them 
with an alternative pathway to enter TVET (MoE, 2008; MoE, 2015).   
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As people age, they associate greater meaning and emotional attachment to group and 
place than they do to personally expansive goals (Carstensen, 2006).  Where training is 
intended to provide new information that is not simply a reinforcement of past experiences the 
choice to participate is, Atherton (1999) posited, strongly influenced by the social outcome the 
potential learner considers may result from that education or training.  This becomes especially 
so among older individuals as they see life changing outcomes as a potential threat to their 
long-held group identity, one which may challenge their “emotional investment in beliefs or 
practices, or by the greater disturbances caused by efforts to change them” (Ibid: 78).  Those 
challenges are not necessarily, Atherton continued, posed by ‘big issues’ that directly assault 
social norms but more often by those which create a series of small confrontations regarding 
their individual behaviour and beliefs, or threaten their group membership.   
These group memberships are important to whatever degree of civil resistance 
smallholders might be able to mount in response to their displacement.  As Shock (2013: 282) 
noted, mobilization occurs through formal and informal ties to the community, although “the 
tendency for traditional mobilization is to be defensive rather than change oriented.”  Without 
those group ties however, there is no foundation for social organization.  
6.7.1  Older Smallholders and Vocational Training 
The aging process itself has an influence upon the decision to enrol in adult learning.  
Reitz, et al., (2014: 287) noted that friendship networks become increasingly important as 
people age and the size of their social networks decreases, forming “an increasing focus on a 
few close relationships across adulthood.”   
Writing about adult education and vocational training in the United Kingdom, Crowther 
(2000: 479) concluded that attendees tend to be the least disadvantaged in society and this 
includes those who are younger; from higher social classes who can afford to participate in 
educational programmes; and, those who are already educated.  Non-participants are “typically 
older, working class; with a minimum of education; from lower socioeconomic groups, women 
and the unemployed.”  In the United States, Maurer (2001) found a lack of willingness among 
trainers to engage with older workers who will not have sufficient time left in the employment 
market to make their training cost effective, and noted this is reinforced by a frequent lack of 
self-confidence among older workers.  Thus, older displaced smallholders easily fit the profile of 
those who typically choose not to participate in adult education and who may be shunned by the 
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programmes designed to assist them.  This becomes even more noticeable with the avoidance 
of individual risk which is motivated by the possibility of failure (Henrich & McElreath, 2002; 
Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2009).   
Time Horizons of Older Students 
In Ethiopia, the shorter planning horizons of older smallholders67 may explain why they 
are less likely to seek rehabilitative training or to learn new skills which are outside of their 
previous life experiences.  As a result, they may become more willing to acquiesce to their 
displacement with its diminished social and economic conditions rather than learn new 
employment skills.  Several vocational centre administrators explained their own admission 
priorities in terms of the length of time younger attendees might use their new skills as opposed 
to the shorter-lived economic returns of older students:   
“We have no older students here because they do not have the academic background 
needed to apply, even though most could learn the trades we teach if they wanted to do that.  
Our focus is on younger workers.  Younger workers have a longer period they can use their 
skills and so it makes sense to train them instead of older people who might only work three 
or four years before they choose to retire.” 
Vocational Center Administrator, July 2015 (Interview2) 
Though the government does offer rehabiliative training opportunities for older workers, 
such as the 30-day short-courses at the Community Skills Centre or the Integrated Functional 
Adult Education programme, only a small number of displaced smallholders appeared to take 
advantage of them.  TVET administrators explained several issues pertaining to the degree of 
acceptance and internalization of the instruction by older students and how this also influenced 
their selection of older, displaced smallholders for matriculation:   
 
 
 
“Few of our students are older, those who are usually do not take our short course 
information seriously.  They want to keep doing things the way they’ve always done them, 
even though their circumstances have changed greatly from their farms to their lives in town 
where agriculture is different.  We ensure our instructors visit the new businesses former 
students start to help us better prepare future classes, and so we see our instruction is 
simply ineffective for many of the older students  The short courses are otherwise well 
attended by people who are trying to start their lives over.” 
Vocational Center Administrator, July 2015 (Interview 10) 
 
6.7.2  Success Among Older Vocational Students 
                                                             
67  Life expectancy in Ethiopia is currently 67 years for women and 64 years for men (WB, 2017).  
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Success among Ethiopia’s older vocational graduates does occur.  A field interview 
which began in the office of the administrator of an urban TVET quickly progressed to a visit to a 
local poultry raising site whose operators had attended a 30-day short course.  After completing 
training, a married couple who had been displaced from a nearby small hold by residential 
development rented a plot of ground and began to raise egg laying chickens.  In the seven 
months since they had begun their business they were able to establish a brood of 
approximately 400 chickens whose eggs are sold in local markets for ETB 3 each, for a net 
income of approximately ETB 10,000 per month.  This micro-entrepreneur said the operation 
provides her with: 
“a very quick way to earn a lot of money with the help of a micro-business loan.  Our 
problem now is to find a new, larger location where we can raise even more chickens but one 
that will [also] reduce the possibility of a single sickness wiping out our entire flock.”  
Urban poultry producer, July 2015 (Interview 8) 
However, older smallholders are often unwilling to undertake radical change and learn 
new non-farm skills.  Thus, it is unlikely they will find suitable employment because there remain  
younger and newly experienced applicants who do not pose the same physiological or skills 
limitations older workers do (Crowther, 2000).  This situation was neatly summed by a graduate 
of a TVET east of Addis Ababa who had joined with nine other graduates to form their own 
construction business: 
“Some of our parents still farm their plots near here but many have been bought out 
and lost their land, so most of us had no option other than to learn a trade instead of 
becoming the farmers we’d imagined as children.  The ten of us met five years ago while we 
were studying at the vocational centre and afterward we formed our own construction 
business.  For people who want to work hard and learn to do new things, going into business 
is easy though we’ve been very lucky.  The project here is a new government center with a 
medical clinc attached.  We hire extra workers as we need them and pay ETB 80 per day, 
which is not very much but the work is not skilled.  Mainly it involves carrying materials from 
one spot to another or holding things for the more skilled workers to finish.  Many of our 
workers are older farmers who our families know, but who’ve developed no new skills and so 
we can’t pay them more because that would upset the skilled workers.”  
Entrepreneur, Legatafo, August 2015 (Interview 31) 
This realization of physical and aptitude limitations appeared to influence smallholder 
decisions to forego livelihood retraining where it was available and as they regressed into 
familiar peer groups and social settings, only choosing to partake in training or to find work 
when it was absolutely necessary after their land payments are exhausted.  Rather than 
enroilling in vocational programs themselves, older smallholders in the study area were strongly 
supportive of the programme of instruction delivered through TVETs as a legitimate and 
potential means for their children to obtain a more secure livelihood.  
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6.8 Emigration 
As described earlier, Ethiopia’s educational system has resulted in the over-qualification 
of graduates relative to the employment opportunities available.  This imbalance has resulted in 
increased emigration of graduates with advanced skills out of Ethiopia.  Long-term emigrés 
have typically completed programmes in engineering, agricultural technology, and medical 
specialities, making them among the most expensively educated and skilled graduates in 
Ethiopia (Nunn, 2005; Demissie, 2018).  During field interviews, educators at the university level 
noted Ethiopia’s trend towards under-employment and several described emigration as one 
method their students are using to cope with the poorly performing employment market.  One 
instructor succinctly described the social costs of emigration to the process of national 
development:  
“There are not enough good jobs for graduates here and  they are often able to earn 
far better salaries in other African countries, in Europe or the United States.  That deprives us 
of the people and talent needed to expand our manufacturing industries.” 
Maths instructor, private university, July 2015 (Interview 9) 
Figures for total emigration indicate that it had declined in both real numbers and as a 
percentage of the population during the economically expansive post-conflict years of the 
1990’s as predictable growth and development patterns were directing the economy.  However, 
expatriation began to increase again among both the youngest and oldest age groups as the 
economy began to slow (UNDESA, 2013) (Figure 6.4).  One explanation for the continued 
decline within the 25-to-44 year age groups is that emigration is often undertaken by unmarried 
people who are able to easily relocate (Interview 20).  The stability of marriage temporarily 
decreases the likelihood of mobility due to the birth of children (Vertovec, 2007; Fransen & 
Kushminder, 2009).  The subsequent emancipation of their children as they reach adulthood 
releases the now older and potentially better-skilled parents who are once again in search for 
employment opportunities or new life experiences choose to emigrate.   
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Although attendance at Ethiopia’s elementary and secondary schools is free, university 
education is not (Johnstone, 2003).  The losses incurred by the nation as a result of emigration 
are two-fold.  The first, and most obvious, is that the student takes her education with her.  This 
deprives the nation of her potential contributions to its economic and social development.  The 
second is less apparent as repayment of university fees only becomes required once the 
graduate is employed and her name is sent to the Ministry of Labour for cross-matching with the 
Ministry of Education to ascertain what is owed (MoE, 2015).  Repayments are then deducted 
through structured salary garnishments.  Departing the country for work abroad enables the 
graduate to avoid repayment.  This creates a simultaneous financial and intellectual drain as the 
government neither recoups its financial investment nor gains a social benefit.  This minimizes 
Ethiopia’s scarce resources as well as reduces the ability of the nation to alleviate poverty in 
rural areas, as fewer and less-capable graduates remain, adding to Ethiopia’s on-going 
development challenges (WB, 2003).   
Emigration Destinations 
Highly skilled émigrés often choose western nations to practice their skills.  As example, 
“the nation's health minister has complained there are more Ethiopian doctors in Chicago [USA] 
than in his own country” (Foreman, 2013: 2).  However, poor and unskilled workers also 
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emigrate.  Among them, poor men often find themselves becoming barely-paid labourers on 
remote construction projects or operating dangerous equipment in hazardous conditions.  Poor 
Ethiopian women without formal education were often found to have migrated to nations in the 
Middle East where there is a high demand for unskilled labour such as housekeepers and cooks 
(Demissie, 2018).  Numerous examples of unskilled women who had taken employment outside 
of Ethiopia were found during the field work. In each case, their experiences were disappointing 
and resulted in their return to Ethiopia, though they were still unskilled and in at least three 
cases these women had forfeited their opportunities to complete junior elementary or lower 
secondary schooling: 
“I moved here after I got divorced.  The only thing I knew how to do was make tela.  It 
was a good business until the wereda widened the road for the new housing project.  Now 
people pass by too quickly to notice that I’m here, but without any education there are no 
other jobs from a woman like me.  My daughter left school when she was 14 years old to work 
in Saudi Arabia as a servant.  We arranged her employment and travel through a broker, but 
when she arrived there she was almost kept as a prisoner.  They took her passport and 
refused to pay her for the work she did.  She escaped after two years and returned here but 
now she is too old to attend school.  She has no skills and no job other than helping me make 
tela.”        
Entrepreneur, July 2015 (Interview 24) 
 
Yet, it is this group of social and cultural risk-takers who are the engine of national 
economic redevelopment.  Thus, the collective loss of both the highly educated and the 
ambitious poor to countries outside of Ethiopia wastes resources and undermines the very 
growth and development it seeks.  
6.9 Conclusion and Emerging Findings 
This chapter began by describing the educational process in Ethiopia, noting that shortly 
after the revolution in 1991 the nation’s educational system had achieved an increased level of 
quality, innovation and professionalism which has since been lost.  While Ethiopia’s educational 
system is now able to provide almost universal access to elementary level education, only 47% 
of students complete the eighth grade (MoE, 2015).  Paradoxically, the same system produces 
a surplus of secondary and university educated graduates who often become unemployed or 
under-employed for lack of appropriate opportunities (ILO, 2017).   
The chapter also explored the second objective of the thesis regarding education and its 
economic and social disparities.  It highlighted that vocational retraining programmes for 
displaced smallholders are technically available but generally out of their reach due to social or 
educational reasons and that even newly degreed professionals may be unable to find 
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employment in their professions.  As unemployment looms even for professionals, they are 
frequently forced into situations of under-employment.  This displaces workers with fewer skills 
who then displace workers with even fewer skills. Yet, under-employment not only drives down 
wages, it has adverse psychological consequences that have been shown to result in political 
instability and violence, which then cause further economic slowing and loss of employment 
(Desta, 2012; Desalegn, 2016; ADBG, 2017).   
Access to education at the elementary school level is almost universal.  Rural students 
however, are at a disadvantage as the distance to secondary schools often create 
insurmountable transportation costs which virtually precludes their attendance.  In addition to 
the cost of transportation, safety concerns among girls, and the withdrawal of government 
funding for local schools that create educational service deserts, prevent further attendance by 
the majority of rural students.  These barriers create horizontal inequalities between rural and 
urban areas and deepen existing conditions of poverty and unemployment.  As rural youth 
remain educationally unqualified there are fewer pathways available for them to access skills-
producing vocational training or higher-level academic education.   
Numeracy and literacy programmes are available that might lead to admittance to 
vocational training for older workers.  However, few had knowledge of them, especially older 
displaced smallholders, thus few had the ability to make an informed choice as to whether to 
attend them.  Even if those smallholders had been aware of these programmes, vocational 
centre administrators were reluctant to admit them since space is limited and the working life of 
an older smallholder is far shorter than that of a recent secondary school graduate.  Older 
workers too, noting a loss of their physical abilities, may limit attempting a new vocation and 
prefer to remain with their peer groups. 
The observations of the public and private university researchers who were interviewed, 
and both grey and academic literature, find the decline in Ethiopia’s educational quality, initially 
noted in 2003 (Saint, 2004) was a result of a too rapid-expansion in enrolments.  That decline 
accompanied by other socio-cultural influences, has subsequently increased labour costs as 
new hires must frequently be trained, educated and socialized before they can become 
productive employees.  Manufacturing sector leaders state this need for retraining delays 
expansion and diversification of the industrial centres which might become a more suitable 
generator for the employment of both graduates and the displaced smallholders who are 
increasingly becoming assimilated into urbanized areas.  
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Emigration has historically been a means for the best educated to provide for 
themselves and their families, or as an escape from local poverty or other adverse social or 
political conditions.  Emigration drains both the best educated, and greatest risk takers, groups 
critical for social and economic development.  At the same time, the current derth of appropriate 
employment opportunities for both displaced smallholders and better educated youth is resulting 
in groups whose need for economic stability and social mobility are increasingly similar and 
unmet.   
Exclusion from personal economic advancement is occasioning an already politically 
and economically damaging increase in civil disturbances among the educated.  Bandura 
(1982) and Udogu (2005) suggest that as this group has already experienced personal success 
as they had advanced through the educational system, this may lead to elevated expectations 
for the future.  Thus, unemployed graduates may be less willing to accept their situation, and 
therefore more willing to engage in civil disobedience to draw attention to wider economic and 
employment conditions (Desalegn, 2016; Okafor, 2017).   
Finally, both academic and vocational institution administrators observed that while 
students often made poor career training choices, there are simply not enough formal 
employment opportunities available in Ethiopia.  However, among the unskilled, a narrowly 
tailored training course, such as urban poultry raising, was observed to be highly successful and 
profitable.  These courses met specific market needs and satisfied local demand for services. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
7.0  Introduction 
 The objective of this thesis was to interrogate the ways development unintentionally 
contributes to new strata of poverty and internal instability.  There is a rich literature concerning 
the displacement resulting from Ethiopia’s infrastructure projects and international land leasing, 
yet a similar examination of the effects of expropriation and ex situ ousting due to residential 
development such as is occurring east and north of Addis Ababa is largely absent.  Ethiopia’s 
successful economic growth and social development policies and programmes have clearly 
benefited the majority of the population.  They have resulted in higher real incomes; improved 
healthcare; greater access to education; and, better quality of life.  Yet, unintended adverse 
effects have also emerged.   
Among these are the permanent ousting of hundreds of thousands of smallholders in 
Addis Ababa’s peripheral areas (Home, 2016) to accommodate the housing needs of an 
increasingly prosperous urban middle class.  This has permanently displaced smallholders who 
have few skills with which to begin new livelihoods.   At the same time, a substantial expansion 
of educational opportunities has taken place, extending from elementary school to the university 
level.  Yet, Ethiopia’s employment policies have remained closely tied to agriculture while little 
social investment has been made in the expansion of the manufacturing base or the inculcation 
of the necessary work and life skills that are required by employers (Mbate, 2016).  Thus, while 
improved access has resulted in a more highly educated youth, a substantial number of that 
cohort are unemployed or under-employed and they have become socially displaced in-situ.   
Desk research first considered the highly erratic economic growth subsequent to the 
assumption of power by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front in 1991, 
followed by the calming effect of former Prime Minister Zenawi’s development plans which were 
introduced in 2002.  Growth in national GDP reached a peak of 12.6% per annum in 2005 
though that rate slowed to a still robust 8% in 2015.  Although recent information suggests GDP 
is rebounding, there is not yet enough data available to indicate a clear upward trend (NBE, 
2017).  These outcomes have contributed to conditions leading to both new strata of peri-urban 
poverty among displaced smallholders and civil unrest among an educated youth which 
ultimately undermine Ethiopia’s investment in its economic and social development. 
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7.1  Main Findings 
This research had two main objectives.  First, to examine the role of Ethiopia’s state-led 
development policy in delivering outcomes that support equitable and inclusive pro-poor growth. 
Second, to identify the social, cultural, and economic dynamics of these government-led 
development programmes among two disparate groups: young graduates and smallholder 
farmers, particularly within and around the city of Addis Ababa.  The findings are formed of six 
interrelated themes which reveal unintentional outcomes of the physical, economic, and social 
displacement resulting from development.  These themes are: Ethiopia’s pro-poor policies; its 
education policies; delayed manufacturing starts; employment; liminality; and groupism.  
Displacement is a pervasive and cross-cutting issue.  Ethiopia’s successful policies have 
created a more prosperous urban-middle class who are now causing the ousting of smallholders 
who lose their primary means of livelihood and income.  Yet, of the 46 smallholders interviewed, 
fully 37 spontaneously offered that they continue to consider themselves to be ‘farmers’ before 
they are anything else.  This strong group self-identification was confirmed by informed local 
residents who have watched as smallholders are displaced from their livelihoods yet often 
choose not to take alternative employment until it has become absolutely necessary.  When 
they do take employment, it is most often menial, outdoor, and low paid work which somewhat 
resembles their previous work as farmers.   
Conversely, conversations with students who have become liminaly displaced indicated 
they are no longer the same person following their education.  Their accomplishments and 
educational experiences had made them ‘larger’ and different than during their previous lives 
and, in the case of rural students, they knew they have become capable of far more than 
returning to plough the fields.  Of the approximately 35 students who were encountered, most 
related they had taken positions whose demands are well below their original expectations and 
new abilities.   
In both circumstances, displacement has resulted in a state of liminality, where 
displacees neither belonged to their previous lives and livelihoods, nor had they fully entered the 
next phase of their lives.  In this sense, both smallholders and students have become physically 
and socially displaced (See figure 7.1). 
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Fig. 7.1 
Objectives Expected Findings Observations 
Pro-poor Policies: to 
investigate the effect of 
Ethiopia’s centralized 
developmental policies 
Social and economic policies 
would result in significantly 
greater opportunity and 
enhanced lifestyles for 
Ethiopians.  
While Ethiopia’s pro-poor policies have 
resulted in longer life spans, increased access 
to medical care, and distress food distribution 
programmes, access to those, and others 
benefits, is often predicated upon support for 
the elected government rather than individual 
or family need.   
Educational Policies: 
to observe and 
investigate the delivery 
and outcome of 
instruction at each level 
of the system.  
Educational programmes would 
provide a greater access to 
employment and this would 
elevate the earnings of all 
Ethiopians.  
While access to education is generally 
universal, and strongly supported by rural 
parents, non-completion rates are high among 
students who observe their peers have not 
benefitted from even junior secondary school.  
Older students were often jobless or under-
employed due to a lack of demand for their 
educational background. 
Delayed Industry & 
Manufacturing: to 
better understand the 
lack of industrial and 
manufacturing 
enterprises in the study 
area.  
Industry and manufacturing 
would be in the early stages of 
growth and that industrial training 
programmes would be available 
to meet employment demand.   
Although several small industries and clothing 
mills were observed in peri-urban 
communities, managers stated they had great 
difficulty hiring suitably skilled workers.  Rural 
workers were generally unable to assimilate 
into the rote indoor manufacturing processes 
that industry requires.   
Employment: to 
investigate the 
generally subsistence 
level of employment 
among urban and rural 
residents. 
Employment generating 
industries, businesses and 
services would easily hire 
displaced smallholders, newly 
graduated students or other 
youth. 
Cultural and group-based traditional practices 
continue despite their often detrimental effect 
on modernization.  Potential workers still 
eschew employment in manufacturing, 
hindering national development.  
Liminality: to better 
understand the process 
of personal change. 
Personal transitions from rural to 
urban lives or from educational to 
employment paradigms would be 
smoothened through educational 
and social programmes. 
Both graduated students and displaced 
smallholders were frustrated with their inability 
to enter into new lives and livelihoods.  They 
were often not socially accepted into new 
groups and struggled to develop new 
identities.   
Groupism: to observe 
the impact of peer 
group relations. 
That while important socially, 
there would be relatively little 
other influence of groups; that 
groups could be easily entered or 
departed.   
Peer groups where enormously important to 
the social and economic navigation of 
smallholders. They determined the livelihood 
direction of smallholders following their 
ousting.  As a result, smallholders remained 
within their established peer relationships, 
often to their own detriment. 
 
While there is no assertion made here that smallholder displacement contributes to 
youth unemployment, research finds a strong effect upon the employment of displaced 
smallholders as students / youth take jobs for which they are overqualified.  This does, however, 
result in unemployment among unskilled workers, including displaced smallholders (Barnichon 
& Zylberberg, 2015).  Therefore, development policies must be comprehensive and address 
such foreseeable unintended outcomes early in the planning process.  
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A Constructivist Approach  
Selection of the three study areas was based on discussions with aid workers; with 
United States and United Kingdom embassy officials; and others with extensive professional 
knowledgeable of conditions in Ethiopia.  Population movement was successfully and regularly 
observed in each of those areas.  However, forced displacement and its effects were only 
observed in the primary study area to the east and north of Addis Ababa.   
Taking its cue from those who are experiencing both individual and shared 
displacement, the research question (“In what ways does development unintentionally 
contribute to new strata of poverty and internal instability?”) is answered through a constructivist 
approach in terms of “what is thought and what is lived” (Mills, et al., 2006: 2) as it examined 
Ethiopia’s development objectives and pro-poor strategies.  Each of the three geographically 
dispersed study areas is contending with increased growth and different forms of development.  
Interviews of key informants throughout each area revealed locally recognized and significant 
issues of under-employment among newly educated youth, especially among secondary school 
and university graduates as well as the generalized lack of motivation by older small holders 
who have left their fields to participate in the labour market.   
While observations of expropriation and rurbanization were limited to the areas 
contiguous to Addis Ababa, the findings here are not intended to suggest that forced 
displacement is not occurring elsewhere in Ethiopia.  Moreover while the opinions provided by 
key informants, and the researchers own observations, apply only to the study areas and are 
therefore not assumed to be entirely replicable in other localities in Ethiopia, there are useful 
generalizable conclusions.   
7.1.1  Pro-poor Policies 
Since the 1991 revolution which overthrew the Marxist-oriented Dergue government, 
Ethiopia’s centralized, pro-poor social interventions have resulted in better diets and 
advancements in health care, especially in maternal, infant and elder care.  These have resulted 
in much healthier and longer lives.  Overall poverty has been reduced, and per capita income 
has increased from US$133/GB£85 in 1995 to $590/GB£471 as of April 2017 (WB, 2017b).  
Likewise, new roads are paved or cobblestoned and access to electricity has significantly 
improved.  Key to achieving these results, and the stabilization of the erratic post-war economy, 
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was former Prime Minster Zenawi’s evolving programme of centralized economic growth and 
social development.  From the initiation of his first plan in 2002, Ethiopia’s economy grew 
quickly and then stabilized.   
Inadvertently, the success of Zenawi’s policies have now created a series of oustings as 
small holds in the urban periphery of Addis Ababa are expropriated to accommodate new 
demand for residential dwellings and commercial space.  Observations suggest this ousting has 
atomized rural communities and their social networks.  It prevents political organization by 
former residents who might contest their ousting and their newly degraded economic condition.  
Thus, pro-poor policies have not evenly, nor necessarily, benefited all segments of society and 
in spite of its high economic growth rate, Ethiopia continues to be among the poorest nations in 
the world (Gebreeyesus, 2014) since many of the poor remain poor.   
These outcomes are not representative of the post-conflict economies that are predicted 
in the literature (i.e., Cevik & Rahmati, 2013; Del Castillo & Bunch, 2015) but are a reflection of 
Ethiopia’s own form of government and the development choices and policies it has chosen to 
pursue.  Nyasha, et al., (2017) conclude that pro-poor policies do not always have a positive 
impact upon the very poor, and they found Ethiopia’s policies have been more instrumental in 
improving the economic circumstances of the new middle class.  As discussed in Chapter 5, 
Ethiopia’s pro-poor policies have addressed many issues, but have not resolved the multi-
dimensional character of poverty including its “voicelessness and powerlessness” (Daubon, 
2005; Haile, 2015: 14).   
7.1.2  Educational Policies and Outcomes 
The developmental policies which Ethiopia has instituted, and which were explored 
through Chapter 6, have dramatically increased access to elementary and secondary schools, 
and the federal Ministry of Education (MoE, 2015) is rightfully credited for achieving the almost 
universal availability of local schools.  Yet while far more children than ever before are being 
educated, for a variety of reasons attendance is often low and completion rates are 
disappointing, especially for rural children.   
Throughout the field work area, children who would have been expected to be in school 
were observed to be engaged in the informal labour market, often as horse cart drivers, shoe 
shiners, or in other unskilled work.  Such jobs do not provide these youth with the training or 
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problem solving skills necessary to take more appropriate employment as they come of age and 
their adult needs change.   
Without the ability to obtain decent employment, their social acceptance into adulthood 
is delayed.  Consequently, they can often neither marry nor begin the next stage of their lives as 
independent men and women (Honwana, 2013; ILO, 2013).  In a larger context, their lack of 
education and skills frustrates the development of the nation as investors and foreign 
manufacturers who are attempting to establish new facilities are unable to find suitable workers.  
This hinders the ability of the nation to evolve from a primarily agrarian society to one which 
creates employment through manufacturing and technology (MoE, 2015).   
The Effects of Too-Rapid Growth in Tertiary Educational  
Given Ethiopia’s fast growing population, the rapid growth of its education system has 
also meant that training and education resources are stretched extremely thin and this affects 
the quality of instruction.  Key informants observed that Ethiopia’s educational and cultural 
structure have not given sufficient emphasis to the development of appropriate work habits and 
social skills for what will become a potential labour force of some 82 million by the year 2030 
(Yirdaw, 2016; WB, 2017c).  The cultural lack of proper work habits and interpersonal skills 
manifests in four principal ways.  These include (i) a failure to show up for work or to meet work 
deadlines; (ii) continued engagement in risky personal behaviour (Carrier & Klantschnig, 2012); 
(iii) a reluctance to train in new skills; and (iv) the propensity to reject employment or training 
options which would lead away from personal and place identities in ways that might threaten 
long-held peer group associations (Galbin, 2014).  Therefore, in addition to what has become a 
lower quality educational process, the active failure to acquire ‘modern’ habits and skills 
preclude many smallholders and graduates from a successful entry into the labour market.  This 
further restrains Ethiopia’s manufacturing expansion.    
Similarly, as a lack of appropriate employment opportunities increasingly force graduates 
into circumstances below their educational expectations, they lose confidence in and become 
impatient with the Ethiopian government.  While public demonstrations are viewed by the 
government as threats to the fabric of society, participation in them by students has become 
more frequent as employment opportunities are scarce and paternalistic social benefits are 
offered in their place.  The sometimes violent civil dissension of youth who are demanding 
decent work is being securitized by the government as an existential threat to Ethiopia’s core 
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tradition of mengist social and cultural values, and has been met by increasingly repressive 
measures.   
 
7.1.3  Delayed Industry & Manufacturing 
Despite developmental advances and decades of social and economic progress, the 
overwhelming majority of Ethiopians remain smallholding subsistence-farmers who possess few 
non-farm skills (CSA, 2012; Bohnet, et al., 2016).  Both the literature and field observations 
strongly suggest the dual emphasis by the government upon labour-intensive agriculture and 
higher education has contributed to the slowed expansion of entry and mid-level manufacturing 
enterprises.  This has simultaneously, and circularly, resulted in a deficit of employment 
opportunities for graduates.  As late as 2014, the manufacturing sector accounted for just 4.4% 
of GDP (see footnote #49) a figure which was “only 0.2 percentage points higher than its share 
in 2005” (Seid, et al., 2015: 7).  The lack of manufacturing capacity and other commercial 
employment is restricting the growth of manufacturing and employment opportunities are not 
capable of keeping pace with Ethiopia’s rapidly increasing population or its now better-educated 
youth.  Consequently, as noted in section 1.3, a large segment (54%) of that youthful cohort is 
currently either unemployed or under-employed (Yirdaw, 2016; ILO, 2017).   
Younger smallholders were particularly frustrated by their lack of useful non-farm skills 
and by the inadequacy of the training opportunities that are available to them (AU, 2007; Belete, 
2011).  Post-displacement, few of the younger smallholders who were interviewed had been 
able to find employment that approached their previous earnings or which provided them with 
similar levels of autonomy their families had enjoyed on their farms.  While rural children and 
early teens were sometimes able to become relatively well paid horse cart drivers or shoe shine 
boys, those jobs are not culturally appropriate for adults to engage in.   
Economic Impact Upon Nearby Communities 
Several kebele officials who were interviewed stated the ousting and rapid movement of 
large numbers of unskilled smallholders into the nearby villages and towns has now adversely 
affected the employment options and earnings of peri-urban residents.  As noted in Chapter 2, 
newcomers drive down local wages and they and their families consume finite housing and 
social services such as health care and education in the communities into which they relocate.  
Thus, the localized movement of displaced smallholders has a wide-ranging and observable 
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socio-economic impact, portending an environment poised for increased levels of poverty and 
social animosity.   
New training and educational opportunities have delayed the entry of youth into the 
labour market, and this temporarily relieves the immediate pressure upon the government to 
stimulate employment (Eight, 2013).  While vocational graduates are finding fewer opportunities 
to work in the trades due to the slowing construction sector, professional graduates are 
increasingly unable to find adequate employment within their fields of study.  Here, the absence 
of suitable employment degrades their perishable academic and technical skills and results in a 
loss of currency in their specialism.  Therefore, educational-over subscription begins a chain of 
under-employment which can push many low and unskilled workers, who may already be at the 
bottom of the labour structure, out of the job market and potentially into persistent poverty.   
7.1.4  Employment 
Although economic growth and social development policies have dramatically improved 
living conditions for a majority of Ethiopia’s population, some groups have been injured and 
others have not fully realized the anticipated outcomes of their efforts.  This is leading to 
widening class divisions, fraternal relative deprivation, and horizontal inequality among the rural 
poor (Jayne, et al., 2014).  At the same time, as described by eight of the educational experts 
who were interviewed and by the former Prime Minister, better educated youth are becoming 
increasingly under-employed as the economy is unable to absorb their growing numbers or to 
use their more highly developed skills.  These graduates are rejecting compensatory forms of 
social net protections and are increasingly demanding decent and appropriate employment, 
sometimes violently.  
In the short term the lack of proper employment opportunities has led to unrest and 
political violence among some segments of the youth cohort.  In the long term this has resulted 
in a further slowing of the economy as violence and the increasing potential of political discord 
reduce foreign investment in the very manufacturing enterprises that might otherwise create 
employment for both blue-collar workers and entry level managers (ADBG, 2017).  Likewise, as 
export markets remain generally under-developed, the lack of skills, and individual acumen 
among workers also inhibits the creation of employment in value added industries.  This has 
contributed to an increase in emigration, graphed in Figure 6.4.  The continued lack of 
professional employment in Ethiopia entices an increasing number of the most highly educated 
to emigrate.  This directly reduces the developmental capability of the nation through the loss of 
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the most talented individuals, while posing a substantial financial cost to the nation as the 
recoupment of their university attendance fees is not possible.  Thus, the successes of 
development and education have inadvertently resulted in other forms of under-employment 
and unemployment, and Ethiopia’s growth and developmental success has by-passed many 
among its neediest population.  
However, several of the educational experts who were interviewed did state that 
students who, for various reasons, return to their villages following graduation tend to improve 
local conditions by advocating for additional social services or for more frequent access to 
agricultural development agents.  Thus, while their formal educations might not be fully utilized 
at least anecdotally, the effects of their education are seen as changing social conditions in 
positive ways.  In this limited respect, over-education was having a positive effect upon the 
society.   
7.1.5  Liminality 
As defined by Rutherford & Pickup (2015: 706) liminality is a state of “transition from the 
old to a new being and understanding.”  In the study area, developmental displacement results 
in liminal situations among both smallholders and students.  Smallholders who are no longer 
farmers tend to possess few skills that are useful in their transition to a more urban environment 
(AU, 2007; Belete, 2011).  Likely due to their physiological state or proximity to the end of their 
working lives, older workers tend to have shorter planning horizons.  The social pressure to find 
work may be individually reduced and replaced by what Douglas (1992) attributed to strong 
social cohesion and a culturally low level of freedom of movement outside of their peer group 
experience.  For younger children, the absence of observed employment opportunities following 
even elementary school is causing an increasing number of them to lose faith in the education 
process (Desta, 2012).  Many discern few benefits of education and leave school at an early 
age.  As they grow older and are no longer children, youth become economically displaced in 
their own environment through a lack of qualification for acceptable employment and this makes 
it difficult to be recognized as having become fully adult.   
Particularly for those who leave their farms, villages, or urban neighbourhoods to obtain 
a tertiary education, many students become separated from their past and so they no longer fit 
in with their former friends nor have they obtained suitable employment or formed new 
professional relationships.  Among these students, the social losses incurred through 
educational change are not necessarily tied to a place so much as to a past.  Graduates and 
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better-educated youth become separated from their previous life-experiences and peer groups.  
Their new rootlessness resembles Murcia’s (2018: 2) description of those “who no longer have 
a place to call home.”  It sets in motion the potential for anti-government sentiments and 
violence (section 5.4.1) among a segment of society who suddenly realize their future social and 
economic opportunities as adults are substantially limited.     
7.1.6  Groupism 
One outcome of this liminality is the observed tendency among displaced smallholders 
to remain within their social groups.  As described in chapter 5 by land use agents, tela house 
proprietors, and textile plant managers, they often eschew offers of new employment to remain 
within their groups.  This was a particularly surprising finding.   
Legally mandated payments for expropriated land were reported by both smallholders 
and government officials as sufficient to sustain ousted families for approximately two years, 
however most of the oustees who were observed appeared to ignore the time limited nature of 
their windfall payments.  Displaced smallholders in the study area typically took payment for 
their land and then resettled into the nearby peri-urban municipalities, finding housing as they 
could.  They were observed to have retreated within small, tightly-knit peer groups who found it 
difficult to transition to new employment or wage earning opportunities.  This was explained by 
local observers during interviews, including by tela house owners who described the individual 
and collective reluctance of smallholders within peer groups to be known or socially recognized 
as anything other than a farmer.   
The social forces of identity and groupism which had developed over the course of a 
lifetime appeared to form barriers to the acquisition of new employment among former 
smallholders, especially if it might threaten the loss of personal and social identities.  Similar 
attitudes of groupism, highlighted in section 2.6, were observed during informal conversations 
with students who perceived they were not able to achieve a level of personal or economic 
success that was similar to their parents’ when they were the same age.  Ironically, and as 
explored in sections 2.3.2 and 6.4.3, in developing nations, rapidly increased educational 
opportunities for the youth cohort has often been intended to stimulate economic growth through 
‘development from above’ and through the sheer number of educated individuals within the 
economy (Rasmussen & Sorheim, 2006; Bloom, et al., 2014).  Lacking that developmental 
outcome, frustrated and restive students were not interested in compensatory social benefits 
provided by the government.  Rather, they continued to demand honourable employment 
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commensurate with their educational attainment and to be accepted as adults within the 
community.   
Realization of meaningful employment, as related in conversations with graduates, is not 
socially possible for them without the suitable opportunities that come from a more diversified 
economy, including manufacturing and its secondary employment effects.  Several university 
educators who were interviewed concluded many youth are becoming exasperated with the 
limited prospects that are open to them, leading some to participate in violence related to their 
own group identity as students.  However, the resultant social instability results in losses to the 
economic growth of the nation as foreign investment is slowed (ADBG, 2017).   
7.2 The Implication for Pro-poor Policies 
The contribution to knowledge of this thesis is the correlation of development and 
economic policy choices with displacement and under-employment among ousted smallholders 
and better-educated youth.  It has shown that otherwise successful government policies and 
programs have had unintended and adverse outcomes as hundreds of thousands of 
smallholders are being ousted from their land and livelihoods, while at the same time an 
increasingly large youth cohort is becoming unemployed or insufficiently employed.  These 
issues are particularly evident in the areas to the north and east of Addis Ababa, where rapid 
physical and social changes are taking place.    
There are four key findings that contribute to the body of knowledge of Ethiopia’s 
development and which may inform future policy.  
• Physical Displacement 
First, although living conditions, including infrastructure, health care, income, and 
education have unmistakably improved throughout Ethiopia, the growing economy has created 
structural inconsistencies in both opportunity and outcome.  As better paid urban workers 
pursue new and more comfortable housing options outside of the city, smallholder displacement 
is occurring as an inadvertent result of the ‘rurbanization’ of peri-urban areas.  In the study area, 
this modernization and development is inexorably displacing hundreds of thousands of 
smallholders (Home, 2016) ex situ.  Their place attachment, social grounding, and a sense of 
bereavement at the loss of their identity was consistently communicated by oustees who had 
lost the place and past which they had known as home.  Consequently, many struggle to 
establish a new personal or group identity.   
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Critically, the absence of farm employment coupled with a lack of non-agricultural skills 
places this group into a condition of chronic and persistent poverty among a densely 
concentrated urban population cluster where it had not existed for them previously.  Their 
poverty is causing a secondary effect within the peri-urban communities into which they have 
resettled as the price of labour is being bid downwards and social services are becoming over-
subscribed.  Thus, their displacement is creating consequences which are beyond the 
immediate effects suffered by individually ousted smallholders and for which few plans have 
been made.  Therefore, policymakers must actively engage, and more universally address, who 
may be harmed by successful development, including both oustees and the communities into 
which they resettle.  
• Educated Youth Un/Under-employment  
Second, an increasing percentage of Ethiopia’s youth have undertaken lengthy courses 
of study and, as graphed in Figure 5.3, educational attainment among the age cohort 15 to 29 
years has dramatically improved.  However, Ethiopia’s primary employment emphasis has long 
been upon agriculture, hence manufacturing and light industrial aspirations have been slow to 
materialize and insufficient employment opportunities are being created for entry-level 
managers.  Thus, Ethiopia’s economic policies are inadvertently producing a surplus of 
university graduates relative to the availability of appropriate employment opportunities (ILO, 
2017).  Consequently, expectations for social and economic success among those students is 
increasingly unrealized (IMF, 2016).   
As this educated youth cohort is inevitably forced to take positions that are well below 
their newly attained education level they, in turn, displace less educated and skilled individuals.  
This new form of joblessness and under-employment was recognized by former Prime Minister 
Desalegn in 2016 as a cause for the civil dissension and violence that is increasingly occurring 
among some groups of youth and students.  The African Development Bank Group (ADBG, 
2017) contends that violence has been at least partially responsible for Ethiopia’s recently 
slowed economic growth rate as foreign investors perceive increased political, social, and 
therefore economic instability.   
Extended Liminality   
The over education and under-employment of youth results in the third finding, as 
individuals and communities move from a known to an unknown physical and social 
environment.  During this liminal period, both physically and socially displaced individuals are 
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not yet accepted or comfortable in their new surroundings, but cannot return to the former 
environment.  While this state is often a normal and temporary situation, potentially resulting 
from such commonplace activities as marriage or retirement, the ex situ displacement of 
smallholders and in situ displacement of un/under-employed youth has resulted in an extended 
period that promotes a social instability which is inhibiting investment in Ethiopia’s 
modernization.  Suitable work provides self-worth and a sense of social respect which Crivello & 
Van Der Gaag (2016: 33) assert “becomes even more important for youth in contexts of both 
economic and political marginalization.”  For Ethiopia’s youth, an extended period of social 
placelessness results in the inability to be fully recognized as an adult.  This impairs their ties to 
the community and may ultimately affect the stability of Ethiopia’s political and social system 
(Section 5.4).   
 
Similarly, displaced smallholders are not only physically separated from their past, they 
are often unable to visualize and engage in their future.  As they are paid for their land and then 
ousted, they become separated from the political and social system and are left landless and 
voiceless.  While the majority of smallholders continue to conform to the mengist traditions 
(Vaughan, 2011) and rarely challenge the government, it is unwise to assume the hundreds of 
thousands of displaced smallholders and their families will continue to endure their 
circumstances in silence (Chapter 5) or continue to give allegiance to the local and national 
governments that have been responsible for expropriating their property yet who fail to provide 
alternative employment.  Thus, policy makers should actively pursue programs and methods to 
better integrate these disparate, yet similarly affected, groups into the social milieu.   
 
• Changing the Emphasis from Subsistence Agriculture to Manufacturing Employment 
Finally, the current national development plan, the Second Growth and Transformation 
Plan as well as the concurrent Education Sector Development Plan V, continue to prioritize the 
polar opposites of subsistence agricultural employment and higher education.  Although the 
current prioritization of agricultural employment is understandable given the population 
distribution of Ethiopia, those policies are not preparing the nation for its near-term future as the 
population approaches its predicted doubling by the year 2050 and little new agricultural land is 
available for cultivation (UNDP, 2012).   
As has been shown, agricultural holdings are often too small to continue to support a 
growing rural population and so their subdivision is no longer possible.  Substantial numbers of 
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rural children can be expected to resettle into already crowded Addis Ababa or other 
municipalities where youth unemployment is high.  Without new means of employment, chronic 
poverty is likely to become desperate poverty and this will further threaten the stability of the 
nation.  Policy makers should, therefore, seek methods to increase manufacturing and other 
industrial employment in parallel with more focussed training programs that increase the 
potential of Ethiopia’s human capital.  These should be based on further economic development 
programs, including the creation of value-added exports, and should be made in concert with 
labour market projections rather than continuing to rely upon temporary employment through the 
current program of infrastructure development.    
7.3 Recommendation for Future Research  
This thesis has shown that while Ethiopia’s developmental policies have benefitted much 
of the population, they have also created adverse outcomes.  As the thesis began, it noted 
Cernea & Kanbur (2002: 22) endorsed a reorientation from “the economics of compensation to 
the economics of resettlement.”  The study has shown that while development has clearly had 
positive consequences, not all social problems will be resolved through increased access to 
education and that the economics of resettlement are not fully resolved.  The inadvertent 
outcomes and likely undesirable effects of development can be addressed through further 
study.  Specific recommendations for further study include: 
✓ Reassessment of Ethiopia’s Industrial Sector Investment and Development Plans 
 
Much of Ethiopia’s current economic growth is the result of infrastructure construction 
rather than employment in manufacturing, however funding for infrastructure is becoming scarce 
and major projects are reaching completion.  As fewer new infrastructure projects are 
undertaken, an increased number of newly unemployed men and women will be returned back 
into the economy (Wondifraw, et al., 2015; Clapham, 2017) and this may create additional 
destabilizing effects.   
 Therefore, a comprehensive study of the future and potential of Ethiopia’s manufacturing 
sector, its entry into new export markets, and the inculcation of the non-farm employment skills 
which are necessary to meet the needs of the youth bulge, is warranted.   
✓ New Vocational Training Centre Entry Requirements 
 
Participation in vocational education is impeded by the cost of the curriculum as well as 
by the strict academic qualification requirements that form barriers, especially among older 
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students, including among displaced smallholders.  In conversation with vocational centre 
instructors, with the federal Ministry of Education, and with local business community leaders, it 
was not apparent there is significant interest in establishing a greater level of access for older 
displaced smallholders, or older students in general, despite their need for livelihood training.  
Further, the lengthy time frame which remedial academic training requires before application 
can be made to attend a TVET also appeared to significantly dissuade older, displaced workers 
who possess informal skills that might otherwise be positively channelled into industrial uses.    
Therefore, research regarding the potential outcome of modifying the entry requirements 
for this older age cohort, including conducting evaluations of their mechanical aptitude, might 
demonstrate their informal skills.  This may result in a greater acceptance of their training 
potential by vocational administrators.  Research might also include an examination of the 
character traits of successfully retrained smallholders to promote the general acquisition of non-
farm skills and the development of the social skills needed for reemployment.  
 
✓ Cultural Regeneration 
 
 Ethiopia has a long history of using social programmes to facilitate its continued 
development towards a modern, adaptive society.  These extend from Empress Menen’s school 
for girls which taught basic hygiene, to the current requirement for Oromo smallholders who 
apply for farm improvement loans to participate in social betterment classes such as family 
planning and money management instruction.  These behavioural modification techniques have, 
according to several key informants, resulted in strongly positive effects throughout the Oromo 
region.  
Therefore, research might profitably be conducted regarding the leveraging of 
smallholder group identities to provide a broader and more socially acceptable structure to 
participate in livelihood retraining.  Included in this analysis should be the effects of cultural, 
educational and labour policies that contribute to under-employment.  Particularly where 
investment in industry has lagged due to the lack of capable and skilled workers, training small, 
already cohesive, and interdependent groups may foster greater participation in non-farm 
employment and therefore stimulate the industrialization of Ethiopia’s economy through a larger 
and more engaged labour pool.    
261 
 
  
262 
 
Bibliography 
 
AACG. (2012). Addis Ababa Revised Master Plan Proposals, Draft Summary. Addis Ababa: 
Addis Ababa City Government. 
AALEN, L. (2006). Ethnic Federalism and Self-determination for Nationalities in a Semi-
authoritarian State: the Case of Ethiopia. International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights, 13, 243-261. 
AALEN, L., & MURIAAS, G. (2017). Power Calculations and Political Decentralisation in African 
Post-Conflict States. International Political Science Review, 38(1), 56-69. 
AALEN, L., & TRONVOLL, K. (2009). The 2008 Ethiopian Local Elections: The Return to 
Electoral Authoritarianism. African Affairs, 108, 111-120. 
AALEN, L., & TRONVOLL, K. (2009b). The End of Democracy? Curtailing Political and Civil 
Rights in Ethiopia. Review of African Political Economy, 120, 193-207. 
ABAY, K., BERHANE, G., & ASSEFA, T. (2016). Locus of Control, Hyperbolic Preferences, and 
Demand for Commitment and Savings: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 
International Food Policy Research Institute. 
ABAY, K., BLALOCK, G., & BERHANE, G. (2017). Locus of Control and Technology Adoption 
in Developing Country Agriculture: Evidence from Ethiopia. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 143, 98-115. 
ABBINK, J. (2017). Paradoxes of Electoral Authoritarianism: The 2015 Ethiopia Elections as 
Hegemonic Performance. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 35(3), 303-323. 
ABDO, M. (2013, December). Legislative Protection of Property Rights in Ethiopia, An 
Overview. Mizan Law Review, 7(2), 165-206. 
ABEBE, G., & HESSELBERG, J. (2013). Implications of Urban Development-induced 
Redevelopment On Poor Households In Addis Ababa. Ghana Journal of Geography, 5, 
32-50. 
ABEL, J., DEITZ, R., & YAQIN, S. (2014). Are Recent College Graduates Finding Good Jobs? 
Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 20(1), 1-8. 
ABERA, Y., & GEBRESLASSIE, G. (2016). Utilization of and Factors Affecting Individuals 
Saving in Ethiopia (The Case of Dire Dawa). Pavia : Natural Resources, Agricultural 
Development and Food Security, International Research Network. 
ABS. (2003). Australian Social Trends, Catalogue No. 4102.0. Canberra: Australian Bureau of 
Statistics. 
ABSHOKO, A. (2016). Determinants of Youth Unemployment: Evidence from Ethiopia. Global 
Journal of Human-Social Science, 16(4), 11-23. 
ACEMOGLU, D., & JOHNSON, S. (2005). Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy, 
113(5), 949-995. 
263 
 
ACERBI, A., & PARISI, D. (2006). Cultural Transmission Between and Within Generations. 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 9(1). Retrieved from 
http://jass.soc.surrey.ac.uk/9/1/9.html 
ACS, Z. (2006). How is Entrepreneurship Good for Economic Growth? Innovations(Winter), 97-
107. 
ADAM, A. (2013). Land Readjustment as an Alternative Land Development Tool for Peri-Urban 
Areas of Ethiopia. Property Management, 33(1), 36-58. 
ADAM, M. (2014). Constraints and Growth Potentials of Micro and Small Enterprises: Case from 
Mekelle City. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 5(24), 133-140. 
ADAMU, A., & ADDAMU, A. (2012). Quality Assurance in Ethiopian Higher Education: 
Procedures and Practices. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 69, 838-846. 
ADBG. (2013, March 27). Recognizing Africa's Informal Sector. Retrieved March 10, 2016, from 
African Development Bank Group: http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-
inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/recognizing-africas-informal-sector-11645/ 
ADBG. (2017). Ethiopia Economic Outlook. Retrieved December 15, 2017, from Africa 
Development Bank Group: https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/ethiopia/ 
ADBG. (2018, July 7). Ethiopia Economic Outlook. Retrieved from African Development Bank 
Group: https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/ethiopia/ 
ADMASSIE, A., & ABEBAW, D. (2014). Rural Poverty and Marginalization in Ethiopia: A Review 
of Development Interventions. In J. Von Braun, & F. Gatzweiler, Marginality: Addressing 
the Nexus of Poverty, Exclusion and Ecology (pp. 269-300). Netherlands: Springer. 
AEYNEW, M. (2002). Decentralization in Ethiopia: Two Case Studies on Devolution of Power 
and Responsibilities to Local Government. In B. Zewde, & S. Pausewang, Ethiopia: The 
Challenge of Democracy from Below (pp. 130-146). Uppsala : Nordic Africa Institute. 
AGHION, P., BOUSTAN, L., HOXBY, C., & VANDENBUSSCHE, J. (2009). The Causal Impact 
of Education on Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S. Washington, D.C.: Brookings . 
AKAY, A., MARTINSSON, P., MEDHIN, H., & TRAUTMANN, S. (2009). Attitudes Toward 
Uncertainty Among the Poor: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia. Bonn: Institute for the Study 
of Labor. 
AKRAM, S. (2013). Millennium Development Goals and the Protection of Displaced and 
Refugee Women and Girls. Laws, 2, 283-313. 
ALBA, R., & NEE, V. (1997). Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration. 
International Migration Review, 31(4), 826-874. 
ALBY, P., AURIOL, E., & NGUIMKEU, P. (2013). Social Barriers to Entrepreneurship in Africa: 
The Forced Mutual Help Hypothesis. St. Catharines, Ontario: Canadian Economic 
Association. 
ALEMAN, E., & KIM, Y. (2015). The Democratizing Effect of Education. Research and Politics, 
October-December, 1-7. 
264 
 
ALEMU, K. (2015). District Level Decentralization and Public Service Delivery in Ethiopia: 
Cases from Amahra Region. International Journal of African and Asian Studies, 10, 24-
39. 
ALEXOPOLOUS, G. (2005). Depression in the Elderly. Lancet, 365, 1961-1967. 
ALI, D., & DEININGER, K. (2014). Is There a Farm-size Productivity Relationship in African 
Agriculture? Washington, D.C. : World Bank. 
ALI, D., DERCON, S., & GAUTAM, M. (2011). Property Rights in a Very Poor Country: Tenure 
Insecurity and Investment in Ethiopia. Agricultural Economics, 42, pp. 75-86. 
ALTENBURG, T. (2010). Industrial Policy in Ethiopia. Bonn: German Institute for Development 
Policy. 
AMINE, L., & STAUB, K. (2009). Women Entrepreneurs in sub-Saharan Africa: An Institutional 
Theory Analysis From a Social Marketing Point of View. Entrepreneurship & Regional 
Development, 21(2), 183-211. 
AmInt. (2016, January 16). Ethiopia: Civil Society Groups Urge the International Community to 
Address Killing of Oromo Protesters. Retrieved January 14, 2018, from Amnesty 
International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/01/ethiopia-civil-society-
groups-urge-the-international-community-to-address-killing-of-oromo-protesters/ 
ANDERSON, J. (2013). Studentification. Cardiff: Cardiff Case Studies. 
ANDERSON, M., BECHHOFER, F., MCCRONE, D., JAMIESON, L., LI, L., & STEWART, R. 
(2005). Timespans and Plans Among Young Adults. Sociology, 39(1). 
ANDREWS, T. (2012). What is Social Constructionism. The Grounded Theory Review, 11(1), 
39-46. 
ANIRUDDHA, B., & PAUL, J. (2018). Youth Unemployment and Terrorism in the MENAP 
(Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) Region. Social Economic 
Planning Sciences, In Press. 
ANNAN, N. (2014). Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and 
Prospects. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 3(1), 1-16. 
ARC. (2016). The Master Plan: OLF Members and Their Family Members; Ill-treatment by State 
Agents of Oromo Persons Who Are Not Politically Active. London: Asylum Research 
Consultancy. 
Arnason, H., & Valgeirsdottir, H. (2015, December 31). Why do People with Little Formal 
Education Not Participate in Life Long Learning Activities? Retrieved January 10, 2018, 
from Online Journal of Pedagogy and Education: 
http://netla.hi.is/greinar/2015/ryn/009.pdf 
ARTINO, A. (2012). Academic Self-efficacy: From Educational Theory to Instructional Practice. 
Perspectives on Medical Education, 1, pp. 76-85. 
265 
 
ASAMINEW, E. (2010, June). Adopting Private Pension Systems in Ethiopia. Retrieved April 12, 
2016, from The African Symposium: An On Line Journal of African Educational 
Research Network: https://www.ncsu.edu/aern/TAS10.1/TAS10.1Asaminew.pdf 
ASTHANA, R. (1996). Involuntary Resettlement: Survey of International Experience. Economic 
and Political Weekly, 31(24), 1468-1475. 
ATHERTON, J. (1999). Resistance to Learning: A Discussion Based on Participants in In-
service Professional Training Programs. Journal of Vocational Education, 51(1), 77-90. 
ATLAW, H. (2014). Slum Redevelopment in Addis Ababa: How Can it Become Sustainable. 
International Journal of Science and Research, 31(9), 2387-2393. 
AU. (2007). Strategy to Revitalize Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) in 
Africa. Addis Ababa: African Union. 
AURICK, M., MUNALULA, M., MUNDIA, L., MWALKE, N., & VINCENT, K. (2017). Urban 
Informality and Small-scale Enterprise Development in Zambia: An Exploration of Theory 
and Practice. Journal of Behavioural Economics, Finance, Entrepreneurship, Accounting 
and Transport, 5(1), 19-29. 
AUSTIN, G. (2010). African Economic Development and Colonial Legacies. International 
Development Policy, 1, 11-32. 
AVTGIS, T. (1998). Locus of Control and Persuasion, Social Influence, and Conformity: A Meta-
analytic Review. Psychological Reports, 83, 899-903. 
AWGICHEW, S., & SEYOUM, Y. (2017). Integrated Functional Adult Literacy: Existing Practices 
and Challenges in Eastern Ethiopia. International Journal of Education and Literacy 
Studies, 5(4), 86-98. 
AYALEW, D., DERCON, S., & GAUTAM, M. (2005). Property Rights in a Very Poor Country: 
Tenure Insecurity and Investment in Ethiopia. Oxford: Global Poverty Research Group. 
AYELE, Z. (2014). The Politics of Sub-national Constitutions and Local Government in Ethiopia. 
Perspectives on Federalism, 6(2), 89-115. 
AYOGU, M. (2007). Infrastructure and Economic Development in Africa: A Review. Journal of 
African Economies, 16(1), 75-126. 
AZENG, T., & YOGO, T. (2015). Youth Unemployment, Education and Political Instability from 
Selected Developing Countries 1991-2009. Brighton: The Institute for Development 
Studies. 
AZUELA, A., & HERRERA-MARTIN, C. (2009). Taking Land Around the World: International 
Trends in Expropriation for Urban and Infrastructure Projects. In S. Lall, M. Freire, B. 
Yuen, R. Rajack, & J. Helluin, Urban Land Markets (pp. 337-362). Houten: Springer. 
BABARINDE, J. (2014). Forced Migration and Displacement: A Conceptual Framework for 
Explaining the Impact on Women and the Role of Land Management. Journal of Internal 
Displacement, 4(1), 92-111. 
266 
 
BABOO, B. (2009). Politics of Water: The Case of the Hirakud Dam in Orissa, India. 
International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, 1(8), 139-144. 
BACH, J. (2014). EPRDF's Nation-building: Tinkering with Convictions and Pragmatism. 
Cadernos de Estudo Africanos, 27, 104-123. Retrieved December 19, 2017, from 
http://cea/revues.org/1501 
BADA, S. (2015). Constructivist Learning Theory: A Paradigm for Teaching and Learning. 
Journal of Research & Method in Education, 5(6), 66-70. 
Badwaza, A. (2015, April 28). Ethiopia: The Election That Isn't. Addis Ababa: Freedom House. 
Retrieved January 19, 2016, from https://freedomhouse.org/blog/ethiopia-election-isn-t 
BAKER, C., & CAMPBELL, M. (2012). Context Matters: An Ethiopian Case Study; Adapting 
Leadership Development Methods to Serve Different Cultures. Greensboro: Center for 
Creative Leadership. 
BAKER, S., & EDWARDS, R. (2006). How Many Qualitative Interviews is Enough? 
Southampton: National Centre for Research Methods. 
BALAND, J. (1989). Social Disarticulation Models: An Analytical Critique and Re-exposition. The 
Journal of Development Studies, 25(4), 521-536. 
BALCHA, B. (2008). Ethnicity and Restructuring of the State in Ethiopia. Aalborg East: Aalborg 
University. 
BALSVIK, R. (1998). Student Protest: University and State in Africa 1960-1995. Forum for 
Development Studies, 2, 301-325. 
BALSVIK, R. (2009). Addis Ababa University in the Shadow of the Derg, 1974-1991. 
Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, (pp. 259-272). 
Trondheim. 
BALZACQ, T. (2005). The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and 
Context. European Journal of International Relations, 11(2), 171-201. 
BANDURA, A. (1982). Self-efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency. American Psychologist, 2, 
pp. 122-147. 
BARAKI, A., & VAN KEMENADE, E. (2013). Effectiveness of Technical and Vocational 
Education and Training (TVET): Insights from Ethiopia's Reform. The TQM Journal, 
25(5), 492-506. 
BARBARINDE, J. (2014). Forced Migration and Displacement: A Conceptual Framework for 
Explaining the Impact on Women and the Role of Land Management. Journal of Internal 
Displacement, 4(1), 92-111. 
BARNES, C. (2006). Ethiopia: A Sociopolitical Assessment. Geneva: UNHCR, Status 
Determination and Protection Information Section. 
BARNICHON, R., & ZYLBERBERG, Y. (2015). Under-employment and the Trickle-down of 
Unemployment. Barcelona: Barcelona GSE Research Network. 
267 
 
BARTLETT, J., KOTRLIK, J., & HIGGINS, C. (2001). Organizational Research: Determining 
Appropriate Sample Size in Survey Research. Information Technology, Learning, and 
Performance Journal, 19(1), 43-50. 
BASHSHUR, M., HERNANDEZ, A., & PEIRO, J. (2011). The Impact of Under-employment on 
Individual and Team Performance. In D. Maynard, & D. Feldman, Underemployment (pp. 
187-213). New York: Springer. 
BASSON, T., BATES, A., BLACKMORE, D., BLOCK, P., ENTEKHABI, D., & WHITTINGTON, 
D. (2014). The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: An Opportunity for Collaboration and 
Shared Benefits in the Eastern Nile Basin. Cambridge (USA): Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. 
BAYUCAN-DACUYCUY, C., & LIM, J. (2014). Chronic and Transient Poverty and Vulnerability 
to Poverty in the Philippines: Evidence Using a Simple Spells Approach. Social 
Indicators Research, 389-413. 
BBC. (2015, December 17). Amnesty Warns Against 'Brutal Crackdown' on Protestors. 
Retrieved March 12, 2017, from BBC News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
35117713 
BEAULAC, C., KRISTJANSSON, E., & CUMMINS, S. (2009). A Systematic Review of Food 
Deserts 1966 - 2007. Preventing Chronic Disease: Public Health Research, Practice and 
Policy, 6(3), 1-10. 
BECK, N. (2006). Is Causal-Process Observation an Oxymoron? Political Analysis, 14(3), pp. 
347-352. 
BEINE, M., DOCQUIER, F., & RAPOPORT, H. (2001). Brain Drain and Economic Growth: 
Theory and Evidence. Journal of Developmental Economics, 64, 275-289. 
BEKELE, E., & WORKU, Z. (2008). Factors That Affect the Long-term Survival of Micro, Small 
and Medium Enterprises in Ethiopia. South African Journal of Economics, 76(3), 548-
568. 
BEKELE, S., & REGASSA, T. (2012). Democratization in a Developmental State: The Case of 
Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: UNDP. 
BELACHEW, A. (2014). Souring Income and Wealth Inequality in Ethiopia. Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund. 
BELACHEW, Y. (2013). Expropriation, Valuation and Compensation in Ethiopia: The Case of 
Bahir Dar City and Surrounding. Property Management, 31(2), 132-158. 
BELDA, R. (2016). Population Dynamism and Agrarian Transformation in Ethiopia. African 
Journal of Agricultural Research, 11(39), 3863-3879. 
BELETE, S. (2011). Literacy, Skills Training and Entrepreneurship -- Support for Rural Women 
in Ethiopia. In M. Samlowski, Non-formal Skills Training: Adult Education for Decent 
Jobs and Better Lives (pp. 67-82). Bonn: Institute for International Cooperation of the 
German Adult Education Association. 
268 
 
BELLU, L. (2011). Development and Development Paradigms: A (reasoned) Review of 
Prevailing Visions. Rome: FAO. 
BENJAMIN, N., & MBAYE, A. (2012). The Informal Sector in Francophone Africa: Firm Size, 
Productivity and Institutions. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
BERAKA, B., & ABRHA, G. (2014). The Role of Farmers' Research Group to Promote Improved 
Technologies in Jimma and Illuababora Zones in Ethiopia. The Open Agricultural 
Journal, 8, 18-27. 
BERDAL, M., & MALONE, D. (2000). Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
BERGER, J., & HEATH, C. (2008). Who Drives Divergence? Identity-Signaling, Out-group 
Dissimilarity, and the Abandonment of Cultural Tastes. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 95(3), 593-607. 
BERGER, N., & FISHER, P. (2013). A Well-educated Workforce is Key to State Prosperity. 
Washington, D.C. : Economic Analysis and Research network. 
BERHANE, G., & GARDEBROEK, C. (2011). Does Microfinance Reduce Rural Poverty? 
Evidence Based on Household Panel Data From Northern Ethiopia. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 93(1), 43-55. 
BERHANE, G., PAULOS, Z., TAFERE, K., & TAMRU, S. (2011). Foodgrain Consumption and 
Calorie Intake Patterns in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: International Food Policy Research 
Institute. 
BERRY, J. (1974). Psychological Aspects of Cultural Pluralism: Unity and Identity 
Reconsidered. Topics in Cultural Learning, 2, 17-22. 
BERTOCCHI, G., & CANOVA, F. (2002). Did Colonization Matter for Growth? An Empirical 
Exploration into the Historical Causes of Africa's Underdevelopment. European 
Economic Review, 46, 1851-1871. 
BEVAN, P. (2016, May 3). Rurbanisation, Urban Expansion, and Thickening Rural Urban Links. 
Retrieved January 14, 2018, from Ethiopia WIDE: http://ethiopiawide.net/wp-
content/uploads/WIDE_DB02Rurbanisation_final.pdf 
BEYENE, H. (2015). Final Report: National Assessment, Ethiopia; Gender Equality and the 
Knowledge Society. Los Angeles: Women in Global Science and Technology. 
BEYERS, C. (2013). Urban Land Restitution and the Struggle for Social Citizenship in South 
Africa. Development and Change, 44(4), 965-989. 
BEZU, S., & BARRETT, C. (2012). Employment Dynamics in the Rural Nonfarm Sector in 
Ethiopia: Do the Poor Have Time on Their Side? Journal of Development Studies, 48(9), 
1223-1240. 
BEZU, S., & HOLDEN, S. (2014). Are Rural Youth in Ethiopia Abandoning Agriculture. World 
Development, 64, 259-272. 
269 
 
BEZU, S., & HOLDEN, S. (2015). Demand for Second Stage Land Certification in Ethiopia: 
Evidence from Household Panel Data. Land Use Policy, 41(November), 193-205. 
BEZU, S., BARRETT, C., & HOLDEN, S. (2012). Does the Nonfarm Economy Offer Pathways 
for Upward Mobility? Evidence from a Panel Data Study in Ethiopia. World Development, 
40(8), 1634-1646. 
BHATIA, K., & GHANEM, H. (2017). How Do Education and Unemployment Affect Support for 
Violent Extremism. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
BHATTACHARYA, R., & DAS, S. (2008). Advent of Industrial Mass Production: Three Stages of 
Economic Development. The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 8(1), 1967-1982. 
BIAVASCHI, C., EICHHORST, W., & GUILIETTI, C. (2012). Youth Unemployment and 
Vocational Training. Bonn: IZA. 
BIAZEN, A., & ABEGAZ, A. (2009). Technical Vocational Education and Training in Ethiopia 
Mapping. Addis Ababa: Edukans Foundation. 
BIGSTEN, A., & SHIMELES, A. (2004). Dynamics of Poverty in Ethiopia. World Institute for 
Development Economics Research. Goteberg : United Nations University. 
BISHAW, A., & LASSER, J. (2012). Education in Ethiopia, Past, Present and Future Prospects. 
African Nebula, 5. 
BLACK, M. (2003). Micronutrient Deficiencies and Cognitive Functioning. Journal of Nutrition, 
133(11), 3927S-3931S. 
BLANK, R. (2002). Can Equity and Efficiency Complement Each Other? Labour Economics, 9, 
451-468. 
BLAU, P. (1977). A Macro-sociological Theory of Social Structure. The American Journal of 
Sociology, 83(1), 26-54. 
BLOOM, D., CANNING, D., CHAN, K., & LUCA, D. (2014). Higher Education and Economic 
Growth in Africa. International Journal of African Higher Education, 1(1), 23-57. 
BLUM, A., & GRANGAARD, R. (2018). Collaberative Design in Peacebuilding: Lessons from 
the Central African Republic. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace. 
BMI. (2015, August 7). 'Existential' Threats and Political Risks: An Assessment. BMI Research. 
Retrieved from http://www.bmiresearch.com/articles/existential-threats-and-political-
risks-an-assessment 
BOAHEN, A. (1985). General History of Africa VI; Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880 - 
1935. Paris: UNESCO. 
BOHNET, H., COTTIER, F., & HUG, S. (2016). Conflict-induced IDPs and the Spread of 
Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(6), 1-26. 
BOND, R., & HULME, D. (1999). Process Approaches to Development Theory and Sri Lanken 
Practice. World Development, 27(8), 1339-1358. 
270 
 
BORNSTEIN, L. (2011). Mega-projects, City-building and Community Benefits. City, Culture and 
Society, 1, 199-206. 
BOURKE, B. (2014). Positionality: Reflecting on the Research Process. The Qualitative Report, 
18, 1-9. 
BRADSHAW, T. (2006). Theories of Poverty and Anti-Poverty Programs in Community 
Development. Columbia: Poverty Research Center. 
BRAINARD, L., & CHOLLET, D. (2007). Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict, and 
Security in the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
BRAINERD, E. (2001). Economic Reform and Mortality in the Former Soviet Union: A Study of 
the Suicide Epidemic in the 1990s. European Economic Review, 45, 1007-1019. 
BRAND, J. (2014). The Far-reaching Impact of Job Loss and Unemployment. Los Angeles: 
California Center for Population Research. 
BRANDTH, B. (2002). Gender Identity in European Family Farming: A Literature Review. 
Sociologia Ruralis, 42(2), 181-201. 
BRANNEN, J. (2005). Mixed Methods Research: A Discussion Paper. Southampton: ESRC 
National Center for Research Methods. 
BRECHENMACHER, S. (2017). Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in 
Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. 
BRESLIN, S. (2011). The 'China Model' and the Global Crisis: From Friedrich List to a Chinese 
Mode of Governance? International Affairs, 87(6), 1323-1343. 
BRINKMAN, H., ATTREE, L., & HEZIR, S. (2013). Addressing Horizontal Inequalities as Drivers 
of Conflict in the Post-2015 Development Agenda. New York: United Nations 
Peacebuilding Support Office. 
BRODY, E. (1973). The Lost Ones: Social Forces and Mental Illness in Rio de Janiero. New 
York: International Universities Press. 
BROOKFIELD, S. (2005). Overcoming Impostorship, Cultural Suicide, and Lost Innocence: 
Implications for Teaching Critical Thinking in the Community College. New Directions for 
Community Colleges, 130(Summer), 49-57. 
BROUSSARD, N., & TEKLESELASSIE, T. (2012). Youth Unemployment: Ethiopia Country 
Study. London: International Growth Centre. 
BROWN, G. (2005). Horizontal Inequality or Polarisation? Inter-group Economic Disparity and 
its Relationship with Conflict. San Diego: University of California Institute of Global 
Conflict and Cooperation. 
BRUNNSCHWEILER, C., & LUJALA, P. (2015). Economic Backwardness and Social Tension. 
Norwich: University of East Anglia. 
271 
 
BRUNTLAND, G. (1987). Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development. Oslo: United Nations, World Commission on 
Environment and Development. 
BRYCESON, D. (1996). Deagrarianization and Rural Employment in sub-Saharan Africa: A 
Sectoral Perspective. World Development, 24(1), 97-111. 
BRYMAN, A. (2012). Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
BUCHMANN, C., & HANNUM, E. (2001). Education and Stratification in Developing Countries. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 77-102. 
BURKETT, M. (2011). The Nation Ex Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized Nationhood 
and the Post-climate Era. Climate Law, 2, 345-374. 
BURR, V. (2003). Social Constructionism. London: Routledge. 
BURYAN, E. (2012). Analysis of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq, Jordan. 
Edinburgh: Mercycorps. 
BUTCHER, C., & SVENSSON, I. (2016). Manufacturing Dissent: Modernization and the Onset 
of Major Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(2), 311-
339. 
BUZAN, B., WAEVER, O., & DE WILDE, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
Boulder: Reinner Publishers. 
CAFFARELLA, R., & MERRIAM, S. (1999). Perspectives on Adult Learning: Framing Our 
Research. Kansas State University. Dekalb: Adult Education Research Conference. 
Retrieved from http://newprairiepress.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2825&context=aerc 
CALDENTEY, E. (2008). The Concept and Evolution of the Developmental State. International 
Journal of Political Economy, 37(3), 27-53. 
CAMMACK, D. (2007). The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism. Development Policy Review, 
25(5), 599-614. 
CAMPBELL, H. (2015). Gender Empowerment in Microfinance: How SHGs in India Exemplify 
the Institutional Potential. Policy Briefing, 3(1), 6-19. 
CANTONE, H. (2016). The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement c. 
1960-1974. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 50(2), 339-341. 
CARLING, J. (2015). Pathways Out of Waithood: Initial Steps Towards a Conceptual 
Framework. Paris: 6th European Conference on African Studies. 
CARRIER, N., & KLANTSCHNIG, G. (2012). Africa and the War on Drugs. London: Zed Books. 
CARSTENSEN, L. (2006). The Influence of a Sense of Time on Human Development. Science, 
312, 1912-1915. 
Carter. (2009). Observing the 2005 Ethiopian National Elections. Atlanta: Carter Center. 
272 
 
CATALANO, R., DOOLEY, D., & WILSON, G. (1994). Depression and Unemployment: Panel 
Findings from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study. American Journal of 
Community Psychology, 22(6), 745-765. 
CERNEA, M. (1995). Social Integration and Population Displacement: The Contribution of 
Social Science. New York: UNESCO. 
CERNEA, M. (1996). Public Policy Responses to Development-induced Population 
Displacements. Economic and Political Weekly, 31(24), 1515-1523. 
CERNEA, M. (1996b). Bridging the Research Divide: Studying Refugees and Development 
Oustees. New York: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. 
CERNEA, M. (1997). The Risks and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced Populations. 
World Development, 25(10), 1569-1587. 
CERNEA, M. (1999). Why Economic Analysis is Essential to Resettlement: A Sociologist's 
View. Economic and Political Weekly, 34(31), 2149-2158. 
CERNEA, M. (2004). Impoverishment Risks, Risk Management, and Reconstruction: A Model of 
Population Displacement and Resettlement. Beijing: Symposium on the Social Aspects 
of Hydropower Development. 
CERNEA, M., & KANBUR, R. (2002). An Exchange on the Compensation Principle in 
Resettlement. Ithaca, New York: Cornell Conference on Displacement. Retrieved March 
22, 2016, from www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/kanbur/compprincerkan.pdf 
CERRA, V., & SAXENA, S. (2007). Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery. Basel: 
Bank for International Settlements. 
CEVIK, S., & RAHMATI, M. (2013). Breaking the Curse of Sisyphus: An Empirical Analysis of 
Post-conflict Economic Transitions. Washington: International Monetary Fund. 
CHALA, T. (2016). Analysis of Politics in the Land Tenure System: Experience of Successive 
Ethiopia Regimes Since 1930. African Journal of Political Science and International 
Relations, 10(8), 111-118. 
CHAMBERS, R. (1993). Challenging the Professions: Frontiers for Rural Development. London: 
Intermediary Technology Publications. 
CHANDLER, D. (2013). Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-linearity: Rethinking 'Hidden' 
Agency and 'Resistance'. Peacebuilding, 1(1), 17-32. 
CHANIE, P. (2007). Clientelism and Ethiopia's Post-1991 Decentralisation. Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 45(3), 355-383. 
CHANYALEW, D. (2006). Rural Urban Linkage and the Role of Small Urban Centers in 
Enhancing Economic Development in Ethiopia. In G. Zeleke, T. Pete, & A. Denekew, 
Proceedings of a Planning Workshop on Thematic Research Area of the Global 
Mountain Program (pp. 79-97). Addis Ababa. 
CHANYALEW, D. (2015). Ethiopia's Indigenous Policy and Growth: Agriculture, Pastoral and 
Rural Development. Addis Ababa: (unattributed). 
273 
 
CHARMAZ, K. (2006). Conducting Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative 
Analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
CHARMAZ, K. (2008). Grounded Theory as an Emergent Method. In S. Hesse-Biber, & P. 
Leavy, Handbook of Emergent Methods (pp. 155-172). New York: Guilford Press. 
CHAUDHRY, S. (2010). Development-induced Displacement and Forced Evictions. In W. Kalin, 
& R. Williams, Incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into 
Domestic Law: Issues and Challenges (pp. 591-645). Washington D.C. : Brookings 
Institution. 
CHEN, H., & SWAIN, A. (2014). The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Evaluating Its 
Sustainability Standard and Geopolitical Significance. Energy Development Frontier, 
3(1), 11-19. 
CHENOWETH, E., & LEWIS, O. (2013). Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the 
NAVCO 2.0 Dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 50(3), 415-423. 
CHINIGO, D., & FANTINI, E. (2015). Thermidor in Ethiopia? Agrarian Transformations Between 
Liberalization and the Developmental State. EchoGeo, 31, 1-22. 
CHO, B. (2007). Individual Reactions to a Group Merger: An Integration of Relative Deprivation 
Theory and Social Identity Theory. Seoul Journal of Business, 13(1), 49-76. 
CHOWDHURY, N., & SKARSTEDT, C. (2005). The Principle of Good Governance (Draft 
Working Paper). Oxford: Centre for International Sustainable Development Law. 
CIGDEM, K., CEMALCILAR, Z., & BAYDAR, N. (2009). Children of Rural to Urban Migration: 
An Integrative Intervention for Adaptation to Social Change. (K. Weichold, & B. Barger, 
Eds.) International Society for the Study of Behavioural Development, 55(1), 10-14. 
CLAPHAM, C. (1988). Transformation and Continutiy in Revolutionary Ethiopia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
CLAPHAM, C. (2017). The Ethiopian Developmental State. Third World Quarterly, 1-15. 
Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01436597.2017.1328982 
CLARK, G. (2007). A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
CLARK, J., MUNROE, D., & MANSFIELD, B. (2010). What Counts as Farming: How 
Classification Limits Regionalization of the Food System. Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, 3, 245-259. 
CLARK, R. (2008). Resistance to Change: Unconcious Knowledge and the Challenge of 
Unlearning. In D. Berliner, & H. Kupermintz, Fostering Change in Institutions, 
Environments and People (pp. 75-94). New York: Routledge. 
CLEAVER, F. (2005). The Inequalities of Social Capital and the Reproduction of Chronic 
Poverty. World Development, 33(6), 893-906. 
CLEMENS, M., & POSTEL, H. (2018). Can Development Assistance Deter Emigration? 
Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. 
274 
 
CLOKE, P., GOODWIN, M., MILBOURNE, P., & THOMAS, C. (1995). Deprivation, Poverty and 
Marginalization in Rural Lifestyles in England and Wales. Journal of Rural Studies, 
11(4), 351-365. 
COHEN, L., DUBERLEY, J., & MALLON, M. (2004). Social Constructionism in the Study of 
Career: Accessing the Parts That Other Approaches Cannot Reach. Journal of 
Vocational Behaviour(64), 407-422. 
COHEN, L., MANION, L., & MORRISON, K. (2000). Research Methods in Education (Fifth ed.). 
New York: Routledge. 
COHEN, M., & LEMMA, M. (2011). Agricultural Extension Services and Gender Equality. Addis 
Ababa: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
COLLIER, P. (1999). Doing Well Out of War. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
COLLIER, P. (2007). The Bottom Billion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
COLLIER, P. (2009). Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. New York: 
Harper Perennial. 
COLLIER, P., & HOEFFLER, A. (1998). On the Economic Causes of Civil War. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 50, 563-573. 
COLLIER, P., & HOEFFLER, A. (2004). Aid Policy and Growth in Post-conflict Societies. 
European Economic Review, 48, 1125-1145. 
COLLIER, P., & HOEFFLER, A. (2004b). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic 
Papers, 56, 563-595. 
COLLIER, P., & ROHNER, D. (2008). Democracy, Development, and Conflict. Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 6(2/3), 531-540. 
COLLIER, P., HOEFFLER, A., & SODERBOM, M. (2006). Post-conflict Risks. Journal of Peace 
Research, 45(6), 467-478. 
COLLINS, H. (2010). Creative Research: The Theory and Practice of Research for the Creative 
Industries. Lausanne: AVA Publishing. 
CONSIDINE, G., & ZAPPALA, G. (2002). Factors Influencing the Educational Performance of 
Students from Disadvantaged Backgrounds. Sydney: Proceedings of the National Social 
Policy Conference. 
COOPER, S., DURLAUF, S., & JOHNSON, P. (1993). On the Evolution of Economic Status 
Across Generations. In Papers and Proceedings (pp. 50-58). Madison: American 
Statisical Association. 
COSTA, R., & RIJKERS, B. (2011). Gender and Rural Non-farm Entrepreneurship. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank. 
COYNE, C. (2008). After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
275 
 
CPRC. (2005). Chronic Poverty Report 2004/05. Manchester: Chronic Poverty Research 
Centre. 
CRESSWELL, J. (2003). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods 
Approaches. London: Sage Publications. 
CRESSWELL, J. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
CREWETT, W., & KORF, B. (2008). Ethiopia: Reforming Land Tenure. Review of African 
Political Economy, 116, 203-220. 
CREWETT, W., BOGALE, A., & KORF, B. (2008). Land Tenure in Ethiopia - Continuity and 
Change, Shifting Rulers, and the Quest for State Control. Washington, D.C.: CAPRI 
(Collective Action and Property Rights). 
CRISP, J. (2002). No Solutions in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in 
Africa. University of California, The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. 
Geneva: UNHCR. 
CRIVELLO, G., & VAN DER GAAG, N. (2016). Between Hope and a Hard Place: Boys and 
Young Men Negotiating Gender, Poverty and Social Worth in Ethiopia. London: Young 
Lives. 
CROSSLEY, N. (2008). Social Networks and Student Activism: On the Politicizing Effect of 
Campus Connections. The Sociological Review, 56(1), 18-38. 
CROWTHER, D., & LANCASTER, G. (2010). Research Methods: A Concise Introduction to 
Research in Management and Business Consultancy. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
CROWTHER, J. (2000). Participation in Adult and Community Education: A Discourse of 
Diminishing Returns. International Journal of Lifelong Education, 19(6), 479-492. 
CRUSH, J. (2012). Migration, Development and Urban Food Security. Cape Town: African Food 
Security Urban Network. 
CSA. (1991). The 1984 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Central 
Statistical Agency. 
CSA. (2011). Statistical Report on the 2011 Urban Employment Unemployment Survey. Addis 
Ababa: Central Statistics Agency. 
CSA. (2012). Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey, 2011. Addis Ababa: Central Statistical 
Agency. 
CSA. (2012b). Household Consumption and Expenditure Survey 2010/2011. Addis Ababa: 
Central Statistical Agency. 
CSA. (2013). Ethiopia Rural Socioeconomic Survey. Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Agency. 
CSA. (2014). Ethiopia Mini Demographic and Health Survey. Addis Ababa: Central Statistical 
Agency. 
CSA. (2014b). Key Findings on The 2014 Urban Employment Unemployment Survey. Addis 
Ababa: Central Statistics Agency. 
276 
 
CSA. (2014c). Statistical Report on the 2014 Urban Employment Unemployment Survey. Addis 
Ababa: Central Statistics Agency. 
CSA. (2014d). Statistical Report on the 2013 National Labour Force Survey. Addis Ababa: 
Central Statistical Agency. 
CSA. (2014e). Ethiopia Time Use Survey 2013: How Men and Women Spend Their Time. Addis 
Ababa: Central Statistical Agency. 
CSA. (2016). Demographic and Health Survey Key indicators Report. Addis Ababa: Central 
Statistical Agency. 
DARCH, C. (2006). Soviet and Russian Research on Ethiopia and Eastern Africa: A Second 
Look in the Context of the Area Studies Crisis. In M. MATUSEVICH (Ed.), Africa in 
Russia Russia in Africa, Three Centuries of Encounters (pp. 133-151). Asmara: Africa 
World Press, Inc. 
DAS, K., DERCON, S., HABYARIMANA, J., KRISHNAN, P., MURALIDHARAN, K., & 
SUNDARARAMAN, V. (2013). School Inputs, Household Substitution, and Test Scores. 
American Economic Journal of Applied Economics, 5, 29-57. 
DAS, V. (2006). Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary. Berkeley: Berkeley 
University Press. 
DAUBON, R. (2005). A Primer for Promoting Deliberative Democracy and the Dynamics of 
Development at the Grassroots. Journal of Public Deliberation, 1(1). Retrieved October 
21, 2015, from http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol1/iss1/art4 
DAVENPORT, C. (2007). State Repression and the Tyranical Peace. Journal of Peace 
Research, 44(4), 485-504. 
DAVIDSON, P., MCGRATH, S., MELEIS, A., & STERN, P. (2011). The Health of Women and 
Girls Determines the Health and Well-being of Our Modern World: A White Paper from 
the International Council on Women's Health Issues. Health Care Women International, 
32(10), 870-886. 
DAVIES, J. (1974). The J-curve and Power Struggle Theories of Collective Violence. Amenican 
Sociological Review, 39(4), 607-611. 
DAVIES, J. (2009). Parliamentarians and Corruption in Africa. Ottawa: The Parliamentary 
Centre. 
DAVIS, K., SWANSON, B., AMUDAVI, D., MEKONNEN, D., FLOHRS, A., REISE, J., . . . 
ZERFU, E. (2010). In-depth Assessment of the Public Agricultural Extension System of 
Ethiopia and Recommendations for Improvement. Washington, D.C.: International Food 
Policy Research Institute. 
de CHATEL, F. (2014). The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: 
Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution. Middle Eastern Studies, 50(4), 521-535. 
De SCHUTTER, O. (2011). How Not to Think of Land-grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-scale 
Investments in Farmland. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(2), 249-279. 
277 
 
de Waal, A. (2012, December 6). The Theory and Practice of Meles Zenawi. Retrieved from 
Meles Zenawi Memorial (1955 - 2012): http://www.meleszenawi.com/the-theory-and-
practice-of-meles-zenawi/ 
DEININGER, K., & JIN, S. (2006). Tenure Security and Land-related Investment: Evidence from 
Ethiopia. European Economic Review, 50, 1245-1277. 
DEININGER, K., BYERLEE, D., LINDSAY, J., NORTON, A., SELOD, H., & STICKLER, M. 
(2011). Rising Global Interest in Farmland. Washington, D.C. : The World Bank. 
DEL CASTILLO, G., & BUNCHE, R. (2015). Economic Reconstruction and Reforms in Post-
conflict Countries. Leuven: Centre for Research on Peace and Development. 
DEMERITT, J. (2016). The Strategic Use of State Repression and Political Violence. Oxford: 
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. 
DEMISSIE, F. (2018). Ethiopian Female Domestic Workers in the Middle East and Gulf States: 
An Introduction,. African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal, 11(1), 1-5. 
DENZIN, N. (2009). The Elephant in the Living Room: or Extending the Conversation About the 
Politics of Evidence. Qualitative Research, 9(2), 139-160. 
DENZIN, N., & LINCOLN, Y. (2005). Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative 
Research. In N. Denzin, & Y. Lincoln, The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (pp. 
1-26). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
DERCON, S., & ZEITLIN, A. (2009). Rethinking Agriculture and Growth in Ethiopia: A 
Conceptual Discussion. London: Department for International Development. 
Desalegn, H. (2016, March 9). Ethiopian Prime Minister: 'We Are an Island of Stability in a 
Troubled Region'. (R. Kramer, Interviewer) The Guardian. Retrieved May 19, 2017, from 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/09/ethiopian-prime-minister-
hailemariam-desalegn-island-of-stability-troubled-region 
DESTA, A. (2012). Centrally Planned or Developmental-oriented State: A Review of the 
Ethiopian Economic System. Journal of the Academy of Business and Economics, 12(2), 
16-27. Retrieved June 4, 2017, from http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Journal-
Academy-Business-Economics/293813050.html 
DEVEREUX, S., SABATES-WHEELER, R., & LOUNGHURST, R. (2012). Seasonality, Rural 
Livelihoods and Development. London: Routledge. 
DEVINE-WRIGHT, P. (2010). Introduction to the Special Issue: Place, Identity and 
Environmental Behaviour. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 30, 267-270. 
DI NUNZIO, M. (2014). Thugs, Spies and Vigilantes: Community Policing and Street Politics in 
Inner-city Addis Ababa. Africa, 84(3), 444-465. 
DIBIE, R., & DIBIE, J. (2014). The Dichotomy of Capacity Building and Unemployment in 
Ethiopia. Africa's Public Service Delivery & Performance Review, 2(3), 25-76. 
DIPIETRO, W. (2016). Political Repression and Government Effectiveness. Asian Journal of 
Social Science Studies, 1(1), 27-31. 
278 
 
DIXON, T., & WOODCRAFT, S. (2013, November). Creating Strong Communities -- Measuring 
Social Sustainability in New Housing Development. Town and Country Planning, 473-
480. 
DOBBINS, J., JONES, S., CRANE, K., & DEGRASSE, B. (2007). The Beginners Guide to 
Nation-Building. Santa Monica: RAND. 
DOCENA, P. (2015). Adaptive Coping, Resilience, and Absence of Anxiety Among Displaced 
Disaster Survivors. Phillippine Journal of Psychology, 48(2), 27-49. 
DoD. (1990). FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Department of Defense. 
DOHMEN, T., FALK, A., HUFFMAN, D, SUNDE, U., SCHUPP, J., & WAGNER, W. (2005). 
Individual Risk Attitudes: New Evidence from a Large Representative, Experimentally-
Validated Survey. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. 
DOLLISSO, A., & MARTIN, R. (1999). Perceptions Regarding Adult Learners Motivation to 
Participate in Educational Programs. Journal of Agricultural Education, 40(4), 38-46. 
DOM. (2016, March 28). Education in Rural Ethiopia (2010-13): Aspirations and Uncertainties. 
WIDE Discussion Brief No. 5 of 10. Retrieved December 29, 2017, from Ethiopia Wide: 
http://ethiopiawide.net/wp-content/uploads/WIDE_DB05Education_final.pdf 
DONAIS, T. (2009). Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-conflict 
Peacebuilding Processes. Peace and Change, 34(1), 3-26. 
DOOLEY, D. P., & HAM-ROWBOTTOM, K. (2000). Under-employment and Depression: 
Longitudinal Relationships. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 41(December), 421-
436. 
DORIUS, S. (2012). The Spirit of Capitalism, Economic Development, and National Wealth. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan, Population Studies Research Center. 
DOROSH, P., & SCHMIDT, E. (2010). The Rural-Urban Transformation in Ethiopia. Addis 
Ababa: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
DORWARD, A., KYDD, J., MORRISON, J., & COLIN, P. (2005). Institutions, Markets, and 
Economic Co-ordination: Linking Development Policy to Theory and Praxis. 
Development and Change, 35(1), 1-25. 
DoS. (1941, August 16). Joint Declaration by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister 
Churchill. Department of State Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: United States Government. 
DOUGLAS, M. (1992). Risk and Blame: Essays in Culture Theory. London: Routledge. 
DOUTRIAUX, S., GEISLER, C., & SHIVELY, G. (2008). Competing for Coffee Space: 
Development-Induced Displacement in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. Rural 
Sociology, 73(4), 528-554. 
DREYFUS, H. (1991). Being in the World: A Commentary on Heideggers Being and Time. 
Cambridge, USA: MIT Press. 
279 
 
Driscoll, D., Appiah-Yeboah, A., Salib, P., & Rupert, D. (2007, January 1). Merging Qualitative 
and Quantative Data in Mixed Methods Research: How to and Why not. Retrieved 
October 16, 2014, from DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln: 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=icwdmeea 
DU, F., & DONG, X. (2008). Why Do Women Have Longer Durations of Unemployment Than 
Men in Post-restructing Urban China? Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33, 233-252. 
DUBOIS, R., BALGOBIN, K., GOMANI, M., KELEMBA, J., KONAYUMA, G., PHIRI, M., & 
SIMIYU, J. (2010). Integrating Sustainable Development in Technical and Vocational 
Education and Training. Bonn: UNESCO. 
DURLAUF, S. (1996). A Theory of Persistent Income Inequality. Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 
75-93. 
DURMAZ, Y., & TASDEMIR, A. (2014). A Theoretical Approach to the Influence of Social Class 
on Consumer Behaviour. American International Journal of Social Science, 3(3), 187-
191. 
DVORKIN, M., & SHELL, M. (2015). A Cross-country Comparison of Labor Force Participation. 
St. Louis: United States Federal Reserve. 
DYRKOLBOTN, S. (2016). On the Legitimacy of Economic Development Takings. Doctoral 
Thesis, Durham University, Durham. Retrieved from http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11559/ 
EASTER, G. (1996). Personal Networks and Post-Revolutionary State Building: Soviet Russia 
Reexamined. World Politics, 48(4), 551-578. 
EASTERLY, W. (2003). Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
17(3), 23-48. 
EBC. (2017, July 13). Council Endorses Addis Ababa's 10th Master Plan. Retrieved January 14, 
2018, from Ethiopia Broadcasting Corporation: http://www.ebc.et/web/ennews/-/council-
endorses-addis-ababa-s-10th-master-plan 
EDER, C. (2014). Displacement and Education for the Next Generation: Evidence from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. IZA Journal of Labor & Development, 3(12), 1-24. 
EEA. (2005). Report on the Ethiopian Economy Volume IV, 2004/2005: Transformation of the 
Ethiopian Agriculture: Potentials, Constraints and Suggested Intervention Measures. 
Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Economic Association. 
EENHOORN, H., & BECX, G. (2007). Constrain Constraints! A Study into Real and Perceived 
Constraints and Opportunities for the Development of Smallholder Farmers in sub-
Saharan Africa. Wageningen: Wageningen UR. 
EGZIABBER, T. (1998). The Influence of Decentralization on Some Aspects of Local and 
Regional Development Planning in Ethiopia. Eastern Africa Social Science Research 
Review, XIV(1), 33-63. 
EIGHT. (2013). The Changing PhD. Turner, Australia: Group of Eight. 
280 
 
EISENBRUCH, M. (1991). From Post-traumatic Stress Disorder to Cultural Bereavement: 
Diagnosis of Southeast Asian Refugees. Social Science Medicine, 33, 673-680. 
ELDER, G., KING, V, & CONGER, R. (1996). International Continuity and Change in Rural 
Lives: Historical and Developmental Insights. International Journal of Behavioral 
Development, 19(2), 433-455. 
ELHADI, A., NYARIKI, D., WASONGA, V., & EKAYA, W. (2012). Factors Influencing Transient 
Poverty Among Agro-Pastoralists in Semi-arid Areas of Kenya. African Crop Science 
Journal, 20(1), 113-122. 
ELLEN, R., PARKES, P., & BICKER, A. (2000). Indigenous Environmental Knowledge and its 
Transformations: Critical Anthropological Perspectives. London: Psychology Press. 
ELLIOTT, N., & LAZENBATT, A. (2005). How to Recognise a 'Quality' Grounded Theory 
Research Study. Australian Journal of Advanced Nursing, 22(3), 48-52. 
ELLIS, F. (2000). The Determinants of Rural Livelihood Diversification in Developing Countries. 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 51(2), 289-302. 
EL-NASHAR, W., & ELYAMANY, A. (2017). Managing Risks of the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam on Egypt. Ain Shams Engineering Journal, (article in press). 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.asej.2017.06.004 
ENGEL, J., & ROSE, P. (2011). Ethiopia's Progress in Education. Sussex: Overseas 
Development Institute. 
EPA. (2012). National Report of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: The United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development; Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority. 
EPSTEIN, M., & YUTHAS, K. (2012). Redefining Education in the Developing World. Stanford 
Social Innovation Review(Winter), 19-22. 
ERAUT, M. (2000). Non-formal Learning and Tacit Knowledge in Professional Work. British 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 70(113), 113-136. 
ERDMANN, G., & ENGLE, U. (2006). Neopatrimonialism Revisited -- Beyond a Catch-all 
Concept. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies. 
ERIKSEN, S., & LIND, J. (2009). Adaptation as a Political Process: Adjusting to Drought and 
Conflict in Kenya's Drylands. Environmental Management, 43, 817-835. 
ERIKSON, E. (1975). Life History and the Historical Moment. New York: Norton. 
ERMAN, T. (1998). Becoming "Urban" and Remaining "Rural": The Views of Turkish Rural to 
Urban Migrants On The Integration Question. International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 30, 541-561. 
ESCOBAR, A. (1992). Imagining a Post-development Era? Critical Thought, Development and 
Social Movements. Social Text, Third World and Post-colonial Issues, 31, 20-56. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/466217 
ESHETE, A. (1982). The Cultural Situation in Socialist Ethiopia. Paris: UNESCO. 
281 
 
ESHETU, D. (1999). From Bread-winning to Money-making: Individual and Social Factors 
Behind Entrepreneurship in Ethiopia. Leipzig: Universitat Leipzig. 
ESTACHE, A., & GARSOUS, G. (2012). The Impact of Infrastructure on Growth in Developing 
Countries, Note 1. Washington, D.C.: International Finance Corporation, World Bank. 
ETANA, D., & TOLOSSA, D. (2017). Unemployment and Food Insecurity in Urban Ethiopia. 
African Development Review, 29(1), 56-68. 
EU. (2003). A Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels: European Union. 
EVANS, P. (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation.  
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
 
FAKIH, A., & IBRAHIM, M. (2016). The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Labour Market in 
Neighboring Countries: Emperical Evidence from Jordan. Defence and Peace 
Economics, 27(1), 64-86. 
FANTA-VAGENSHTEIN, Y. (2008). How Illiterate People Learn: Case Study of Ethiopian Adults 
in Israel. Journal of Literacy and Technology, 9(3), 26-55. 
FANTINI, E. (2013). Developmental State, Economic Transformation and Social Diversification 
in Ethiopia. ISPI Analysis, 163(March), 1-7. Retrieved from 
http://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/analysis_163_2013.pdf 
FAO. (2010). Policies and Institutions to Support Smallholder Agriculture. Rome: Food and 
Agriculture Organization. 
FAO. (2012). Decent Rural Employment for Food Security: A Case for Action. Rome: Food and 
Agriculture Organization. 
FELDMAN, M., HADJIMICHAEL, T., & LANAHAN, L. (2016). The Logic of Economic 
Development: A Definition and Model for Investment. Government and Policy, 34, 5-21. 
FELDMAN, S., GEISLER, C., & SILBERLING, L. (2003). Moving Targets: Displacement, 
Impoverishment, and Development. International Social Science Journal, 55(75). 
FENG, Y., & GIZELIS, T. (2002). Building Political Consensus and Distributing Resources: A 
Trade-off or a Compatible Choice? Economic Deveopment and Social Change, 51(1), 
217-236. 
FERNANDES, W. (2007). Development-Induced Displacement: The Class and Gender 
Perspecitve. Bangalore: Paper Presented at the International Conference on The 
Emerging Woman in the Indian Economy. 
FERRARO, V. (2008). Dependency Theory: An Introduction. In G. Secondi, The Development 
Economics Reader (pp. 58-64). London: Routledge. 
FERRIS, E., & WINTHROP, R. (2010). Education and Displacement: Assessing Conditions for 
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Affected by Conflict. New York City: 
UNESCO. 
FH. (2014). Freedom in the World. Washington, D.C.: Freedom House. 
282 
 
FIELD, J., & MORGAN-KLEIN, N. (2010). Studenthood and Identification: Higher Education as 
a Liminal Transitional Space. Coventry: 40th Annual SCUTREA Conference, University 
of Warwick. 
FISEHA, A. (2007). Constitutional Adjudication in Ethiopia: Exploring the Experience of the 
House of Federation. Nairobi: African Network of Constitutional Law on Fostering 
Constitutionalism in Africa. 
FISEHA, A. (2012). Ethiopia's Experiment in Accommodating Diversity: 20 Years' Balance 
Sheet. Regional and Federal Studies, 22(4), 435-473. 
FISHER, J., & ANDERSON, D. (2015). Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Development 
in Africa. International Affairs, 91(1), 131-151. 
FITZSIMONS, P. (1999). Human Capital Theory and Education. In M. Peters, & T. G. Besley, 
The Encyclopaedia of Educational Philosopy and Theory.  
FJELDE, H., & OSTBY, G. (2010). Economic Inequality and Non-State Conflicts in Africa. 
Washington, D.C.: Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. 
FLAVIUS, C. (2014). Undemocratic Regimes. Annals of the Constantin Bransusi University(2), 
105-110. 
Foreman, M. (2013). Battling Brain Drain: Training Doctors in Ethiopia. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan. Retrieved from http://www.ns.umich.edu/new/releases/21706-battling-brain-
drain-training-doctors-in-
ethiopia?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+umns-
releases+(University+of+Michigan+News+Service+-+News+Releases) 
FRANCO, J., BORRAS, S., ALONSO-FRADEJAS, A., BUXTON, N., HERRE, R. K., & 
FEODOROFF, T. (2013). The Global Land Grab: A Primer. Amsterdam: Transnational 
Institute of Agrarian Justice Programme. 
FRANKEMA, E., & VAN WAIJENBURG, M. (2011). Real Wages in British Africa, 1880 - 1940. 
Utrecht: University of Utrecht. 
FRANKENBERGER, T., & MCCASTON, M. (1999). The Household Livelihood Security 
Concept. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
FRANSEN, S., & KUSHMINDER, K. (2009). Migration in Ethiopia: History, Current Trends and 
Future Prospects. Maastricht: Maastricht School of Governance. 
FRANZESE, R. (2001). Political Participation, Income Distribution, and Public Transfers in 
Developed Democracies. Hartford: American Political Science Association. 
FREIDBERG, L. (1999). The Impact of Technological Change on Older Workers: Evidence from 
Data on Computers. Cambridge, USA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
FRENCH, J., & RAVEN, B. (1959). The Bases of Social Power. In D. Cartwright, Studies in 
Social Power (pp. 150-167). Lansing: University of Michigan. 
FRIED, M. (2000). Continuities and Discontinuities of Place. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 20, 193-205. 
283 
 
FRIEDMAN, W., KREMER, M., MIGUEL, E., & THORNTON, R. (2016). Education as 
Liberation? Economica, 83(329), 1-30. 
FRITZ, V., & MENOCAL, A. (2006). (Re)building Developmental States: From Theory to 
Practice. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
FROST, M., & ROLESTON, C. (2013). Improving Education Quality, Equity and Access: A 
Report on Findings from the Young Lives School Survey in Ethiopia. London: Young 
Lives. 
FUKUNISHI, T., & MACHIKITA, T. (2017). Vocational Education and Employment Outcomes in 
Ethiopia: Displacement Effects in Local Labor Markets. Chiba: Institute of Developing 
Economies. 
FUKUYAMA, F. (2001). Social Capital, Civil Society and Development. Third World Quarterly, 
22(1), 7-20. 
GALBIN, A. (2014). An Introduction to Social Constructionism. Social Research Reports, 26, 82-
92. 
GALBRAITH, J. (2016). Inequality: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: University Press. 
GALIPEAU, B., INGMAN, M., & TILT, B. (2013). Dam-induced Displacement and Agricultural 
Livelihoods in China's Mekong Basin. Human Ecology, 41, 437-446. 
GALLAROTTI, G. (2011). Soft Power: What It Is, Why It Is Important: and the Conditions for its 
Effective Use. Journal of Political Power, 4(1), 25-47. 
GALLO, W., BRADLEY, E., SIEGEL, M., & KASL, S. (2001). The Impact of Involuntary Job Loss 
on Subsequent Alcohol Consumption by Older Workers: Findings From the Health and 
Retirement Survey. Journal of Gerontology, 56b(1), S3-S9. 
GALLUP, J., SACHS, J., & MELLINGER, A. (1999). Geography and Economic Development. 
International Regional Science Review, 22(2), 179-232. 
GANGA, D., & SCOTT, S. (2006). Cultural "Insiders" and the Issue of Positionality in Qualitative 
Migration Research: Moving 'Across' and Moving 'Along' Researcher-Participant Divides. 
Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 7(3). 
GARLAND, G., MORRISON, J., & NAUDE, P. (2018). Economic Growth and Progress: A 
Paradigmatic Conflation. African Journal of Business Ethics, 11(2), 37-55. 
GAVENTA, J. (2016). Finding the Spaces for Change: A Power Analysis. Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies. 
GEBREEYESUS, M. (2007). Growth of Micro-enterprises: Empirical Evidence from Ethiopia. 
Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Development Research Institute. 
GEBREEYESUS, M. (2014). Industrial Policy and Development in Ethiopia: Evolution and 
Present Experimentation. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
GEBREEYESUS, M. (2016). Industrial Policy and Development in Ethiopia. In C. Newman, J. 
Page, J. Rand, A. Shimeles, M. Soderbom, & F. Tarp, Manufacturing Transformation: 
284 
 
Comparative Studies of Industrial Development in Africa and Emerging Asia (pp. 28-59). 
Oxford: Oxford Scholarship On-line. 
GEBREEYESUS, M., & LIZUKA, M. (2010). Discovery of the Flower Industry in Ethiopia: 
Experimentation and Coordination. Maastricht: United Nations University. 
GEBREGZIABHER, Z., YIADOM, K., & ASFAW, M. (2014). The Impact of Urban Sprawl on the 
Livelihood of Fringe Farmers in Mekelle, Ethiopia. Research on Humanities and Social 
Sciences, 4(16), 126-134. 
GEBREHIWOT, T., & VAN DER VEEN, A. (2015). Farmers Prone to Drought Risk: Why Some 
Farmers Undertake Farm-level Risk-reduction Measures and Others Not? Environmental 
Management, 55, 588-602. 
GEBREMESKEL, D. (2011). Land Tenure and Farmers Investment on Agriculture: Evidences 
from Three Counties in Hawzen District, Tigray, Northern Ethiopia. International Journal 
of Research in Commerce, 1(6), 5-12. 
GEBRESELASSIE, S. (2006). Land, Land Policy and Smallholder Agriculture in Ethiopia: 
Options and Scenarios. Sussex: Future Agricultures Consortium. 
GEBRESENBET, F. (2014). Securitisation and Development in Ethiopia: The Discourse and 
Politics of Developmentalism. Review of African Political Economy, 41(1), s64-s74. 
GEDA, A., SHIMELES, A., & WEEKS, J. (2009). Growth, Poverty and Inequality in Ethiopia: 
Which Way for Pro-poor Growth? Journal of International Development, 21, 947-970. 
GELLNER, E. (1984). The Scientific Status of Social Sciences. International Social Science 
Journal, XXXVI(4), 567-586. 
GERGEN, K. (1985). The Social Constructionist Movement in Modern Psychology. American 
Psychologist, 40(3), 266-275. 
GERGEN, K. (1999). Social Construction and the Transformation of Identity Politics. In F. 
Newman, & L. Holzman, End of Knowing: A New Developmental Way of Learning (pp. 
47-65). New York: Routledge. 
GETAHUN, A. (1978). Agricultural Systems in Ethiopia. Agricultural Systems, 3, 221-293. 
GHATAK, M., & MOOKHERJEE, D. (2014). Land Acquisition for Industrialization and 
Compensation of Displaced Farmers. Journal of Developmental Economics, 110, 303-
312. 
GIDDENS, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
GILL, P., STEWART, K., TREASURE, E., & CHADWICK, B. (2008). Methods of Data Collection 
in Qualitative Research: Interviews and Focus Groups. British Dental Journal, 204(6), 
291-299. 
GILLIGAN, D., HODDINOTT, J., & TAFFESSE, A. (2009). The Impact of Ethiopia's Safety Net 
Programme and its Linkages. Journal of Development Studies, 45(10), 1684-1706. 
285 
 
GIZAW, S. (2013). Resettlement Revisited: The Post-resettlement Assessment in Biftu Jalala 
Resettlement Site. Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, 3(1), 23-57. 
GOETTE, L., HUFFMAN, D., & MEIER, S. (2006). The Impact of Group Membership on 
Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real 
Social Groups. The American Economic Review, 96(2), 212-216. 
GOLDSTONE, J. (2002). Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to 
Violent Conflict. Journal of International Affairs, 56(1), 3-22. 
GORDON, L., SULLIVAN, S., MITTAL, S., & STONE, K. (2015). Ethiopia's Anti-Terrorism Law: 
A Tool to Stifle Dissent. Oakland: Oakland Institute. 
GORDUS, J. (1986). Coping with Involuntary Job Loss and Building a New Career: Workers' 
Problems and Career Professionals. Journal of Career Development, 12, 316-326. 
GORE, C. (2000). The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for 
Developing Countries. World Development, 28(5), 780-804. 
GRAFF, M. (1998). Educational Imbalance, Socio-economic Inequality, Political Freedom and 
Economic Development. Dresden: Leibniz Information Centre for Economics. 
GREEN, E. (2011). Decentralization and Political Opposition in Contemporary Africa: Evidence 
from Sudan and Ethiopia. Democratization, 18(5), 1087-1105. 
GRELLER, M., & STROH, L. (1995). Careers in Midlife and Beyond: A Fallow Field in Need of 
Sustenance. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 47, 232-247. 
GRIGORIEV, P., MESLE, F., SHKOLNIKOV, V., ANDREEV, E., FIHEL, A., PECHDOLDOVA, 
M., & VALLIN, J. (2014). The Recent Mortality Decline in Russia: Beginning of the 
Cardiovascular Revolution? Population and Development Review, 40(1), 107-129. 
GRIMM, S., LEMAY-HEBERT, N., & NAY, O. (2014). 'Fragile States': Introducing a Political 
Concept. Third World Quarterly, 35(2), 197-209. 
GROTH, T., & CURTIS, A. (2017). Mapping Farmer Identity: Why, How and What does it Tell 
Us? Australian Geographer, 48(3), 365-383. 
Guion, L., Diehl, D., & McDonald, D. (2002, September). Triangulation: Establishing the Validity 
of Qualitative Studies. Retrieved August 13, 2014, from IFAS Extension: 
http://www.rayman-bacchus.net/uploads/documents/Triangulation.pdf 
GUNDUZ, C. (2004). Human Rights and Development: The World Bank's Need for a Consistent 
Approach. London: London School of Economics. 
GUPTA, A. (1995). Blurred Boundaries: the Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and  
the Imagined State. American Ethnologist, 22(2), 375-402. 
 
GURR, T. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
GUTNER, T. (1999). The Political Economy of Food Subsidy Reform in Egypt. Washington, 
D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
286 
 
HADENIUS, A., & TEORELL, J. (2006). Authoritarian Regimes: Stability, Change, and 
Pathways to Democracy, 1972-2003. Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute for International 
Studies. 
HAGMANN, T. (2006). Ethiopian Political Culture Strikes Back: A Rejoinder to J. Abbink. 
Affrican Affairs, 105(421), 605-612. 
HAGMANN, T. (2014). Punishing the Periphery: Legacies of State Repression in the Ethiopian 
Ogaden. Journal of African Studies, 8(4), 725-739. 
HAGMANN, T., & ABBINK, J. (2011). Twenty Years of Revolutionary Democratic Ethiopia. 
Journal of Eastern Africa Studies, 5(4), 579-595. 
HAGOS, A., & GETA, E. (2016). Review of Smallholders Agriculture Commercialization in 
Ethiopia: What are the Driving Factors To Focus On? Journal of Development and 
Agricultural Economics, 8(4), 65-76. 
HAGOS, H., & HOLDEN, S. (2013). Links Between Tenure Security and Food Security: 
Evidence from Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Development Research Institute. 
HAILE, T. (2015). Comparative Analysis for the SDPRP, PASDEP, and GTP of the FDR of 
Ethiopia. Global Journal of Business, Economics and Management, 5(1), 13-24. 
HAILESELLASIE, A., ABERA, N., & BAYE, G. (2013). Assessment of Saving Culture Among 
Households in Ethiopia. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 4(15), 1-8. 
HAILU, S. (2014). Is the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front Rule Sustainable in 
Ethiopia? A Critical Reflection. Public Policy and Administration Research, 4(11), 64-71. 
HALEVY, N., CHOU, E., COHEN, T., & BORNSTEIN, G. (2010). Relative Deprivation and 
Intergroup Competition. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 13(6), 685-700. 
HALLER, A. (2012). Concepts of Economic Growth and Development: Challenges of Crisis and 
of Knowledge. Economy Transdisciplinarity Cognition, 15(1), 66-71. 
HAMMERSLEY, M. (2000). Taking Sides in Social Research: Essays on Partisanship and Bias. 
London: Routledge. 
HAMMOND, C., & FEINSTEIN, L. (2005). The Effects of Adult Learning on Self-efficacy. 
London Review of Education, 3(3), 265-287. 
HAMMOND, L. (2008). Strategies of Invisibilization: How Ethiopia's Resettlement Programme 
Hides the Poorest of the Poor. Journal of Refugee Studies, 21(4), 517-536. 
HANCOCK, D., & ALGOZZINE, B. (2006). Doing Case Study Research. London: Teachers 
College Press. 
HANJRA, M., TADELE, F., & GUTTA, D. (2009). Pathways to Breaking the Poverty Trap in 
Ethiopia: Investments in Agricultural Water, Education, and Markets. Agricultural Water 
Management, 98, 1596-1604. 
HANSEN, G. (2009). A Guide to Worker Displacement: Some Tools for Reducing the Impact on 
Workers, Communities and Enterprises. Geneva: International Labour Organization. 
287 
 
HANUSHEK, E. (2013). Economic Growth in Developing Countries: The Role of Human Capital. 
Economics of Education Review, 37, 204-212. 
HANUSHEK, E., & WOSSMANN, L. (2010). Education and Economic Growth. In P. Peterson, 
E. Baker, & B. Mcgraw, International Encyclopedia of Education (Vol. 2, pp. 245-252). 
Oxford: Elsevier. 
HAQUE, M. (1999). The Fate of Sustainable Development Under Neo-Liberal Regimes in 
Developing Countries. International Political Science Review, 20(2), 197-218. 
HARDON, A., & HODGKIN, C. (2004). How to Investigate the Use of Medicines by Consumers. 
Amsterdam: World Health Organizatoin. 
HARRIS, J., & TODARO, M. (1970). Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-sector 
Analysis. The American Economic Review, 60(1), 126-142. 
HART, K. (1973). Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana. The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, 11(1), 61-89. 
HATHAWAY, T. (2008). What Cost Ethiopia's Dam Boom? Spring Hill (Australia) : International 
Rivers. 
HAUGE, A. (2006). Identity and Place: A Critical Comparision of Three Identity Theories. 
Architectural Science Review, 50(1), 44-51. 
HAUSHOFER, J. (2013). The Psychology of Poverty: Evidence from 43 Countries. Retrieved 
February 22, 2016 , from Documento de Trabajo: 
http://www.princeton.edu/joha/publications/Haushofer_2013.pdf 
Haylemariam, D. (2017, October 17). How Real is the Ethiopia Rising Narrative. Retrieved 
October 9, 2017, from The WorldPost: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dawit-ayele-
haylemariam/how-real-is-the-ethiopia-_b_7985180.html 
HEALE, R., & TWYCROSS, A. (2015). Validity and Reliability in Quantitative Research. 
Evidence Based Nursing, 66-67. 
HELDRING, L., & ROBINSON, J. (2012). Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa. 
Cambridge, USA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
HELFAND, S., & TAYLOR, M. (2017). The Inverse Relationship Between Farm Size and 
Productivity: Refocusing the Debate. Riverside: University of California, Pacific 
Conference for Development Economics. 
HELLEINER, E. (2015). International Policy Coordination for Development: The Forgotten 
Legacy of Bretton Woods. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. 
HELLEINER, G. (1994). From Adjustment to Development in sub-Saharan Africa: Consensus 
and Continuing Conflict. In G. Cornia, & G. Helleiner, From Adjustment to Development 
in Africa (pp. 3-24). London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
HELMAN, G., & RATNER, S. (1992). Saving Failed States. Foreign Policy, 89(Winter), 3-20. 
288 
 
HENDERSON, V. (2002). Urbanization in Developing Countries. The World Bank Research 
Observer, 17(1), 89-112. 
HENRICH, J., & MCELREATH, R. (2002). Are Peasants Risk-averse Decision Makers? Current 
Anthropology, 43(1), 172-181. 
HENZE, P. (1989). Ethiopia: Crisis of a Marxist Economy. Santa Monica: RAND. 
HERRERA-IDARRAGA, P., LOPEZ-BAZO, E., & MOTELLON, E. (2013). Informality and Over-
education in the Labor Market of a Developing Country. Barcelona: Institut de Recerca 
en Economia Aplicada Regional i Publica. 
HESS, S. (2015). The Political Staleness of China-Ethiopia Relations. In S. Hess, & R. Aidoo, 
Charting the Roots of Anti-Chinese Populism in Africa (pp. 41-56). Cham: Springer. 
HICKEY, S. (2007). Conceptualizing the Politics of Social Protection in Africa. Manchester: 
Brooks World Poverty Institute, University of Manchester. 
HICKEY, S., SABATES-WHEELER, R., GUENTHER, B., & MACAUSLAN, I. (2009). Promoting 
Social Transfers: DFID and the Politics of Influencing. London: Department for 
International Development. 
HILLMAN, N., & WEICHMAN, T. (2016). Education Deserts: The Continued Significance of 
Place in the Twenty-first Century. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education. 
HIMMELSTEIN, D., THORNE, D., WARREN, E., & WOOLHANDLER, S. (2009). Medical 
Bankruptcy in the United States; Results of a National Study. American Journal of 
Medicine, 122(8), 741-748. 
HINDMAN, M., LU-HILL, O., MURPHY, S., RAO, S., SHAH, Y., & ZHU, Z. (2015). Addressing 
Slum Redevelopment Issues in India. Ann Arbor: International Institute of University of 
Michigan. 
HOFMAN, W., & STEIJN, A. (2003). Students or Lower-skilled Workers? 'Displacement' at the 
Bottom of the Labour Market. Higher Education, 45, 127-146. 
HOFSTEDE, G., & BOND, M. (1984). Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions: An Independent 
Validation Using Rokeach's Value Survey. Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, 14(4), 
417-433. 
HOLDEN, S., & YOHANNES, H. (2002, November). Land Redistribution, Tenure Insecurity, and 
Intensity of Production: A Study of Farm Households in Southern Ethiopia. Land 
Economics, 78(4), pp. 573-590. 
HOME. (2016). Ethiopia: Opposition to the Government. London: British Home Office. 
HOME. (2016b). Ethiopia: Oromos and the 'Oromo Protests'. London: British Home Office. 
HONWANA, A. (2012). The Time of Youth, Work, Social Change and Politics in Africa. Sterling: 
Kumarian Press. 
HONWANA, A. (2013). Youth and Revolution in Tunisia. Chicago: Zed Books. 
289 
 
HORST, C., & GRABSKA, K. (2015). Flight and Exhile -- Uncertainty in the Context of Conflict-
induced Displacement. Social Analysis, 59(1), 1-18. 
HOVE, M., NGWERUME, E., & MUCHEMWA, C. (2013). The Urban Crisis in sub-Saharan 
Africa: A Threat to Human Security and Sustainable Development. Stability, 2(1), 1-14. 
HRW. (2005, May). Mechanisms Used by the Ethiopian Government to Control Rural 
Communities in Oromia. Retrieved June 3, 2015, from Human Rights Watch: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/ethiopia0505/6.htm 
HRW. (2010, October 19). Development Without Freedom. Retrieved June 1, 2015, from 
Human Rights Watch: http://www.hrw.org/zh-hans/node/93604/section/10 
HRW. (2012). Waiting Here For Death: Forced Displacement and Villigization in Ethiopia's 
Gambella Region. Amsterdam: Human Rights Watch. 
HRW. (2014). They Know Everything We Do: Telecom and Internet Surveillance in Ethiopia. 
Amsterdam: Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from 
http://www.refworld.org/publisher,HRW,,ETH,533576fc4,0.html 
HRW. (2016). Such a Brutal Crackdown: Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia's Oromia 
Protests. Amsterdam: Human Rights Watch. 
HSIEH, H., & SHANNON, S. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. 
Qualitative Health Research, 15, 1277-1288. 
HUANG, J. (1995). Structural Disarticulation and Third World Human Development. 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 36, 164-183. 
HUDELSON, P. (2004). Culture and Quality: An Anthropological Perspective. International 
Journal for Quality in Health Care, 16(5), 345-346. 
HUI, G., & PHILLIPS, M. (2014). Secondary Analysis of Existing Data: Opportunities and 
Implementation. Shanghai Archives of Psychiatry, 26(6), 371-375. 
HUNDE, A., & TACCONI, G. (2017). Professionalization of VET Teachers in Ethiopia: The 
Current Practices, the Challenges and the Way Forward. In F. Eicker, G. Haseloff, & B. 
Lennartz, Vocational Education and Training in sub-Saharan Africa: Current Situation 
and Development (pp. 329-341). Bielefeld: W, Bertelsmann-Verlag. 
HUNG, D., & CHEN, D. (2007). Context-process Authenticity in Learning: Implications for 
Identity Enculturation and Boundry Crossing. Education Technology Research 
Development, 55, 147-167. 
HYNDMAN, J. (2012). The Geopolitics of Migration and Mobility. Geopolitics, 17(2), 243-255. 
IGE, K. (2014). The Absolute - Relative Deprivation Dichotomy in Estimating Variations in 
Reaction to Inequality: Comparing Antecedents of Collective Action Among 
Disadvantaged Groups. Journal of Social Science, 39(1), 87-101. 
IGOE, J. (2006). Becoming Indigenous Peoples: Difference, Inequality, and the Globalization of 
East African Identity Politics. African Affairs, 105(420), 399-420. 
290 
 
ILO. (1998). Resolution Concerning the Measurement of Under-employment and Inadequate 
Employment Situations, Adopted by the Sixteenth International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians. Geneva: International Labor Office. 
ILO. (2007). Characteristics and Determinants of Youth Unemployment, Under-employment, 
and Inadequate Employment in Ethiopia. Geneva: International Labor Organization, 
Employment Policies Unit. 
ILO. (2009). Globalization and Informal Jobs in Developing Countries. Geneva: International 
Labor Organization. 
ILO. (2010). Local Economic Recovery in Post-conflict. Geneva: International Labor Office. 
ILO. (2013). Decent Work Country Profile, Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: International Labor Office. 
ILO. (2017, June 15). Combined Rate of Time-related Under-employment and Unemployment 
(LU2) by Sex and Age. Retrieved January 2, 2018, from Key Indicators of the Labour 
Market: 
http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/oracle/webcenter/portalapp/pagehierarchy/Page27.jspx?i
ndicator=LUU_XLU2_SEX_AGE_RT&subject=LUU&datasetCode=A&collectionCode=YI
&_adf.ctrl-
state=s47byqgap_45&_afrLoop=1033119314917780&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowI
d=s47byqgap_ 
IMF. (2013). The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Selected Issues. Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund. 
IMF. (2014). The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Selected Issues Paper. Washington, 
D.C. : International Monetary Fund. Retrieved January 7, 2018, from 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14304.pdf 
IMF. (2015). The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Selected Issues. Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund. 
IMF. (2016). Regional Economic Outlook: sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund. 
IMF. (2016b). World Economic Outlook, Subdued Demand: Symptoms and Remedies. 
Washington. D.C.: International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/ 
IMF. (2017). People's Republic of China, Staff Report for the 2017 Article IV Constitution. 
Washington , D.C. : International Monetary Fund. 
IMF. (2017b). The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Retrieved December 13, 2017, 
from International Monetary Fund: http://www.imf.org/en/Countries/ETH 
IOM. (2003). An Overview of International Migration. Geneva: International Organization for 
Migration. 
IRB. (2014, October 1). Ethiopia: Appearance of Identity Cards and Birth Certificates Issued in 
Addis Ababa, Including Description of Features, Variation in Appearance, and Issuing 
291 
 
Authorities. Retrieved January 9, 2017, from Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: 
http://www.refworld.org/publisher/IRBC.html 
IRIZARRY, R. (1980). Overeducation and Unemployment in the Third World: The Paradoxes of 
Dependent Industrialization. Comparative Education Review, 24(3), 338-352. 
JANSEN, S. (2008). Misplaced Masculinities: Status Loss and the Location of Gendered 
Subjectivities Amongst 'non-transnational' Bosnian Refugees. Anthropological Theory, 
8(2), 181-2000. 
JAYNE, T., CHAMBERLIN, J., & HEADEY, D. (2014). Land Pressures, the Evolution of Farming 
Systems, and Development Strategies in Africa: A Synthesis. Food Policy, 48, 1-17. 
JEMBERE, A., & WOLDEMELAK, W. (2011). An Introduction to the Legal History of Ethiopia: 
1974-2009. Addis Ababa: Shama Books. 
JEMMA, H. (2004). The Politics of Land Tenure in Ethiopia History: Experience from the South. 
Trondheim: XI World Confrerence of Rural Sociology. 
JENBERE, A., & WOLDEMELAK, W. (2011). An introduction to the Legal History of Ethiopia 
1974-2009. Addis Ababa: Shama Books. 
JERRIM, J. (2014). Family Background and Enterance to High Status Universities. London: The 
Sutton Trust. 
JIAO, F., & DILLIVAN, M. (2013). Transit Deserts: The Gap Between Demand and Supply. 
Journal of Public Transportation, 16(3), 23-39. 
JOHNSON, E. (2015). Empowerment of Women Through Vocational Training. Journal of 
Education Research and Review, 4(2), 37-44. 
Johnston, K. (2007). Climate Change: A Cause for Conflict? Retrieved April 23, 2015, from 
Global Politics: http://www.global-politics.co.uk/issue5/johnston/ 
JOHNSTON, M. (2014). Secondary Data Analysis: A Method of Which Time Has Come. 
Qualitative and Quantative Methods in Libraries, 3, 619-626. 
JOHNSTONE, D. (2003). Higher Education Finance and Accessibility: Tuition Fees and Student 
Loans in sub-Saharan Africa. 2003: Regional Training Conference on Improving Tertiary 
Education in sub-Saharan Africa. 
JUSTINO, P. (2011). Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro-level Perspective on the Causes and 
Duration of Warfare. Brighton: Institute for Development Studies. 
KANAS, A., CHISWICK, B., VAN DER LIPPE, T., & VAN TUBERGEN, F. (2011). Social 
Contacts and the Economic Performance of Immigrants: A Panel Study of Immigrants in 
Germany. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. 
KASSIE, B., ROTTER, R., HENGSDIJK, H., ASSENG, S., VAN ITTERSUM, M., KAHILOUTO, 
H., & VAN KEULEN, H. (2014). Climate Variability and Change in the Central Rift Valley 
of Ethiopia: Challenges for Rainfed Crop Production. Journal of Agricultural Science, 
152, 58-74. 
292 
 
KATSIRIKOU, A., & SKIADAS, C. (2010). Qualitative and Quantative Methods in Libraries, 
Theory and Applications. London: World Scientific Publishing. 
KATZ, L. (2010). The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution in 
Property Law. McGill Law Journal, 47(55), 47-80. 
KAUFMANN, D., & KRAAY, A. (2008). Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should 
We Be Going? The World Bank Observer, 23(1), 1-30. 
KEBEDE, G. (2013). Political Corruption: Political and Economic State Capture in Ethiopia. 
European Scientific Journal, 9(35), 250-279. 
KEBEDE, M. (2008). Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation in Ethiopia, 1960 - 1974. Philosophy 
Faculty Publications, 112, 8-36. 
KECK, M., & SAKDAPOLRAK, P. (2013). What is Social Reslience? Lessons Learned and 
Ways Forward. Erdkunde, 67(1), 5-19. 
KEELEY, J., SEIDE, W., EID, A., & KIDEWA, A. (2014). Large-scale Land Deals in Ethiopia: 
Scale, Trends, Features and Outcomes to Date. London: International Institute for 
Environment and Development. 
KEFALE, A. (2010). Federal Restructuring in Ethiopia: Renegotiating Identity and Borders Along 
the Oromo-Somali Ethnic Frontiers. Development and Change, 41(4), 615-635. 
KEITH, S., MCCAUSLAN, P., KNIGHT, R., LINDSAY, J., MUNRO-FAURE, P., & PALMER, D. 
(2008). Land Tenure Studies (Compulsory Acquisition of Land and Compensation). 
Rome: FAO. 
KELLER, E. (1992). Drought, War, and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 30(4), 609-624. 
KELLEY, C., MOHTADI, S., CANE, M., SEAGER, R., & KUSHNIR, Y. (2015). Climate Change 
in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian Drought. PNAS, 112(11), 
3241-3246. 
KELSALL, T. (2011). Developmental Patrimonialism? Rethinking Business and Politics in Africa. 
London: Africa Power and Politics. 
KENNEDY, J. (1962, March 13). Address on the First Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. 
Washington, D.C. 
KENNEDY, R. (2002). The Ideology of American Isolationism: 1931-1939. Cercles, 5, 57-76. 
KETTLEWELL, N. (2010). The Impact of Rural to Urban Migration on Wellbeing in Australia. 
Australasian Journal of Regional Studies, 16(3), 187-213. 
KIBERT, B., ROKANDLA, V., LALISHO, A., & BELAYNEH, E. (2013). Opportunities and 
Challenges of Small Business Enterprises in Dedo Zone-Ethiopia: From Policy, 
Regulatory and Institutional Perspectives. Asia Pacific Journal of Applied Finance, IV(2), 
12-22. 
KIBRU, M. (2012). Employment Challenges in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University. 
293 
 
KIROS, F. (2006). Enough with Famines in Ethiopia: A Clarion Call. Hollywood, California: 
Tsehai Publishers and Distributors. 
KIRSCHNER, P., SWELLER, J., & CLARK, R. (2006). Why Minimal Guidance During 
Instruction Does Not Work: An Analysis of the Failure of Constructivist Discovery, 
Problem-based, Experiential and Inquiry-based Teaching. Educational Psychologist, 
41(2), 75-86. 
KISPALNE-HORVATH, M. (2012). The Positive and Negative Effects of Formal Adult Education 
on the Sense of Comfort. Training and Practice, 10(3-4), 320-324. 
KLANDERMANS, P. (2014). Identity Politics and Politicized Identities: Identity Processes and 
the Dynamics of Protest. Political Psychology, 35(1), 1-22. 
KLANDERMANS, P., SABUCEDO, J., & RODRIGUEZ, M. (2004). Inclusiveness of Identification 
Among Farmers in the Netherlands and Galicia. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
May, 887-899. 
KLEIN, D., & ROBINSON, J. (2011). Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property 
Symposium. Econ Journal Watch, 8(3), 193-204. 
KNOWLES, M. (1973). The Adult Learner: A Neglected Species. Madison: Gulf Publishing. 
KNOWLES, M. (1978). Androgogy: Adult Learning Theory in Perspective. College Review, 5(3), 
9-20. 
KOLB, D. (1984). Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and 
Development. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
KOLB, D., & GOLDMAN, M. (1973). Toward a Typology of Learning Styles and Learning 
Environments: An Investigation of the Impact of Learning Styles and Discipline Demands 
on the Academic Performance, Social Adaptation and Career Choices of MIT Seniors. 
Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
KOLB, D., BOYATZIS, R., & MAINEMELIS, C. (2010). Experiential Learning Theory: Previous 
Research and New Directions. In R. Sternberg, & L. Zhang, Perspectives on Cognitive, 
Learning, and Thinking Styles (pp. 227-248). New York: Routledge. 
KONDRACKI, N., WELLMAN, N., & AMUNDSON, D. (2002). Content Analysis: Review of 
Methods and Their Applications in Nutrition Education. Journal of Nutrition Education 
Behavior, 34, 224-230. 
KRISHNAN, P., & SHAORSHADZE, I. (2013). Technical and Vocational Education Training in 
Ethiopia. London: International Growth Center. 
KUMAR, K. (1989). Conducting Key Informant Interviews in Developing Countries. Washington, 
D.C. : United States Agency for International Development. 
KUMSA, G. (2011). Issues of Expropriation: The Law and the Practice in Oromia. Addis Ababa: 
Addis Ababa University, School of Law. 
294 
 
KUREKOVA, L. (2011). Theories of Migration: Conceptual Review and Empirical Testing in the 
Context of the EU East-West Flows. London: Interdisciplinary Conference on Migration, 
Economic Change, Social Change. 
KUZNETS, M. (1955). Economic Growth and Income Inequality. The American Economic 
Review, XLV(1), pp. 1-28. 
LABAND, D., & LENTZ, B. (1983). Occupational Inheritance in Agriculture. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 65(2), 311-314. 
LARSSON, D. (2006). Exposure to Property Crime as a Consequence of Poverty. Journal of 
Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 7(1), 45-60. 
LAVERS, T. (2012). 'Land Grab' as Development Strategy? The Political Economy of 
Agricultural Investment in Ethiopia. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(1), 105-132. 
LAVERS, T. (2012b). Patterns of Agrarian Transformation in Ethiopia: State-mediated 
Commercialisation and the Land Grab. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), 795-822. 
LAVRINOVICHA, I., LAVRINENKO, O., & TEIVANS-TREINOVSKIS, J. (2015). Influence of 
Education on Unemployment Rate and Incomes of Residents. Procedia -- Social and 
Behavioural Sciences, 174, 3824-3831. 
LEE, D. (2016). Resistance Dynamic and Social Movement Theory. PRISM, 6(3), 131-149. 
LEFEBVRE, J. (1992). Arms for the Horn: US Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-
1991. Pittsburg, USA: University of Pittsburg Press. 
LEFORT, R. (2007). Powers -- mengist --and Peasants in Rural Ethiopia: The May 2005 
Elections. Journal of Modern African Studies, 45(2), 253-273. 
LEFTWICH, A (1995), Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State,  
 Journal of Development Studies, 31 (3), 400-27. 
 
LEGESSE, B., & DRAKE, L. (2005). Determinants of Smallholder Farmer's Perceptions of Risk 
in the Eastern Highlands of Ethiopia. Journal of Risk Research, 8(5), 383-416. 
LEHTONEN, M. (2014). Evaluation of "The Social" in Megaprojects: Tensions, Dichotomies, 
and Ambiguities. International Journal of Architecture, Engineering and Construction, 
3(2), 98-109. 
LEIDHOLM, C. (2002). Small Firm Dynamics: Evidence from Africa and Latin America. Small 
Business Economics, 18, 227-242. 
Leigh, D. (2012). UK Aid to Ethiopia Probed in Legal Action Over Alleged Human Rights 
Abuses. Retrieved January 6, 2015, from 
http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2012/September-2012/UK-Aid-to-Ethiopia-Probed-in-
Legal-Action-Over-Hum 
LEMARCHAND, R., & LEGG, K. (1972). Political Clientalism and Development: A Preliminary 
Analysis. Comparative Politics, 4(2), 149-178. 
295 
 
LEMI, A. (2009). The Dynamics of Income Diversification in Ethiopia. Ethiopian Journal of 
Economics, XVIII(1), 35-70. 
LENTH, R. (2001). Some Practical Guidelines for Effective Sample Size Determination. The 
American Statistician, 55(3), 187-193. 
LENTON, P. (2014). Personality Characteristics, Educational Attainment and Wages: An 
Economic Analysis Using British Cohort Study. Sheffield: University of Sheffield. 
LEU, T., & MULLER, D. (2016). Maintaining Inherited Occupations in Changing Times: The 
Role of Tourism Among Reindeer Herders in Northern Sweden. Polar Geography, 39(1), 
40-57. 
LEUVEN, E., & OOSTERBEEK, H. (2011). Overeducation and Mismatch in the Labor Market. 
Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. 
LEVINSOHN, J., & MCMILLIAN, M. (2007). Does Food Aid Harm the Poor? Household 
Evidence from Ethiopia. In A. Harrison, Globalization and Poverty (pp. 561-596). 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
LEVITSKY, S., & WAY, L. (2002). Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 52-65. 
LEWIS, O. (1966). The Culture of Poverty. Scientific American, 214(1), 19-25. 
LEWIS, W. (1954). Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour. The Manchester 
School, 22(2), 139-191. 
LIPSET, S. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69-105. 
LITTAU, P., DONOVIC, I., PAU, L., MANCINI, M., DIEQUEZ, I., MEDINA-LOPEZ, C., . . . 
LUKASIEWICZ, A. (2015). Managing Stakeholders in Mega-projects. Leeds: University 
of Leeds. 
LIU, J., & WUERKER, A. (2005). Biosocial Bases of Aggression and Violent Behaviour -- 
Implications for Nursing Studies. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 42, 229-241. 
LIU, J., RAINE, A., VENABLES, P., & MEDNICK, S. (2004). Malnutrition at Age 3 Years and 
Externalizing Behaviour Problems at Ages 8, 11 and 17 Years. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 161, 2005-2013. 
LIU, W., SINHA, G., & STERN, R. (2013). Unheard Voices: The Human Rights Impact of Land 
Investments on Indigenous Communities in Gambella. Oakland: The Oakland Institute. 
LIVERPOOL, L., & WINTER-NELSON, A. (2010). Poverty Status and the Impact of Social 
Networks on Smallholder Technology Adoption in Rural Ethiopia. Washington, D.C.: 
International Food Policy Research Institute. 
LOENING, J., & IMRU, L. (2009). Ethiopia: Diversifying the Rural Economy. An Assessment of 
the Investment Climate for Small and Informal Enterprises. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank. 
296 
 
LOGAN, D. (2009). Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, Unknown Unknowns and the 
Propagation of Scientific Enquiry. Journal of Experimental Botany, 60(3), 712-714. 
LOWE, S., SAMPSON, L., GRUEBNER, O., & GALEA, S. (2015). Psychological Resilience 
After Hurricane Sandy: The Influence of Individual- and Community-Level Factors on 
Mental Health After a Large Scale Natural Disaster. PLoS ONE, 3, 1-15. 
LUCKHAM, R. (2004). The International Community and State Reconstruction in War-torn 
Societies. Conflict, Security & Development, 4(3), 481-507. 
LUNDBERG, S. (2013). The College Type: Personality and Educational Inequality. Bonn: 
Institute for the Study of Labor. 
LUSARDI, A. (2007). Household Saving Behavior: The Role of Financial Literacy, Information, 
and Financial Education Programs. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank Conference on 
Implications of Behavioral Economics for Economic Policy. 
LUVALO, L. (2014). The Role of Higher Education in Social Transformation and Rural 
Development. Mediterranian Journal of Social Sciences, 5(23), 1206-1212. 
Maasho, A. (2016, October 7). Ethiopian Protesters Attack Factories in Africa's Rising Economic 
Star. Retrieved March 5, 2017, from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-
unrest-idUSKCN1270MX 
MACLEOD, S., MUSICH, S., HAWKINS, K., ALSGAARD, K., & WICKER, E. (2016). The Impact 
of Resilience Among Older Adults. Geriatric Nursing, 37, 266-272. 
MADDISON, A. (2001). The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: OECD. 
MAGARAMOBE, G. (2010). 'Displaced in Place': Agrarian Displacements, Replacements and 
Resettlement Among Farm Workers in Mazowe District. Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 36(2), 361-377. 
MAGNAN, A. (2016). When Wheat Was King. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
MAHLER, S. (1999). Engendering Transnational Migration. American Behavioral Scientist, 
42(4), 690-719. 
MAHONEY, J., & GOERTZ, G. (2006). A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and 
Qualitative Research. Political Analysis, 14, 227-249. 
MAKKI, F. (2014). Development by Dispossession: Terra Nullius and the Social-ecology of New 
Enclosures in Ethiopia. Rural Sociology, 79(1), 79-103. 
MALTERUD, K. (2001). Qualitative Research: Standards, Challenges, and Guidelines. The 
Lancet, 358, 483-488. 
MANCINI, L. (2005). Horizontal Inequality and Communal Violence: Evidence from indonesian 
Districts. Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity. 
MANKIW, G. (2012). Macroeconomics. New York: McGraw Hill Press. 
MANN, M. (1984). The Autonomous Power of the State: It's Origins, Mechanisms, and Results. 
European Journal of Sociology, 25(2), 185-213. 
297 
 
MANNARINE, T., ROCCATO, M., FEDI, A., & ROVERE, A. (2009). Six factors Fostering 
Protest: Predicting Participation in Locally Unwanted Land Use Movements. Political 
Psychology, 30(6), 895-920. 
MARCUS, H. (1994). A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
MARSHALL, E., LYYTIKAINEN, J. N., MONTES, A., PEREZNIETO, P., & TEFERA, B. (2016). 
Child Marriage in Ethiopia: A Review of the Evidence and an Analysis of the Prevalence 
of Child Marriage in Hotspot Districts. Geneva: UNICEF. 
MARSHALL, M., & COLE, B. (2014). Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility. Vienna, USA: 
Center for Systemic Peace. 
MARSHALL, N., PARK, S., ADGER, W., BROWN, K., & HOWDEN, S. (2012). Transformational 
Capacity and the Influence of Place and Identity. Environmental Research Letters, 7, 1-
9. 
MARSHALL, T. (2015). Prisoners of Geography. London: Elliott and Thompson Limited. 
MARTIN, B. (2007). Activism, Social and Political. In G. Anderson, & K. Herr, Encylopedia of 
Activism (pp. 19-27). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
MARTON, F. (1981). Phenomenography: Describing Conceptions of the World Around Us. 
Instructional Science, 10, 177-200. 
MASINO, S., & NINO-ZARAZUA. (2016). What Works to Improve the Quality of Student 
Learning in Developing Countries? International Journal of Educational Development, 
48, 53-56. 
MASON, E. (2000). Forced Migration Studies: Surveying the Reference Landscape. Libri, 50, 
241-251. 
MASSEY, D., ARANGO, J., HUGO, G., KOUAOUCI, A., PELLEGRINO, A., & TAYLOR, J. 
(1993). Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. Population and 
Development, 19(3), 431-466. 
MATERU, P. (2007). Higher Education Quality Assurance in sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank. 
MATFESS, H. (2015). Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental Authoritarianism and the New 
Politics of Strong Men. African Studies Review, 58(2), 181-204. 
MATSAERT, H. (2002). Institutional Analysis in Natural Resources Research. Greenwich: 
Natural Resources Research Institute / Department for International Development. 
MAURER, T. (2001). Career-relevant Learning and Development, Worker Age, and Beliefs 
About Self-efficacy for Development. Journal of Management, 27, 123-140. 
MAYOUX, L. (2006). Quantitative, Qualitative or Participatory? Which Method, for What and 
When? In V. Desai, & R. Potter, Doing Development Research (pp. 115-129). London: 
Sage. 
MAYSTADT, J., & VERWIMP, P. (2014). Winners and Losers Among a Refugee-Hosting 
Population. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 62(4), 769-809. 
298 
 
MBATE, M. (2016). Structural Change and Industrial Policy: A Case Study of Ethiopia's Leather 
Sector. Journal of African Trade, 3, 85-100. 
MBERU, B. (2005). Internal Migration and Household Living Conditions in Ethiopia. Nairobi: 
Africa Population and Health Research Center. 
MCCABE, J. (2013). An Analysis of Police Department Staffing: How Many Officers do You 
Really Need? Washington, D.C.: International City/County Management Association. 
MCDONALD, M. (2008). Securitization and the Construction of Security. European Journal of 
International Relations, 14, 563-587. 
MCGIVNEY, V. (1990). Education's for Other People: Access to Education for Non-participant 
Adults. Leicester: National Institute of Adult Continuing Education. 
MCKAY, A., & LAWSON, D. (2003). Assessing the Extent and Nature of Chronic Poverty in Low 
Income Countries: Issues and Evidence. World Development, 31(3), 425-439. 
MCLAREN, S., & CHALLIS, C. (2009). Resilience Among Men Farmers: The Protective Roles 
of Social Support and Sense of Belonging in the Depression-Suicidal Ideation Relation. 
Death Studies, 33(3), 262-276. 
MCQUIRE, J., MORTON, L., ARBUCKLE, J., & CAST, A. (2015). Farmer Identities and 
Responses to the Social-biophysical Environment. Journal of Rural Studies, 39, 145-
155. 
MEARSHEIMER, J. (2013). Structural Realism. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, & S. Smith, International 
Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (pp. 77-93). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
MEGENTO, T. (2013). Inner City Housing And Urban Development-Induced Displacement: 
Impact On Poor Female-headed Households in Arada Sub City of Addis Abba, Ethiopia. 
Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 15(2), 131-141. 
MEHRETU, A. (2012). Ethnic Federalism and its Potential to Dismember the Ethiopian State. 
Progress in Development Studies, 12(2 & 3), 113-133. 
MEHTA, I., & GUPTE, J. (2003). Whose Needs Are Right? Refugees, Oustees and the 
Challenges of Rights-based Approaches in Forced Migration. Sussex: Institute of 
Development Studies. 
MELESSE, M. (2005). City Expansion, Squatter Settlements and Policy Implications in Addis 
Ababa: The Case of Kolfe Keranio Sub-city. Trondheim: Norway's Technical-Natural 
Science University. 
MELKE, D. (2013). Promising Democratic Developmental State in Africa: Evidences from 
Ethiopia. International Journal of Educational Research and Development, 2(7), 168-
177. 
MERRIAM, S., JOHNSON-BAILY, J., LEE, M., KEE, Y., NTSEANE, G., & MUHAMAD, M. 
(2001). Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status Within and Across 
Cultures. International Journal of Lifelong Education, 20(5), 405-461. 
299 
 
MEYER, J., & LAND, R. (2005). Threshold Concepts and Troublesome Knowledge: 
Epistomological Considerations and a Conceptual Framework for Teaching and 
Learning. Higher Education, 49, 373-388. 
MILDENBERGER, M., & TINGLEY, D. (2017, December 12). Beliefs About Climate Beliefs: The 
Importance of Second Order Opinions for Climate Politics. Retrieved March 13, 2018, 
from British Journal of Political Science: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000321 
MILLS, J., BONNER, A., & FRANCIS, K. (2006). The Development of Constructivist Grounded 
Theory. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 5(1), 2-10. 
MISKO, J. (2008). Combining Formal, Non-formal and Informal Learning for Workforce Skill 
Development. Brisbane: Department of Education, Employment and Workplace 
Relations. 
MoA. (2014). Productive Safety Net Programme Phase IV Programme Implementation Manual. 
2014: Ministry of Agriculture. 
MoE. (1994). Education and Training Policy. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Education. 
MoE. (2006). Nonformal Technical and Vocational Education and Training Implementation 
Framework. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Education, Technical and Vocational Education 
and Training Sector. 
MoE. (2008). National Report on the Development and State of the Art of Adult Learning and 
Education. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Education. 
MoE. (2008). National Technical & Vocational Education & Training (TVET) Strategy. Addis 
Ababa: Ministry of Education. 
MoE. (2010). Education Sector Development Program IV. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Education. 
MoE. (2015). Education Sector Development Programme V (ESDP V). Addis Ababa: Ministry of 
Education. 
MoFED. (2003). Annual Progress Report: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction 
Program. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 
MoFED. (2005). Ethiopia: The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Needs Assessment 
Synthesis Report. Addis Ababa: Development Planning and Research Department, 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 
MoFED. (2010). Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/2014. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development. 
MoFED. (2012). Ethiopia's Progress Towards Eradicating Poverty: An Interim Report on Poverty 
Analysis Study (2010/2011). Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development. 
Moges, A. (2013). The Challenges and Policies of Poverty Reduction In Ethiopia. Retrieved 
December 16, 2017, from Ethiopian e-journal for Research and Innovation Foresight: 
http://www.nesglobal.org/eejrif4/index.php?journal=admin&page=article&op=view&path
%5B%5D=104&path%5B%5D=267 
300 
 
MOGUES, T., COHEN, M., BIRNER, R., LEMMA, M., RANDRIAMAMONJY, J., TADESSE, F., 
& PAULOS, Z. (2009). Agricultural Extension in Ethiopia Through a Gender and 
Governance Lens. Addis Ababa: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
MOHAMMED, I., KOSA, A., & JUHAR, N. (2017). Urbanization in Ethiopia: Expropriation 
Process and Rehabilitation Mechanism of Evicted Peri-urban Farmers (Policies and 
Practices). International Journal of Economic Management Science, 6(5), 1-9. 
MoI. (2002). Ethiopian Industrial Development Strategy. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Industry. 
MoI. (2013). Bole-Lemi II Industrial Zone Development Project Resettlement Action Plan. Addis 
Ababa: Ministry of Industry. 
MoI. (2013b). Ethiopian Industrial Development Strategic Plan. Addis Ababa: Ministry of 
Industry. 
Mojtahed, R., Baptista-Nunes, M., Tiago-Martins, J., & Peng, A. (2014). Equipping the 
Constructivist Researcher: The Combined Use of Semi-structured Interviews and 
Decision-making Maps. The Electronic Journal of Business Methods, 2, 87-95. Retrieved 
from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287518420_Equipping_the_constructivist_rese
archer_The_combined_use_of_semi-structured_interviews_and_decision-making_maps 
MoLSA. (2009). National Employment Policy and Strategy of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs. 
Montevideo. (1933). Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Montevideo: 
Seventh International Conference of American States. 
MOONEY, E. (2005). The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally 
Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 24(3), 9-26. 
MOREDA, T. (2015). Listening to Their Silence? The Political Reaction of Affected Communities 
to Large-scale Land Acquisitions. Journal of Peasant Studies, 42(3), 517-539. 
MOREDA, T., & SPOOR, M. (2015). The Politics of Large-scale Land Acquisitions in Ethiopia: 
State and Corporate Elites and Subaltern Villagers. Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies, 36(2), 224-240. 
MORGAN, D. (2007). Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained: Methodological Implications 
of Combining Qualitative and Quantitative. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(1), 
48-76. 
MORGENTHAU, H. (1962). A Political Theory of Foreign Aid. The American Political Science 
Review, 56(2), 301 - 309. 
MORTON, J. (2007). The Impact of Climate Change on Smallholder and Subsistence 
Agriculture. PNAS, 104(50), 19680-19685. 
MoUDHC. (2015). Resettlement Policy Framework: Urban Productive Safety Net Project. Addis 
Ababa: Ministry of Urban Development Housing and Construction. 
301 
 
MOUZAKITIS, G. (2010). The Role of Vocational Education and Training Curricula in Economic 
Development. Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences, 2, 3914-3920. 
MoWA. (2006). National Action Plan for Gender Equality. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Women's 
Affairs. 
MOYO, D. (2008). Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa. 
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
MUHUMUZA, F., & RWAKAKAMBA, M. (2015). National Budget Priorities: Do They Reflect the 
Public Interest? Kampala: Great Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies. 
MULAT, A., & MOGES, S. (2014). Assessment of the Impact of the Grand Ethiopian Dam on 
the Performance of the High Aswan Dam. Journal of Water Resources and Protection, 6, 
583-598. 
MULDERIG, M. (2013). An Uncertain Future: Youth Frustration and the Arab Spring. Boston, 
USA: Boston University. 
MULLER, C. (1997). Transient Seasonal and Chronic Poverty of Peasants: Evidence from 
Rwanda. Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies. 
MURCIA, L. (2018). The Sweet Memories of Home Have Gone; Displaced People Searching for 
a Home in a Liminal Space. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, April, 1-17. 
MURTHY, R., & LAKSHMINARAYANA, R. (2006). Mental Health Consequences of War: A Brief 
Review of Research Findings. World Psychiatry, 5(1), 25-30. 
Muske, G., Woods, M., Swinney, J., & Khoo, C. (2007, February). Small Business and the 
Community: Their Role and Importance Within a State's Economy. Retrieved August 7, 
2016, from Journal of Extension: http://www.joe.org/joe/2007february/rb4.php 
MUST, E., & RUSTAD, A. (2016). What Triggers Civil Unrest Support and Behaviour? Objective 
Horizontal Inequalities vs. Collective Grievances in Southern Tanzania. Geneva: 
ENCoRe Conference. 
NAGEL, C. (2002). Reconstructing Space, Re-creating Memory: Sectarian Politics and Urban 
Development in Post-war Beirut. Political Geography, 21, 717-725. 
NAJAFI, M., & KAMAL, M. (2012). The Concept of Place Attachment in Environmental 
Psychology. Sustainable Architecture, 45, 7637-7641. 
NASIR, M., & HUNDIE, B. (2014). The Effect of Off-farm Employment on Agricultural Production 
and Productivity: Evidence from Gurage Zone of Southern Ethiopia. Journal of 
Economics and Sustainable Development, 5(23), 85-98. 
NAYAK, B. (2014). Unemployment in Ethiopia: A Call for Action. International Journal of 
Management and Social Sciences Research, 3(4), 34-43. 
NBE. (2017). 2015/2016 Annual Report. Addis Ababa: National Bank of Ethiopia. 
NEGASH, T. (2006). Education in Ethiopia: From Crisis to the Brink of Collapse. Uppsala: 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
302 
 
NEKBY, L., RODIN, M., & OZCAN, G. (2007). Acculturation Identity and Educational 
Attainment. Bonn: Insitute for the Study of Labor. 
NEWMAN, E., & RICHMOND, O. (2006). Peacebuilding and Spoilers. Conflict, Security & 
Development, 6(1), 101-110. 
NG, K., & HASE, S. (2008). Grounded Suggestions for Doing Grounded Theory Business 
Research. The Electronic Journal of Business Methods, 6(2), 154-170. 
NIR, A., & KAFLE, B. (2011). The Effect of Political Stability on Public Education Quality. 
International Journal of Educational Management, 27(2), 110-126. 
NOBLE, C., & WALKER, B. (1997). Exploring the Relationships Among Liminal Transitions, 
Symbolic Consumption, and the Extended Self. Psychology and Marketing, 14(1), 29-47. 
NOMAN, A., BOTCHWEY, K., STEIN, H., & STIGLITZ, J. (2012). Good Growth and 
Governance in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
NOORLOOS, V., F, & KLOOSTERBOER, M. (2017, July 24). Africa's New Cities: The 
Contested Future of Urbanisation. Urban Studies, 1-19. Retrieved January 6, 2018, from 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0042098017700574 
NORDAS, R., & DAVENPORT, C. (2013). Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression. 
American Journal of Political Science, 57(4), 926-940. 
NORVY, P. (2013). Development, Displacement and Social Disarticulation. Saarbrucken: 
Lambert Academic Publishing. 
NPC. (2015). The Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) 2015-2019. Addis Ababa: 
National Planning Commisson. 
NRC. (2009). Ethiopia: Human Rights Violations and Conflicts to Cause Displacement. Oslo: 
Norwegian Refugee Council. 
NUNLEY, J., PUGH, A., ROMERO, N., & SEALS, R. (2017). The Effects of Unemployment and 
Under-employment on Employment Opportunities: Results from a Correspondence Audit 
of the Labor Market for College Graduates. International Labor Relations review, 70(3), 
612-669. 
NUNN, A. (2005). The 'Brain Drain', Academic and Skilled Migration to the UK and its Impacts 
on Africa. London: Department for International Development. 
NWAKA, I. (2008). The Immediate Threat: Multiple Definitions of Exigency Create Conflicting 
Jurisprudence. University of California, Irvine Law Forum Journal, 6, 1-26. 
NYASHA, S., GWENHURE, Y., & ODHIAMBO, N. (2017). Poverty and Economic Growth in 
Ethiopia: A Multivariate Causal Linkage. The Journal of Developing Areas, 51(1), 343-
359. 
NYE, J. (1990). Soft Power. Foreign Policy, 80(Autumn), 153-171. 
NYU. (2016, May 12). Post-conflict Reconcilliation Led to Societal Healing But Worsened 
Psychological Health. Retrieved January 8, 2018, from Science Daily: 
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/05/160512161058.htm 
303 
 
OAKLEY, P., & GARFORTH, C. (1985). Guide to Extension Training. Rome: Food and 
Agricultural Organization. 
OECD. (1996). Budgeting and Policy Making. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kml6g6wccq0-en 
OI. (2011). Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa, Country Report: Ethiopia. Oakland: 
Oakland Institute. 
OI. (2013, April 17). FAQ's on Indian Agriculture Investments in Ethiopia. Retrieved March 10, 
2015, from Oakland Institute: https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/faqs-indian-agriculture-
investments-ethiopia 
OI. (2014). Engineering Ethnic Conflict: The Toll of Ethiopia's Plantation Development on the 
Suri People. Oakland: Oakland Institute. 
OKAFOR, G. (2017). The Impact of Political Instability on the Economic Growth of ECOWAS 
Member Countries. Defence and Peace Economics, 28(2), 208. 
OKETCH, M. (2007). To Vocationalise or Not to Vocationalise? Perspectives on Current Trends 
and Issues in Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) in Africa. 
International Journal of Educational Development, 27, 220-234. 
OKONJO-IWEALA, N., & COLLIER, P. (2002). World Bank Work Group in Low-income 
Countries Under Stress: A Task Force Report. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
OLIVEIRA, R. (2013). Africa's Illiberal State-builders. Oxford: Refugee Studies Center. 
OLIVER-SMITH, S. (1996). Development-induced Impoverishment, Resistance and River-basin 
Development. In C. McDowell, Understanding Impoverishment: The Consequence of 
Development Induced Displacement (pp. 77-97). Oxford: Berghan Books. 
OLUWABAMIDE, A. (2015). An Appraisal of African Traditional Economy as an Heritage. 
International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies, 2(12), 107-111. 
ONU, F., ASOGWA, V., & OBETTA, E. (2013). Emotional Intellingence, Locus of Control and 
Self-Efficacy as Determinants of Graduates' Self Employment in Agricultural 
Occupations in South-East Nigeria. Journal of Emerging Trends in Educational 
Research and Policy Studies, 4(6), 872-877. 
OOI, G., & PHUA, K. (2007). Urbanization and Slum Formation. Journal of Urban Health, 84(1), 
i27-134. 
OQUBAY, A. (2018). Industrial Policy and Late Industrialization in Ethiopia. Abidjan: African 
Development Bank Group. 
ORAM, J. (2014). The Great Land Heist: How the World is Paving the Way for Corporate Land 
Grabs. Johannesburg: ActionAid. 
OSBAHR, H., & ALLAN, C. (2003). Indigenous Knowledge of Soil Fertillity Management in 
Southwest Niger. Geoderma, 111, 457-479. 
OSTBY, G. (2008). Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict. Journal of 
Peace Research, 45(2), 143-162. 
304 
 
OSTBY, G., & URDAL, H. (2010). Education and Civil Conflict: A Review of the Quantatitive, 
Empirical Literature. New York: United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization. 
OSTROM, E., AGRAWAL, A. B., SCHALGER, E., & TING, S. (1994). Rules, Games, and 
Common Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
OTA, T. (2003). Development of Political Regime and Economic Growth in Asia. Management 
Study, 59(94), 145-158. Retrieved from 
https://www.toyo.ac.jp/uploaded/attachment/2835.pdf 
OTHMAN, A. (2013). Challenges of Mega Construction Projects in Developing Countries. 
Organization, Technology and Management in Construction: An International Journal, 
5(1), 730-746. 
OWEN, I. (1995). Social Constructionism and Theory, Practice and Research in Psychotherapy: 
A Phenomenological Pyschology Manifesto. Bulletin of Psychology, 46, 161-186. 
Oxford. (2017). Multidimensional Poverty Index Data Bank. Retrieved from Oxford Poverty and 
Human Development Initiative: http://ophi.org.uk/ 
PAFFENHOLZ, T. (2008). Underdevelopment and Armed Conflict: Making Sense of the 
Debates. San Francisco: International Studies Conference. 
PAGGI, M., & JOPP, D. (2015). Outcomes of Occupational Self-efficacy in Older Workers. 
International Journal of Human Development, 80(4), 357-378. 
PALADANIUS, S. (2007). The Rationality of Reluctance and Indifference Toward Adult 
Education: Difficulties in Recruiting Unemployed Adults to Adult Education. Halifax: 
Kansas State University, Adult Education Research Conference . 
PALINKAS, L., HORWITZ, S, GREEN, C., WISDOM, J., DUAN, N., & HOAGWOOD, K. (2013). 
Purposeful Sampling for Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis in Mixed Method 
Implementation Research. Administrative Policy for Mental Health. 
PAN, L. (2007). Risk Pooling Through Transfers in Rural Ethiopia. Amsterdam: Tinbergen 
Institute. 
PAPE, R. (2005). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Terrorism. New York: Random House. 
PARK, R. (1921). Sociology and the Social Sciences: The Group Concept and Social Research. 
American Journal of Sociology, 27(2), 169-183. 
Parliament. (2017). Democracy Defined. Retrieved from Our Country, Our Parliament: 
https://lop.parl.ca/About/Parliament/Education/ourcountryourparliament/html_booklet/de
mocracy-defined-e.html 
PARSONS, T. (1951). The Social System. London: Routledge. 
PASDEP. (2006). Ethiopia: Building on Progress, A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained 
Development to End Poverty Vol. 1: Main Text (2005/2006). Addis Ababa: Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development. 
305 
 
PASHAEIZAD, H. (2010). A Glance at the Characteristics of Mixed Methods and Importance of 
its Applications in LIS Research. In A. Katsirikou, & C. Skiadas, Qualitative and 
Quantitative Methods in Libraries: Theory and Applications (pp. 6-18). London: World 
Scientific Publishing. 
PATEL, S., SLIUZAS, R., & MATHUR, N. (2015). The Risk of Impoverishment in Urban 
Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement in Ahmedabad. Environment & 
Urbanization, 27(1), 231-256. 
PAUL, M., & wa GITHINJI, M. (2017). Small Farms, Small Plots: Land Size, Fragementation, 
and Productivity in Ethiopia. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 1-19. Retrieved from 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03066150.2016.1278365?needAccess=true 
PAUSEWANG, S. (2009). Political Conflicts in Ethiopia --in View of the Two-faced Amhara 
Identity. Trondheim: Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian 
Studies. 
PAWSON, R., WONG, G., & OWEN, L. (2011). Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, Unknown 
Unknowns: The Predicament of Evidence-based Policy. American Journal of Evaluation, 
32(4), 518-546. 
PCC. (2008). Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census. 
Addis Ababa: Population Census Commission. 
PELUSO, N., & LUND, C. (2011). New Frontiers of Land Control: Introduction. Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 38(4), 667-681. 
PEREIRA, L. (1984). Development and Crisis in Brazil 1930-1983. Boulder: Westview Press. 
PEREZNIETO, P., & JONES, N. (2006). Educational Choices in Ethiopia: What Determines 
Whether Poor Children Go To School? Oxford: Young Lives. 
PETTERSSON, B. (2002). Development-induced Displacement: Internal Affair or International 
Human Rights Issue? Forced Migration Review, 12, 16-20. 
PETTIT, J. (2013). Power Analysis, A Practical Guide. Stockholm : Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency . 
PHINNEY, J., HORENCYZK, G., LIEBKIND, K., & VEDDER, P. (2001). Ethnic Identity, 
Immigration and Wellbeing: An Interactive Perspective. Journal of Social Issues, 57, 
493-510. 
PICCHIO, M. (2015). Is Training Effective for Older Workers. Bonn: IZA. 
PIEKKARI, R., & WELCH, C. (2011). Rethinking the Case Study in International Business and 
Management Research. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, LTD. 
PIERCE, J., KOSTOVA, T., & DIRKS, K. (2001). Towards a Theory of Psychological Ownership 
in Organizations. Academy of Management Review, 26(2), 298-310. 
PITCHER, A., MORAN, M., & JOHNSTON, M. (2009). Rethinking Patrimonialism and 
Neopatrimonialism in Africa. Africa Studies Review, 52(1), 125-156. 
306 
 
PLANEL, S., & BRIDONNEAU, M. (2017) (Re)making politics in a new urban Ethiopia: an 
empirical reading of the right to the city in Addis Ababa’s condominiums, Journal of 
Eastern African Studies, 11:1, 24-45 
PLANTE, T., SIMICIC, A., ANDERSEN, E., & MANUEL, G. (2002). Stress and Coping Amongst 
Displaced Bosnian Refugees. International Journal of Stress Management, 9(1), 31-42. 
POLZER, T., & HAMMOND, L. (2008). Invisible Displacement. Journal of Refugee Studies, 
21(4), 417-431. 
POSTMES, T., HASLAM, S., & SWAAB, R. (2005). Social Influence in Small Groups: An 
Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation. European Review of Social Psychology, 
16, 1-42. 
POTTS, D. (2013). Rural-Urban and Urban-Rural Migration Flows as Indicators of Economic 
Opportunity in sub-Saharan Africa: What do the Data Tell Us? Brighton: Migrating Out of 
Poverty Consortium. 
PRITCHETT, L., & WERKER, E. (2012), Developing the Guts of a GUT (Grand Unified Theory):  
Elite Commitment and Inclusive Growth (Manchester: ESID). 
 
PRESTON, J., & FEINSTEIN, L. (2004). Adult Education and Attitude Change. London: The 
Centre for Research on the Wider Benefits of Learning. 
PRICE, L. (2011). Rural Support Networks in the UK and Canada: The Influence of the 
Patrilineal Culture of Family Farming. Belfast: Institute of Spatial and Enviornmental 
Planning, Queens University. 
PRICE, S. (2009). Prologue: Victims or Partners? The Social Perspective in Development-
induced Displacement and Resettlement. The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 
10(4), 266-282. 
PRIDDLE, R. (2000). Coal in the Energy Supply of China. Brussels: OECD. 
PUNCH, K. (2005). Introducton to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches. 
London: Sage. 
RABINOW, P. (1989). French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment. 
Cambridge, USA: MIT Press. 
RADICE, H. (2008). The Developmental State Under Global Neo-liberalism. Third World 
Quarterly, 29(6), 1153-1174. 
RAHMATO, D. (1984). Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies. 
RAHMATO, D. (2014). The Perils of Development from Above: Land Deals in Ethiopia. African 
Identities, 12(1), 26-44. 
RANDELL, H. (2016). The Short-term Impacts of Development-induced Displacement on 
Wealth and Subjective Well-being in the Brazillion Amazon. World Development, 
87(November), 385-400. 
307 
 
RAO, V. (2006). On Inequality Traps and Development Policy: Africa Region Findings & Good 
Practice. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
RASHID, I. (2016). Locus of Control and Its Relationship With Other Constructs: A Systematic 
Review of Literature. International Journal of Multifacited And Multilingual Studies, 3(2), 
1-9. 
RASMUSSEN, E., & SORHEIM, R. (2006). Action-based Entrepreneurship Education. 
Technovation, 26, 185-194. 
RAYMOND, C., BROWN, G., & WEBER, D. (2010). The Measurement of Place Attachment: 
Personal, Community and Environmental Connections. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 30, 422-434. 
RAZVIJA, K. (2007). China as a Developmental State. Montenegrin Journal of Economics, 5, 
105-111. 
REBOK, G., BASS, J., PERRIN, P., & SINGH, N. (2012). Aging in Displacement: Assessing 
Health Status of Displaced Older Adults in the Republic of Georgia. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. 
REDFIELD, R., LINTON, R., & HERSKOVITS, M. (1936). Memorandum on the Study of 
Acculturation. American Anthropolgist, 56, 973-1002. 
REEVES, S., AYELET, K., & HODGES, B. (2008). Qualitative Research Methodologies. 337, 
512-514. 
REGASSA, T., TOLEMARIAM, T., FEREDE, B., HUNDE, A., & LEMMA, A. (2013). Quality of 
Education: The Case of Jimma University. Education, 3(5), 267-278. 
REITZ, A., ZIMMERMAN, J., HUTTEMAN, R., SPECHT, J., & NEYER, F. (2014). How Peers 
Make a Difference: The Role of Peer Groups and Peer Relationships in Personality 
Development. European Journal of Personality, 28(3), 279-288. 
RELPH, E. (1976). Place and Placelessness. London: Pion. 
RENAN, E. (1882 [1992]). Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? Sorbonne Lecture. 
Reuters. (2016, October 7). Ethiopian Protesters Attack Factories in Africa's Rising Economic 
Star. Addis Ababa. Retrieved March 29, 2017, from 
http://news.trust.org/item/20161007081207-pi9e3 
REW, A., FISHER, E., & PANDEY, B. (2006). In D. Wet, Development-Induced Displacement: 
Problems, Policies and People (pp. 38-72). Berghahn Books. 
REYNOLDS, J., & BAIRD, C. (2010). Is There a Downside to Shooting for the Stars? Unrealized 
Educational Expectations and Symptoms of Depression. American Sociological Review, 
75(1), 151-172. 
RHODA, R. (1983). Rural Development and Urban Migration: Can We Keep Them Down on the 
Farm? The International Migration Review, 17(1), 34-64. 
308 
 
RICHARDSON, C. (2011). Relative Deprivation Theory in Terrorism: A Study of Higher 
Education and Unemployment as Predictors of Terrorism. New York: New York 
University. 
RIJKERS, B., & SODERBOM, M. (2013). The Effects of Risk and Shocks on Non-Farm 
Enterprise Development in Rural Ethiopia. World Development, 45, 119-136. 
RITTER, E. (2014). Policy Disputes, Political Survival, and the Onset and Severity of State 
Repression. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(1), 143-168. 
ROBINSON, W. (2003). Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of 
Development-induced Displacement. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
ROHWERDER, B. (2016). Women and Girls in Forced and Protracted Displacement. London: 
Department for International Development. 
ROSE, P. (2003). Can Gender Equality in Education be Attained? Evidence from Ethiopia. 
Sussex: Center for International Education, University of Sussex. 
ROSSITER, J. (2012). A New Measure of Social Classes. Journal of Consumer Behaviour, 11, 
89-93. 
RUDMIN, F. (2009). Constructs, Measurements and Models of Acculturation and Acculturative 
Stress. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 33, 106-123. 
RUTHERFORD, V., & PICKUP, I. (2015). Negotiating Liminality in Higher Education: Formal 
and Informal Dimensions of the Student Experience as Facilitators of Quality. In A. 
Curaj, L. Matei, R. Pricopie, J. Salmi, & P. Scott, The European Higher Education Area: 
Between Critical Reflections and Future Policies (pp. 703-723). London: Springer. 
SACHS, J. (2014, January 21). The Case for Aid. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/the-case-for-aid/ 
SAEZ, L., & GALLAGHER, J. (2009). Authoritarianism and Development in the Third World. 
Brown Journal of World Affairs, XV(II), 87-101. 
SAID, M., AL-ATTIYA, F., & AL-HAKIMI, A. A.-K. (2012). Food Insecurity and Food Sovereignty 
in the Middle East, Working Group Summary Report. Doha: Georgetown University 
School of Foreign Service in Qatar. 
SAINT, W. (2004). Higher Education in Ethiopia: The Vision and Its Challenges. Journal of 
Higher Education in Africa, 2(3), 83-113. 
SAKWA, R. (2013). The Soviet Collapse: Contradictions and Neo-Modernisation. Journal of 
Eurasian Studies, 4, 65-77. 
SANBORN, H., & THYNE, C. (2013). Learning Democracy: Education and the Fall of 
Authoritarian Regimes. British Journal of Political Science, 44, 773-797. 
SANDHOLTZ, W., & KOETZLE, W. (2000). Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, 
Democracy, and Trade. International Studies Quarterly, 44, 31-50. 
309 
 
SATTERTHWAITE, D., MCGRANAHAN, G., & TACOLI, C. (2010). Urbanization and its 
Implications for Food and Farming. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 
365, 2809-2820. 
SAVASTANO, S., & SCANDIZZO, P. (2017). Farm Size and Productivity: A 'Direct-Inverse-
Direct' Relationship. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
SCANNELL, L., & GIFFORD, R. (2010). Defining Place Attachment: A Tripartite Organizing 
Framework. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 30, 1-10. 
SCHEDLER, A. (2006). The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc,. Retrieved from http://www.ethiomedia.com/accent/ea_schedler.pdf 
SCHMIDT, E., & BEKELE, F. (2016). Rural Youth and Employment in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 
Ethiopian Development Research Institute. 
SCHOCK, K. (2013). The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance. Journal of Peace Research, 
50(3), 277-290. 
SCHWARTZ, S., PANTIN, H., SULLIVAN, S., PRADO, G., & SZAPOCZNIK, J. (2006). Nativity 
and Years in the Receiving Culture as Markers of Acculturation in Ethnic Enclaves. 
Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology, 37, 345-353. 
SCHYNS, B., & VON COLLANI, G. (2002). A New Occupational Self-efficacy Scale and its 
Relation to Personality Constructs and Organizational Variables. European Journal of 
Work and Occupational Psychology, 11(2), 219-241. 
SCRIBNER, S., & COLE, M. (1978). Literacy Without Schooling: Testing for Intellectual Effects. 
Harvard Educational Review, 48(4), 448-461. 
SCUDDER, T. (1996). Development Induced Impoverishment, Resistance and River Basin 
Development. In C. McDowell, Understanding Impoverishment: The Consequences of 
Development-induced Displacement (pp. 49-74). Oxford: Berghahan Books. 
SDPRP. (2002). Ethiopia: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program. Addis 
Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 
SEERS, D. (1969). The Meaning of Development. Sussex : Institute of Development Studies. 
SEID, Y., TAFFESSE, A., & ALI, S. (2015). Ethiopia -- An Agrarian Economy in Transition. Cape 
Town: United Nations University. 
SELESHI, Y., & ZANKE, U. (2004). Recent Changes in Rainfall and Rainy Days in Ethiopia. 
International Journal of Climatology, 24, 973-983. 
SEMELA, T. (2011). Breakneck Expansion and Quality Assurance in Ethiopian Higher 
Education: Ideological Rationales and Economic Impediments. Higher Education Policy, 
24(3), 399-425. 
SEN, A. (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
SHANE, S. (1993). Cultural Influences on National Rates of Innovation. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 8, pp. 59-73. 
310 
 
SHEN, H., & ZIDERMAN, A. (2008). Student Loans Repayment and Recovery: International 
Comparisons. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. 
SHIBESHI, A. (2005). Education for Rural People in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Ministry 
of Education. 
SHIFERAW, A. (2017). Productive Capacity and Economic Growth in Ethiopia. New York City: 
United Nations, Development and Analysis Division, Committe for Development Policy. 
SHIMAHARA, N. (1970). Enculturation -- A Reconsideration. Current Anthropology, 11(2), 143-
154. 
SHKOLNIKOV, V., CHERYAKOV, V., MCKEE, M., & LEON, D. (2004). Russian Mortality 
Beyond Vital Statistics: Effects of Social Status and Behaviours on Deaths From 
Circulatory Disease and External Causes: A Case-Control Study of Men Aged 20 - 55 
Years in Udmurtia, 1998-1999. Demographic Research, 2(4). 
SHOCK, K. (2013). The Practice and Study of CIvil Resistance. The Journal of Peace 
Research, 50(3), 277-290. 
SHUMUYE, M. (2015). The Role of Development State in Development: The Case of Ethiopia. 
International Journal of African and Asian Studies, 14, 96-110. 
SIDDIQUI, R. (1997). Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990's. Westport: Praeger Publishers. 
SIMSON, R., SHARMA, N., & AZIZ, I. (2011). A Guide to Public Financial Management 
Literature. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
SINGER, H., & ANSARI, J. (1988). Rich and Poor Countries: Consequences of International 
Economic Disorder. London: Unwin Hyman. 
SINGER, M. (2009). Buying Voters with Dirty Money: The Relationship Between Clientelism and 
Corruption. Toronto: American Political Science Association. 
SINGH, J. (2011). Revolution in Human Affairs: The Root of Social Violence. Cadmus, 1(2), 
114-120. 
SINGH, K. (2007). Quantitative Social Research Methods. New Delhi: 2007. 
SKOCPOL, T. (1987). Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research. In 
P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (pp. 3-43). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
SMALL, M., HARDING, D., & LAMONT, M. (2010). Reconsidering Culture and Poverty. Annals, 
629, 6-27. 
SMEEDLING, T. (2013). On the Relationship Between Income Inequality and Intergenerational 
Mobility. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute of Advanced Labour Studies. 
SMITH, H., PETTIGREW, T., PIPPIN, G., & BIALOSIEWICZ, S. (2012). Relative Deprivation: A 
Theoretical and Meta-analytic Review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 16, 
203-232. 
311 
 
SOLIMAN, G., SOUSSA, H., & EL-SAYED, S. (2016). Assessment of Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam Impacts Using Decision Support System. Journal of Computer 
Engineering, 18(5), 8-18. 
SPEVACEK, A. (2010). Constraints to Female Entrepreneurship in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Washington, D.C.: USAID. 
SPIELMAN, D., DAVIS, K., NEGASH, M., & AYELE, G. (2011). Rural Innovation Systems and 
Networks: Findings from a Study of Ethiopian Smallholders. Agricultural Human Values, 
28(2), 195-212. 
SPRING, A. (2009). African Women in the Entrepreneurial Landscape: Reconsidering the 
Formal and Informal Sectors. Journal of African Business, 10, 11-30. 
SRUR, M. (2014, December). State Policy and Law in Relation to Land Alienation in Ethiopia. (A 
Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree). University of 
Warwick, School of Law. Retrieved January 25, 2017, from 
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/74132 
Standard, A. (2016, February 16). Oromo Protests: Dozens Die in West Aris Protests: Situation 
"Extremely Volatile.” Addis Ababa. Retrieved March 28, 2017, from 
http://addisstandard.com/oromo-protests-dozens-die-in-west-aris-protests-situation-
extremely-volatile-police-officer/ 
STARKS, H., & TRINIDAD, S. (2007). Choose Your Method: A Comparison of Phenomenology, 
Discourse Analysis, and Grounded Theory. Qualitative Health Research, 17(10), 1372-
1380. 
STEBEK, E. (2013, December). Role Conflict Between Land Allocation and Municipal Functions 
in Addis Ababa. Mizan Law Review, 7(2), pp. 241-280. 
STEDMAN, R. (2002). Toward a Social Psychology of Place: Predicting Behaviour from Place-
based Cognitions, Attitude, and Identity. Environmental Behaviour, 34(5), 561-581. 
STEDMAN, S. (1997). Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. International Security, 22(2), 5-53. 
STEIN, M. (1998). The Three Gorges: The Unexamined Toll of Development-induced 
Displacement. Forced Migration Review, 2, 7-20. 
Steingraber, S. (1987, November 7). Militarization and Indigenous Peoples. Retrieved from 
Cultural Survival: http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/resettlement-
and-villagization-tools-militarization-sw-ethiopi 
STEVENS, Y. M., & HENNESSY, J. (2014). Technology, Unemployment and Policy Options: 
Navigating the Transition to a Better World. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 24 (1), 
26-44. 
STEWART, F. (2000). Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities. Oxford Development 
Studies, 28(3), 245-262. 
STEWART, F. (2002). Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development. Oxford: 
QEH Working Papers. 
312 
 
STEWART, F. (2002b). Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries. BMJ, 324, 
342-345. 
STEWART, F. (2008). Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict. Basingstoke: Palgrave, McMillian. 
STEWART, F. (2011). Horizontal Inequalities as a Cause of Conflict. Washington, D.C. : World 
Bank. 
STEWART, F., & BROWN, G. (2009). Fragile States. Oxford: Center for Research on Inequality, 
Human Security and Ethnicity. 
STIFEL, D., MINTEN, B., & KORU, B. (2016). Economic Benefits of Rural Feeder Roads: 
Evidence from Ethiopia. The Journal of Development Studies, 52(9), 1335-1356. 
STOKES, D. (2003). When the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: The US War of Terror in 
Columbia. Review of International Studies, 29, 569-585. 
STOLER, A. (1995). Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the 
Colonial Order of Things. Durham: Duke University Press. 
STRATFORD, E. (2009). Belonging as a Resource: The Case of Ralphs Bay, Tasmania, and 
the Local Politics of Place. Environment and Planning, 41, 796-810. 
STUIVER, M. (2006). Highlighting the Retro Side of Innovation and its Potential for Regime 
Change in Agriculture. In T. Marsden, & J. Murdoch, Between the Local and the Global 
(Research in Rural Sociology and Development) (pp. 147-173). Bingley: Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited. 
SUKAMOLSON, S. (2010). Fundamentals of Quantitative Research. Bangkok: Language 
Institute, Chulalongkorn University. 
SULS, J., & MULLEN, B. (1982). From the Cradle to the Grave: Comparision and Self-
evaluation Across the Life-span. In J. Suls, Psychological Perspectives on the Self (pp. 
97-125). Hillsdale: Erlbaum. 
SUMPTION, M. (2009). Social Networks and Polish Immigration to the UK. London: Institute for 
Public Policy Research. 
SWANN, W., JETTEN, J., GOMEZ, A., WHITEHOUSE, H., & BASTIAN, B. (2012). When Group 
Membership Gets Personal: A Theory of Identity Fusion. Psychological Review, 119(3), 
441-456. 
SWIFT, R. (1940). Individualism and Groupism. Ethics, 50(2), 219-225. 
TABER, K. (2011). Constructivism as Educational Theory: Contingency in Learning, and 
Optimally Guided Instruction. In J. Hassaskaha, Educational Theory (pp. 39-61). 
Hauppauge: Nova. 
TADEGE, A. (2007). Climate Change National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) of 
Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Water Resources. 
TADELE, F. (2009). Urban Development and Displacement of Rural Communities Around Addis 
Ababa. In A. Pankhurst, & F. Piquet, Moving People in Ethiopia: Development, 
Displacement & the State (pp. 102-118). Oxford: James Currey. 
313 
 
TADESSE, A. (2007). Resettlement and Food Security with Reference to the Ethiopian 
Experience: The Boreda Case. Boreda: Catholic Church Community Based Integrated 
Development Program, Southern Region of Ethiopia. 
Tadesse, E., & Imana, G. (2017, May 23). Prospects and Challenges of Urbanization on the 
Livelihood of Farming Community Surrounding Finfinne. Retrieved December 19, 2017, 
from Americal Research Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences: 
https://www.arjonline.org/papers/arjhss/v3-i1/4.pdf 
TAFERE, Y., & WOLDEHANNA, T. (2012). Beyond Food Security: Transforming the Productive 
Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia for the Well-being of Children. Oxford: Young Lives. 
TAMRAT, I. (2010). Governance of Large Scale Agricultural Investments in Africa: The Case of 
Ethiopia. Washington, D.C. : The World Bank. 
TARMIDI, L. (2005). The Importance of MSEs in Economic Development of Developing APEC 
Countries. Jawa Barat: University of Indonesia. 
TASPINAR, O. (2015). Relative Deprivation is a Key to Understanding the Roots of Terrorism. 
Cairo Review, 19, 76-83. 
TAWIL, S., & HARLEY, A. (2004). Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion. Geneva: UNESCO. 
TAYDAS, Z., & PEKSEN, D. (2012). Can States Buy Peace? Social Welfare Spending and Civil 
Conflicts. Journal of Peace Research, 49(2), 273-287. 
TAYLOR, D., & HAMDY, H. (2013). Adult Learning Theories: Implications for Learning and 
Teaching in Medical Education. Medical Teacher, 36(11), e1561-e1572. 
TAYLOR, E. (2008). Transformative Learning Theory. New Directions for Adult and Continuing 
Education, 119, 5-15. 
TE. (2017). Ethiopia - Economic Indicators. Retrieved December 14, 2017, from Trading 
Economics: https://tradingeconomics.com/ethiopia/indicators 
TEGENU, A. (2006). Statement at the Fourteenth Commission on Sustainable Development. 
New York: United Nations Development Programme. 
TEKLU, A. (2005). Land Registration and Women's Land Rights in Amahra Region, Ethiopia. 
London: International Institute for Environment and Development. 
TERBORGH, A. (2003). The Post-war Rise of World Trade: Does The Bretton Woods System 
Deserve Credit? London: London School of Economics. 
TERFA, S. (2012). The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Liberal Democratic or 
Authoritarian Regime? African Social Science Review, 5(1), 130-156. 
TERMINSKI, B. (2013). Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Social Problem 
and Human Rights Issue. Geneva: University of Geneva. 
TERMINSKI, B. (2015). Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement Causes, 
Consequences, and Socio-legal Context. Stuttgart: Ibidem Press. 
314 
 
TESFA, B. (2013). Benefit of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP) for Sudan 
and Egypt. University of Huddersfield. Queensgate, Huddersfield: EIPSA. Retrieved from 
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/19305/ 
TESFAY, N., & MALMBERG, L. (2014). Horizontal Inequalties in Children's Educational 
Outcomes in Ethiopia. International Journal of Educational Development, 39, 110-120. 
TESHOME, E., ZENEBE, M., METAFERIA, H., & BIADGILIGN, S. (2014). Participation and 
Significance of Self-help Groups for Social Development: Exploring the Community 
Capacity in Ethiopia. Springer Plus, 3(189). Retrieved from 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4000359/pdf/40064_2013_Article_892.pd
f 
TESSEMA, K. (2009). The Unfolding Trends and Consequences of Expanding Higher 
Education in Ethiopia: Massive Universities, Massive Challenges. Higher Education 
Quarterly, 63(1), 29-45. 
TESSEMA, R. (2017). Assessment of the Implementation of Community-led Total Sanitation, 
Hygiene, and Associated Factors in Diretiyara District, Eastern Ethiopia. PLoS One, 
12(4), 1-11. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. 
THOMAS, N. (2011). Towards a New Definition of Unlearning: Rethinking Individual Level 
Unlearning and its Implications for Practice Change. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve 
University. 
THOMPSON, E. (1991). The Making of the English Working Class. London: Penguin Books. 
THUKRAL, E. (1996). Development, Displacement and Rehabilitation: Locating Gender. 
Economic and Political Weekly, 31(24), 1500-1503. 
TODO, Y., MATOUS, P., & MOJO, D. (2014). Effects of Social Network Structure on the 
Diffusion and Adoption of Agricultural Technology: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia. Addis 
Ababa: Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research. 
TOMASEVSKI, K. (1992). Monitoring Human Rights Aspects of Sustainable Development. 
American University Journal of International Law and Policy, 8, 77-102. 
TOWNSEND, P. (1979). Poverty in the United Kingdom: A Survey of Household Resources and 
Standards of Living. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
TRIPNEY, J., & HOMBRADOS, J. (2013). Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
(TVET) for Young People in Low and Middle Income Countries: A Systematic Review 
and Meta-analysis. Empirical Research in Vocation Education & Training, 5(3), 2-14. 
TROMBETTA, M. (2007). The Securitization of the Environment and the Transformation of 
Security. Delft: Delft University. 
TRONVOLL, K. (2008). Human Rights Violations in Federal Ethiopa: When Ethnic Identity is a 
Political Stigma. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 15, 49-79. 
TSAI, Y. (2010). Returns to Overeducation: A Longitudinal Analysis of the U.S. Labor Market. 
Economics of Education Review, 29, 606-617. 
315 
 
Tucker, T. (2016). Grounded Theory Generation: A Tool for Transparent Concept Development. 
International Studies Perspectives, 17, 426-438. 
TULI, F. (2010). The Basis of Distinction Between Qualitative and Quantative Research in 
Social Science: Reflection on Ontological, Epistemological and Methodological 
Perspectives. Ethiopia Journal of Education and Sociology, 6(1), 97-108. 
TULLOCH, J., & LUPTON, D. (2003). Risk and Everyday Life. London: Sage. 
TURNER, V. (1987). Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites of Passage. In L. Mahdi, 
S. Foster, & M. Little, Betwixt and Between: Patterns of Masculine and Feminine 
Initiation (pp. 94-203). Peru: Open Court. 
TURTON, D. (2003). Refugees and 'Other Forced Migrants'. Oxford: Refugee Studies Center. 
TYBOUT, J. (2000, March). Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They 
Do and Why? Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVIII, 11-44. 
UDOGU, E. (2005). African Development and the Immigration of its Intelligentsia: An Overview. 
Journal of African Migration, 48(2), 1-24. 
UiO. (2013, February). Urban Development. Retrieved from University of Oslo, Department of 
Sociology and Human Geography: 
http://www.sv.uio.no/iss/english/research/subjects/urban-development/ 
UJANG, N., & ZAKARIYA, K. (2015). Place Attachment and the Value of Place in the Life of the 
Users. Procedia -- Social and Behavioural Sciences, 373-380. 
UN. (1989). Handbook on Social Indicators. New York: United Nations Department of 
International Economic and Social Affairs. Retrieved from 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/  
UN. (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revisions. New York: Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 
UNDESA. (2013). International Migration Report. New York: United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs. 
UNDP. (2007). Measuring Human Development: A Primer . New York: United Nations 
Development Program. 
UNDP. (2007b). The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis and Post-conflict Countries. 
Vienna: 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government. 
UNDP. (2008). Post-conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity. New York: United 
Nations Development Program. 
UNDP. (2009). Poverty, Inequality, and Social Policy Reform in the Former Soviet Union. New 
York: United Nations Development Program. 
UNDP. (2012). World Population Prospects. Geneva: United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs. Retrieved from 
http://esa.un.org/wpp/documentation/pdf/WPP2012_%20KEY%20FINDINGS.pdf 
316 
 
UNDP. (2014). National and Regional Human Development Reports. Retrieved from Human 
Development Reports: http://hdr.undp.org/en/country-reports 
UNDP. (2015). Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South, Human Progress in a 
Diverse World. New York: United Nations Development Program. 
UNDP. (2016). Income Gini Coefficient. Retrieved June 17, 2017, from Human Development 
Reports: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient 
UNDPE/S. (2012). World Population Prospects. Retrieved June 23, 2014, from United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs: 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/p2k0data.asp 
UNESCO. (1975). Work-Oriented Adult Literacy Pilot Project. Paris: United Nations Education, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization. 
UNESCO. (2001). The Development of Education: National Report of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 
UNESCO. 
UNESCO. (2011). Education Challenges in Africa and LDCs. Addis Ababa: UNESCO. 
UNESCO. (2012). Study on Situation of Out of School Children in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 
UNESCO. 
UNESCO. (2015). Education for All 2015 National Review: Ethiopia. Incheon: UNESCO. 
UNHABITAT. (2007). State of the World's Cities 2010-2011: Bridging The Urban Divide. Nairobi: 
United Nations Human Settlements Program. 
UNHCHR. (1997). Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. United Nations. Geneva: United 
Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights. Retrieved from 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=E/cn.4/res/1997/39 
UNHCR. (2015). UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement 2014: World at War. Geneva: 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
UNICEF. (2015). Does Horizontal Education Inequality Lead to Violent Conflict? New York: 
UNICEF. 
UNOCHA. (2004). Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Bern: United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs . 
Urama, K., & Acheampong, E. (2013, Summer). Social Innovation Creates Prosperous 
Societies. Retrieved January 7, 2018, from Stanford Social Innovation Preview: 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/social_innovation_creates_prosperous_societies 
URDAL, H. (2006). A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence. International 
Studies Quarterly, 50, 607-629. 
USAID. (2011). Radicalism in the Middle East. Retrieved from USAID Fact Sheets: 
https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/factsheets/ 
VALLINGS, C., & MORENO-TORRES, M. (2005). Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States 
Fragile? . London: Department for International Development. 
317 
 
VAN DEUREN, R. (2013). Capacity Development in Higher Education Institutions in Developing 
Countries. Maastricht: Maastricht School of Management. 
VAN EVERDINGEN, Y., & WAARTS, E. (2003). The Effect of National Culture on the Adoption 
of Innovations. Marketing Letters, 14(3), 217-232. 
VAN GENNEP, A. (1909). The Rites of Passage. Paris: Emile Nourry. 
VAN MARREWIJK, A. (2011). Organizing Mega-projects: Understanding Their Cultural 
Practices. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. 
VAN ROOIJEN, D., & TADDESSE, G. (2009). Urban Sanitation and Wastewater Treatment in 
Addis Ababa in the Awash Basin, Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 34th WEDC Intenational 
Conference. 
Van Zomeren, M. (2017, October). Collective Mobilization and Social Protest. Retrieved January 
9, 2018, from Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology: 
http://psychology.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.001.0001/acrefor
e-9780190236557-e-268?print=pdf 
VANCLAY, F. (2017). Project-induced Displacement and Resettlement: From Impoverishment 
Risks to an Opportunity for Development. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 
35(1), 3-21. 
VARGAS-SILVA, C. (2011). Migration and Development. Oxford: The Migration Observatory. 
VAUGHAN, S. (2011). Revolutionary Democratic State-building: Party, State and People in the 
EPRDF's Ethiopia. Journal of Eastern Africa Studies, 5(4), 619-640. 
VAUGHAN, S., & TRONVOLL, K. (2003). The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian 
Political Life. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. 
VEILLEUX, J. (2013). The Human Security Dimensions of Dam Development: The Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Global Dialogue, 15(2). 
VERTOVIC, S. (2007). Circular Migration: The Way Forward in Global Policy? University of 
Oxford: International Migration Institute. 
VU, T. (2007). State Formation and the Origins of Developmental States in South Korea and  
Indonesia. Studies in Comparative International Development, 41(4), 27-56 
 
WALKER, B., HOLLING, C., CARPENTER, S., & KINZIG, A. (2004). Resilience, Adaptability 
and Transformability in Social-ecological Systems. Ecology and Society, 9(2). Retrieved 
September 14, 2016, from http://www.ecologyand society.org/vol19/iss/art5 
WALKER, R. (2000). The Geography of Production. In E. Sheppard, & T. Barnes, A Companion 
to Economic Geography (pp. 113-132). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Walker, R. (2015, October). Multidimensional Poverty. Retrieved August 2016, from GSDRC 
Professional Development Reading Packet: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/Multidimensional-Poverty_RP.pdf 
318 
 
WALMSLEY, D., & LEWIS, G. (1984). Human Geography: Behavioural Approaches. London: 
Longman. 
WALTON, M. (2011). Culture Matters for Poverty, But Not Because of a Culture of Poverty: 
Notes on Analytics and Policy. In J. Platteau, & R. Peccoud, Culture, Institutions and 
Development: New Insights on an Old Debate (pp. 195-233). London: Routledge. 
WARMERDAM, W., & DE HAAN, A. (2011). The Roles of Aid in Politics: Putting China in 
Perspective. International Institute of Social Studies. 
WB. (1994). Resettlement and Development, The Bankwide Review of Projects Involving 
Involuntary Resettlement 1983-1993. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
WB. (2003). Higher Education Development for Ethiopia: Pursuing the Vision. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank. 
WB. (2005). Ethiopia: Well-being and Poverty in Ethiopia, The Role of Agriculture and Agency. 
New York: World Bank. 
WB. (2008). World Development Report. Washington, D.C. : World Bank. 
WB. (2014). Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Urban and Metropolitian 
Transport and Land Use Linkages. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
WB. (2015, September 23). Economic Overview. Retrieved from World Bank Country Data, 
Ethiopia: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview 
WB. (2015b). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Enhancing Urban Resilience. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank. 
WB. (2016). Ethiopia's Great Run; The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It. Addis Ababa: 
World Bank. 
WB. (2016b, September 15). Forced Displacement: A Developing World Crisis. Retrieved from 
The World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/09/15/forced-
displacement-a-developing-world-crisis 
WB. (2016c). Why So Idle? Wages and Employment in a Crowded Labor Market. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank. 
WB. (2017). Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach Supporting Refugees, The 
Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
WB. (2017b). GDP Growth (Annual %). Retrieved December 13, 2017, from World Bank: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ET 
WB. (2017c). Life Expectancy at Birth. Retrieved from World Development Indicators: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.FE.IN?locations=ET 
WB. (2017d). The Effects of Post-conflict Reconstruction in MENA. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank. 
WB. (2017e, December 11). A Stepping Stone to Job Creation. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/12/11/a-stepping-stone-to-job-creation 
319 
 
WB. (2018). Ethiopia Economic Update: The Inescapable Manufacturing Services Nexus, 
Exploring the Potential of Distribution Services. Washington, D.C. : The World Bank. 
WEBSTER, C., & KINGSTON, S. (2014). Anti-poverty Strategies for the UK: Poverty and Crime 
Review. Leeds: Center for Applied Social Research. 
WEGERICH, K. (2001). Institutional Change: A Theoretical Approach. University of London. 
School of Oriental and African Studies. 
WEINSTEIN, J. (2005). Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative 
Perspective. London: Center for Global Development. 
WELCH, F. (1975). Human Capital Theory: Education, Discrimination, and Life Cycles. The 
American Economic Review, 65(2), 63-73. 
WELDEGEBRIEL, Z., FOLLONI, G., & PROWSE, M. (2015). The Determinants of Non-farm 
Income Diversification in Rural Ethiopia. Journal of Poverty Alleviation, 6(1), 109-130. 
WERQUIN, P. (2007). Terms, Concepts, and Models for Analysing the Value of Recognition 
Programmes. Brussels: OECD. 
WERZ, M., & CONLEY, L. (2012). Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in Northwest Africa. 
Washington, D.C. : Center for American Progress. 
WESTAWAY, A. (2012). Rural Poverty in the Eastern Cape Province: Legacy of Apartheid or 
Consequence of Contemporary Segregationism? Development Southern Africa, 29(1), 
115-125. 
WHITE, B., BORRAS, S., HALL, R., SCOONES, I., & WOLFORD, W. (2013). The New 
Enclosures: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Land Deals. London: Routledge. 
WHITMORE, T. (2010). Peacebuilding and its Challenging Partners: Justice, Human Rights, 
Development, and Solidarity. In R. Schreiter, R. Appleby, & G. Powers, Peacebuilding: 
Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis (pp. 155-189). Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 
WHO. (2015). World Report on Ageing and Health. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
WHYTE, M. (2009). Paradoxes of China's Economic Boom. Annual Review of Sociology, 35, 
371-392. 
WIESMANN, U. (1998). Sustainable Regional Development in Rural Africa: Conceptual 
Framework and Case Studies from Kenya. Berne: University of Berne. 
WILKINS, R. (2007). The Consequences of Under-employment for the Under-employed. 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 49(2), 247-275. 
WILKINS, R., & WOODEN, M. (2011). Economic Approaches to Studying Under-employment. 
In D. Maynard, & D. Feldman, Under-Employment: Psychological, Economic and Social 
Challenges (pp. 13-34). New York: Springer. 
WILKINSON, R., & PICKETT, K. (2010). The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone. 
London: Penguin. 
320 
 
WILLIAMS, A., & BALAZ, V. (2012). Migration, Risk and Uncertainty. Population, Space and 
Place, 18(2), 167-180. 
WILLIG, R. (2012). Grammatology of Modern Recognition Orders: An Interview with Axel 
Hooneth. Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, 13(1), 145-149. 
WIND, T., & KOMPROE, I. (2012). The Mechanisms Which Associate Community Social 
Capital with Post-disaster Mental Health: A Multilevel Model. Social Science & Medicine, 
75, 1715-1720. 
WITHERELL, S. (2012). Enhancing the Quality of English Language Education in Ethiopia. 
Addis Ababa: Institute of International Education. 
WOLDEGIYORGIS, A. (2014). The Ethiopian Developmental State and its Challenges. Social 
Science Research Network. Retrieved August 12, 2016, from 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512907 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2512907  
WOLDU, H. (2001). Looking at African Value System Through Cultural Dimensions: How Do 
Africans Culturally Differ Among Themselves and From the United States? Kalamazoo: 
International Conference on African Development Archives. 
Wolf, M., GOTTWALD, S., & MORRIS, R. (2014). The Reading Brain, Global Literacy, and the 
Eradication of Poverty. Scripta Varia, 125, 1-22. 
Wondifraw, A., Kibret, H., & Wakaiga, J. (2015). African Economic Outlook Ethiopia. Retrieved 
May 12, 2018, from African Development Bank Group: http//www.Africaneconomic 
outlook.Org/En/Country-Notes/East-Africa/Ethiopia 
Wong, J. (2014, May 19). Can China’s Model of State-led Economic Development Pick Life 
Science Winners? (C. TOPAL, Interviewer) Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian 
Research . 
WOODWARD, S. (1995). Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia 1945 - 
1990. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Worldegebriel, E. (2013, August 12). Ethiopian Dams Won't Cause Harm ex-Head of Ethiopian 
Environmental Protection Authority. Retrieved December 15, 2017, from Reuters: 
http://news.trust.org/item/20130812133857-74iy1 
WRIGHT, B., MANIGAULT, L., & BLACK, T. (2004). Quantitative Research Measurement in 
Public Administration: An Assessment of Journal Publications. Administration & Society, 
35, 747-764. 
WUEPPER, D., & LYBBERT, T. (2017). Perceived Self-efficacy, Poverty, and Economic 
Development. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 9(1), 1-22. 
WVS. (2009). World Values Survey. Vienna: Institute for Comparative Survey Research. 
Retrieved from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp 
YAMA, H., & NORHAYATI, Z.  (2012), “Inference and Culture: The Distinction Between  
Low Context Culture and High Context Culture as a Possible Explanation for Cultural 
Differences in Cognition.” Presented during the 34th annual meeting of the Cognitive Science 
Society (August, 2012). 
321 
 
YAMAZAKI, Y. (2005). Learning Styles and Typologies of Cultural Differences: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Comparison. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29, 521-548. 
YESUF, M., & BLUFFSTONE, R. (2009). Poverty, Risk Aversion, and Path Dependence in Low-
Income Countries: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 91(4), 1022-1037. 
YILMAZ, S., & VENUGOPAL, V. (2008). Local Government Discretion and Accountability in 
Ethiopia. Atlanta: Georgia State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. 
YIN, R. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
YIN, R. (2015). Qualitative Research From Start to Finish. New York: Guilford Publications. 
YIRDAW, A. (2013). Expropriation, Valuation, and Compensation Practice in Ethiopia: The Case 
of Bahir Dar City and Surrounding. Property Management, 31(2), 132-158. 
YIRDAW, A. (2016). Quality of Education in Private Higher Institutions in Ethiopia: The Role of 
Governance. Addis Ababa: Unity University. Retrieved from 
http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/6/1/2158244015624950 
YNTISO, G (2002). Differential Reestablishment of Voluntary and Involuntary Migrants: The 
Case of Metekel Settlers in Ethiopia. Africa Study Monographs, 23(1), 31-46. 
YNTISO, G. (2008). Urban Development and Displacement in Addis Ababa: The Impact of 
Resettlement Projects on Low-Income Households. Eastern Africa Social Science 
Research Review, 24(2), 53-77.  
 
YOUNG, R., & COLLIN, A. (2004). Constructivism and Socal Constructionism in the Career 
Field. Journal of Vocational Behaviour, 64(3), 373-388. 
YUAN, Y., & MCKELVEY, B. (2004). Situated Learning Theory: Adding Rate and Complexity via 
Kauffman's NK Model. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences, 8(1), 65-
102. 
Yuqing, S. (2007, April 21). Chongquing Works to Create Jobs for Gorges Migrants. China 
Daily. Chongquing. Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-
04/21/content_856364.htm 
ZAHONOGO, P. (2016). Trade and Economic Growth in Developing Countires: Evidence from 
sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of African Trade, 3, 41-56. 
ZAKARIA, F. (2003). The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
ZENAWI, M. (2006). African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginings. Unpublished thesis. 
http://www.meleszenawi.org.uk/pdf/zenawi_dead_ends_and_new_beginnings.pdf. 
ZENAWI, M. (2012). States and Markets: Neoliberal Limitations and the Case for a 
Developmental State. In A. Norman, Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking 
Development Strategies (pp. 140-174). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
322 
 
Zenawi, M. (2011, April 2).  Ethiopian PM Meles Zenawi speech on Launching GERD. Retrieved 
from Remembering Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia: 
http://www.meleszenawi.com/ethiopian-pm-meles-zenawi-speech-on-launching-gerd-
text-and-videos/ 
ZEWDE, B. (2010). Documenting the Ethiopian Student Movement: An Exercise in Oral History. 
Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies. 
ZEWDIE, M. (2000). A Study Guide for Curriculum Implementation and Evaluation. Addis 
Ababa: Addis Ababa University. 
ZHAO, H., & HILLS, G. S. (2005). The Mediating Role of Self-efficacy in the Development of 
Entrepreneurial Intentions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(6), pp. 1265-1272. 
ZILTENER, P., KUNZLER, D., & WALTER, A. (2017). Research Note: Measuring The Impacts 
of Colonialis: A New Data Set for the Countries of Africa and Asia. Journal of World-
Systems Research, 23(1). Retrieved July 16, 2017, from 
http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/article/view/683 
ZIMMERMAN, B. (2000). Self-efficacy: An Essential Motive to Learn. Contemporary Educational 
Psychology, 25, pp. 82-91. 
ZINN, J., & TAYLOR-GOOBY, P. (2006). The Current Significance of Risk. In P. Taylor-Gooby, 
& J. Zinn, Risk in Social Science (pp. 20-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
ZOLBERG, A. (1989). Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing 
World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
ZOOMERS, A. (2010). Globalisation and the Foreignisation of Space: Seven Processes Driving 
the Current Land Grab. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 37(2), 429-447. 
 
 
